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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE

sT.

This petition and the accompanying petition in No. 71-572
are concerned with the federal court's rulings with reference to
school
desegregation in Denver, Colorado.
--......
" c::::A ..

the c~ms ra~sed I will trace briefly the history of this case.

(~;:
~ Petrs are
~~·

Jt(J~':

LJ_vtQ~

~

the parents of Negro and Mexican-American school

ldren in Denver• Resps are the School Bd, the Superintendent of
Bd of Educ, and the School District.
USDC D Colo

Petrs filed this suit in the

seeki~eclaratory ~d injunctive ~lief) Their case

was comprised of 2 distinct causes of action and they have been treated
separately throughout.

~

In order to appreciate

The first cause of action dealt with condi-

tions in the Negro-Spanish schools in northeast Denver, known as the
"Park Hill" region.

In this area the DC found, after an extended

trial, a pattern of de 1ure segregation arising from two general

causes.

•

First, while segregation in Denver has never been a matter

of state or locally enforced written law, the DC found that the
~merous

-----

activities of the school authorities had perpetuated and

exascerbated the degree of racial separation in northeast Denver.
Among the acts constituting de jure segregation were the following•
(1) minority race teachers were assigned to minority race schools
instead of being distributed throughout the school system; (2) new
school construction was planned, both in terms of location of the
+J.c,...
school and its enrollment size, to perpetuateAracial character of
the school (designed to serve only an identifiable Negro neighbor(3)

hood rather than designed to straddle racial lines);/attendance lines
were changed from time to time in a manner that cut along racial
lines rather than drawing in students from adjacent non-Negro

•

areasr (4)

use of portable classrooms to accommodate an expanding

Negro population within already heavily Negro schools rather than
Nc.,H~t..S

sending •••• to white schools (22 of 23 available portable classrooms were utilized in schools with enrollment over 70% Negro or

Mexican-American)~~e

second

c~use

of de jure segregation in the

Park Hill area was the school board's rescission of Resolutions
promulgated by the previous Board calling for positive action to
integrate the schools.

-el«.f•.. .,

It appears that a major issue in the school

boara 1campaign was whether

••c..£,

~candidate

the already-approved resolutions.

would approve or reject

The board members-elect did

vote to wipe out the integration plans

• .,.J
~

.

place in their stead

alternative plans which the DC and the CA found would be ineffective
in dismantling the segregated schools.
The CA found all of the DC's first set of factual findings to
•

be supported by the evidence and agreed that, taken together, they

amounted to de jure segregation.

The CA found it unnecessary to

state whether it agreed with the second conclusion but indicated that

the rescinded resolutions were more realistically designed to

•

dismantle segregated schools than the substitute plan.

the CA aff'd the DC's conclusion that de jure segregation had

1
~~e
second cause of action
·~ the schools in the remainder of

~und in the.Park Hill region.

~ DC
~

In sum,

presented by Petrs focuses on
Denver, excluding Park Hill.

The

examined all Petr's claims concerning the nature of segregation

~d

concluded that any separation which existed was not de jure--

~/.0. , it was not the product of state impoSition as had been the'
/ ~~ase in the first cause of action. (Petr had claimed that the
City's freedom of choice plan constituted de jure state action;
l'~
~----------

that transfer policies favored white migration to white schools;
attendance zones were gerrymandered to effect further separation;
building and repairing patterns tended to exascerbate disaprities.)
•

Despite its finding that segregation was not the product of state
action, the DC found that the students in 15 schools were receiving
1

Iunequa 1 e ducat~ona
:--1
an
......_.__. ..._..
. . ...
~

~(..

• ..
opportun~ty.
...
..""... ...._ .

That f ~n
• d ~ng
•
•
o f unequa1 e d ucat~on

was peemised on the following• (1) consistently lower performance
on standard achievement tests; (2) teachers were less experienced
in nonwhite schools; (3) the system of teacher transfers based on
~uJ.t.,.S

seniority allowed experiencedato flee the undesirable atmosphere
of the nonwhite schools; (4) higher rate of dropout in nonwhite
schools; (5) nonwhite schools were generally smaller and older;
(6) the DC also was presented with, and may have relied on,
testimony indicating the intangible indicia of unequal education-feelings of inferiority; low academic expectancy among teachers
Sfll~t .... +

•

leading to lowJachievement; low student morale •
Having found (1) that the school system was providing to some
of its students an inferior educational opportunity, and (2) that
it was not a product of state action, the DC nonetheless concluded

~

that the inequality was not tolerable under the 14th Amendment •

•

On this score the CA reversed the DC.

The CA agreed with the

factual findings that some students were receiving an inferior
education but concluded that the federal cts are powerless to act

..--

in the absence of a finding of constitutional deprivation.
The Petition

challenges only the CA's resolution

of this second cause of action.

Petrs claim (1) that the DC and CA

erred in concluding that the segregation found to exist in the
City were not the product of de iure efforts to racially separate the
children, and (2) even if segregation was not the product of state
action, the CA erred in ruling that a federal ct is powerless
to correct the effects of unequal educational opportunities.
I find that the only possibly certworthy issue is this latter
one.

•

I do not think there is much to be gained at this time by

granting a case of this type merely to define what the word "de jure"
means.

The lower courts have uniformly agreed that practices,

such as altering attendance ,zones, building new schools,repaiting
~

old

I

schools~appointing

teachers, may constitute de iure segregation

under circumstances that indicate the school officials performed
such acts with the design and effect of perpetuating segregation.

_________________

--------------....___
The
question in most-...____federal coutts has dissolved into one of fact.

~

The other question--whether a federal court has the power to
II

'\ \

compel affirmative action to eradicate unequal schools--is a more
difficult one.

The state of the law in this Court as I understand it

runs something like this.

If racial segregation in a school is the

product of state action, i.e., is dejure, the school boards and the

•

courts must take affirmative action to dismantle that dual system •
If racial segregation in a- city's schools is the product of normal
residential community lines or other factors not related to some
affirmative state action, ~ it is de facto, the state has no duty

•

•

to take positive steps to integrate those schools •

-

But, the state

I~

may not maintain segregated schools, no matter how they bepame
segregated, unless the education offered is equal.

~

k~

To this

extent I believe Plessy v. Ferguson is still good law.

If the

school children are to remain separate, they must at the least be
treated equally.

I do not believe that a city can offer a higher

quality education to members of one race than another merely because
the city is not responsible for their separation in the first place.
Despite my disagreement with the CA on this point, I am not
prepared to recommend that cert be granted.

It is my understanding

that several cases are presently being prepared for filing in this
Court involving the question of equalization of per-pupil expenditures
on a statewide basis (the California case was the first and there
have been a number since then).
•

Indeed, as of 12/24/71 there

appears to be a direct conflict in the lower federal courts with
a federal court in Texas holding that local property taxes may not
be the source of school financing because of the per-pupil inequities

while another federal court in Iowa (I believe) has held to the
contrary.

....

Those cases when they arrive here most certainly should

be gr. .ted and at that time the Court will have to consider this
question of whether a federal court may take any affirmative
action to wipe out the inequalities in the educational system in the
absence of state imposed prior segregation.

Therefore, unless three

of the other Justices are strongly disposed to grant on the "equality
fo education" issue, I recommend that you deny "on discretion" and
• await cert petitions in the property tax cases.

•

DENY (?)

LAH

Denver School Cases No. 71-507
This case arises froma a very complex facutal and legal
background in the courts below. I thought it would be helpful
to refresh you in a brief way . - as to the findings• and
~x~~ee«xgR

proceedings in the lower federal courts.

There are two sets of schools that are being discussed
here. The first are those in Northeast Denver and the second are
the so"called Core City Schools. There x was a different set of
findings

xixkxxegxx«xx~xex

and legal conclusions with regard to

each.
I-- The s Northeast Denver Schools
The x USDC found that these schools wer~egregated by
affirmative state action.
The CAlO xsxxxtx sustained the trial court with regard to

--

~

the Northea~t Denver schools. It found that the trial court was

s-,,:r~ae•

in

~is

finding of a history of state imposed segregation

with regard to the Northeast Denver or Park Hill area schools.

J.l:'r/

~~

~ ~

II-"The Core City Schools

(~)The

in the core city schools

~9~~dingly
~

'"'~

~

I_.J

ltxil trial court found that

~e

th~tions compl~ed

of

not racially inspired and accor-

the allegations x of de jure segregation xa were not

•

accepted.
-The CAlO sustained the trial court's xx& finding that the
segregation existing in the core city schools was not racially

...

xx inspired or racially motivated •

...._

(b) The trial court found also that although the core city
schools aiaxR~Xxkax~xxa~iaiix ~RX~xxe& were not segregated by

racially motivated state action, nonetheless fifteen designated
~

xk schools, those with an 8 excess of 75% minority population,

should be gra9Ped relief because it was demonstrated that they He

"' in violation of
were offering their pupils an ~nequal education
1

______ _

the equal protectio~ause.
......
The CAlO resersed the xk trial court on this issue. It held
that where no

xxxxexxm~sxesxxegxegxxxsxxxxxxxsaRH

state imposed segregation was found and where

HB

history of
there existed

no history of segregatory intent, then there was no constitutional
deprivation involved and no basis for a court to gx gxxxx grant

xxesxxxx any remedy. The courts were powerless under the constitution to grant any remedy, the CAlO said, even though inequality xx
and inferior educational opportunities might exist in fact.
Finally, xke both courts said that Denver's neighborhood

l

school policy was not unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment because it permits sex segregation in fact.

---3--As we discussed this case in some detail on Thursday, I will give

•

you a

somewhat more abbreviated memo, summarizing what I feel

s~

to be the most salient points of the case. I think that
&8383

though the case presents

-~~

~~~t

what superficially appear to

be many diverting and peripheral issues,

~

~~

that the main one,

and the one which this case inevitably will call upon you to aai

~~

--

decide,is ahthaz whether to extend the •• affirmative duty to

~
~

eliminate

~

3~ school segregatmon to those areas where there is no

history of overt

~~

~~

~r~n.

II'-'

~: -

~

•

state imposed school -.seg-

I think the Denver case is ia likely to present the ques-

tion is in its most typical form. Here in Denver there is the

----

'~~
~~~ w~~1t.cearl
~

BKhaatxmasa~za~atia~x

~

northern city pattern of residential segregation, with a
of conflicting evidence which absolves the school authorities

of overt segregative intent but which a can be read to implicate
those

3~

same authorities of maintaining the segregated status quo •

I am convinced that there is a legally respectable way to
take

ax~

virtually any position you want as to the constitution-

ality of de facto L se?regation. There is unfortunately no legally
, t)l I:~~ • :s;,c.."Yc
/')
respectable way, J; ·~ Dill. 0 take your most ~aatx heartfelt

r

views on the remedial validity of cross-town busing.
I will try ta first to outline the

ia~aixa~ai~sis

•
path of

legal analysis that I think this case caiiis calls for on the
question of the

ca~•t~ ca~stit~t~iaaaiit~

constitutionality of de

fat facto segregation.

I--IF YOU WISH II TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DE FACTO IIKMIK
S~tt:.&£rr

SEGREGATION _____ p

•

w.~

• THIS ANALYSIS.

(M~X~~~x~~~~i~~~XM

JfAfLS

(a) All previous decisions of this Ea Court have dealt~ only
history
with the ~zaaia~ of state imposed segregation. The Court in Brown

....,....

I noted that the *•tz petrs had all been denied "admission a to

---4--schools attended by white children under laws

~

or permitting segregation according to

••z~itti~~

race.~n

requ1r1ng

Greene the Court

spoke of an affirmative duty which existed until "it is clear that
state-imposed segregation has been completely removed."(p.439). In
Swann, the Court • explicitly noted that the case dealt only with "States
~

having a long history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single

BE~x

school

satti~~

BM system deliberately operated to carry out a goverm-

mental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the
(p.6). And in the

i~

BE~

~

basis of race."

Emporia case last a term the question was once again

framed in terms of school districts that had not yet completed the "process
of dismantling a system of
Thus the Court has

•~iBZB~

enforced racial

segregation."~~¥

gone out of its way to stress that its

~BB

~BEis

decisions have applied to only those states with a history of state imposed
• segregation and

~

taxi~~i¥

thus to imply that only a

history of state-

~·

imposed segregation amounted to "state action denying equal protection
of the

laws."Ram~iaxi~

Many of the

~~

northern circuit courts which have

considered the question of northern urban de facto segregation have taken
the Court at its word that the duty to dismantle segregated schools applied
only where a history of
See e.g.

ii~

state~

imposed segregation was

Deal v. Cincinnatti Board of

i~B

i~~Education,

involved.

~

369 F.2d 55(CA6)

and Taylor v. Bd. of Education of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d39(CA2).

This is

obviously the theory under which the CA10 acted in this case when with
regard to the core city Denver schools, it remarked1"We
Brown to prohibit racially

i~Bix

~-~~never

considered

imbalanced schools provided they are •

established and maintained on ZBEii racially neutral

cr~teria

•••• "

Once this is established you could go on to contrast the situation

~

of Denver with those of the States where the Court has imposed

ax~

an

aiiiz~

affirmative duty to dismantle dual schools. You Could first start by proving
that the real culprit of racial segregation in Denver was not the actions of
(~~~ ...~--...

the Denver BB~Bi school author! ties, but . !:'.~~~~"~-~9-..~.D~_,E.~-~~~,e':!~A.~!,A,.f..~!.~.~s
llillliE~XiBZIIIBIIII

--5-formed in Denver primarily in the years following World War II and fa

•

formed independently of any state policies or actions. The

~~~

zaasa

reasons for housing segregation were primarily economic and the zaw
------~-.. "'--~----- ·····-·· -·---····~--"'· ""~·"''""~•..«•"" __.......... ,.
w~i~ which

result of private prejudices
___,____ ___..---,'d;. . .

. .• " - '""

......,.. .••.•..• -""

axisti existed BHtisaax outside

..._.,.~"\-'

the official arm of the state.

i~xfaEt~x9&~¥BZ

Not only were these

residential patterns not a matter of state enforcement, but

9B~»azxm~aza

even while they were • for{!jng, Denver operated under the provision
in the Colo. constitution
which

~zm~i¥i

~zm~i8i,

AztiEii Article IX sectioni 8,

prohibited racial discrimination in the public schools.

In 1959 the Colo. legislature even passed a fair housing law. Not only
was Denver operating under a

~mii

state legal policy of

~•~MBiBEZi~i~ati

non-discrimination, in contrast to southern states, but there is some
ta~~i8ai

tangible evidence that the school board in Denver BEta actually

took a number of poaitive steps to alleviate racial imbalance such as

•

transfering Negro attendance zones to predominantly Anglo Geo. Washington High school, adopting majority to minority transfer program such
as VOE, and pouring additional funds and new experimental compensatory
problems into minority schools.
Thus the Denver schools situation can be sia said to differ from
districts with a history of state imposes saf segregation in that
zas'' residential

~atta~

patterns \~ere the prime

EB~tfli¥M

contributors

-

mf to racial imbal4nce, that the school board ope~ated under a nondiscriminatory policy in the Colo. statutes and constitution, and that
the school board actually took some steps of a positive

~aHt

e

nature to

('"

redress racial imbalance.
Then you can go on to say, if you wish to
of de facto segregation,
•

~;

•z~M

H~B~

uphold this kind

II)ilt4 tht that you reaffirm both the

CA10 and the USDC's findings tMt that no public segregatory purpose or
actions are the prime contributors to the segregated situation in Denver,
and that as

~HE~xasx~BH

detrimental as

segregated~

schools may be, the

\ constit~tion_does not afforD a bssis for ~remedy where no state h ~ction

equal

~xma

protection

has been found by either of the courts aat

in their consideration of the

B¥iaa~

lengthy evidentiary record.

Finally you may wish to add a short ata statement to the effect

_______

t~

the state does have at least a zt rational interest and perhaps a
-------..-----------------~~"""-·,~~,_

compelling £_ne in pursuing the values inherent in a neighborhood school
----~

,.---

~--~--.......~"''l'li""·""'-~'•N,~)"l\"",..,._,...,:-,...,•~'ll"~r...,,.,.oo;:rl""'i'~"''~Vo'("'<~'-"''-•~'l"'"'-""<•'~''•"·•...,M~.,.,""""'""'_W"'.._....,
-..~-~-........,.,.....,--.~

policy which is neutrally
~·

~•i~t~i

maintained.

~mHXB~¥XBiamx&B¥Xt~atxit

personally believe that a neighborhood school

~miiE~

I

policy Bi does

qualify as a legitimate state interest under the ••H equal protection
clause as long as it is non-prjudicially maintained.

EiB~

You may also, if you write an opinion refusing to extend

Qzaa~

Green,Swann and company to northern school districts wish to say that
where no state policy is involved in the maintenance of sai segregated
schools,t~aza

~

that it cannot be stated with certainty that those schools

are providing an unequal education. One major indiciai of inequality
might t be the stigma asamEai associated with a

polic~

of state imposed

segregation, but where this is absent, the evidence as to inequality is
E»~ii

i

conflicting. Even Dr. Coleman has published a study

~·

qualifying

fhis earlier remarks and it may not be fair to say that achievement scores
~are a proper index of a school's• educational quality since the sshai ssh

school ~y have mt to overcome enormous deficiencies in a student's home
BBEk~m

background even to get

t~i

him to the 10th percetile on his

Sta~im

Stanford achievement test score.
These are, I aaiai believe the major analytical outlines you might
wish to pursue should you decide not to extend Swann, with its remedy of
cross-town busing,to northern,residentially segregated school districts.

~

There are two little hookers in writing an opinion along these lines. One
is
and

•~z

whether you would wish to affirm the

~ t~axaffi~

fi~~i ~

findings of the USDC

their affirmance by the CA10 that there was segregatory

intent on the part of theDenver School

~oard

with respect to the Park Hit

---7--area schools. In
~

reviewing~

this evidence, you are bound of course

by Fed. R. of Pro. 52 which binds appellate~ courts to the evidentiary
findings of the USDC unless those
erroneous.
of the

~

findings are Eiaz Eia clearly

fi~~i

I do not personally believe the supposed segregative acts

Denver school board with respect to the Park Hill area schools

were ~ious or in fact so different from those with respect to the
core city schools where the trial court found no history of segregative
intent. The teacher policy was

~»zsias

pursued with

za~

respect to

the neutral Eziti criteriai of seniority, and as to the construction
of Barrett School, is it not
constrcut a

~.

small school

ie~i»logical

to~

for the school board to

relieve overcrowded conditions in

the middle of the Negro communitya it was

conveniently

EB~»i•~

~·~•t

meant to serve?. In fact, there were important reasons of traffic safety
which persuaded the School Board to construct Barrett School the size

~

that it did. However, i I

~~

must also admit that there can conceivabl'

be segregative motives imputed to the actions of the School Board
in its transfer of assignment

xe~•

zones and its

construct~on

of SE"Bmi

schools, and its ZBE zasEisi rescission of the Resolutions. Thus,
with this whole case being filled with

¥

t"~

a very contradictory and

illlusive brand of evidence, there EB is azgua>Jy enough evidence
to support the USDC's determination and survive appellate reversal
under Rule 52.
Believing as I do that you cannot reverse both the CA10 and
the USDC in their evidentiary findings with

re~ct

t" to

segre~tory

enver
schools, you must then confront

~

such

~eti»BSXEaiixfez

petr•s arguments t"z that

segregatory action Eais calls for

relief throughout Denver and
granted by the CA10

~atz;

~i

s~stem

not merely the limited relief

withxxas~&EtxtmxthaxRaxkxWiii

wide
i~~BB&m

covering only the

Park Hill area schools. On pages 71-79 of their brief, petrs make the

----8---case for
~

~

system-wide relief. ihBXEBS They contend in

ass~

essence

that the segregatory actions of the school board affected not a mere
trivial sliver of the Denver school district, but over one-third of
the Negro population of the district, They complain that all

at~

blacks within the SEhmt school s district were hurt and affected by
the discriminatory actions of the SEhmt school board. They contend
t~at

further that no school

axis~x

as exists in a school district

in isolation, but that a policy of keeping some shE schools black
has the reiproca! effect of keeping other white.

~at~zatt

The entire

Denver school board was possessed of segregat,ry "hidden ••tk motive"
~-~:.~~~~~!!:?~1~;;-~~

petrs assert, and the only reason segregatory motives were most ¥isia
visible in the Park Hill area were because Park Hill schools
represented a pressure point where Negro migration was

•aki~~

za~zas•~

threaten-

ing formerly all white areas.

~

This could prove to be the stickiest point in the case. Bill Kelly
feels that

B¥i~~·~EB

evidence of segregatory intent on the part of the

school district with regard to the Park Hill schools necessarily
Em~¥iEt~

convicts the board of segregatory intent

h~ing

of the affairs of the

a~tia

•~i

m~xtha

in its

~·~~iii

entire school district. I sus-

pect some members of the Court could feel likewise. I think the most
i•~mza

important question in this regard is whether an effective

remedy can be

~zat

z•~

granted with regard to the Park Hill schools only.

Presumably the Negro children in the Park Hill sEhmt schools could be
part of an integratory busing program while the core city Negroes
z~

--<~
\/

~

remained in a segregatory setting. This looks a little ridiculous,

however, to have the anomalous situation of the core city blacks, the
~mmzaaz

poorer blacks, still confined in their

~~·

"ghetto" schools

while the less impoverished Park Hill blacks are integrated si•~k simply
, because the

~m~ztx

USDC managed to find segregatory intent with regard

\ to one area and not to another, despite the fact that the

•i¥BB~E•

ev-

---9---

:raixt :raiatiJOf

•

:ra

idence relating to both areas is remarkably similar •
SUMMATION1 The preceeding has been a discussion of the

~:rmBi~

analytical paths and problems in an opinion upholding the traditional &is
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. For the reasons
stated aBBE above, a legally respectable face

Ea~

can be put on an opinion

affirming~he basic position of the CA10. But tRa:ra ~¥, to take your

phrase, my "Confederate emotions" rebel at this m course, and there is
an extraordinary anfount of hypocrisy involved, when today, Southern and
Northern cities present bascially the same situation. You know as well as
I do that the history of southern segregation before 1954 has as little to
do with the present :ra racial imbalance in the schools of southern cities.
Southern cities and northen cities are today both suffering racial
imbalance in thi r schools from what is basically the

•

ss~x

same root cause.

That root EBBH cause is economic disparities aJOB iJOxtR& between the
two races and

-

~:ri»ata

tm~

the private desires of whites to keep segregated

..

neighborhoods. This is what has resulted in racial imbalance in the Eitias
mfxB~BmtR

t

city school systems of both north and south, and not any bogus

legal mumbo jumbo about histmzH histories of state-imposed

1 As

segregat~n.

a matter of policy you must ask ¥BH:rsi yourself how long must an area BH

bear t tBB the onus of its history, when as a pratical matter, all aistiJOEt
distinctions between the South and the rest of tre country have s ceased
to exist.

*****************************************************
II---IF YOU WISH TO I ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DE JURE AND DE K
FACTO SEGREGATION AND TRANSPOSE THE SWANN REMEDIES TO ~~~X ~~~ NORTHERN
SCHOOLS.

•

There are several

~as

ways to accomplish this analytically and

legally, all of BRiER which are intellectually respectable. There are
three analytic

paths, as I see it, to this result. Two of the paths

~a~xJOmt produce the result more subtly than the ~rd but they all Eia

,.

<

----10----

•

ultimately and inevitably point in the direction of eliminating y the
de facto-de jure distinction.

~')The f~way

to insure the a ultimate elimination of the

distinction would be to grant petr's plea for

s~stem

wide relief.

This would afford an acceptance of petr's contentions that evidence

-----

of segregatory intent with regard to a
portion of Denver's Negro population

-....

s~mstat~i

substantial

i~E~i~atasxt~axa~tiza

~Mll'"¥

-

taints

the ma~ement
;f the
entire
school district. The analysis isxt~a
A
.............._
,._.
.-.

-

~

.._...

would be that where segregatory purpose is proved with respect to
one portion of the school district(i,e, the Park Hill schools), then
actions elsewhere with s a
~zas~•aaxtaxma

sa~za~a•z•y

segregatory effect must BB

,tyti-'

likewise must be presumed t

~ntaken

with a segregatory

purpose, The analysis would also rest on the assumption that within a

•

school district, no action of the School Board can be viewed in isaiatia
isolation,
The reason this

~za~t

analysis would lead to the elimination

of the de facto-de jure distinction is that

~•

very few school districts

anywhere in the country will be found tom be entirely without segregatory motives in all their actions. And if one

sa~za~atazy

finding

of segregatory ••tia motive is allowed to taint the actions of the

BE~BB

school board across the entire district, t~a• then it is clear that
will
every district wiii ultimately be found culpable,

~The

s!:ond

~ay

to arrive at the elimination of the de facto,

de jure distinction is to upset the USDC's finding on the

lac~

discriminatory intent on the part of Denverls school board in
........

•

"'----....,

,...,t:sauuA

.+#-

--

of
it~
...

actions with regard to the core city schools, The chief piece of

......

.___..,...--

evidence

•~i~E

B¥iaa~E

~

which could be used in this finding is the a construction

of Manual High School and the boundary lines drawn therefor, The

EB~stz~

construction of Manual differs very little from the construction of iazz

----11--Barrett where the USDC did find segregatory
~

i~t~

~

intent on the part

of the school board. Both schools were constructed a squarely in t~a
middle of all black or black dominated areas, ana boundary lines
were drawn for each which effectively
attendance. Furthermore,

~-~

many

•••~•

~aiiEi

assured segregatay

policies

•~ix

atta~aa~E

which I believe

the USDC pointed toward in finding discriminatory intent on the part
of the school board with respect to Park Hill existed district wide,
such as the

~iaEB~~

placement of

taaE~BZB

i~••

inexperienced teachers

int the mat black schools. This crourt could,if i t wantedlsay it was
inconsistent to find

segregator~

intent ai on the part of the school

board with regard to the Park Hill area schools • and not with regard
to the core city schools when the lines of evidence were so pa~el.
This reasoning would go far to eliminating the distinction
between de jure and f de facto, iha I have a strong faa feeling that the

~

actions of the Denver school board are fairly typical of the decisons
of schools boards acrosss the country. In fact, I should
Denver

mza~axaf

t~atx

think the

school board is comparatively innocent in segregatory

motives. Denver has a rather small

Ha~aza

Negro

~·~t

compared to most northern cities, and if the Court

population as

fi~as

actually

reverses the USDC and CA10 and finds segregarory intent on the school
board with regard to the core city schools, then no school ma board
action anywhere will withstand BEZ constitutional

~~

BEZH~

scrutiny.

The_!inal wa! of eliminating the de jure,de fats facto

aisti~Et

distinction is the most direct, and the way petrs would most like the
Court to go. This
two

~

••~i

way does a not hinge so closely as the previous

m~txE~tsxaxazaaaxs•atha

on the particular facts of the Denver

sitHata situation, but rather fashions a broad legal rule •i which will

c~t a veritable tornado throug~ut northern school distric\s• This
path is suggested by the a

E~~

combination of petr's questions 3 and

4 on page 4 ·~ of their brief. Question 4,asks though it is slightly

---12--camouflaged, virtually asks ti this Court to say that seperate schools

•

are unequal per se, and question 3 is worded thusly: "The court below
erred in holding that the sole critierion ae of constitutionally
actiona~le

racial segregation was segregationist intent judged by the

narrow test whether decisions of the school board EB»ie resulting in
racial separation could conjecturally be explained by any conceivable
non-racial explanation,"
As one reads

brief, it soon becomes clear exactly what

eet~'s

~atz

petrs are asking, They ask the Ea»x Court to jettison a "purpose" test
~

altogether and to hold that state actions and classifications which have
a segregatory effect with regard to public schools require a compelling
state interfet to justify them, This would almost be tantamount to ruling
neighborhood schools

•

»~s

»~Ea~stit»tiaa~

because the effect of every

BE~aii

unconstitutional per se,

school board &Eta action can somehow

be interpreted as maintaining the segregated status quo,
To

..

eaxt~is

reach this result would involve the carry-over of ta

two fundamental concepts the Warren Court used with regard to southern BE
schools, The first is the Ei celebrated statement in Brown I that
~

~

''y

"separate schools are inherently unequal," Once this is accepted, them
it becomes siao clear that any state action having the effect of separation, i ,e. of inequality, becomes a denial of equal protection, The

~effect

~ustii

test is thus easily

justified because it has so long been

iff... t·

the test used with regard to southern schools. Last termi, in the

~·

Emporia case, the majority za~ae rejected the CA4's reliance on a purpose

..

test as too elusive, and sxi said the aii test of unconstitutional
action had always been, not its purpose, but its effect in aiding af
•

or hindering the eis~a~i dismantlement of dual school systems everywhere,
And the Court in Swann

stated that "As we said in Greene, a schools

authorities remedial plan or a districts court's remedial decree is to
be judged by its

effectiveness,"(p.25~.

~---13----

•

It would tMi thus be very easy to carry faa forward the southern
school district

analys~s

into the north by saying simply tht that

segregated facilities are unequal, north or BBHXM south,

sep~£ate,

and that any state action which has the effect of
such inequality is a denial of equal protection,
by a

EBM~i

compeiling state

i~taza

EB~ti~H~i

H~is

continuing

unless justified

interest.

I do not need to stress to you how great an impact such an
analysis could have. But that essentially is what petrs would have us
adopt.

*****************************************************
My intent in this memo is to provide you

~ziMat

primarily with a

legal anlysis which could enable you to most effectively If support •hata
whatever policy result you might wish to choose. As I said before, this

•

is one of those peculiar cases, where the evolution of constitutional
law in the Court's past decisions makes

any of a

•~¥

~HMV

number of

courses you wish to take legally respectable. From a policy standpoint,
this is a very unattractive case because we are facedwith thee ~mssimiiit
possibility of extending an odious

za~

remedy BEZBB across the

EBH~zt

country and victimizing thousands of innocent families and schoolchildren
or leaving our own section of the country to suffer in isolation under an
inequitable and hypocrtical

P.s.

EB~stitHtima~

I reread Swann the other evening,

constitutional doctrine.

a~

the language is even

stza~

stiffer than I had remembered. iaz Burger got very little for his vote.
There is language like thisa "Desegregation plans cannot bei limited to

•

the walk-in school."(p.30) ••••• "The importance of bus transportation as
a normal and accepted tool of educational

~i

policy is readily discernable

in this and the companion case ••• "(p.29). And a great deal of language ama

r

~/1/-,aamt about the far-ranging powers of equity. There is ms• some language
•hiEhXKBJQ

~

which may one day justify a rule of reason,but I doubt that this&
case will be the opportunity for ti it.

JHIAJ

•

...

•

,

•
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MFJilRANDUM

TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

July 31, 1972

Keyes v. Denver School District
The school cases from Brown through Charlotte/Mecklenburg
and Emporia hwve all articulated or assumed a distinction between
de facto and de jure segregation.
By this technique, the federal courts have undertaken
a rather massive program of - not merely desegregating but
affirmatively of integrating schools throughout the South.

At

the same time, with isolated exceptions, the courts have done
little or nothing·about segr.gated schools in the rest of the
country.

In many of the great cities, outside of the South,

segregated schools have been a way of life as surely as they
were in the South.
I have never been convinced that the de factrde jure
distinction was sound as a matter of constitutional law.

I

have been completely convinced that it is unsound as a matter
of social policy.

MOreover, and putting constitutional principles

aside for the moment, it seems immoral to hold this generation

2.
in the South responsible for the "sins" of their fathers with
respect to segregated schools because there was "state action",
and to impose no comparable responsibility on the same generation
in other sections of the country even though the schools are
just as segregated.

Or, putting it differently, if segregated S"c.4u/$

are so bad that the courts can impose an affirmative duty to
integrate them in one section of the country on the flimsy ground
of correcting a lawless past state action, what justification
is there for saying that this evil need not be corrected in
other sections of the country?
The evil is segregation.

If segregation if a denial

of equal protection, black children in the nothern schools have
been denied it to the same extent as those in the southern
schools.

I realize, of course, that there must be "state action"

before the Constitution can be invoked.

Yet, in an interesting

opinion by Judge Walter Hoffman of the Eastern District of
Virginia, he documents the fact that all but a small handfull
of our states have - at one time in the past - had racially
restrictive laws that could have contributed to segregation.
Almost certainly this is true of zoning and housing laws and
regulations, often relied upon by federal courts in the South.

*****

,,

''

....
3.
The views expressed above, obviously, are not
definitive in any sense.

They are, rather, the making of a

sketchy argument as the background for asking you to focus on
the question:

Can we make a principled argument to support

the view that there is in most circumstances no valid
constitutional distinction between de facto and de jure
segregation, as these terms have been used?

*****
I am not at all sure that this issue will be before
the Court in the Denver School Case.

But it may be.

In any

event, it will certainly be before the Court in the Detroit
case, now on its way - I believe - to the Court.
In·your intensive study of the Denver school case,,
and the doing of a full bench memo on it, I would appreciate
your keeping this question in mind.
Although I have little hope that I could persuade
a majority of the Court to go with me, I will certainly write
separately in support of repudiating the de jure/de facto
distinction if a sound and principled argument can be made
for my tentative view.

4.
I have done no research in this specific area.

I do

call your attention to Judge Skelly Wright's article 6ntitled
"Prof. Bicket, The Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court",

84 Harv. L. Rev. 769, at pp. 798 !!

~·

Judge Wright does

not address this question, but he describes some of Prof. Bickel's
views which are tangentially relevant.

I recommend that you

read Prof. Bickel's book, and particularly the portions thereof
referred to by Judge Wright.
Also, please obtain from Hunton, Williams a copy of
my brief in the Charlotte/Mecklenburg case.

You may find a

part of this slightly helpful.

*****
I reaffirm that I have no fixed views and will keep

an open mind.

This is, however, an interesting area to study.

L.F.P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Willdnsoo,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: Sept. 28, 1972

No. 71-507 - Denver School Case
I recommend that you do selective reading from Prof. Bickel's
book "The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress".
I do not have the book before me, but Bickel's discussion of
the segregation cases of this Court takes place in his final essay the name of which is something like "Remembering the Future". He
argues, usually in his uniquely oblique way, that there is no distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation; that since the publlc schools
are operated by the state, the continuation of segregation - which this
Court has f01Dld to be unjust - constitutes state action which infringes
rights.
But Bickel points out that if the Court pursues the logic of its

own decisions (and holds that the affirmative duty to eliminate segregation
ls a national constitutional duty), the result wlll be to force public

educatloo to be centralized at least in the states and possibly in the
national government. The rationale for this ultimate view ts that ( 1)
the 14th Amendment requires equal educational opportunity; (it) this
cannot be afforded through segregated schools; (Ui) in view of white

2.
filgbt, and the historic movement of more amuent people to suburban
areas, local school districts cannot assure integration (

•·I·

Richmcmd

consolidation case); (tv) therefore, only the state itself can enforce
desegregation on a statewide basts. But what about situations like New
York City where at least three states are Involved?
And if the cOJUJtltuticmal requirement is "equal educational opportunity", what about the contrast between Mississippi and Connecticut
(for example) in terms of expenditures per pupil on public education?
Thus, this line of argument brings us to the San Antonio- Rodriguez
ease. The philosophy underlying the three-judge court decision - if
carried to its ultimate logical extreme - would require nationalizing of
all public schools.
Thus, while my lawyer's judgment (not to mention my Confederate
emotion) ten. .me that the distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation is a constitutional phony, we need to do a lot of clear thinking
as to whether elimination of this distinction would not result (as Prof.
Bickel suggests) tn a revolutimary change tn our federal system.
L. F. P., Jr.

lfp/ss
ee: Mr. Larry A. Hammond

---~·---

-

-

--- -~

-----

"

-

---

-·-

--

---

-----------·

--------

--

-

---------

--- ------ -

---

----

---

---··

-------

-·

-··

--

---

1~--!!~~s -~
- - ---- -

/, ... ,()- c
-·--·-·-

~-.

-¥-

-_
l

-~-

-----

22_ /)__

-

-···---------

-

--·-

·-

-----

------·-----------~-···--

>L

-

·-

---

. -

--- - Jl• L :C

-·-

--------------------

-----------

----.

----~--------

---

·--- ------ ----- -

-------

- ---

----- ·-----·---

f.

------

-

- ""-~

--

.Efl• ~ .. ~...... elk:~
~ F~l~

-~------------

-----------

-

-----

.-

-----

-

--~ -----

---

..

--~---------

~~J----

.J--

-----------

----

--~~-~-~~-~------

----·

~

-----------

·--·

-------

-----·------------

C:: A __~

---

-

---

-----

---------- - ----

-----------

--

.

-~--

---

~-~ _ ~ ~

~- ~-- ~ _4.~~

- -

-------

-

-

_

--~-

- -~__/f_k ~-----''-~-~-. -- - --'
. . . 9- C'A -Y" L4'
-- :;:x
,
~,__.......,,
-------------~-----

------------------

---

----------------- ------------

-------~

-- ------·

__ e%$ - _ ... ---

c .

- ----------·-- - - - - - - - - - - -

--------------------------

·-----

.....,_..__
------· -----·---- ----

---- - - -

-------·--

·- --- --- ---- -

--

9~-~€/f ~-~-~

~- 't- -~- ~-~-

·----- •
~--

---.

-~ - ~- .-!'_ _ ~· . ., !-41

-- -

'7-4-_4-~1C'!.kh. ~~~-~

~-~-~/.--

. . - 11-

~-

-----

-

--- -------------------------- -

-----------

-----

-·-

Cr :;..~i.J.;_;;._~ A~J~j/--L~_~

~~~;I·

n

p__- __ ~___ c___

-~-~

~~1-~-~ ...c..hm~ .•• • ••
! ..~·~....,.,.....__...........,_~·~·-A+.~.

I
'

.,,.

-

----- --

. ·-

-- --

-

. --

---

. ------

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. J. Harvie WUkinSon,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: October 7, 1972

No. 71-507 Denver School Case
The press this morning (Bt*JJ by McKenzie) states that the
Solicitor General has filed a brief amicus 1n this case.
I am sure you will want to give it your attention promptly, as
the press account indicates that it takes a "middle position".
L. F.P., Jr.

.....

•

-

-a

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: October 7, 1972

No. 71-507 Denver School Case
You and I have discussed the artificiality of the view that
segregated schools are the product of discriminatortal governmental
action. They may be - and certainly have been in the past in certain
areas. But my own c ooviction is that, certainly for the 17 years since
Brown v. Board of Education and perhaps for the last quarter of a
century - the segregation of schools in the larger cities has resulted
primarily from social and economic causes, and has been influenced
very little by any intention on the part of govemment at any level to
impose and continue segregation.
Washington, D. C. may be an example of this point. I suggest
that you ask the Library of Congress {through our own library upstairs)
to provide the following data oo the D. C. schools for the 20-year period
1950-70 (the school year ending June 30, 1971):
1. The racial mix, in terms of percentage of whtte and black
students, at five year intervals - 1950-1955-1960-1965 and 1970.
2. The average test scores for the District of Columbia schools
at each of these five year intervals (you. can obtain from the Denver

•·· ..

~·

..
2.
school briefs the preclae D&me of the standard IICholaatle achtevemeDt

tests and be sure you have comparable grades). 1t may be that these
test scores have not been publlshed for the past 20 years, aDd you w1ll

have to take whatever years are avaUable.
My guess ls that these figures wUl shOW that segregation 1n the
D. C. schools has substantially increased smce Brown v. Board of
Education_, over a 17 -year period when there certainly was no de jure
action here in the Dtstrict. I suspect, also, that the test scores will
have deteriorated.
1f the statistics agree with my ''hunch", nothing very dramatic
wUl have been proved. I will not attach any great weight to the results,
but we may have a concrete illustration to support the thesis -if we
~

pursue it -that so-called de faCto segregation is far more virulent_... ":1-

~~'1

-,

than an~-1 de jure segregation.
L. F. P., Jr.

.. .
'

'"'

I

Justice Powella

•

I did not wish to leave without leaving you my final thoughts
on the Denver schools case. As you know I have written you a skazt
ia~a

longer previous memo on the legal analysis of the situation,

mHtxa¥&iai spelling out the options but avoiding the expression of

my own viewpoint. Since you asked me to give you my ••xas personal
view, I will. It is not a pleasant case, and no solution a satisfies
me. But here briefly are my convictions.

****************************
I think the distinction between de jure and de facto should be

ax¥BRiEiaxtaxaii~i~ataxit¥

tRisxisxmasaaxa~

The racial problem and

the problem of segregated BR schools has a now become a national one.
It seems fundamentally h'pocritical to

• ------- ..

deal~

of racial segregation under two entirely

with the national problem

ais.xitaxa~axiiiaza~t

disparite

sets of legal concepts. The law does not gain iz in respect¥ by Hi
doing so. Whatever the law

does~xitx~~a~x

in the area of race relations

must henceforth& be done fronally, candidly and without hypocrisy.
The presence of the de jure de iaEa facto distinction has only inhi-

..

bited recognition of the racial problem as a national one and prevented
us from dealing in a nationally unified way with it. The de jure de
facto distinction has encouraged legislative efforts such as the~oting
Rights Act and others which have a fundamentally discriminatory effect
against

a~xa

one section of the country. It has encouraged those who

can see the South only
equally

•

segreg~ed

tR~~h

racial glasses while

sitHaax situation as a pure

a~B¥

seeing~

their own

and justifiable one.

The legal distinction of de jure and de facto no longer

confor~s

to

--~---------~

the reality of our times. Northern and southern cities have

R~~22iR~&alx

~--..,1

stataMiM•asaaxsa~xa~atia~

similar experiences. Segregation has resulted

in each from economic disparities and from residential patterns.

This

[;:_
.

•

sa~azt

is what has contributed to the racial

separations across

(J~)

our land. Even the rural South is now integrated. Lastsummer I
wrote an

aaitzaiaixs~awi~~xthat

editorial pointing out reliable

statistics from the Southern Educational Council which showed the }
shcools of Mississippi were more integrated than ta those of Penn
Examples of more extensive southern integration abound.

IJ~J-

~'
. t'~~...~
--~

Against this backdrop, the Court's taia taia talk of a history
of state-imposed segregation has very little current relevance.
The South is in many cases more integrated than the Northa and West
and

t~axix

what segregation remains results from the same causes.

One section of the country

E~~x

EB~B

cannot suffer interminably the

onus of history when that hisz history

aaasx~a

does not accord with

current reality. Where ix segregation finds the same root causes
and exists to roughly the same extent in

•/

,r~

~ ~,·
-~-;r.

the a simlar legal doctrine

~~B~

~~

mat~

must govern its elimination •

***************************
1\

\\

I would take the effect test applied to tha southenn schools
under Green, Swann,and Wti Wzi Emporia, and transpose it to northern

and western districts. I would say that the state i6 intimately intertwined with the administration of public sh

•'~V st:::-:nder;;.ke;:~ons w:;:;,-;:::~v; t~e
~ ~ shtlOll~at:~tat,;:P~~~~~ t~~~at
.,/

~."~·
J,.,._,../ r ' .
l'-V"" /

across our country,

action in

viol~ion

o~

~hools.

effe;; of

Whereever the

p:;;etuati~g

amounts to axMiad state uti•

equal protection of the laws. A This is so

regargless of whether those actions had a segregatory i"ta"tx•ahi i"t•
~...............

~

:::w;::-=wza

-

intent behin6 them. Under this test, the Denver school ma
has been

~~i

guilty

-of a

~

~

board

violation of equal protection. Its actions,

----------~--~~~_.~~~~~~~-----~----~----------~---~--~-------though
they may a well have been benignly motivated, nonetheless
~

the

had the effect of perpetuating the segregated environment¥ in that
city.

..

~~ ~~,~~

~,~~ ..._.-l,w~

I find the purpose test u ed~\' the CA10 unsatisfactory. It is

•

absolutely
pie~s

i~~•sx

fz•~

impossible to tell

from all the conflicting

of evidence in this case whether motive or purpose is benign

or malignant. If the courts continue to use a purpose test, they
will be BRBBBW pursuing shadow BK&Bi evidence the way the lower courts
did here. The evidence was almost identical with respect to the core
city schools as with the northeast schools, yet the courts found
de jure segregation with regard to one and t de facto segregation
with regard to another. This will happena all over the country and
/~----------------------------------

involve the courts in elusive determinations which will produce
~

a great lack of uniformity

not only among differnet

witRi~x

school districts but within the same BR school district itself as
happened in Denver and Tulsa. Thus in those cities we

find the

~i~

Negor children in one part of the city entitled to BB relief

•

because the court

found de jure while the Negro children BK several

blocks away entitled to no relief because the courts found

de

~

facto, The courts cannot be involved in that sort of charade.
~

Thus I think the E CA10 must be reversed and
applied to the

-a::z

~
&>.,-~J.t........___
actions~of the Denver

-

their actions had the effect of perpetuating
this case and

,

·

***************** **

segregation. In

~)

tr/-

****~ q

Once the Denver school board h

dft.,

found in violation, it

~uty to eliminate inequality in the SERBBis public schooling.

~illtxtilllatxa~tJXis

(This is getting

•

sa~&

in most other school districts they will have had tRa

i~

h tR& that effect.

has a

.

school board was whether
,_,

-

the test

a~xaff&Et

ijfos~

to the property tax case). Tha duty encompasses

the p~vision of compensatory programs to Negro schoolchildren,
and reasonable integarti ve steps such as

of-new

s~ho~l!

in-integra:ed

~

I'EIDlfhhJO,J;f;> construction

sett~ngs,~~djustment
.. , 3

of

scho~l

w

attendance lines to promote integartion, an

----~~~----~----~~---------------.-

a

provision of transp-

portation to those who voluntarily wish to avail themselves of it

•

to transfer from a majority s to a

minor~ty

as~aEai

a remedy of last resort and,

black school. Busing is

especially in urban areas no

child may have a one-way bus ride against his will without his
t~azt~

parent's consent of more than

thirty minutes. Long bus rides

for the sake of integ~tion are not ~BE~ittBB¥ required. Finally,
under the equal protection clause, you may wish to say that a state
has at least a~ational and atxm probably a compelling state interest

in the maintenance of neighborhood schools. This interest
the equal protection clause is
~Be

i~

constitutional}~tifiable

» under
where

the state has undertaken to provide fair housing laws, integrated

neighborhooe attendance zones and other steps designed to achive
~•i~ •~

•

maximum integration

wit~e»txie~~xmMsxxia&s¥

within the

neighborhood setting •

***********************
~ /l:ne.l ,.~/.o J
Thus I would reverse the CA 1 Q [ ] t tJac:fi~ firmly on Swann.
I think you should express

these views at

EB~iBB

conference. I

am convinced that your views are so unique as to require you to
write separately.

iMtxt~BEB

makes good sense and is

t~ez

But it is a sound position and one which
humane and realistic. It neither abandons

the blacks nor uproots &Mt our KB» community and neighborhood values.
It aiieww legitimizes the interests of community and neighborhood
under the equal protection si• Ki» clause. And it

~

abandons the hypoc-

risy of a legal distinction that has long oulived its time.

JHW

•

Argued 10/12/72
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December 1, 1972

Re: No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District No. 1

Dear BUl:
As I was tncltned toward a different view from that of the majority,
I will defer decision for some further study and also to see whether

ODe of the other Justices writes.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

cc: Tbe Cooference

.invrrmt ~llurt of tqt ).lnitrb §tatrs
11Jasltittgton. p. ~· 211,5'~~

j

CHAMBERS OF

December 1 1 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference

.iuprtmt <l;Mtrt cf t~t 'JUnittb .itatts
,rasltinghrn. p.
CHAMBE:RS Of"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

Ql.

21lgt'!-~

December 5, 1972

Dear Bill:
In

71-507, Keyes v. School District,

I join your opinion as I told you less formally
last week.

vJ

Will~ o.

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

Conference
Law Clerks

Douglas

,Snprtmt QJotttf of tltt Jnittb jtalttt
jlhts~lott. ~. <!}. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 7, 1972

Re:

No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District

Dear Bill:
At Conference I voted contrary to the op~n~on which
you have written for the court, and will probably adhere
to that position; I will write something myself only as
a last resort.
Sincerely,

~(l}j\J

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~tqtrttttt <!lourt of tqt 'Jtlnittb .itatttt
,rattlthtgton. !D. <11· 2ll,?~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 7, 1972

No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1
Dear Bill,
I am in basic agreement with your
opinion in this case, although I do have some
suggestions about which I shall be getting in
touch with you.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
the Law Clerks

j

juprtutt Qillltft 4lf tlrt 'Jhitt~ jtattg
Jragfrhtghtn.!D. <q. 21lbi~~
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

December 18, 1972

Re: No. 71-507 -Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo.

Dear Bill:
I want to give you a 11 progress report 11 on my
consideration of your proposed opinion.
With the likelihood of the Detroit cases being
linked on some points, I suspect there is some common ground
between issues in Detroit and Denver. I have no definite
feeling that Denver must wait on Detroit but for the moment I
will hold up untif the situation is clarified.

p

~53'
Mr. Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

•
Memo to: Jay Wilkinson
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 20, 1972

G;J

You will recall our discussion as to Mr. Justice Brennan's
emphasis- in his Keyes opinion- on intent.
Please take a look at the cert note in No. 72-604 New Jersey
v. Smith, where there is a reference to the opinion of CA 3 tO the
effect that the absence of segregatory intent is immaterial.
The case involved a claim that the grand jury selection process
discriminated against blacks.
'Ibis might give you a lead to some Supreme Court decisions
in which we have said that segregatory intent was immaterial in various
types of situations.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls
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December 28, 1972
Keyes -No. 71-507
In discussing the distinction between the effect of the de facto and

de jure rule, I might consider the following:
Under the de jure rule (as in Swann), the Court says that the
Constitution requires the elimination of all vestiges of a dual system requiring busing to and from residential areas which would have been
predominantly white or black entirely without regard to an "de jure"
status.
As contrasted with this situation, neighborhood schools are still
allowed in cities where segregation is regarded as de facto.
I see nothing in the constitution that requires an "over-reaction"
even if the distinction between de facto and de jure is a valid one.

Putting

it differently, why should a greater degree of forced integration (by
busing) be required in Richmond because of de jure segregation than
would have .s:x::idH: existed in Richmond had there never been any such
de jure action.
Putting it differently, the result of the present constitutional rule
is to force a substantially degree of integration in southern cities than would
have existed if there had never been any laws compelling segregation.
Thus, present and future generations of children are being penalized -

2.
in terms of being bused away from their neighborhoods - in a highly
punitive manner for tiJK "sins" of their forebearers, even though there
is no casual relationship (no proximate cause) between such "sins" and
the condition of segregation which exists.

December 28, 1972
Keyes -No. 71-507
In discussing the distinction between the effect of the de facto and

de jure role, I might c msider the following:
Under the de jure rule (as in Bwann), the Court says that the
Constitution requires the elimination of all vestiges of a dual system requiring busing to and from residential areas which would have been
predominantly white or black entirely without regard to an "de jure"
status.
As contrasted with this situation, neighborhood schools are still
allowed in cities where segregatim is regarded as de facto.
I see nothing in the constitution that requires an "over-reaction"
even lf the distinction between de facto and de jure is a valid me. Putting
it differently, why should a greater degree of forced integration (by

busing) be required in Richmond because of de jure segregation than
would have a:x:JDK existed in Richmond had there never been any such
de jure action.
Putting it differently, the result of the present constitutional rule
is

to force a substantially degree of integration in southern cities than would

have existed if there had never been any laws compelling segregattoo.
Thus, present and future generations of children are being penalized -

2.
in terms of being bused away from their neighborhoods - 1n a highly

punitive manner for 1iE "stns" of their forebearers, even thougb there
is no casual relationship (no proximate cause) between such "sins" and

the condition of segregation which exists.

Memo to the file
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Re: Keyes - LFP' s Draft Memorandum

January 2, 1973

(No. 71-507)

I should include -possibly in the text - the following quotation
from Bickle's artie le of September 23, 197 2, in the New Republic (p. 23 ):
"Under the impact of Swann, moreover, it is doubtful
that the de jure - de facto distinction can long survive
... even technically, the distinction is showing some
cracks, as in the Emporia and Scotland Neck cases of
last June and it is fatally vulnerable in a larger sense.
The enforcement of a requirement of racial dispersal
of school population in one region of the country but not
in other regions is morally and politically, and therefore
ultimately legally, an untenable position on any permanent basis. "

L.F.P.,Jr.

LFP, Jr.:pls
cc: Mr. Jay Wilkinson

Rough Draft LFP, Jr./pls

1/5/73

KEYES

A Continuing Duty
Near the end of its opinion in Swann , the Court appeared
to say that there would come a time when school authorities could
forget segregation:
"At some point, these school authorities and others
like them should have achieved full compliance with
this Court's decision in Brown I . The systems
would then be 'unitary' in the sense required by our
decisions in Green and Alexander.
"It does not follow that the communities served by

such systems will remain demographically stable,
for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so.
Neither school authorities nor district courts are
constitutionally required to make yea~by-year
adjustments of the racial composition of student
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate
has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system."
402 U.s. at 31, 32.
It is certainly true that communities do not remain"demo-

graphically stable;" and that the state of integration in a school system and particularly in individual schools -will rarely remain even approximately constant except perhaps for elementary schools located deep
within massive residential patterns of one race or another. It also
would be unreasonable, and in fact impossible, to require year-by-year

'.·

-2possibility explicit in the Swann language quoted above that at
"some point" in time the responsibility of school authorities
would end. I agree that there should be no end of a continuing
~responsibility on the school authorities, as

instrumentalities of the state, to take all reasonable and appro-

0--~~~
priate measures to maintain -an integrated. system. The assuring
that this responsibility is discharged, and that the proper authorities
have a continued awareness of it, will hardly be facilitated by the
courts' adherence to the de jure/ de facto distinction with its
KIIZl<

corollary distinction between

~rpose and~

further reason, the distinction should be disavowed.

For this

.

'

.

-

•

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie WllkiDscm,

PROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: Ja.auary 8, 1973

No. '11-50'7 Kef!&

SlJlce the Christmas ''bolldaJS" I ban deyotecl sueh time u I
eoald mate aft1Jable to dietatmg a memoraacbnn

Ia an of Ita

Oil

Keyes. Here It is,

roa&h aac.t meaadermr form.

Althoagb I haft not yet declded what I wt1l do, I am certain that

l caaot join the oplD.lon cireulated by Mr. Justice Brennau. 1t ts
aacoeptable to me for two major

rea&(Xla:

(1) lt adheres to - mdeed

empblatzea and perhaps embroiders - the de Jure/de facto dlstlnetlcm;
IUld. (U) tt remands the case to the dlatrlct cout (UDder groau.clrulea which
tcftlly foreshadow a Swaim type deaegrep.tloa. depoee)

without addreatag

and attempting to clartfy the amblpltles of Swaim lritb respect to raclal

-~·-· and busing.
I can caa.celYe of no prtD.c1pled buSs for appl.JIDr the cle jure/de
faeto dJsttnetlm, for the

1"ttUOil8

stated Sa my memorudum. J:neideDtally,

the 5th C1rcult optalca ill '12-849 (Corpu Cbrtatl)- which Lai'I'J broapt
to my attention- reaches a e<mClualonldenttcal with my

Olrll

newa.

lf I had seen the 5th Cire1dt oplldoa before dletatmg my memo, obrioaaly

I woald haft alluded to tt aad meluded some porttcu of It ln my draft.

.

}

...

2.
A.. to Swaim, the opbllon obrioaaly was an elaborate compromise
Nflectmg - and attempting uuucceafully to harmonise - diftrgtmt
~

news

Jatlces. Yet, I do thlak tbe domJaant threac:l of Ita reaaoalllg Nhl"'•

the eueDce cl. a "rule of reu011 '', caWnc u:pcm the flezlbWty of equitable

remedies. SWann baa been mtalllterpreted primarily for two reucma:
•appro'Nd a drutie butDg program

m Charlotte,

aad dlatrlcta eoarta

han looked at tt rather tbaD tile amblguoaa lupa(ll of the opla!OD. In

aclclltiOD, there ta oae aeatenee Ill the oplnloll whtch, If taken oat ol.

coatat,

requtrea ''the dlstrlet judp or acllool autborlttea (to) make

enry effort to achteYe the greatest poealble degree of actaa1 cleaesreptlca
• • • • " (p. 26).

'Ibis has beeD cc:utraed to reqalre maaatve bulllg of

elemeatary chllclrea,

m aome iDataDcH ap to 20 mllea and for a couple

of hc.ra a day. In my Ylew there Sa not the allgbtest justiftcatlon in the

Coaatltutlon or any rattcmal buts for such a t!'al'estJ. I recall SeDator
BUDlpb.rey'a commeat to me after retumtng from the Florida e&mPI'P·

Be aald - by no meaaa eatlrely Ill Jest - tbat the Supreme Court hu

cot

the eoantry Into "one hell of a mesa", and tbat the Coart should ftnd

aome way to lead u oat of 1t. Be aut that he would aot haft tolerated
the butng of hta cbildreJl from tbelr former home

MarfJand to Southeast WublqtOD.

mMOiltgomei'J C011Dty,

Obriouly I woald not qaote the

s.ator - a statement made ID the prlftcy of oar apartment - and I do

3.
DOt want anyoae In my chambers to quote blm. I m8JitlOD thla here beeauH

ao tme can daabt Hubert H11Dlphrey's decUcatlOD to ractal equalltJ and to

e• ,

z stamping oat sqrepted echoola.
Retumlllg to S!aJm, the aenteD.ee caUlDg for tile ,_eatest pouible

degree of deeegreptlcm has prompted district ecmts to attempt jat

t1aat, prtmarlly by butag. They -m to onrlook, however, other
Jaapage tD the qtta1ca wtlleh Ia preetsely to the c.trary - u I N&Cllt.
But

whatner SWaml may ban aald,

there Is DO eCJDCelvable

ccutltatioaal but. for compellJD.g the type of baatag wblch we ba'N

wttaeued ln some of the eases. I have felt, UDtll now, compelled to
aeqateeee where the cUatrtct court has fOUDCI that the busing wu n«
ordered to achteve "racJal balance". But here ta Keyes, I ban tor the

tint time aa opporbmlty to ezpreas my news as to the meanmg of Snml U I ccmclude that this will serve any uaefalppurpose.

I am ctmeemed, however, by the fact that may w1ll view an

a:pnatCD from me u retlect1ng a "southern" blu,

1f not Indeed

soatbem "ractsm". There bas beeD, of eoarae, eoagb ra.et.sm to
go arOIIIDd for most 8\'el'J aae. There hu beea aa much among blacb
ta neent yean u amcmgwb.ttea. As you lmolr, I personally suppozted

Brown when th1a was extremely uapoptlar tn VlrgJaJa; I oppoact masslft
resistance and tnterpoattlcm, and was regarded by many in Virginia aa

•

\

J

........

a llberal mtegratlODtstf. I have not retreated Ia the slightest from my
e Cll'ftetic:m that we mut tntegrate the schools oo a DatiODI.l buls aad by
the ue ol. all reucaable meaDIJ. But the comblDatiGD. of Greea aad 8nD as these have beea ecmatraed, has proclu.ced edacattoaal chaos and _., that the Denver deetalca. wUl man the deeegregattOil Utlptlon. Jato

the North - the rattcmale of these declstcas (as tnterpreted) simply canact
be applletl in many of the great northem cttles. It mates ao aeue to
hue a J'\tle of ccmatttuttcmal Jaw whleb Is physlcaJJ.ylmpoulble to

implement. The reaalt may be - u propoeecl tn the IUchmcmd aDd Detroit
~

cun- that local govermnental boandarles"be ipored, and that the

Wt.iL

butllg~

be extended into vast metropolitan areas. But how far wU1 these extend?
Ulllea the populatloals ordered not to take

"ftlght",

a comblDatlCil of

the moblllty and resentment of the peq)le will frustrate even metropolltaD

areabumg.
Despite my eoacel"'UU, I am reluctant to write u opbdon which
wlll be widely constJ'\ted- howeyer 1t ts written- u being a retreat
from the proeesMs of IDtepstlug soaadly the raeu of oar eoantl")',
wbteh after all wtll han to cc.ttnae to 1tn topther for the cmnmma

I therefore want yoar judgment, and that of Larry ud Blll,

u to what

fao.ld say and whether I should say tt.

I m'GSt, of coarse,

5.
reaern the final deelalon for myaelf, but I respect the rien of each ol
yoa.

I woald like for yoarto proceed

Cll

the uaumpttoa. that I wU1

write aadq»bdoa. Indeed, I am certam to write somethtae. It wl1l

either be a fft puqraplaa neordlac the two reu..a (atated abon why
I eau~

of my

Jola 1D the BNDMJI opbdoa.) or lt will be a lalrlylClllg expoetttcm

Yl-.

The attached memoranchun 18 the begbming of euch an

aptaloa..
I would J1ke for 10111 to take my memor&Ddam and deYelop lt Into

a eeholarly, restrained and carefally wrtttea draft oplnlca.
I spent most of my time on the ftrst point (the UD80UildDess of
de jure/de fat:to), &Dd thla part of the memorandum- In my riew- 1s

aat too far removed from a printable ftr8t draft. I am sure, nevertheleu,
that It caa be c<malderably Improved and streragtheed.
The seccmd part of my memOl'IDdum (dealhtgwlth the amblgaJtlee
of ~ and partJcularly wttb busing) was dtctated more hurrtedly ad

wtll reqalre canstderable ttgbtentng, revtahtg and rewriting. Also, yoa
wUl han to do some research and sapply certaht documentation.

I call your attention particularly to the subsectloa. entitled
''Ultimate Goal - Equal Educattcmal Opportunity" (p. 44), and to p. 48

thereof. I Intended here to deal briefly, bat w1tb appropriate documeatatlca

m the footnotes, with the emerging view of scholars that there 1a no

•

8.
el•rly d!seernlble

•w•• correlatl<ll between Integration aDd improred

edaeat1onal achievement. In cXher words, the ezperieDce with lntegratlOD
to date baa beea d18appoiBtmg ill terms of producing better eclaeatlca tn
mtepoated schools. The truth Ja, as scholars are beglnnlDg to admJt, that

Gae aoelo-eeODomte status of chUdND (white or black) 18 the single most
releftllt factor ta determiDJDg the aaccesa ln school. Tbts entire area

18 a delicate me, with high emoticaal feellaga ofte being lnYolYed. I
do aot want to overemphasize tt, and might ..,_ relegate the entire •bjeet

to a footnote - aa lt 18 not ceatral to my bulc poettlcm.
A ftDa1 word of eautiaa: I am troubled by this entire problem, and

may not decide for some time what 1 shall do. A good deal may depend
on how well you can rework my memorandum Into a scholarly, prmclplecl

optalcm. MeanwhUe, please do not ''talk 1n the

corrld~''

here at the

Court, as I want to preserre tall flexibUlty as to my ultimate actlaa
wtfhcat maldDg any lmpHed commitments to other chambers aa to what

I mlgbt do.

L. F. P., Jr.

.ilttFtntt Ql11nri 11f tlft Jtrlttb Jtw•
jiaslthtg~ ~. <!J. 20~'1-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

January 9, 1973

Re:

No. 71-507 - Keyes v. Denver School District

near Bill:
I think I will try my hand at writing a dissent from
your op~n~on in this case. I will try to have it in
circulation late this week or early next week.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~tutt ~ourtltf tqt ~nittb ,jhdttY
~. (!}. 21llJ'l.'

,.._.ltbt¢ou.

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 9, 1973

Re: No. 71-507 -

Keyes v. School District No. 1

Dear Bill:
1 am in large part in accord with your circulation of
November 30. I am not at all certain that the de jure--de facto
distinction in school segregation will hold up in the long run.
Segregation may well be segregation, whatever the form.
Nevertheless, I withhold my vote pending other circulations and pending further consideration of the Detroit and
Richmond situations.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

/

•

.January 9, 19'13

Re: No. '11-50'1 Keyes v. School DistriCt No. 1

Dear BUl:
This is a supplement to my note of December 1.
Although I have not come to rest as to my final posltlcm, I am
now worldng on a draft of an opinion that may coneur in the remand but
for different reascms.
ln view of the complexity of the problem and our other workload,
1t will be some time before I am able to ctreula.te it.
stneerely,

Mr. Justtee Brennan
cc: The cooterence

Memo to: Jay Wilkinson
January 11, 1973

From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

/}} /

~(J-'1

Keyes

In view of the time lag in obtaining requested doCuments,

I suggest that you ask the Library to obtain for you the latest
available Digest of Educational statistics, published by the Office
of Education at HEW.
1bis source was cited in

swann 402 u.s.

at 14. My guess

is that this digest will contain some helpful statistics.
I think it also worthwhile to look at major law reviews for

comments and articles on swann. While most will be laudatory,
perhaps there will be some that recogniZe the infirmities of the
opinion.
I think I have mentioned that Larry probably bas the Jenks
bOOk, which at least merits a footnote.
L. F. P., Jr.

LFP, Jr. :pls

•

MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinsoo.,

m

DATE: January 18, 1973

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 71-507 Keyes
In my rough memorandum, you will find a subseetloo. dealing with

the tnterest of parents.
1 cited Pierce, and suggested that there are other Supreme Court
cases emphasizing the duty and rights of parents. There is a quote
in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949), Frankfurter J. concurring,
that may possibly help. It refers to the "deference" owed the "private
tnterest ••• of a man in the children he has sired".
1 do n<t coo.sider this to be an especially strong authority, but it

may lead you tnt o others.
L. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

TO:

m

DATE: January 19, 1973

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

Keyes
This may give you some background information although I
would not spend too much time on it.
Please return the report to my dfice after it has served your
purposes.
L. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, ID

TO:
FROM:

DATE: February 18, 1973

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 71-507 Keyes - Draft of 2/1/73 and 2/14/73
The above drafts, delivered to me in what you describe as

rough, preliminary form, have now been reviewed by me.
Although I have made a few changes as I went along, I followed
your admonition and have not tried to edit them as I would and will your
final draft. Rather, I have reviewal-them to see whether they are in
line substantively with my thinking.
The short answer is "yes".
As to the first issue (pages 1-21), this is substantially as I wrote
it - although I think your editing has strengthened it.

It is ready to go,

when you have completed the footnotes.
As to the second issue (the meaning of Swann), your draft is a
vast improvement over my initial effort. Some of it - especially your
analysis of the busing issue and the interests adversely affected by
compulsory busing - is brilliant.
I make the following general comments:
/ ' 1. I have discussed with you (Saturday afternoon) the need to

rearrange the subsections. Part IV should be moved ahead of m -C.

2.
I am not quite sure where m-B should go. I suggest you outline your
present draft and consider the best way to restructure it.
2. Subsection m-B seems a little ''bobtailed". Peih aps you
can work it into one of the other subsections.
3. The paragraph beginning on page 36 comes, I think, from
my draft and therefore has an idea which I would like to retain. But it
has an analytical defect, as presently written. It assumes that the
affirmative
"aMia•Bi*J duty doctrine" only requires restoration to the state which
would have existed, absent unlawful action. Of course, the doctrine
has not been applied that way - and this is what I think is so wrong.
Yet, the first part of our opinion assumes that the affirmative duty
doctrine should be applied nationwide. Perhaps the answer is that it
can be applied properly only pursuant to a rule of reason, under the
facts and circumstances.
4. In discussing the interests adversely affected by transportation,
should we make it clear that we are talking primarily about the
elementary grades?
5. Should'W.e use the phrase "achieve desegregation" or "further
integration"?

****
In general, I think you have made real progress.

I agree that

another work of careful scholarship, writing and rewriting- and
documentation - is necessary.
L. F. P., Jr.

•

MEMORANDUM
Mr. J. Harvie WWdns<m, m

TO:

FROM:

DATE: February 18, 19'73

LewiS F. Powell, Jr.
No. '71-50'7 Keyes - Draft of 2/1/'73 and 2/14/'73
'11\e aboVe drafts, delivered to me in what you describe as

rough, prellmtnar)' form, have now been reviewed by me.
Although 1 have made a few changes as 1 went aloog, 1 followed
your admonition and have net tried to edit them as 1 would and wUl your
final draft. Rather, 1 have revtewdthem to see whether they are in
line substantively with my thtnldng.
The short answer is ''yes".
As to the first tssue (pages 1-21), this is substant1ally as 1 wrc:te

it - althongh 1 think your editing has strengthened tt. 1t 18 ready to go,
when you have completed the foctnctes.
As to the seecmd issue (the meaning of

swann),

your draft is a

vast improvement over my initial effort. Some of it - especially your
analysis of the buSing issue and the interests adversely affected by
compulsory rosing - ts brilliant.
I make the follaw~g general comments:
1. I have discussed with you (Saturday aftemoon) the need to
rearrange the subseetioos. Palt IV should be moved ahead of m -C.

2.
I am not quite sure where m-B should go. I suggest you outline your
present draft and ccmatder tbe best way to restructure tt.
2. Subsecttcm m-B seems a little ''bobtaUed". Pelb aps you
can work 1t into one of the other subsections.
3. The paragraph beginning on page 38 comes, I think, from

my draft and therefore has an idea whlcb I would like to retain. But 1t

.

has an analytical defect, as presently written. It assumes that the

,~vauty doctrine" only requires restoration to the state which
would have ex. .ed, absent unlawful action. Of course, the doctrine
bas not been applied that way - and this ls what I think is so wrong.
Yet, the first part of our opinion assumes that the affirmative duty
doctrine should be applied nationwide. Perhaps the answer is that 1t
can be applied properly only pursuant to a rule of reasoo, under the

facts and circumstances.
4. In discussing the interests adversely affected by transportation,

should bre make it clear that we are talking primarily about the
elementary grades?
5. ShouldU use the phrase "achieve desegregation" or "further

Integration"?

••••
In general, I think you have made real progress. I agree that

another work of careful scholarship, writing and rewriting - and
documentation - ts necessary.
L. F. P., Jr.

..........-----------------Memo to: Jay Wilkinson
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FebruarY 28, 1973

Re: Keyes
At a recent Conference, in connection with a case the
name of which I have forgotten, Justice Stewart made a remark
which is so true, I would like to incorporate the substa.J.¥:e of it
in our opinion - perhaps in a footnote. He said:
"A school may be all white or all blaCk and still
not be a segregated school if the system is
genuinely desegregated."
'Ibis is a very important principle that very few people
understand.

LFP,Jr.:psf

Memo to: Larry Hammond
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 1, 1973

No. 71-507 Keyes
In your cert memo in 72-722, you speak of my desire to

"overrule Swann and its companion case from Mobile."
'Ibis is a misapprehension. I do think that the affirmance
in swann of the busing plan in Charlotte/Mecklenburg was unfortunate, and in the end will be a disservice to education and particularly the younger children who are bused so extensively.
If one accepts Green as being applicable to an urbanized

area, I could have joined the opinion in Swann so far as its language
goes. As you will see from what I have been working on with Jay,
I would like to bring the Court back to the language of Swann (basically,

a rule of reason) so that the district courts will look to the decision

rather than to the Charlotte decree itself.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP,Jr.:psf
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Memo to: Messrs. Hammond and Kelly
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 13' 19'73

No. 'H-50'1- Keyes
I deliftr to each of yoa herewith a "Cbambers Copy" of the
first printed draft of my oplDlon, concurriDg ill part and diasenttng
iD part.

There is a vague rumor fioatiDg about that neither of you is
totally enchanted with my position on school desegregation. I am
also DOt unaware of the precllctable negative response that will come

from the eastern media aad, perhaps, from a majority of those who
write in the law Journals. The response may be DO less influenced
by the fact that I am a "southeraer" and I persoally am undoubtedly

lnfluenced by the environment in which I was raised. Yet, DOt by way
of justification bat as baekgrounc:l which may be relevant to an uader-

standhv of my position, I recite the persoal aperieiiCe I bave had
with tbls problem.

I was chaltman of the Richmond School Board when Brown was
decided, and served on that Board UDt1l I was appolntecl to the state
Board of Edacation in Juua17· of '81, on W'hieh I served for eight years.

Without go~JV into IllY of the details, I was regarded by the white

-2commUDlty lD Richmond u a far-out llberal on the race l88Ue aad the
echoola there were gradually desegregated, prlmarUy wader the freedom of choice plln that was coD8ldered valld by most courts (1DcludtJ11
the Foarth Circuit) UDtll Green wU decided lD early 1861. I opealy
opposed the "muaive re8latuee" program lD VlrllDla and the South,
and quietly helped to defeat it lD the VirglDJ.a Legislature.
But the moderate coarae rarely p l - •

of

JDIUl)'

...,cme. To the dlamay

southern conservatlfts (iDcludlDg old friends) I haft hoDeatly

belle'Ved lD the actn.Dtages, lD our plurlatlc soelety, of the chlldrea of
all races aDd creeds beblg brought together in pabllc education. I thoagbt

the Brcnm decision was loag overdue • Bat I wu 118Y8r wlllblg to move

u fast as some of my blaek frleada urged (which reiAllted ill senral
Vlrgbda commUDltles lD the schools beblg abut dowll and in worseablc

race relatlou), and I atlll do

DOt

belle'f'e in the "all or DOthlag" u:treme

lallpage of Greea. Tbe Green case itself was correctly decided on ita

facta, bat to sagest that the Coustitutlon requires that there be DO all
black echool ill my 'f'lew is a rewrltlDg of the CoDstltutlon and a perfectly
ab~n~rb

social and ectacattoaal poUcy.
The constltutloDil error of Green was perpetuated in Swum UDder

totally dlffereat factual clrcUD18taDcea. Ap.ln, the de facto/de jure

-3dlat1Dction -

as unpriDcipled aa any I bave yet seen attrtbated to the

CODStltutlon - wu al8o reaffirmed. But despite my view aaJe the
wroDgDess of Swum, I would DOt vote to overrule lt ReD if joiDed by
four other Justices. It bas become a 8)'mbol of great sipiflcuce for
our black citizens, and u I read the ratloaale of 8walm as written, it
does not support the way it has been iDterpreted by the district courts
in the South.
Ill any event, the inJection of the federal courts into the pubUc
school systems to the point where school authorities are more preoccupied with mtxtng children than they are with educat!Dg them, has
been little short of a disaster to the cause of public education and ita
necessary sapport in many communities.
1be purpose of my wrltiDg in Keyes is to try, reeogniziJW tbat
it can only be a beglnniJW, to lead the Court back to a position that eaa

fairly be called a moderate one, acceptable as sensible by a majority
of our citizens of both races. I would also like to persuade the Court

to depart from what it has chosen to call a coastitutioDal position wb.lch,
in my view, had no support whatever 1D the CoDstltuUon (the eaforced
basing of l.DDocent YOUDI children for many miles to achieve a degree of
mhrtug whkh resalted DO more from state acUon 1D Atlanta thaD it has
from state action in Harlem.)

-4But enough of thls. I did DOt illtead to make a "speech"- least
of all

to Larry Rammoad aad Bill Kelly. Bat u I do iad:aed respect

your views ud Jucfcmeata, I thought possibly tbia preface to the request

wldch followa may be helpful.

I would like for each of you to read the draft, aeceptiDg my
position as refiectlDg my carefully conaidered judcment, but nevertheless feeliDg free to make any aad all suggestiona which you think WODld
strengthen or improve it. Obviously, I am amdous to have a acholarly
and ratioll8l product. I do not expect much agreement with my view,
but I would like for falr-mhtded lawyers to tbJnk that it is a satisfactory

piece of legal craftsmanahlp.
I will be grateful to both of you.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP,Jr.:paf

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE:

March 13, 1973

No. 71-507 Keyes
In connectim with our point 1n Keyes as to the "flexiblllty" -

and wide range of discretion on the part of a court of equity to balance
mterest and rights (including constttutlcmal rights) - see the Chief's
opinion in 71-1470 Lemon v. Kurtzman at pp. 7 (last paragraph at
bottom of page), 8 and 9.
I think you may very well be able to pick up a phrase or sentence
from this and add it to our Keyes draft either in the text or in the note.
L. F. P., Jr.

Comments on the Chambers Opinion in Keyes
l\CK

March 15, 1973
My own Preface will be very short.

In the spirit

of your request, I accept for the purposes of this
memo thw two propositions which underlte the draft
opiniona 1) that the de jure/de facto distinction
should be supplanted by a more objective and national
approachJ and 2) that the Court should "signal" the
lower courts not to use extensive busing.

)

As you point out, . . the close readers of this
opinion are likely to be its opponents rather than
its friends.
im~ant

In my view, this makes it particularly

(j)

-

notAte use argumentative language and

no ~ o tak~iberties with the case law.

-

On the former

point, I have marked a few places in the draft where
I think that certain adjectives might well be

deleted or replaced, because they draw attention
away from the argument and imply that others are
not

~roceeding

in good faith.

In particular, I

think that the negative form of "principled",
that is "unprincipled", has become an epithet among
scholars and judges rather than a mere adjective.
Your argument is really not more "principled" or
"logical" than the majority's "unprincipled" or
"illogical" positiona rather, it simply is more
practical and better reflects contemporary social
reality.

As to the use of the case law, I

~·,~

LVf

-2-

readily admit that I have no more than a passing
acquaintance with the school desegrirgation cases
and have asked Larry to focus particularly on this.

~

Nonetheless, I venture

observations@ I would

not have read Wright v. Emporia as it is explicated on
page 14 of the

d~t,

~-.

in my view, • that case

~

concerned not what it takes to determine whether
a school board has a constitutional duty to desegregate,
but rather whether once a violation and duty has been
found a school board may take a step which further
exacerbates the segregation;@ as an heir to the
legal realist tradition, I do not think that the
present

deraf~

adequately acknowledges your

of disagreement with Swann's view of the proper
remedy,

a~long the

same lines, I do not think

~

it fair to characterize what the district a courts )
have done as "purporting" to follow Swann(p.34).
zA

~

I.
My major suggestion concerns the structure of
the argument.

After establishing what it takes

to make a prima facie case of segreagation, the
draft goes on to talk about remedy.

It seems to

me that this leaves out a step--what it takes for
a school board to rebut the prima facie case.
Indeed, notion of a prima facie case would seem
to carry with it the possibility of rebuttal.

?~·

-3In saying this, I recognize that the draft already
deals with this problem in a number of places, for
example footnote 10 and various paragraphs in the
section on relief.

But I think that rebuttal and

remedy are analytically distinct and that rebuttal
ought to be featurm in the tex•t.

In other

words, it is my view that the argument ought to proceed
as followsa 1) this is what it takes to make out a
prima facie case; 2) this is what a school board
must demonstrate to overcome a prima facie case
of a constitutional violation; and 3) this is
what . . . . a court ought to order by way of
remedy if a school board fails to rebut a prima
facie case.
While,of course, as I understand it, your view
is that 2 and 3 ought in parctice to be aaout
the same, I think that they are nonetheless analytically
different and that the equitable flexibility which
reposes in the district courts must be given a bit
more room to roam--that is, a district court ought to
be able to order at

le~t

a bit more in the way of

remedy than a school board undertake on its • own
to rebut a prima facie case.
I do not think that the rebuttal and remedy sections
should be long and wholly repetitive of one another.
But I do think that they are analytically distinct.

II.
Even if you do not accept my reading of Wright v.
City of Emporia, I think that the opinion ought to
make use of Hernandez v. Texas , 347

u.s.

475(1954),

which contains good language undermining the de
facto/de jure distinctiona
"Circumstances or chance may w ell di~tate
that no persons in a certain class will serve on
a particular jury or during som particular period.
But it taxes our • credulity to say that mere chance
resulted in there being no members of this class
among the over six thousand jurors called in the
past 25 yeaics. The result bespeaks discrimination,
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the
part of
individual iur commissioner." /Emphasis
added •
U.s., at
I alos think that strength can be drawn from this
Court's • statutory decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
401

u.s.

424, a case involving employment discrimination.

There, the Court held that an employer subject to
the Act may not employ a testing device which
has the effect of discriminating unless it is •
shown to have a"manifest relation to employment". 401

u.s.,

at 432.

Motivation was found to be irrelevant.

In short, the fact that a testing device has a
discriminatory effect establishes a prima facie case,
which the employer can rebut by showing a manfest
rela~ion to employment.

By analogy, segregated

schools establish a prima facie case of discriiination,
which is rebuttable by a showing of manifest
to educational policy.

~altion

The First, Second, Fifth, and

-5•

Eigth Circuits have

ma~ggs

approach a constituttonal

one for public employment(policemen, firemen etc.).
The various opinions in those circuits are long
and careful and would provide support for your
position here.
III.
I cannot quite put my finger on it, but I have a
sense in reading the draft that it shifts frequently
from state action to school borad action.

On

page 18, for example, the first paragraph of "C"
states that

segre~taion

is not

1111111)••

solely

a product of state action, goe•s on to state that
socio-economic influences have contributed to the
segreagation, and then concludes that public
school authorities have a continuing responsitility.
Per~aps

at some point the opinion ought to

confront explicitly the fact that other state or federal
bodies(zoning bo~ds, housing authorities, FHA
loan policies etc.) have contributed to the segregation.
IV.

I would be expec•ially wary of citing the Chief's
chambers opinion in Winston/Salen, at least

i~

text.

As I understand it, the Chief wrote that opinion
shortly after Swann, interpret.-ed Swann there,
and then distributed the opinion in envelopes marked
"Personal" to each federal judge in the country.
whole incident created a ansiderable amount of

The

-6animosity both among treother judges of this Court,
who thought that they had reached a compromise and
do not circulate their chambers opinions in this fashion,
and among the lower court judges, Who felt that they
were being lobbied.

Nor do I think that the

citation adds anything of substance to your draft.

v.
Finally, as I read the

d~ft,

I made numerous

notes or suggestions in the margins, some of
them grammatical.

I have a near compulsion to do

this, and you will want to reject many of the suggestions
out of hand.

',_ .:.....,·

~--

-""'·'!!M ' . ~ '

-- ·ft

Comments on the Chambers Opinion in Keyes
\£K

March 15, 1973
My own Preface will be very short,

In the spirit

of your request, I accept for the purposes of this
memo thw two propositions which

underl~e

the draft

opiniona 1) that the de jure/de facto distinction
should be supplanted by a more objective and national
approach; and 2) that the Court should "signal" the
lower courts not to use extensive busing,
As you point out, . . the close readers of this
opinion are likely to be its opponents rather than
its friends,

In my view, this makes it particularly

important not to use argumentative language and
not to take liberties with the case law.

On the former

point, I have marked a few places in the draft where
I think that certain adjectives might well be
deleted or replaced, because they draw attention
away from the argument and imply that others are
not

~roceeding

in good faith,

In particular, I

think that the negative form of "principled",
that is "unprincipled", has become an epithet among
scholars and judges rather than a mere adjective,
Your argument is really not more "principled" or
"logical" than the majority's "unprincipled" or
"illogical" positiona rather, it simply is more
practical and better reflects contemporary social
reality,

As to the use of the case law, I

,

/·~·

readily admit that I have no more than a passing
acquaintance with the school desegr~ation cases
and have asked Larry to focus particularly on this.
Nonetheless, I venture two observationsa 1) I would
not have read Wright v. Emporia as it is explicated on
page 14 of the

d~tt

in my view, • that case

concerned not what it takes to determine whether
a school board has a constitutional duty to desegregate,
but rather whether once a violation and duty has been
found a school board may take a step which further
exacerbates the segregation; 2) as an heir to the
legal realist tradition, I do not think that the
present d•raf.C adequately acknowledges your degree
of disagreement with Swann's view of the proper
remedya and along the same lines, I do not think
it fair to characterize what the district • courts
have done as "purporting" to follow Swann(p.34).

I.
My major suggestion concerns the structure of
the argument.

After establishing what it takes

to make a prima facie case of segreagation, the
draft goes on to talk about remedy.

It seems to

me that this leaves out a step--what it takes for
a school board to rebut the prima facie case.
Indeed, notion of a prima facie case would seem

,·-e

to carry with it the possibility of rebuttal.

..•.

..,.._.,.

-3In saying this, I recognize that the draft already
deals with this problem in a number of places, for
example footnote 10 and various paragraphs in the
section on relief.

But I think that rebuttal and

remedy are analytically distinct and that rebuttal
ought to be featurm in the tex•t.

In other

words, it is my view that the argument ought to proceed
as followsa 1) this is what it takes to make out a
prima facie case; 2) this is what a school board
must demonstrate to overcome a prima facie case
of a constitutional violation; and 3) this is
what . . . . a court ought to order by way of
remedy if a school board fails to rebut a prima
facie case.
While,of course, as I understand it, your view
is that 2 and 3 ought in parctice to be about
the same, I think that they are nonetheless analytically
different and that the equitable flexibility which
reposes in the district courts must be given a bit
more room to roam--that is, a district court ought to
be able to order at

le~t

a bit more in the way of

remedy than a school board undertake on its • own
to rebut a prima facie case.
I do not think that the rebuttal and remedy sections
should be long and wholly repetitive of one another.
But I do think that they are analytically distinct.

-4-

II.
Even if you do not accept my reading of Wright v.
City of Emporia, I think that the opinion ought to
make use of Hernandez v. Texas , 347

u.s.

475(1954),

which contains good language undermining the de
facto/de jure distinctions
"Circumstances or chance may w ell di~tate
that no persons in a certain class will serve on
a particular jury or during som particular period.
But it taxes our • credulity to say that mere chance
resulted in there being no members of this class
among tne over six thousand jurors called in the
past 25 yeruirs. The result bespeaks discrimination,
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the
art of
individual 'ur commissioner." /Emphasis
added •
u.s., at 48,
I alos think that strength can be drawn from this
Court's • statutory decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
401

u.s.

424, a case involving employment discrimination.

There, the Court held that an employer subject to
the Act may not employ a testing device which
has the effect of discriminating unless it is •
shown to have a"manifest relation to employment", 401

u.s.,

at 432.

Motivation was found to be irrelevant.

In short, the fact that a testing device has a
discriminatory effect establishes a prima facie case,
which the employer can rebut by showing a manfest
rel~ion

to employment.

By analogy, segregated

schools establish a prima facie case of discriiination,
which is rebuttable by a showing of manifest
to educational policy.

~altion

The First, Second, Fifth, and

-5-

Eigth Circuits have

ma~Bgs

approach a constitutional

one for public employment(policemen, firemen etc.).
The various opinions in those circuits are long
and careful and would provide support for your
position here.
III.
I cannot quite put my finger on it, but I have a
sense in reading the draft that it shifts frequently
from state action to school borad action.

On

page 18, for example, the first paragraph of "C"
states that.segreagtaion is not

solely

a product of state action, goews on to state that
socio-economic influences have contributed to the
segreagation, and then concludes that public
school authorities have a continuing responsitility.
Per~aps

at some point the opinion ought to

confront explicitly the fact that other state or federal
bodies(zoning bo~ds, housing authorities, FHA
loan policies etc.) have contributed to the segregation.

IV.
I would be expec»ially wary of citing the Chief's
chambers opinion in Winston/Salen, at least

i~

text.

As I understand it, the Chief wrote that opinion
shortly after Swann, interpret.,ed Swann there,
and then distributed the opinion in envelopes marked
"Personal" to each federal judge in the country.
whole incident created a ansiderable amount of

The

. •·.; . '~ :-:., ' ~. drl· ·,

-6animosity both among treother judges of this Court,
Who thought that they had reached a compromise and
do not circulate their chambers opinions in this fashion,
I
and among the lower court judges, Who felt that they·
were being lobbied,

Nor do I think that the

citation adds anything of substance to your draft.

v.
Finally, as I read the

d~ft,

I made numerous

notes or suggestions in the margins, some of
them grammatical.

I have a near compulsion to do

this, and you will want to reject many of the suggestions
out of hand.
~
~

LAH 3/21/73
Rea

LFP's Chambers Draft of Keyes v. School Dist No. 1
My comments will proceed in, as far as possible, the

order of the opinion.
(1}

On page 5 you discuss Green and emphasize that

the "affirmative duty" imposed there

was "proper" in light

of the fact that freedom of choice was a "subterfuge."

You

-

point out twive in the paragraph that New Kent is a rural
school district with no residential segreg~tion and none
of the problems of urban schools.

Either in text or notes

you might consider discussing Green's two companion cases,
Raney & MOnroe. Raney seems compatible with your views
re Green but Monroe does present a problem.

Jackson,

Tennessee, the city from which Monroe came, has 7600

(y

~-~v-"
~~

students in the system and has considerable residential

I

~~ ~~

segregation.

falls somewhere in between Green and Swann.
but its not metropolitan.

~ ~~.

~

~~~,.r

~1"'1

And, you might conclude that, as

free-transfer plan, was a subterfuge.

I think, therefore,

I that you can handle Monroe but I wonder whether you should

~-1__,/

o-. ~ '-~

It's not rural

in Green, the integration plan in Monroe, which called for

~~~a
~ ~~

As a factual matter it seems that Monroe

--

cons~er ~~nin~

the notion that there was an abrupt

change between Green and Swann.
(2)

Your historical analysis (pp 5-7) of this Ct's

decisions jumps from Green to Swann.

You have not discussed

the place that Alexander v. Holmes Cty plays in this
evolutionary process.

Alexander may not be directly perti-

nent to your thesis because it deals with the problem of
delay more than anything else.

But, the Alexander order

affected some 30 school districts in Mississippi and "many

--2- ...
thouiJsands of children."

The Supreme Ct opinion is cryptic

and devoid of factual detail and I do not recall without
more research whether any of these Mississippi districts
were urban (Jackson, for instance).
would disclose this fact.
to be that if the e

ere

The CAS opinions

But, the important point seems
urban_~£~~~~lved

t~"--~~~C:.~-!:-~~E~t:e!~l2-.!_Jjlat__t_~ was

___._

fundamentally
a --.....--._
... .......__new and different factual sita tion when
Swann came here. On the other hand, if the districts were
all rural it might buttress your point.
(3)

In your discussion of why the de jure/ de facto

distinction is unprincipled, I see two threads but I am not
sure which one is responsible for rendering the distinction
unprincipled, or whether both reasons pertain.

I would

call the first thread the rural-urban shift, i.e., in rural
school districts not characterized by racial residential
separation segregation in the schools was clearly a result,
in the South, of the operatjion of state law, but in the
metropolitan areas in the South the existence of state
laws was largely irrelevant (p. 6) since segregation
resulted from residential separation.
noC~~£-c,.._~

~ause

state law

(~.AA..-~~~

is i~i the operative~factor in the S~uth{ there is no
factual basis for distinguishing between northern and
southern metropolitan districts.

The second thread is

the change in constitutional rationale, i.e., while Brown
espouced a limited negative right to be free from compelled
separation, later cases, such as Swann, have established
an affirmative right to an integrated education.

When the

J

--3-rationale was negative, it made sense to apply it only to
wipe away state-imposed separation and substituting something like freedom of choice,

But, if the rationale

is a right to an integrated education it should make little
difference to the disadvantaged class whether segregation
is caused by old state laws or by residential patterns.
From your subsequent commentary I judge that you are

relyin~

primarily on the latter reason for saying that de jure/ de
facto is unprincipled, but it is not quite clear.

If you

are relying on both I think you might more clearly state
your dual reliance.

I don't think that there should be

any doubt in the reader's mind as to why you reject the
distinction.
(4)

On pp 9, 11 and fn 10 you emphasize that the

constitutional right now should be defined as a right to

li.I.I.HdiFtiA an education in an "integrated school system."
WOY have you focused on the system rather than the individual
school?

Are blacks any less disadvantaged if they attend

an all-black school in an integrated system than if they
attend an all-black school in an unintegrated system?

If

you continue to focus on "rights" I think you need to explain this inconsistency (especially since you seem to
regard the cause of segregation as essentially irrelevant).
(5)
s~ious

...... ..~

As Bill's memo indicated, I think there is a

__9uestion about your

,

reliance:_~on~mporia.

...__..,............._......,~_..,....,-.-,.--,~-

-___..,__,__

...

The

Ct's opinion is careful to explain that it rests on cases
like Green and Monroe which involve only the remedial
question.

There was no effort in Emporia to decide whether

there was a constitutional violationr it was conceded that

--4-Emporia had imposed segregation as a matter of law and that
it, threfore, had an affirmative duty to dismantle that
system.

The only question in the case, then, was whether

the City's withdrawal from the system furtheredior
~

impeded the performance of that duty.

"

For this purpose

the intent or motive for the City's action was irrelevant;
the only question was one of effect, i.e., a simple factual
question whether the plan operated to assist or impede iii
integration.

The manner in which you read the case sounds

much like the way the CA4 handled the case.

That is,the

CA4 treated the question as whether the act of setting up
the new system had a segregatory purpose or discriminatory
purpose.

Under traditional analysis though that question

was as immaterial as whether freedom of choicej,free transfer,
or neighborhood schools have a segregatory purpose.

~ might

l ---.__...-..-----

shif#t your argument to another place

~~

(You
opinion,

state that you now agree with the reasoning, and urge that
~·~--.............-~----

it be applied throughout the country.

..._---

But, as is, I do

not think that "fair-minded lawyers" will find this a
satisfactory handling of a recent case.)
(6) On page 26 you might consider substituting your

own cite to the Augusta school case from last summer for
the cite to the CJ's in chambers opinion.

You also might

cite the companion case to Swann, styled North Carolina
State Bd v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 in which the Ct struck down
a state law which prohibited busing to achieve racial
balance.
(7)

The language is close to that you use.
At pp 20-21 you state that Swann approved

"extensive transportation of elementary pupils."

You then

--5--

state that the "far-reaching contours" of Swann may have
caused other lower cts to enter "similar decrees."
drop a footnote (17) citing several cases

i~volving

You
extensive

busing (Thompson 40 minutes to 1 hr each waYJ Northcross
34 minutes with more to come; Potts 2 hrs and 20 minutes

each way).

These examples might lead one to believe that

Swann sanctioned lengthy an onerous bus rides, yet the
opinion states that the average ride was only 7 miles and

~~~~\I J.-,4-0 ~~
~.e-u-....---

.;2;;~.. 0;'"-~u.-11-~

that the longest rides would not be over 35 minutes.

All

this occurred in a school district which bused students
prior to this Ct's decision an average of 15 miles and
an average of over 1 hour.

It was also a system in which,

prior to integration, the most busing was done by elementary
children and in which "four and five-year-olds traveled

the longest routes in the system."

On these facts it is

I~
~tt.--

hard to understand how Swann's decreee, as distinguished ......,.._..,._,....__
~
from its broader language, can be said to be responsible
for other more extensive orders.

~·

If you are going to emphasize

the factual contour4s of Swann and compare it with other decrees
I think you have to face this factual problem.
(8)

Somewhere in your discussion of neighborhood

schools, possible in the paragraph on page 24, you might consider whether you should cite approvingly the Ct's decision
in Davis v. Bd of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33.

This

is the Mobile case in which the DC and the school bd relied
on "neighborhood school zoning for elementary children and
tthe conseqmence was substantial segregation.

The Ct there

said, much as you do on page 21, that "neighborhood school
zoning" is not per se adequate to meet the remedial responsibilities of local boards."

I think you would improve

--6--

~~
i.e.,that

consistently~

the position you have

you would not

overrule Swann, by citing the facts in Mobile and Swann
and stating that, at least under the facts of those cases,
student transportation was justified.

I think you are close

to saying that now (pp 25-26 and fn 25).
(9)

At some point, either in the first or second

parts if the opinion, I think you need to discuss what
the values of integration are.

----......____..--·--

When you reject de jure/

de facto it is because, at least in part, there is a
right shared by all alike to an integrated education.
You accept that interest yet you ascribe to it no si&nificant importance in the text of your opinion. If you are
--,,..,..,----··~~.----..-.... -,._.~ ...-.....-balancing interests you might consider giving some space to

--------....--.--------------

....

the reasons underlying integrated education so that it
appears honestly to stand on the same scales with the
children and parental interests in neighborhood schools and
in an settled educational environment.

In so doing, I would

also delete the qumtation to William Rasberry (p 32).

Whether

some blacks find it offensive to be forced to go to school
with whites seems beyond the question.

It seems to me that

your sentence following the quote fully undercuts it but
its presence at all demeans the interest involved.

Also

you might consider cutting out the paragraph (pp31-32)
suggesting that busing is punishment meted out to innocent
children.

It is similar to the language in fn 24 in which

you state that some commentators have regarded integrative
ga
bus rides as atonement for prior segretory trips. Such
language tends to belittle the benefits of integration.
I do not think that federal judges have imposed busing orders

--7-to punish or extract atonement from innocent children.
Rather they have done so in order to provide an integrated
educational environment.

The tone of your opinion at

present is good but I think it would be improved if
~~

-~·''<'>-·~

~---............._ _ .....__

,...,..,,. ...

~~-"'·.----·-~ ........ . . . . _ ..

-

-

you (1) attach a discussion of the value of integration
.....,__...__..
.

___...~\~~-.....,_,.__..,...

and (2) delete any suggestion that student transportation
---~---....~--···~~--~-,-·----'"""'·-. .-......_,_,,_..__ ,._..,_......-r_.,.....,~-'--·~

has any punitive overtones.
~--·""""-...~..,.··"''......._.,,.,~ ....·<>·'"' ..................~,..._

(10)

There is another argument that I would like to

see the opinion at least aknowledge.

You have assumed that

busing is most detrimental to little children and you are
given to cue to do so by Swann itself.

But I wonder whether

other considerations might temper that conclusion.

I

think some studlies have found that integration--if one of
~:;;-,..,~·.e~·~..- , ,_ _ _,.....,.,_ _ _ ,.._::,.~.~-

.... -."'"""'"'""•'"'

"'""""'·---·-~--~·~--.........,.,.,___...,_.-.._.... _ _ _ ~

its purposes is to provide an environment in which blacks
and whites can learn to live together and to understand
each other--is most effective at the grade school level.

..

~---------" ~-------.------·-

Little children are lacking in the defense mechanisms
which older children and adults have nurtured over the
years.

I am reminded of a book Jay suggested to me, Willie

Mortis's Yazoo, in which he discusses the first days of
integration after Alexander in Mississippi.

The grade schoml

kids would pal around together and imingle readily; the racial
attitudes the the parents proved more inconsequential to
the young than to those in high school.

~

A similar Westing-

house documentary on TV several weeks ago also reflected the
written
same general conclusion. Possibly/empirical studlies have
.

either approved or rejected this notion.

Related to this

~~~phenomenon is the fact that, some would argue, busing harms
~ ~~~~~ high school kids more than it does grade schoolers because
t-t..A-...,

~ ~ ~ w~. ~ ~ ~
f

~ ~ ~.

_oo., .. •
4)..-..,

~A ,k.o--/.:.1 J..t...d"

<e
~<..:::1 ~~

--8--

the high school environment is centered significantly around
extracurricular activities {yearbook, athletics, band, etc)
many of which require participation during nonschool hours.
Students relegated to school bus transportation may be deprived of this opportunity.

As a result their high school

experience might be made a more bitter one and less rewarding.
And, they might view ineegration as the cause of this
deprivation, thereby exascerbating the difficulty of
effective efforts at useful integration.
I think that this problem deserves some consideration
primarily because I believe that you would want readers of
your opinion to believe that you are sensitive to the
benefits of racial harmony in the educational process.
Your opinion might suggest that school boards might well

I~~

view elementary schools as the most appropriate place to
launch efforts at integration.

~

ti"f

~-

~

~·
I have made one or two language suggestions that I
will show Jay, but this is all of my general reactions and
suggestions.
~suasive

In the main I think that your opinion is

and makes considerable sense.

Your appraach

suggests a rational manner in which to deal with the
problems of expanding Brown into the North.

It is also the

hardest thing to write that I have seen this Term or last.
It requires the sort of careful use of language that you
have employed.

I will be glad to contribute in any other

waps that you suggest.

LAH

•

LAB 3/21/73

a. a LI'P' a Cbabera Draft of lftt• y. lcbttl Plat 191. 1
My

c-nta ¥111 proceed 1n, u

p-

far aa peeelble, the

order of the opln.lon.
(1)

Oft

S J0U

dliCUII GDIQ an.cl tnapbaalse that

tbe •atfirllative duty• irlpolhtd tber:e

vaa •proper• ln llabt

of the fact that freedoll of choice vaa a •eubterfuae. •

You

peint out twin in the parap'11Pb that New :rant 11 a rural
eohool cU.atrlct with no neidentlal HSH~. .tlon and noM
of the probl_. of urbu. achoola.

lither in text or notea

JOU •l&ht oenaider dlecuaein& GrMD' • two OOIIPanlon cuea,

pegey

& Mpgnt.

re Qrnp but

"M' .._. COIIJ)atlble vlth your vl.eva

Mrlprot

doea preHnt a probl•.

J.cklon,

Teameaaee, the city fftMI vhl.oh tllftl'll c_, baa 7600
ltudenta in the eyat. . and baa conaiderable r:ealdentlal
aesnsatlon.

AI a factual utter lt • - that -

falla a--.r:e 1n betwen Qrnp and SVMQ•
but lta not •tropelltan.

lt'a not rural

And, JOU •l&ht conclude tbat, u

in Qnfp, the intearatlon plan in tMprgt, wbl.ob called for

a fne•tranafer plan, vaa a aubterfuse.

I think, tlwnfon,

that you can handle Meprgt but I wncter ,._thor you ehould
cenaicler aoftent.ns tbe notion that then vat an alm.tpt
chan&e between Qnta and

(2)
declalona

SVMP•

Your hletorloal analraia (pp 5-7) of thle Ct'a

J._,• fi'OII Gnta to lytgn.

the place that Al......,. y.

wolutionary pnceaa.

nent

You bave net dlaouaaecl

1111- Qtx pl&)'a

in thia

Alg•gster aay not be dlnotl)' pertl•

to your tbeala becauM it cteala with tbe problea of

clel&J •re than anythln& elH.
affected -

But, t1w

A1ttvm'tr order

30 aobool dlatrlota in Mlaal.aalpp1 and

~

•

--2-!be Supre. Ct oplrd.on 11 o17Jtlc

tbeullaanda of cht.lctren. •

and clwold of factual detail

an.ct I do net recall without

• " nMaroh wbether any of t:Mae Mlaat.aat.ppl dlatrlcta
wre urban (JaokHn, for lnatance).

wuld dlaoloM thla

f~~et.

the CAS oplnlona

But, tbe l.llportut pot.nt . . . .

to be that l f there wre urball 8Cboel ayat_. lnvelwcl

there lt •laht undercut

:rour

aut-nt that there vu

a f'und.-ntally new and dltferent factual
'WDD

~

al~tlon

vben

twre. On. tbe ether band, t.f the dlaulota • n

all Nral lt •labt buttreaa your polnt.
(3)

In your dlaouaat.on of why the

ellatlnctt.on t.a unprlnolpled, I -

dtt tyn/ df {Mtt

two tbreada llut I a

not

aure 'tlbt.cb one la naponalble for nndert.na the dlatlnctt.on
unprlnolpled, or 111betber both reuoq pertain.

call the flnt thnad tbrt rural•urban abltt,

I •ulcl

J.a.t...,

1n rural

aoboet dlatr't.cta not cb&racterlaed by neW reat.cla\tt.al

aeparatlon Han&atlon ln the aohooll wu clearly a reault,
1n tbe &eutb, of the operattlon of atate law, but ln the
•tnpelltan anaa ·t.n the leutb tbl exlat:ence ef atate

1.,. waa laqely lftelevant (p, 6) 1t.nce aesreaatt.on
naulted fi'OII na1dent:lal ..,_.att.on. lecauM atate law
not
l.a ... the operatlw f.ator 1n the ltouth, there t.a no
factual bull for dl.ltt.nsulablna bltwen .nortberll and
aoutbem •U'OP011taa dlatrt.cta. · n. aee.-rut tbl'ead la
the chanaft la oonatltutt.onal ratt.Oilale,

.a..a...

eapouoed a lllllted neaatlve rlsbt to be free
aeparatl.on, later caae1, al.lch

an atfll'llatlve rlsht

to

a

vb.lle
fro~~

Jnw

OOIIIMtlled

SJIIM• have eatabllabecl

an lnteanted eclueatt.en.

lllen the

,

__ __
ratlonale wu neaats.ve, t.t Ude MnM to applJ t.t only to
wt.pe . . . , atate•i.Jipoaed aepuatlon and aubatltutlna eoae•

tbl.na lU. fneda of cbctlce. But, if tbe ntlonale
u a d.abt to 8ft lnte&l"ated ectueatt.on lt abeuld .ue little
difference to the dleadvant-sed clua ,._tber Hlft&&tt.on
la oauaed by old atate lava er bJ naldentlal patteZOM.

rna

•-•tai'J I

tubeec~Uent

are relylna
prlui'S.ly on the latter nuen tor a&Ji.na that sit 1sani dl
JOUr

C•ta

1e unprt.nolpled, but lt tA

are ret:rt.na on both

I think )'OU

your dual nllance.

ar

judse tbat

•t

JOU

caulte clear.

It you

•labt ..-e clearly state

I don't think tbat there eheuld be

doubt 1n tbe aacter•a •J.ftd u

to wbJ ,.u reject the

dlatlraotloa•

(4) Oa pp '• 11 and tn 10 JOU eiiPbaalH tbat the
oonatltutlonal ri.aht

now abould M defined u a rlsbt to

MtiMIM an eduoatlon ln an •t.ntearated aohool a)'atft& ~

WD1 have you toouaed Oft t1w • • • rather than the lndlvldual
aoboel t AN bleekl an)' teaa dlaadYantased lf tbiJ attend
an alt•bl•k aobool 1n an ll'ltesrated a)'ata than

t.t

they

attend an all•blMk achool lrt an unlntesrated ayateat

It

,.u eontt..nue te focut on •rt.ahta• I thlnk you -.d to ex•
plain thla laconelatenay (eapeclalty alace you -

to

reprd the oauae of Msn&atloft aa eaMntlallJ irrelevant).
(5)

..now.

Aa

Blll'a -

lndloated, I thlak tbere 1a a

caueatlon allout JOUI' nllance oft_.,..

The

Ct'a opl.alon 18 oueful to ~laln that 1~ nata on e&Ma
lllce CIIMD and -

.-.ts.on.
then waa

tlbt.eh t.nvotve only· the reMC!lal

'lben wu no effort 1a

-da: to deelcle waetber

a eonatltutlonal vlolatt.ona · lt •wu conceded tbat

•

..,Ia bad t,...ed ._,.aact.on aa a

•tter

of

law and tbat

lt• tbl'eton, hacl an atftnative dut.J to dl. . .tle that

.,._..

The onl1 ••tt.en 1n t:M cue, theft, _. whether

the Ciey'a vlthdraat fro• the.,.~ fUI't:bencltor
t.alpeded tbe ped'oaanoe

the t.n.tent

ot

or •tlve for

that clut)'.

Fer thl.a purpoH

the Clt.J'• action wu ln'el•ant.t

tbe oal)' caueatt.on vu oae of eftt~et• 1·••• a alllple fetual

fiUeati.H. -.tbft tbe plaa operated to aaalat or I.Jipede Ml
lnteant.ion.

1.'he • .,..,... ln whloh JOU nad tbe o - aouada

auch lt.ke tbe _, the CM baad1ecl the

CA4 tnated the ...-t.t.on u
the new

JMII'I'*ae.

.,.~

c-.

that. t.a • tbtt

metber tbe • t of Httl.ns up

had a -sator, purpo• or cJlaerillinatery

Uadw trad1t1ona1 analyala tbDuah that queatl.on

vu aa s.-&te.rlal aa whether fnedoa of olwle... fne truafer,
or aeisbbodwod IObOela haw a HP'8Ptol7 purpoH.

•t.aht ahitft ,.ur - ....nt te anott.r pl•• .t.ft
ata'te that JOU..,

~PM

(You

opt.nt.on.,
with the reuoat.na, and uqe that

it 118 appllecl tbnulbeut the oountr)'.

the

Jut, aa la, I de

not think that "fatr-•lllclecl lav:Jen• will tlnd thla a
aatlafMtoJ? baadllna of a·. recut c-.).

,.ur

(6) On • - 26 JOU •labt oonalder aubatltutlna

. _ olte to the Aupata aobool oaae fro. last· •~r ·tor
the

0-

ot.te to tbe CJ' • 1n. ehaa.._. oplnt.en.

olte the oeapant.oa

S!ttf M x. beAD• 402

You alae ·~

to - . . . at)'led fMnb

r...,.,,.. \'\
''i

u.s.

ce
'

43 1.a whlbh tb8

•· •.

\

l

~

auuek

a atate law vbioh piOhlblted bual.na to Mblwe rao1a1·· ,

balaaee.
(7)

lbe

)'OU

' .\ \,

•tate that _ , appnved

"ateMlve tranetortatl.oa of el-tal7 puplla. •

f
i'\..

1....-ae la ot... to that yeu uae.

At pp 20·21

'.' \

ll' \

I

;;

I•

l

Yea
'

!, ·,

.,.~

''U."' ':0.

.

I,

',r4 . ~

..,....

r ltate that the •tar•reachtna

conta~ra•

of laM 11&1 baM

'I

)

\caused other tower eta to enter •aw11ar cteonea.•

You.

'drop a fMtnote (t 7) cltt.Ds aeftn1 ouea ln¥olv1Da ateu1ve

0-·

buatn& ('DM!MP 40 alnutea
34 alnutea vlth

••h va)').

..n to

1 br eaab _,, BtntiPDM

to

ruu

tbHe .......,1ea allbt: lead.,. to Jaell.eve tbat:

laM auctt.onecl leaatbJ an ...nua
oplnt.on atatee tbat t1w
that tbe

2 hn and 20 alnut•

ave~

,.t

bua l'lctea.

t:be

rlcle vu oal)' 7 al.lea and

ltJv&tlti rJAII wuld • t

be ever 35 al.mltQ.

All

tbla ocou:n:'ed ln a eobaol dlstrlot tdllob bused atudeata
priol' to tbla

et•a cteelat.on

an averaae of

eMil'

aacl

It _. alao a a)'lt• l.n wbloh,

1 botJI'.

prl.or to lnte8fttlen, the

art..-- of 15 alt..

••t llwllns vaa ctene bJ tls ?Dt•n

ohllctren and 1n ..tllch •to\d' aDCl flw-,.ar•olda ts-aYel.ect
the lons•t routee ln the

•J•ta· •

Man'•
tanauaae. ean

On theM f•t• lt t.a

hard to Wlderatanct bow

deoreee. u dlatt.aaulaW

from lta broader

be aald to. M napoull»le

for ether •ze exteaalve orders.
the f•tual eontotda of

k-P

If )'OU U'8 &Olna tO eiiPbUlse

ucl OOIIPaft t.t vltb otber dtloi'Ma

I thlnk J'OU have te f•e tbll fMtual probl••
(8)

. ...._.. ln JOUI' dltouaalen of aelshiMtltiOOd

aoboola, poulble ln the puaarapb. on,... 24,,

reu •llht

oon-

elcleJ:' 1fhethft JOU abould ot.te approvln&lY tbe Ct'a ~llt.en

••t

1n DAYS.. v. 14"
Qtwh•iiMa• 402 u~s. ·33 •. tbt.a
la tbe ...._,ltlle c - 1.n wbt.ob t1w DC aa.d ta. acboOl lid nlW
en ••l&hbodllod aebeol IIOilla& for
tt. ~

aald, ..m ..

vu

,.u

el~UQ

etabetantlal ~clon.

do -

oblldrea aad
"Dle Ct the~

.0~1

Pas- 21. that . .lab..dleed

~dlal napon•

801\ln&• la aot per ae ....,..te to - t the
albllltt.• •f local llouu. •

I tbt.ralc. you wuld blpswe ·.
I

'

,

I

·-6-·
, tbe poat.tlon , _ have ooft81atentl)', l.•lt.•th&t

,.u

would not

· .....rule IYMR• 16' oltl.ng tbe f•t• t.n Mobile and Swann
a4 •tatlna tbat, at lMat under the feeta ef those e ...,,

atu.lent uanaportatl.on wu juat1fled.
to

I think JOU an cloee

..,i.Da tbat nov (pp 25•26 and fn 15).
(9) At 8088 point, et.ther 1n the fl.rat or second

P8fta if the opt.n.t.on.. I thlnk you need to dt.souaa 'tlb.at

the valuee of lntepatlon ....

dt , . . lt 1a heoauae. at

~t:

rlabt lbarec1 b1 all alike to •

,t

Yeu . . .

tbat i.llt_...t

lbln 10U reject

,.t

a•

tug/

1n part, there l.a a

lntepated edueatt.en.

JOU asert.be to lt no at.&nl·

fleut l.llportanoe ln the text of ,our oplnl.on.

If 10U are

lllllanolna lntel*lta you at.aht conat.cter at.vt.ng -

•PIIC8 to

ta. r e - u uaderl)'ln& integrated education so that t.t
appears bonHtl)'

au.nct on the • - eoalea vltb the
oltlldnn and panatal t.ntereau 1n nelahltorbood achoola and
to

t.D an Httled eduoatloaal

envt.J:o~t.

la eo doing, I would

also delete tblt quitatt.on to W1111aa Basbeft7 (p 32).
-

11»1Mka flncl lt otfeulve to be forced to

vltll -'tl.tM •••• be,ond the

so

llletber

to acbool

•••tlon.

It - • to • that
, . . - HDtenoe follovt.ns the quote tullJ undei'Outs lt llut

,.u •tabt oout.cter outtlns out the paraai'&Ph (pp31·3Z)

auaae•t'•

tbat

eht.lclnft.

It I.e el.llt.lu to the

bualns

u puaut.en.t

aetect out to lnnocent

lanaU~~Se

1n tn 24 1n eta

JOU atace that . . . oo-.ntaton baVe re&arded lntegratlve

sa

bua rl.clea . . atoneMnt fo~ prior aeantOJ:)'

trips.

SUch

1. . . . . . tenda to bell.ttle tbl beneflta of l.ntesntt.on.
I do not tbt.Rk tbat federal judaea bave lapoeed

tuat.ns

ordera

-·7··
to puni.lh

ato~ent

or extract

froa lnnooent children.

Rather they have done ao 1n order to provide an lntesrated

eduoational envlronaent.
pr:.Mn.t 1a aood

~Jut

'lhe tone of your opinion at

1 think lt wuld be t.mproved 1f

you (1) attach a dlacuae1on of the value of ln.tegratlon

and (2) delete an:v auueation tbat student transportation
baa any pun1t1ve overtones.

then 1a another

(10)

~t

that I wuld llke to

eee the opl.nloa at teut almowleqe.
W.t.ag 1a

You have ueu.d that

••t dout..o.ul to llttle ohlld:r:en and you are

siven to oue co do -..

by

'ann 1teelt.

But I vonct.r vhetber

other conaldera.tt.ona •labt taper tbat oonelwd.on.

I

think • • atudtt.ee have foWlfl that i.ftteant1on••lf one ef

lta ~-· ie to PI'OVlde an envll'onment ln vblch bl•u
and Wh1t:Aie

-.n. leun

to

lt.ve toaetber and to undentand

each otber••l.a ••t effective at the arade achoel level.
Little ehildnn ue laold.ns in the defeue .chanlau
wtd.eh older ebllctren and adults have nurtund over tbe
,....

I •

'M)riis'e

realndtld of a book J&J

•w•

auueat-'

to • • W111le

1n wbloh be dt.aeuaaes the flrat dqa of

t.nbaration after

ttnte"'t

1he srade eobotl

t.n .Mlaalaalppt..

k1da wuld pal &l"GWld tosettaer Del lml.nsle readt.lyt the rMlal
attltud• the tbe parents pl'OWCI

.re

t.noonMC~Uentlal

the )'OUNI than to tboae t.n hlgh aoboel..

to

A ala11ar weatt.ns•
'

houee deeUIIentary on TV MVeral vaekl.· ago··· also reneoted the
Wltte.n
senaral conclualon. Poaa1bly/e~aplrleal atudt11ea have
either

appJ:OVed

or rejeCted th1a

pbenoaenen t.e the

notton~

Related to· tld.a

t•t <that, . . would csue, bwti.J18 ha1:'U

'I
hiab Hbool ld.48 110ft than lt doea &rade .aoboolere becatH
:

~

I

..

•

the hlab school environment ls eantered ei&nt.f1cantly uouad

extraourr1cular aot1v1t1es (78arbook, athletlca. band. eta)
ntanJ of Vhloh recaulft putic1patton durin& noD80hool houn.

Students Nlqated to
pd.ved

et

eehoot

thl.e oppoftuniey.

bus transportation 11a7 lte cltt•

Aa a nault thelr hisb aobool

experlenee 111sht be made a aon bitter one and leaa 1'8WU'dl.na·
And• they •laht vl.ew ineep-atlon aa the eauee o! thla
deprlvaclen, thereby exucertatln& the difficulty of

effective efforte at uaeful 1ntesrat1on.
I think that thls pre'blell clea.:.rYea eoae conaideratl.oa

prlturr11)' beeauae I 1Mt11ew that ,ou would want readere of
your opt.nlon to believe tbat JOU are aenaltl.ve to the
beneflta of racial

bal:'IIOn)'

f.n the eduoatlttnal pl'OCeaa.

Your opinion •icht

auueat

that echoot bouds sa18ht well

vtew eleaentar)' sohoola u the 110at: approprl.&te place to
laanoh eftorte at integration.
I haVe ac:te one or tw ·lan&uege augeationa that 1

will ebov Jttt-. but t!d.a la all
sugest1ona.

ot ray seneral reactiona

aAd

In the 11&111 I think that your op1n1on 1.8

.-.uaat.ve and makes eona1derable a.nae.

Yeur apprueh

St188eata a rational 11.1r1J118r 1n wtd.eh to deal with the
protJ1- of exPanding IL'PD l.nto the Nerth.

It 1s alao tbe

llaNest thing to wrlte that I have aeen th:la Ten. or lut.

It requifta the eort of careful ue of
have eaplo)'ed.
W11J1S that: you

tanauaae

that J'OU

I w111 be slad to contribute 1n any other

augg•t.
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7 # IAI - 3/ ,.~/73
This memorandum, n<X intended by any means to be exhaustiv~

J

or to refiect more than questions for us to dlscuss, is dictated prepatory
for our conference this afternoon:
1. We must decide as between duty affirmatively to operate
"an integrated school system" or to operate a desegregated school system. "
At least one member of the Court, as you lmow, informed me recently
that all prior opinions have been careful to express the obligation in terms
of "desegregation". I have n<X check to verify this statement, I wonder,
however, whether there is In reality a disttnctim. In this cc:mnectim,
take a look at a rought draft of a memo I wr<Xe on January 5, addressing

the language in Swann to the effect - in substance that once a system has
been desegregated the problem is solved and the courts turn responsibillty
back to the school board. Even if one accepts this view as being realistic
when Swann was written, do you think it has any continuing vitality in light
of Bill Brennan's opinion in Keyes? In theory, perhaps 1t could be argued

that once the Denver school board has desegregated the Denver schools
in accordance with the SWann formula, 1t could then forget the matter and

2.
and allow soclo/ecaa.omlc forces to resegregate the schools, as they surely
would. Do you find anythta 1n Brennan's opinion whlcb. would allow
thts? I am inclined to think that hts opinicm places a caa.tinuing and
affirmative duty to do what ts necessary to preserve desegregated schools
(or integrated schools).
This is a delicate question and cme rather fundamental to our
poetticm. My opinion would certainly cc:mtemplate a continuing duty on

the school board, as the instrumentality of the state, to take reascmable
steps- with due regard to the various interests- to maintain and operate
a desegregated (integrated) system. WhUe I believe realistically that thts
is where the Court is certain to end up, where do you consider we are
at this point?
2. Larry suggests that the tcme of my opinion ts good, but might
be improved if (1) we discussed the value of integration, and (ii) deleted
~Y

suggestion that student transportation and any punitive overtcmes.
point
As to Larry's first'_. here, I think we might add a sentence

in the text at an appropriate place stating that the Court has steadfastly
aclmowledged since Brown Illlllla the merits of a desegregated educaticm,
and then perhaps quote some of the appropriate language in a footnote.
I would be careful to make tt clear that the advantage and to which all
would agree relates to the pluraltstic nature· of our society making tt

3.
essential that citizens of all races learn til: at an early age to live,

wor~

play and cooperate with each other. A seeood advantage which I certainly
recognize is that undoubtedly there is psychological damage to any minority
resulting from discrimination or even the feeling that others regard them
as inferior. Yet, if we do a footnote along these lines, I think we should
also add that the advantages in terms of accelerating the learning process
are stUl being debated inconclusively by the scholars. Kere you could
cite Coleman, Monihan, Jenks and perhaps others. I would, however,
emphasize the affirmative aspects of desegregation, namely, our
pluralistic society and the operation of a school system which cannot

""*'

fairly be said to cause minority chUdren to feel demeaned or discriminated
against. I personally doubt very much that mixing the races in the schools
wUl have any significant effect oo elevating the learning abUity or the
ultimate quality of the education. Soeio-ecooomic background are far,
far more relevant than race or racial mixing.
Larry's second point presumably refers to the statement of page 31
as to "some retributive theory". I do not want to abandon the paragraph,
but suggest a revision of the last sentence to read as follows:
"It would indeed be a novel applicatioo of equitable power not to mention a dubious extensioo of cODStitutional doctrine to apply some retributive theory which would employ
extensive transportation of students in disregard of other
interests for the purpose of achieving a greater degree of
forced desegregatioo than would have resulted from purely
natural and neutral non-state causes."

3. In connection with Larry's first point, discussed in the foregoing
paragraphs, 1f we add a foctncte discussing the merits of integration along
the lines I menttmed, and with the caveat as to whether integrated schools
improve the quality of education and leaming ability, we can omit entirely
the sentence at the bottom of page 32 and the accompanying footnote in
which you quote Rasberry.
4. Larry makes a point that some authorities think lntegrattc:m

at the elementary level is the most important time. If there were no factors
to the contrary, his point would have coosideral:Mie weight. I do believe
that the younger children are, less likely to develop racial coosciousness.
But the principal thrust of our opinion is the necessity of balancing in a
rational manner the complex matrix of interests which are involved, doing
this in a way that achieves certain objective Bilk without destroying
other values.
At page 33, the opinion summarizes the advantages of neighborhood
schools and the disruptioo. caused particularly by transportation of
elementary age children. This is my convietic:m and I do not want to change
the emphasis. We might, however, add a fodnote on this page generally
alone the lines Larry suggests,

.!· !: ,

recogntzing that there are some

advantages in commencing as early as practicable the integrative experience,
but these advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages setf forth in the

•

$.
text. Perhaps also 1n this note - or 1n anc:ther ncte as some appropriate
place, we might make the point which 1s embodied somewhere - as I
recall- in my draft of January 2, 1973 -that the psychologlcallmpact
of a segregated system (emphasized by Chief Justice Warllll in Brown)

is certainly ameliorated if the system itself is a desegregated ODe, so
that the chUd lmows - and may be assured by its parents from the outset -

that in due time there will be an opportunity even for the child most
deeply situated in a ghetto area to have a biracial school experience.
In such a system there would be neighborhood schools many of which

would be integrated, through the d:her techniques we have mentioned.
The level of integration would increase at the junior high level, as the
"neighbool" or "community" expands, and finally- at the high school
level - an integrated experience would be inevitable in cities with
substantial racial m1x. Thus, there would always be both the promise
and the assurance of opportunities which should remove the psychological
hurt so emphasized in Brown L

~r.
5. Returning now to Larry's memorandum, in the order of its
numbered paragraphs, I see no great problem with respect to his No. 1
and No. 2. You might drop a footnote after citing Green that refers
to Raney and Monroe. Green was the decisiODal case; Raney, according

6.

to Larry, was also a strictly a rural county, and Monroe also was essentially
rural - involving 7600 students and in no way comparable to a large
metropolitan city or area.
As Swann relied em Green (and placed no emphasis em Aleaander)

I think we can ignore Alexander unless you want to add it to a foctnote
somewhere.
As to Larry's No. 3, he sees ''two threads" in our de jure/de facto

dtscusston. He is as right as to what we rely an primarUy, namely, that
it can make no difference to the disadvantaged class whether its
d.lsadvantage is caused by lmg since invalidated state laws or by the
failure of a school board to take all appropriate remedial steps to maintain
a desegregated system.
Larry's "first thread", as he reads our opinim, is that in the
metropolitan areas in the South the existence of segregatory laws is largely
irrelevant. I do think this is true, and yet I believe Larry has failed to
identify the single most important "thread" for my view that the
dtstinctlm no longer has a principled basts, namely, the extension by
the Brennan opinion in Keyes of the affirmative duty doctrine to Denver,
where the only "state action" has been that of the school board. This
means that a prima facie case of unlawful segregatioo can probably be
made in every city in the United states where there is a substantial

'1.
minority population.
6. In bls paragraph 4, Larry Inquires wby we focus oo "system"

aaldng U blacks are any less disadvantaged U they alblll attend a single
all blaek a•••K school In an integrated system? I think our opinion
auwers this. If n~ we should make it perfectly clear. The answer
fundamentally is that- as Potter Stewart has said a number of times in
conference - a school system may be integrated (or fully desegregated)
with all white and all black school remaining. If the residential patterns
are so deep that all reascmable remedial remedies are unavailable,
especially at the elementary ages when due C<Xl&ideration is given to the
values of neighborhood schools, there will certatnly be all white and all
black schools. The "right" 1s not personalized in the sense that any
particular child may demand the right to attend a xa mixed schooL
Nor may any particular cbild demand the right not to attend such school
or even not to be transported. The right is ooe shared with all children
within the school district to have the school system operated in a ccmstitutional
meaning that the system itself must be desegregated and so maintained
by all appropriate means and with due regard to all relevant rights and

interests. Perhaps, in view of Larry's question, we might add a sentence
or two in the footnote which defines the characteristics of an integrated
school system.

8.
In his No. 5, Larry questicms our reliance em Emporia. We have

discussed this before. It may be that - for the reascm Larry suggests we have given it too prominent a place In our argument. I wwld certainly

not omit it entirely, nor omit the quoted language. Perhaps it wCilld be
prudent to de-emphasize our reliance em it, either by shifting most of It
to the notes or by a more extended analysis of what the Court decided.
(Or by a combination of both). I am not persuaded, without rereading
Emporia, that Larry interprets the decisicm in the way that I did.
6. I don't understand Larry's No. 6.
7. Larry,'s No. 7 as to the transportatioo statistics does require
careful consideraticm. I think he is right about the prior extensive
busing of elementary chUdren in Charlotte/Mecklenburg. 'lb.a-e the
school district embraced :tax the entire county as well as the city.
Possibly the thing II to do is omit all examples or perhaps only leave in
Potts, characterizing it as the most extreme case which has come to my
attention.
It is true, as Larry suggests, that there is some broad language

in SWann which Bickel mentioned, namely, the statement at p. 26 to the
effect that a court must require ''the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation. " See my discussion of this oo p. 50 of my rough draft
of Jan. 2.

If construed literally, this extreme language would require

an intolerable disruption of education in every major city in the United

9.
states. Transportattcm is a logiltical problem and if enough money is
provided, all of the chUdren tn Harlem could be bused to the remote areas
of the ether borroughs of New York City and vice versa. But obviously
8waJm did not intend any such irrational result. In the very same

paragraph the Court went on to say that no ''per se rule" rm nor "any
rigid guidelines were tntended.
I dcm 't feel strongly at all about this, but y011 could add a footnote

potnttng out that the extreme language - sometimes cited as to greatest
possible degree of actual desegregaticm, must be read tn its context;
ctherwtse, its literal appllcatim would mortally wound public educaticm.
8. I don't get the potnt of La~'s No. 8.

9. I have already addressed, at the outset of this memorandum,

Larry's paragraph No. 9.
10. Likewise I have already commented on hts suggestion in his

paragraph 10.

* * * *.
Larry's analysis of my draft opinion is, as we wmld have expected,
per ceptive and lawyerlike. I am grateful to him, especially in view of hts
more enthusiastic attitude toward busing, for such a detached and
ccmstructive commentary. After you and I have discussed all of these
points more carefully, we can consider such revtsims as may then seem
appropriate.

10.
We have already discussed BW Kelly's memorandum, and you
are working on the cooceptual analysts point which seemed meritorious
to both of us. We wUl talk about some of his other points this afternoon.
L. F. P., Jr.

cc: Larry

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE:

March 26, 1973

No. 71-507 Keyes
1 am working my way through the revisions in Jfeyes, generally
with a feeling of satisfaction.
One nagging problem which cmtinues to exist, however, relates
to the language we use to describe when (!. !.·, under what circumstances)
a prima facie case exists of unconstitutionality. We have used different
terminology and my tinkering with some of the language has not helped
straighten this out. Please focus oo what we have said especially on
pages 10 and111, rider A, p. 14-15 and p. 18. There may well be other
examples.
Although 1 am not wedded to any precise language, there is
merit in a fairly high degree of cmsistency on language as critical as
this. 1 rather like your language on p. 18 which states the necessary
finding as being that "a public school system remains significantly
segregated." We should avoid a formulation which would, in effect,
create a per se rule requiring proof only of the existence of a number
of all black or all white schools.

L. F. P., Jr.

•Jqtt"tm:t <!fond of Urt ~tb .jtatte
,-aeltittghtn. ~. <!f. 2llc?'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

April 3, 1973

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN . .JR.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 71-507

Keyes v. School District

At our original conference discussion of this case, Lewis
first expressed his view that the de jure/de facto distinction
should be discarded. I told him then that I too was deeply troubled
by the distinction. Nevertheless, it appeared that a majority of
the Court was committed to the view that the distinction should be
maintained, and I therefore drafted Keyes within the framework
established in our earlier cases. While I am still convinced that
my proposed opinion for the Court is, assuming the continued
vitality of the de jure/de facto distinction, a proper resolution of
the case, I would be happy indeed to recast the opinion and jettison
the distinction if a majority of the Court is prepared to do so.
Although Lewis and I seem to share the view that de facto
segregation and de jure segregation (as we have previously used
those terms) should receive like constitutional treatment, we are
in substantial disagreement, I think, on what that treatment should
be. Unlike Lewis, I would retain the definition of the "affirmative
duty to desegregate" that we have set forth in our prior cases, in
particular Brown II, Green, and Swann. Lewis's approach has the
virtue of discarding an illogical and unworkable distinction, but
only at the price of a substantial retreat from our commitment of
the past twenty years to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation in the public schools. In my view, we can eliminate
the distinction without cutting back on our commitment, and I would
gladly do so. I welcome your comments.
W. J. B. Jr.

.·
.hp-ttm:t <!fonri ttf tlft ~t~ .jtattg
..asftingt~ ~.<If.

2llbi)l.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

April 4, 1973
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No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of April
3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation of
the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat."
I recognize, of course, that we are dealing here with an
area in which we all make judgments with relatively few objective
standards to guide us, and I certainly have great respect for Bill's
judgment. But I ee1' · 45' do not consider my interpretation of Swann
to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional rationale
of Brown-Swann line of cases. As I have said in Conference, it seems
to me that some district courts (apparently not considering the total
context of Swann), have interpreted that opinion too strictly in favor
of extensive transportation to the detriment of other legitimate interests.
Bill and I do read Swann differently. As I understand it, he
would construe Swann as applying the Green formulation to every county,
city or metropolitan area, regardless of its size and demographic
characteristics, and as requiring therein the elimination by transportation and other necessary means of "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation in the public schools." Believing,as I do, that some school
board (e.g. state) responsibility probably can be shown to exist for the
extensi'Ve"segregation that exists in every racially mixed metropolitan
area, the Green formula (prescribed for a rural county with only two
schools) simply cannot be applied as a constitutional rule of general
applicability. As Alex Bickel has said:
"In most of the larger urban areas, demo-

graphic conditions are such that no policy
that a court can order and a school board,
a city or even a state has the capability to
put into effect, will in fact result in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public

-2schools. Only a reordering of the environment involving economic and social policy on
the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact." (see my note 21.)
Quite apart from the question whether the Constitution authorizes the
Court (rather than the legislative branch of government) so to reorder
the economic and social policy of the United States in this way, it seems
to me that we may place the Court itself in the untenable position of
enunciating a formula which simply cannot be complied with in many
school districts without the most serious disruption.
For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula of
general application which preserves the basic principles of past decisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing obligations
to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be unworkable for
the community involved. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads
the entire draft, my identification of the constitutional right which is
implicated. See pp. 9-12. The right is to attend schools in an integrated
school system. The correlative duty is on the school board to operate
such a system. In a sense, this goes beyond any duty heretofore expressed by the Court. Yet I consider a requirement that school board
decisions be taken with overall integrative effect (as well as with due
regard to other relevant interests) as being the most effective way to
achieve the constitutional mandate that segregatory considerations,
subtle or otherwise, do not enter into the decisions of public school
authorities.
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours of
what constitutes an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, ll). I see in
these no "retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only effective
and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" is to
employ court-compelled transportation in disregard of demographic
conditions and at the expense of other educational interests. As to the
employment of transportation, an essential technique in many situations,
I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize a rule of reason which will
recognize other legitimate educational and communal values which localities across the country are entitled to assert.
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult life
working in public education, I am convinced that the ultimate goal must
be the best possible education for all children; that this includes, in view

..

•

-3-

of the pluralistic nature of our population in addition to the constitutional mandate, the operation of integrated school systems; it also
must mean less drastic overseeing by federal courts of the operation
of the schools by the duly constituted local authorities; and, unless
we wish to risk ultimately the grave impairment of public school
education, it means a rule of reason with which school boards and
widely varying communities can live.
I do not ask the Court to "retreat" on this vital issue. I do
indeed urge (1) the adoption of a constitutional rule of national application to the effect that all school boards have a duty to operate integrated systems, and (2) a clarification of the meaning of Swann so
that it is read as expressly authorizing the balancing of all relevant
interests rather than encouraging transportation to the full extent
necessary to achieve racial integration, to the detriment of other
interests and consequences.

L.F.P.,Jr.

LFP, Jr. :psf

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District
This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of
April 3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation
of the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat".
I recognize, of course, that we are dealing here with an area
in which we all make judgments with relatively few objective standards
to guide us. But I certainly do not consider my interpretation of
Swann to be a "substantial retreat" from the basic constitutional
rationale of Brown-Swann line of cases. As I have said in Conference,
it seems to me that district courts (taking a phrase or two out of the
total context and looking at what was actually approved in Charlotte/
Mecklenburg as being within the broad discretion
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in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public
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For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula
of general application which preserves the basic principles of past

decisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing
pressure to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be
unworkable. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads the
entire draft, my definition of the constitutional right which is
implicated. See pp. 9-12.

The right is to attend schools in an

"integrated school system". The correlative duty is to operate such
a system. In a sense, this goes beyond any duty heretofore
expressed by the Court (prior decisions have referred to a duty to
/I-~
"desegregate"), and even Swann expressly .mftieafes that once

desegregation has been accomplished no further duty remains - a
.9~~1...

view which perieBillly J!eg:ud. as.l\unrealistic and in the end
self defeating.

*

*No school system remains static. I have seen the black/white
ratio in Richmond shift as much as 5% per year, and population
shifts within a city or any given metropolitan area shift and change
constantly. The process of maintaining an integrated system,
under reasonable standards:k is a continuing one.

4.
I particularly invite attention to my outline of the contours
of what constitutes asx an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, 11).
I see no "retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only
effective and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation"
is to employ court-compelled transportation to the maximum degree
possible, regardless of conditions and all other educational interests.
As to the employment of transportation, essential in many situations,

I simply attempt to clarify and rationalize the rule of reason
articulated in Swann but apparently not fully understood by the
district courts.
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult
life working in public education (including the trying years of leading
my city gradually into an integrated system despite bitter opposition),
I am convinced that the ultimate goal must be the best possible
education for all children; that this includes, in view of the pluralistic
nature of our population in addition to the constitutional mandate,
the operate of integrated school systems; it also must mean less,
rather

tha~ more, ~Y admittedly unqualified federal

5.
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courts wHh the operation of the:adilalx schoolA by the duly constituted
authorities; and, unless we wish to risk ultimately the grave
n impariment of public school education, it means that a rule of

reason -with which school boards and widely varying communities
can live - should be the basic position of this Court.

L. F. P., Jr.
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No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District

This is a comment on Bill Brennan's memorandum of April
3, in which he expressed the view that my suggested formulation of
the correct reading of Swann would "constitute a substantial retreat."
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"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic
conditions are such that no policy that a court can
order and a school board, a city or even a state has
the capability to put into effect, will in fact result
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public
schools. Only a reordering of the environment
involving economic and social policy on the broadest
conceivable front might have an appreciable impact."
(see my note 21).
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For these reasons, I have tried to articulate a formula of
general application which preserves the basic principles of past decisions, which will impose on school authorities continuing obligations

-3to achieve integration, and yet one which will not be unworkable for
the community involved. It is necessary to keep in mind, as one reads
the entire draft,
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what constitutes. an "integrated school system" (pp. 10, 11). I see~ no
"retreat" whatever, unless one believes that the only effective and constitutional means of achieving ultimate "desegregation" is to employ
court-compelled transportation in disregard of demographic conditions
and at the expense of other educational interests. As to the employment
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assert.
I would add only this: having spent 19 years of my adult life
working in public education, I am convinced that the ultimate goal
must be the best possible education for all children; that this includes,
in view of the pluralistic nature of our population in addition to the
constitutional mandate, the operation of integrated school systems;

$

operation of the school by the duly constituted local authorities; and,
1\

unless we wish to risk ultimately the grave impairment of public school
education, it means a rule of reason ll1lii:lK with which school boards
and widely varying communities can live.
I do not ask the Court to "retreat" on this vital issue. I do
indeed urge (l) the adoption of a constitutional rule of national application

-5to the effect that all school boards have a duty to operate integrated
systems, and (2) a clarification of the meaning of Swann so that it is
read as expressly authorizing the balancing of all relevant interests
rather than encouraging transportation to the full extent necessary to
achieve racial integration, to the detriment of other interests and
consequences.

L.F.P.,Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF' ..JUSTICE

May 30, 1973

Re: No. 71-507 .. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1

Dear Bill:
I have been waiting for the 6th Circuit case
and I now conclude that I will defer action.
Indeed I think this case shou 1dgo over to
the next Term, but the 6th Circuit opinion may alter
my View.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

/

/

.iupt'tmt <!fcurt cf tlrt 'Jltnittb .itatte::ur~ut1png~ ~. <q. 2Ll~Jl.:l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

May 30, 1973

RE: No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District No.1
Dear Chief:
I most strenuously oppose your suggestion that Keyes
go over for reargument. If you have canvassed the Detroit
issues, as I have, you might agree that none of them is
even remotely connected with any decided in Keyes. Moreover, Byron is out of Keyes,and any idea that it must go
over because it overlaps issues in Detroit is only to suggest
that he must also stay out of Detroit. I thought we all agreed
that Richmond should come down when it did to be sure that
we\i have a nine-judge Court for Detroit. Your suggestion
would defeat that objective.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

Jttpttmt Qlllltrl of tlft ~b Jhdts
Jlaslfhtghtn, J. <q. 2llc?,.~
CHAMBERS 01'"

May 30, 1973

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

Re:

No. 71-507 -Keyes v. School District No. 1

Dear Bill:
Your note of today indicates you did not observe that
my comment about putting this case over is tied to what is
revealed by the Court of Appeals opinion in the Detroit case.
I freely confess I have not canvas sed the Detroit issues. I
have an abundance of work on the cases already here and for
my part my final conclusion on Keyes would await a reading
of the 6th Circuit opinion in Keyes. Their analysis of the issues
may not correspond with yours and, of course, it will be their
opinion we will be asked to review.
I do not understand your point on Byron's participation.
We pointedly laid aside an 8th Circuit case on the death penalty
to decide the same issue in another case presenting precisely
the same issue in order to be sure Harry could participate.
There is no basis to think Byron would need to stay out of the
Detroit cas.e in any circumstance.
May I suggest that your concern is premature.
I read the CA6 opinion I may well agree with you.

Mr. Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference.

After

~ttp'ftnu

<.qtmrl of tqt ~ttiftb .ihttts

._.aslfhtgton:. ~. <.q. 21l.;i~$
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 30, 1973

Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School District No. 1

Dear Bill:
I had again reviewed the circulations in this Denver case
and was ready to write when the Chief's note to you of today
came around.
Wholly apart from the suggestion of the Chief Justice, and
without passing upon the merits of that suggestion pending further
discussions, I would be ready to join your last circulation. This
generally is in line with my note to you of January 9.
I retain some unease about the situation, for I am persuaded,
as Lewis and Bill Douglas appear to be, that the de jure-de facto
distinction eventually must give way. Lewis 1 opinion -- both parts
of it -- is, for me, forceful and persuasive. I take it, from your
letter of April 3, that you also are inclined to the view Lewis entertains except for the question of remedy. I feel, however, as apparently you do, that we need not meet the de jure-de facto distinction
for purposes of the Denver case. Because I feel this way, I join
you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc: The Conference

MEMORANDUM

TO:

J. Harvie Wilkinson,

m

Date: June 15, 1973

FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 71-507 Keyes v. School District
Please review the attached memoranda from Justice
Brennan with recommendations as to the ''holds" for Keyes.
I would like pour view as to each of these seven cases
in a little memorandum that can be attached to the Brennan
memoranda for my study.

L.F.P., Jr.

LFP/gg

Ju;rrmu <!fouri of tlrt ~~ ~tatt•
..a.Irhtght~ :!f1. <If. 21T~"'~
CHAMBERS OF'

June 19, 1973

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

Re: No. 71-507 - Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1

Dear Bill:
Will you be good enough to show me as
concurring in the result.

I

Regards,

G
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM

II'")

TO:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

J. Harvie Wilkinson, Ill

Date: June 21, 1973

On Thursday, June 21, 1973, I checked with the Library
to make certain there were no more recent school desegregation
statistics than those contained in Footnotes 3 and 4 of your Keyes
opinion. The Library confirmed that the most recent HEW statistics
for the 1972 school year will not be available for another two weeks
at the earliest.

J.H.W., Ill

JHW/gg

MEMORANDUM

ro.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

J. Harvie Wilkinson,

Date: June 21, 1973

m

?I- ~r~'
On Thursday, June 21, 1973, I checked with the Library
to make certain there were no more recent school desegregation
statistics than those contained in Footnotes 3 and 4 of your Ketlus
sties
opinion. '!be Library confirmed that the most recent HEW s
for the 1972 school year will not be available for another two weeks
at the earliest.
J.H.W.,

JHW/gg
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Busing: .The Push-Pull Effect
Wednesday, as if to underscore the unhappy and
unprofitable relationship that has developed between the courts and Congress on the question of
school desegregation, U.S. District Judge Stephen J.
Roth made final his comprehensive busing order in
Detroit, and a subcommittee of the House turned
loose a version of Mr. Nixon's "anti-busing" legislation-which evidently stands a fairly good chance
of passage. No coincidence could better illustrateat least symbolically-the push-pull effect that has
come into play between the two branches of government on this subject, an action-reaction phenomenon of sorts that has impelled each, in
different ways, to strain at the outer limits of
constitutional commands and restraints. For Judge
Roth's decision represents the evolution of certain
low court-endorsed doctrines and assumptions about
segregation to a point well beyond anything endorsed thus far by the Supreme Court and-in
some respects-beyond anything that logic can
easily sustain. For their part, the politicians and
legislators continue to promote counter measures
relevant only' to their own immediate political
needs, measures destined to make worse, not better,
the murderous conditions of ghetto entrapment and
ghetto school life that Judge Roth-however flawed
his decision-was at least trying seriously to
address.
The Detroit ruling, which will now be appealed,
is tremendous in its sweep: altogether it covers
schools enrolling about 780,000 students; it involves
a great number of suburban school districts against
which no specific finding of discrimination was
made, but which Judge Roth believes must be
made a party to the state's rectification of conditions that prevail in Detroit; by September, 1973,
the order would apparently require the reassignment of some 300,000 children-half of these black
children sent from Detroit to suburban schools, the
other half white children reassigned from the suburbs to the city. Despite all this, however, it is not
the magnitude of the order alone which makes it
distinctive. Perhaps more important is the doctrine
on which Judge Roth has based his decision and the
way in which he has described his remedy. He has
made very clearcut indeed certain assumptions and
opinions that turn up more ambiguously in other
lower court rulings.
One is that school systems have an affirmative
duty to assign students in a manner that overcomes neighborhood racial

under desegreation pressures, present patterns
of racial concentrations iri the schools are the
result of hundreds of decisions, legal and illegal,
public and private, inside the school systems and
outside them. In the record of nearly any large
school system, it is therefore possible to find some
administrative actions which have tended to promote the segregation of children by race. Taken
together, the Detroit finding and the Detroit remedy could lead to endless relitigation and endless
readjustment of racial proportioning in a fashion
that lost sight of both the educational and constitutional questions involved.

Along with the Denver and Richmond cases, to
which it bears certain important similarities, the
Detroit case will doubtless be resolved when the
Supreme Court addresses itself to this phase of
desegregation law in the fall. That fact plus the
strong likelihood that the high court, if it follows
its own reasoning in Swann, will establish limits to
what the lower courts may order, should have been
enough to keep Congress and the administration
from trying to play high court themselves. But it,
of course, was not. The variation on the administration "anti-busing" bill now out of subcommittee
would strip the federal courts of the right to remedy certain violations of a child's constitutional
rights under any circumstances, and it is another
measure of the spirit motivating the legislators that
they have in fact stripped from this measure what
funds are allocated for the improvement of ghetto
education.
We shall return to the provisions of this pernicious legislation which is soon due for further
House action. For now it seems enough to offer
it as an example of what the push-pull effect is all
about. For 18 years now, the federal judiciary has
been obliged to assume the lonely and often inappropriate role of school desegregator for the nation,
with lower courts often being obliged to function
as proxy school boards. All this is owing to the
massive default of the other branches of government at all levels and of communities across the
nation who were content to let the courts take the
heat. So it is hardly any wonder that some federal
courts may have overreached themselves or made
policy that is less than fair and/or less than wise.
And they can hardly be faulted for showing themselves to be the only branch of government with a
sustained concern for righting inequities which
others have assiduously ignored. For the principal
"help" these courts have received from men like
those now pushing "anti-busing" legislation is the

is tremendous in its sweep: altogether it covers
schools enrolling about 780,000 students; it involves
a great number of suburban school districts against
which no specific finding of discrimination was
made, but which Judge Roth believes must be
made a party to the state's rectification of conditions that prevail in Detroit; by September, 1973,
the order would apparently require the reassignment of some 300,000 children-half of these black
children sent from Detroit to suburban schools, the
other half white children reassigned from the suburbs to the city. Despite all this, however, it is not
the magnitude of the order alone which makes it
distinctive. Perhaps more important is the doctrine
on which Judge Roth has based his decision and the
way in which he has described his remedy. He has
made very clearcut indeed certain assumptions and
opinions that turn up more ambiguously in other
lower court rulings.
C'+-'

One is that school systems have an affirmative
duty to assign students in a manner that overcomes neighborhood racial concentrations-even
where such concentrations are the result of housing patterns to which the school system was not a
party. Another is that failure to do so-acquiescence
in letting school zones reflect these housing patterns-may be accounted evidence that the school
system as a whole has promoted de jure segregation.
Judge Roth found that school officials in Detroit
had done some things to further racial integration
and some things to inhibit its progress-the latter
including, for example, the creation of optional
attendance zones, a refusal to bus white students
' into predominantly black schools, and the location
of certain other schools in ways that reinforce
racial patterns. He espoused, however, what has
been called the theory of "total taint," which holds
that whether or not a school system's actions pave
been consistently and/or predominant.ly taken with
an intent t9 segregate children by race, and whether
or not such actions as it has taken bear prime
responsibility for the segregation that occurs, evidence that some of its actions have contributed to
the separation of the races is sufficient to bring
down upon it a finding of de jure segregation.
Judge Roth's remedy-which would assure that
"upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom be substantially disproportionate to the overall racial composition" of the city-suburb area-is
also distinctive. It is, in uncommonly pure form, a
racial balance solution. Heretofore, the Supreme
Court has authorized the creation of fixed racial
proportions only as a relative and transitional means
of measuring whether a formerly dual school system has in fact taken steps to dismantle its outlawed arrangements: Judge Roth appears to be
authorizing racial proportioning in the classroom
as an absolute and permanent feature of desegregated schools.
This last departure is one which we have long
opposed on grounds that it represents a substantive
and dangerous reassertion of race as the defining
feature of the individual citizen and one on which
government can base all manner of actions affecting him. Between a transitional and necessarily
race-conscious remedy for past discriminatory acts
and the establishment of government's right to deal
with people in perpetuity strictly on the basis of
their race, there is, it seems to us, a profound dif-

measure of
the legislators that
they have in fact stripped from this measure what
funds are allocated for the improvement of ghetto
education.
We shall return to the provisions of this pernicious legislation which is soon due for further
House action. For now it seems enough to offer
it as an example of what the push-pull effect is all
about. For 18 years now, the federal judiciary has
been obliged to assume the lonely and often inappropriate role of school desegregator for the nation,
with lower courts often being obliged to function
as proxy school boards. All this is owing to the
massive default of the other branches of government at all levels and of communities across the
nation who were content to let the courts take the
heat. So it is hardly any wonder that some federal
courts may have overreached themselves or made
policy that is less than fair and/or less than wise.
And they can hardly be faulted for showing themselves to be the only branch of government with a
sustained concern for righting inequities which
others have assiduously ignored. For the principal
"help" these courts have received from men like
those now pushing "anti-busing" legislation is the
observation that you can't do anything about the
schools until you do something about housing and
that you can't do anything about housing until you
do something about jobs and that you can't do anything about jobs until you have done something
about schools.
C'+-t

Judge Roth's decision seems to us a highly !lUestionable one-not least on the grounds that it
probably won't work. It seems evident to us that
judicial remedies of the kind that flowed from
Brown have pretty much exhausted their usefulness
as a way of addressing the deprivations that flow
from the great racial concentrations in our inner
cities. And it seems evident, too, that what is sorely
wanted is federal policy based on well-conceived
legislation that would draw children toward integrated schools with an emphasis on educational
benefits, one that would take advantage of the fact
that falling birth rates are already creating unexpected vacancies in many good school systems, one
that would enlist federal and community funds and
effort in the socially desirable goal of racial integration and the constitutionally required goal of
racial equity.
Even though most white Americans recognize the
unfairness of shutting the ghetto's children into
inferior housing and inferior schools, few of the
politicians who represent that majority seem willing to help it work out reasonable solutions to the
problem. They would rather dump the problem
on. the courts-and run against the predictable
result. That is the meaning of what the President
and the Congress are up to this summer-and that
is the reason we find Judge Roth and some of his
lower court colleagues who have been wrestling
with these cases sympathetic and honorable figures
who, if they have been wrong, have been wrong for
decent and right reasons. 'that is more than you
can say for the politicians who are after them in
full cry.
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The Busing Bust
During the long months in dubious effectiveness as a rider
which Congress has been nibbl- to the omnibus education bill
ing around the edges of an ap- recently signed by the President.
proach to the forced-busing probT h e subcommittee-approved
lem, the original educational-so- bill puts busing at the bottom of
cia! rationale for busing has a list of priority desegregation
evapora-ted.
remedies available to judges.
First, social scientist James S. Such alternatives as neighborColeman of Johns Hopkins Uni- hood assignments, free transfer
versity said that federal judges from a school where a student is
have been misusing his mam- in a racial majority to one where
moth 1966 government-financed he is in a minority, revision of
study of student achievement, attendance zones or grade strucentitled "Equality of Educational t u res , construction of new
Opportunity," as a justification schools or · closing of inferior
for massive busing. "I don't ones, and use of magnet schools
think a judge can say there is or educational parks, would have
prima facie evidence of in- higher priorities as remedies
equality in educational opportun- than busing. Even as a "last reity on achievemeot grounds if sort," busing could not be rethere is school segregation," the qui red in the sixth grade and
Coleman Report's author said.
below, and busing orders would
N e x t , Harvard Professor automatically terminate after
David J. Armor, himself a propo- five years. Additionally, the bill
nent of integration, reported that seeks to preserve the integrity of
his before-and-after study in five school district boundaries from
Northern school systems showed judicial manipulation of the kind
that busing produced no im- proposed by District Judges in
provement in pupil achievement, Richmond and Detroit.
but did produce increased racial
The bill may not be the whole
intolerance,
declining
edu- answer. We would like to see an
cational aspirations, and lowered authentic educational freedom of
self-esteem on the part of black choice returned to both black and
pupils who were bused.
w h it e families with strict
Nevertheless, it apparently safeguards against any intakes Congress a long time to ·dividual being denied the excatch up with reality, if it ever ercise of his choice. But the bill
does. A subcommittee of the is a good start toward recogniHouse Education and Labor tion that enforced busing is the
C o m m i t t e e has just gotten least desirable way to correct
around to approving one of the past injustices against black chiltwo bills President Nixon pro- dren and to seek sound eduposed on March 17 to deal with cations for all the nation's young.
the busing problem. The second In short, it is time for Congress
bill, calling for a freeze on all to recognize that busing has been
new busing orders until July 1, a bust and that expeditious ac1973, is still mired in a House tion is needed to set the nation on
·Judiciary panel, but Congress w i s e r paths toward non-disdid enact a busing moratorium of criminatory, quality education.

William _Raspberry

~inging

the Same
(School Contract) Bell

IF THE D. C. SCHOOL board's squabble over what to do with Supt. Hugh J.
Scott when his contract' expires next·
Qctober Ita$ a familiar ring, it is because the song Ita$ been played so often.
The names, faces and tiUes ~;hange, but
the refrain is constant: The schools are
bad, and the only ones who can improve
them are the people downtown-the
school board and the superintendent.
T hey're playing it again, ·both with
Scott's contract and with a proposal that
he and t}l.e ,poard work out a statement
of what ·changes we may expect in the
school s11_stem next year.
• ' A s" long ·as we're singing old songs,
· let ' ~e repeat one I wrote over a year
ago, 3ust aftet the school board elections,
.. not only . to demonstrate how little
thing~ change but also because I still
: believe that we're looking to the wrong
people for solutions. Here it is:
\1

PEO:t>L~

<

r

... ARE expecting the election of Marion Barry and the candidates
he supported to transform our schools
into institutions of academic 'excellence. It is no reflection on the victorious candidates to say: It won't happen.
For w..bile the bickering among school
board m,embers, and between certain
board :members and the superintendent, 'has garnered a lot of press coverage, the nub of the prdblem is not at
t he Presideptial Building. The problem
~s in local classrooms, where dlstressmgly large numbers of . our children
are not learning. Marion Barry for all
' of ~s brains, leadership abilit~, imagi·nabon am! rapport, is not going to
teach a single child to read. Don't do
him the disservice of expecting him to.
-r:he Board of Education, Washingtomans :keep forgetting, is neither a
centrally located tutorial service nor a
hydra-headed superintendent. The
board's job is to set the policies by
which our schools shall be run. The
long-run implications of wise policy
are obvious. But those who expect major short-term improvements are
bound to be disappointed.
' , This is not to castigate those who
have ):>een elected to t he board but to
r emind the people who elected them
that casting a ballot is only a first step.
'It is, of course, important to elect
'board members who are ·b right enough
. to set sound policy and strong enough
t o see that it is carried out. And in

that regard, it will be useful for the
community to give the board some
idea of what that general policy should.
be . . . But policy is no more than ·a
statement of what we want to happen';'•
it doesn't mak~ it happen.
The key figui-e in what makes it hap:
pen is t he local principal, and ordinafr
parents can exert rp.ore influence atthat level than anyone else. One super.•
intendent and 11: school board mero:
bers simply cannot keep day-to-day
t abs on 18(}-odd principals.
-'
PARENTS CAN. And if they want.
genuine il!lprovement in their 'ch1ldren'sl 'd cation, they'd better. Casting a_
ballot 's no substitute for visiting
Schoo S, seeing at first P,and what iS
happening (or not happening), offering.
suggestions and volunteering assi~h
ance. .
~
"" .'
It is no accident that edu ation s"
worse at t
schoo
a
·
'i vo ement is east.
know t at ''in
many o
e ow-inc.ome neighbor..:
hoods, where the least learning is tak..:
ing place, parents often are too busy..
t oo timid or too poorly educated themselves to get very much involved ih
what's happening at their children'!; ·
schools.
•·
But they'll have ·to make the time t'b
get involved if they · expect .their
schools to get ).Jetter. As a matter J>f.. ..
fact, simply knowing that his or herpare nts · are concerned can do a gr~~t
deal to motivate a child to learn.
The superintendent and the schooi'
board can increase the effectiveness Of·
parental involvement by giving princi.-·
. pals sufficient autonomy to do wb}t":,
parents want done and by holding.
· them accountable for results. Princi:
pals may choose to pass this autonomy
along, in effect telling individual'
teachers: I don't care how you do it;:_
but this is what. must be qone.
The board of education can offe!"' \
guidance, resources and assistanc~.:
But it cannot improve classroom learn: _
ing any more than the board of Geh·
eral Motors can make a better automobile.
·•
It will be nice for a change to have a
strong, effective and unified board..
But the real work of improving educa:·
tion is in the hands of principals.,-.
teachers and parents.
' '

/

Joseph Alsop

Johnny Still Can't Read
It is not the sort of stuff headlines
Thus the meaning of the school criare made o~, but the deepening crisis
sis is that our last large E-xcluded
in American education is still the most
groups, the great majorities of the
ominous single feature of our political
blacks and Puerto Ricans are not belandscape. Consider the following
ing given the tool they ~eed most of
facts:
.
all, in order to escape into equality.
ITEM: The Supreme Court has just
T.here is no use talking about equal oprefused to strike down the discriminaportunity, for people who cannot take
tory system by which our schools are
advantage of opportunities, even when
largely financed by property taxes.
offered. And there are precious few
The court was probably wise not to or
opportunities in modern America for
der a judicially-contrived educational
persons who leave school without the
earthquake. But that still leaves rich
ability to read and write ·a nd figure .
school districts paying lower taxes and
So consider the future of so many of
getting better schools, and poor school
our big cities, which are getting nearer
districts getting poorer schools while and nearer to being straight-out ghetpaying higher taxes.
tos half hidden behind financial and
ITEM: Only a few decades ago, New !business districts! All this in sum betoYork City's school system was still a kens a horrifying failure of American
model for other big cities. The other
day, however, the annual citywide
reading tests showed that the New - ~.
.o. .tty today, and an eveh more hairYork system had once again dropped
1 -~ng problem for American society
further behind in teaching the city's
in the future .
children the most basic and essential
Yet the soggy silence that now preskill, which is how to read. The reading level has been declining conUnuva~ls on ~hese subjects also has its own
ously in the New York schools since
grim, qmte current political meaning.
1965, when testing began.
~fter all, you do not look to hold-theITEM: There is a class difference
line conservatives like President Nixon
here. Queens and Staten Island childfor creative answers to vast social
ren, still predominantly white and midproblems. For such answers you lookdle class, are still reading at the level
pr used to look-to the liberals who
want change and do not fear it.
of the ·national averages, and sometimes above. But in the overwhelm~ut in the crucial area of education,
ingly black Williamsburg district in
as m so many other areas important
Brooklyn, for instance, the boys and
for domestic policy, the American libgirls in the ninth grade are reading at
erals have fallen strangely silent. TJJ.ey
the level of normal sixth graders. That
cannot even find the energy to chalmeans most of them will leave school , l~nge the nonsense of pseudo-thinkers
effectively illiterate.
like Harvard's Christopher Jencks
ITEM: Really recent exact figures are
who has grandly announced that it i~
not available. But in all big cities in
hopeless to expect the schools to edu·
cate the people who need education
America, the black and Puerto Rican
most.
,
components in the school populations.
-the ones who are not learning to
The reasons for the liberal silence
read, in fact-have been steadily inon education are pretty obvious too
creasing, year by year. In most AmeriThe slogan-thi.t?-k remedy of the' past.
can big cities beginning on a Northwas school desegregation, forcible if
South line from Chicago to New Orleneed be, and by busing if need be. But
an~ line and going eastwards, the
whites are now in the minority in the
school populations, both in North and
South.
The social meaning of this for the
future hardly bears thinking· about. In
the last half centuries, great numbers
of Americans-all the so-called ethnic
groups, for instance, and the Chineseand Japanese-Americans-have escaped from partial or total exclusion
into full success in the larger American society. But these groups escaped
by having the tools to escape; and
reading was the first tool.
--~------~---

•

three things have happened to make
the slogan-thinkers taciturn.
Busing has proved to be a horribly
hot political potato, especially with the
white blue collar workers who are so
vital to the Democratic Party. Most
black people have turned out not to
want their children bused, any more
than blue collar whites want it. And
even where the device has been given
the fairest kind of chance, in places
like Berkeley, Calif., mere forcible desegregation has turned out to do little
or nothing to raise black children's
reading levels.
.T his is a thing that can be done, and
has been done, although it costs a good
deal of money. It was done for instance, very briefly,- by the mdre effective schools program in new York City
-which was killed by liberal hostility
and liberal neglect, because it did not
suit the slogan-thinkers. But is it really
liberalism (or is it bankruptcy?) To
have no p~oblem except dismantling
the country's foreign policy and national defense? All the same, that is
American liberalism today.
• @
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The court in general is moving m
that direction, as a number of cases
in the last week suggest. It held thnt
tests for police applicants are not
discriminatory simply because a
disproportionate number of blacks
The using Tan~~e
tail; di scriminatory intent must be
President Ford's proposal for E The best an I sis that \ve have proved. lt held that it is illegal for
~ egislation limiti ng t~e use of busing see~ o w ~re the courts' desegre- private schools to refuse admission
111 school desegregatiOn cases prob- gat10n deciSions went astray ap- to blacks, but that a white cannot be
ably would not succeed in solving pears in a cou rt opinion, Justice subjected to employment discrimithe busing turmoil even if, im proba- Powell's cons<!nti_ng. opimon 1n nation to favor u black . Yesterday it
bly, it were enacted by Congress. Reyc:; v. School D1stnct t:Jo. 1, the held that school districts need not
But that is by no means to 11 uy the Denver bu!:>lng case. Ju st1ce Powell chan.ge desegregation plans to keep
proposal is not directed at 11 real notes the moral force of Brown, and abreast of population patterns.
problem.
approves of Green v. Co1mty School
These are healthy decisions, and
The courts have worked them- Board, in which a suiJterfuge to us they seem to point to an ultiselves into a huge tangle on the bus- "freedom oi choice'' plan was mate resolution of the busing tangle
ing issue. They have done so for his- stru~ ~ down nnd an "affirmative along the li nes suggested by Justice
torical reasons with which one must duty to desegregate promulgated_. Powell. Busing orders were an upsympathize, but that does not re- This was an appropriate remedy for propriate remedy in breaking dcwn
duce the present problem . The bus- the facts of Green, a rural county subterfuges ert>ctetl by recaicitrant
ing orders recently in the news clearly maintaining a dual school segregationists, but they are discommand almost no public support. system.
proportionate to the more s ubtie ofThe cou rt went wr_onl.'!, Jus~ice fcnses the co urt s now typically enWhen the public sees children bearing the brunt of pu hl ic policy, it nat- Powell clearly feels, 111 Swa"!ln v. counte r. And there is a danger in
urally asks preci sely what" public C~arlotte-Mecklenburg, when 1t ap- the courts trying to undo the effect
purpose is being se1·ved . In public plted t~e Green remedy to the far of residential patterns, for they can
debate the typical response is to different facts of an urban setting. never know how much the patterns
throw the accusation of racism at He notes that the busing order re- r esult from discrimination and how
anyone who dares raise the ques- quired Charlotte "to alleviate condi- much from truly free choice.
tions, and even the courts don't do tions which in large part did notreIf President Ford's actions in
?. much better job in supplying a suit from historic, state-imposed de supporting le g i.~tltion and Justice
persuasive answer.
jure segregation." Ra the r, it re- Department
h l''iefs
speed
the
The original Brown decision quircd r edress of the effects on court's progress toward this solustriki ng down segregated schools school r acia l composition of "seg- tion, it will be all to the good. The
stood 011 a finn moral foundation: r egated r e!Jidential an9. migratory courts will be on sound moral footThe state shall be neutral with re- pHtterns" Cha rlotte shares with any ing, and accordingly will ngnin
spect to r ace. It is unconstitutional metropolitian area, Southern or command public suppor t, when they
for a ·state to pass laws assigning Northern.
find their way back to the original
school children on the basis of race.
Now, Charlotte had maintained a logic of Brown: with r e spect to race
But as the law evolved, as the legally mandated dual school sys- -the state shoil be neutral; this Concourts struck down subterfuges in- tern--de jure segregation by any stitu tion is colorblind.
tended to violate 1his command, as definition. But Justice Powell re- _ __
they dealt with r ecalc itrant racism, mark ed that in nearly any school
it arrived at a different point. district the authorities have contribSchools must take affirmative ac- uted in one way or anothe r to whattion to desegregate, even if this ever segrt>gation exists .. and since
means assigning school children on Swann the courts have in fact been
tht:> basis of ruce .
stretching the de fure doctrine acThis latter conclusion the .public cordingly . In this. Justice Po~ell
will not support, nnd the public is - sugges~s. they a re met·ely follo wmg
ri ght. But it is difficult to write lnws tht:; log1c of Swann: If the law rete lling the courts how to int erpre t Qlllres Cha ~lotte. to remedy the eflhe Constitution. Presi dent Ford •s fects of . r cS1lient1al _patterns,. to fol proposols for example would limit low racial r att.os 111 correc:tmg d~
.'
f .b· .
' d
..
facto sq~rega twn, 1t r P.qutres all
t he d u~att on o us.mg or ers to hve cities to do like wise.
·
yt:>nrs ~: ..the court s. or.~ers are fo1Ju stice Powell concurred in the
lo~,·e d 111 good fmth ; but. 1-i 0 ~ ~3 decisiun upholding the Denver
fmth IS oftt•n already the pr euse ~~- busing order, in part because
sue. Tht• cuurts can
· now se ttl e d 1aw. B u t
· of· course be d1d S u:o rm- 1s
rected by const1tut1ona 1 umen
I
I
l
.
c ear v 1e was as k"111g th e o th er J u!lnwnt, an d ·we can conct·l.ve . an tices 'to jui"n .him in dealing. with
amendment_ bnsed on the p11nc tple Su•ann's '·'ambiguities" in a way
of n color~ltnd lnw. But It would ~e that would gt> t away fr om rac ial rafar bt•tter 1f tht• cu11rts '~o rlwd thetr tios and bnck to a colm·blind rule.
own way out uf the tan~te, nnd perhaps th~t i!l not too much to hope.
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William Raspberry

Busing: A Question of Power
The "busing" controversy, in many
of its manifestations, is less a dear-cut
issue of morality and simple justice
than a question of power. To the degree that it involves a power struggle,
some perspective may be useful.
It is no disparagement of those activists whose life-risking commitment
created The MovP.ment to say that the
civil rights struggle of the 1960s
turned largely on the embarrassment
of white people. It took far more courage and ·s trength than most of us possess to create that embarrassment; and
often the white people who were embarrassed were far removed from
those against whom The Movement's
fury was directed.
But it did work, and the result is
that some landmark civil rights legislation is on the books ; some of it is even
being enforced.
It worked exceedingly well to use
police dogs and firehoses in Alabama
to embarrass white people in the rest

of the country, and there was even

some ·s cattered success in embarrassing white people right where they
lived, with demonstrations over job
and housing discrimination, for instance.
And if it is true that this success implies that The Movement-that black
people-possessed power, it is also
true that what was involved was power
of a very contingent sort, relying for
its existence on its appeal to con(cience and basic morality: on the embarrassment of white people.
Some of those in the forefront of the
busing thing are forgetting how contingent that power was. They think that
the power is real and that nine-tenths
of the people can be forced by a minority of the remaining tenth to do
something they don't want to do.
The odds against that happening
would be great even if the morality
and justice of the question were

clearly on the side of the minority. But
"busing" is an issue on which moral
and just men may differ.
There are important distinctions to
be made, for instance, between school
desegregation, which says that Qificials
may not practice racial discrimination ~
in pupil assignment, and inte(ITI~tion,. -~
which says that the law requires not.
only an end to racial seg1egation but~
also that each black pupil have his fair ·
share of white schoolmates.
'· '
For a time, the only people willi:rig '
to speak out against "busing" as .' a •
means for redistributing . children ·On ,
the basis of their race were. the same f
people who only a short time earlie~
were using buses fot the express pur- '
pose of maintaining racial segregatfulf. ·;
Anyone who identified with the .bigo~s. •
antibusing stand ran the risk of be.in~"f
identified with his bigotry as w:el!. ~
That's embarrassing.
•.
' ,..
But the embarrassment is dy1pg;..
More and more white people are '
saying: It might be unfair to make you ·
bus your children away so that mine "'
can keep their all-white schools; but..i\ •
also is unfair for you to make me bus
my children away for the purpose of
integrating your children's classroorriS::-"
Decent white people have begun • .to.,
speak of the value of neighborhood,¥
schools without any more fear <>f em-,
barrassment than black parents who'.
say the same thing.
'
111
The pofnt is this: If opposition
"busing" is a position held not only by>
white bigots but by whites generall.,v; '
then it is likely that the prpbusing peo- •
ple are riding a loser. For when white~
embarrassment goes, what is l~ft is a
power struggle pure · and simple. ·J. ·
don't like the odds.
'·'
What would seem a reasonable thin~1
for black Americans to do at this point!
is to back off for a moment and dec~
on some priorities. If that happened~ I.
suspect the result· would be close to'
what NAACP Executive Director Rof
Wilkins said several days ago: Integra-•
tion is a desirable end, .but qual'ity edlb··
cation is a higher. prior-ity,
. • ~-~
The Wilkins formulation (which( ·in-t
cidentally, already is being "clarifi~q:\
nearly out of existence) may come
close to the consensus view of bhick
America: Keep integration where yo· ·
have it, increase it where you can, bnt';
the name of the game is quality edu:ca.
tion. Let busing revert ,to being just- a
means of transportation.
·
'
As the breadth of white opposition
to busing is taken into account, blacks
can begin -to tr\lde busing for other
things they consider more important: a
fair share of the money and resources,
for example, or maybe even .some special considerations, l:lased on , speq~~-,
·J

~

to

•

Impact and Criticism
By coincidence, the book
had its apparently significant
impact on a Supreme Court
majority last week at the
same time that it was drawing
a new round of withering criticism in the influential Harvard Educational Review.
The "Jencks study," as it is
now commonly called, disputes the liberal belief that
equalizing opportunity - particularly in the schools - will
improve the education of poor
children, and wUI assure them
as adults of a productive and
prosperous life.
Possibly as much as 75 percent of a person's future prosperity, "Inquality" found, may
result simply from just plain
luck plus the accident that a

Christopher Jencks has discovered, six months after his
major book about education
came out, that the critics were
right: It is being read, and
taken seriously, in high places.
At the same time, Jencks
has learned - after last
week's landmark Supreme
Court d e c i s i o n on public
schools - that some of these
very important readers are
satisfied that the author's controversial conclusions were
persuasive.
A sociologist, Jencks teamed
with seven Harvard University
associates in preparing a report titled "Inequality - A
Reassessment of the Effect of
Family and Schooling in
America.'• n came out amid
publicity fanfare in September, and was published in book
form in October.
Since then it has been the
center of a critical storm.
the field today. In a long footnote, citing Jencks, Colem.an
and other researchers, Powell
said the extent to which the
quality of educat~on varies
with expenditure per pupil is
debated inconclusively by the
m~t 1houghtful students of
public education."
Justice Thurgood Marshall,
in a long dissent, also discussed the Jencks, Coleman
and similar studies, but he
argued that they did not make
a difference on the constitutional issue of equal education.
"The question of discrimination in educational quality,"
Marshall said, "must be
deemed to be an objective on.e
that looks to what the state
provides its children, not to
what the children are able to
do with what they receiv~."
The court, lie said, does not
sit "to resolve disputes over
educational theory but , to enforce our Constitution."

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS

The fact that the Jencks Clark, the well-known black his study, Clark c
study might have a direct im- sociologist. He calls the study
"Jencks' findin
pact on courts and' other pub- and other research disputing pretations had b
lic policy makers has always the effect of schooling "a so- advertised to the
been a basic source of critichl phisticated intellectual form of lic through the
complaint.
white backlash."
before other soc
Social scientists, Clark sug- had had the opp
That point is restated frequently in the current issue of gests, have given government view them critic
the Harvard Educational Re- policy makers the rationale time this study c
view, in which critics question for arguing "there is in fact no fully reviewed,
Jencks' statistical methods realistic need either to deseg- public, including
and his political orientation regate schools, decentralize ers, was quoting
and contend that his findings schools, equalize expenditures tionable findings
are alTeady bolstering opposi- for schools, or for that matter, were sacred writ.
tion to better-financed schools, even adequately m a in t a i n
Dr. Alice M. Ri
school desegregation, and ex- schools."
ings Institution,
panded social programs.
tique, says "Ine
'As H ••• Sacred Writ'
Some of the most severe lan. new form of
guage used in the criticism
Recalling that Jencks held a biased research
comes from Dr. Kenneth B. • press conference to announce who "take on the

Jencks Scliool ifheory 1n Publi
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skills or competence.
Even if schools were made
fully equal, the study argued,
there is no guarantee that they
would produce adults with
equal incomes.
When the study first was
made public, it was widely assumed that it would provide
support for arguments against
equalizing spending between
schools, and even against
spending more money for
schools. Jencks himself said
he feared the conclusions
would be "taken out of context
and used to support all kinds
of political causes" which be,
as a liberal, would consider
"detestable."
The study, it is now clear,
figured prominently in the reasoning used by a Supreme
Court majority last week. By a
5-4 vote, the court upheld the
financing of public education
by local propertY taxes even
while conceding that this leads
to unequal spending between
school districts.
Not aRight
Education is not a fundamental right under the Constitution, and thus there is no
guarantee that school districtJ
must finance education equally, the court concluded.
Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr.'s majority opinon appears
to rely significantly on Jencks'
study and on some similar
conclusions drawn in 1966 in
the famous "Equality of Educational opportunity" report
by James S. Coleman of Johns
Hopkins Unversity.
The Coleman study -which
Jencks relied upon in part in
his new study - concluded
that added spending for educational "inputs" (improved facilities, equipment and teaching), does not produce the
desired "outputs" (improved
· stuoent achievement). More
important, it concluded, are
social and economic differences in a child's personal and
familY background.
Justice Powell's opinion basically sides with Jencks and
Coleman, accepting the doubts
they have raised about increased school spending.
Educational experts, the justice said, are divided on this
point and it is one of the "hottest sources of controversy" in

KEYES

III.

The Court's remand in this case requires that the district court
determine whether "the Denver school system is a dual school system. "
If so, ''respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate

the entire system 'root and branch.' Green v. County School Board, supra,
391 U. S. at 438, " supra, 22. As the opinion of the ;_ourt virtually compels
a ''dual school system" finding,* the D€:nver school authorities are face to

fac~::

with the type of desegregation order now familiar in southern cities.
Although

*

stated above.*

~is cited,

it is not factually relevant for the reason

The controlling case

is~.

and the question which will

confront - and confound - the Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann
require. It is this question which I will now address. Swann purported to
enunciate no new principles, relying heavily on Brown 1 and 2 and

on~·

*
After suggesting that the "deliberate racial segregation policy with respect
to the Park Hill schools" may constitute the entire Denver ystem a dual one,
the majority opinion ''observes" that "Denver is not a school district which
might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated units." The opinion
goes on to ''suggest" that "the official segregation in ida: Park Hil~ affected the
racial composition of schools throughout the district." Supra, 13, 14.
** In Green, a sparsely settled rural county was involved -with only two
school a nd 1300 pupils. The city of Denver has 100 square miles, there are
120 schools serving some 100,000 pupils.

-2-

It did, without discussion, extend the full sweep of the affirmative duty
rule of Green to a large metropolitan school district, and it affirmed a
district court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and had
ordered extensive bussing of elementary as well as secondary pupils.
Perhaps because of the relatively drastic contours of the Charlotte/
Meckltnburg desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower federal
courts have

1001

since read Swann as requiring similar decrees. In the

context of a large urban area, with heavy racial concentrations of white
and black citizens in different - and sometimes remote - sections of the
school district, substantial bussing of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read
as expansively as the facts in that case might justify. I take a somewhat
different view of WR Swann. It can fairly be read - not as mandating the
massive restructuring of every segregated school system -but as laying
down a broad rule of reason which recognizes that desegregation remedies
must remain flexible, and that other values and interests are implicated.
It is illuminating to review the unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice

Burger. It commenced with the reaffirmation of Brown 2' s emphasis on
the "practical flexibility" of remedies:

-3"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts will
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs.·· Brown 2, 349 U.S. at 229, as
quoted in Swann, 402 U.s. at~

The Chief .Justice referred to the "massive problem" of converti8g from
a dual to a unitary system, and empl:asized the duty on school authorities
nevertheless to fulfill this obligation. But in the same paragraph there
the
was a reference to the "breadth and flexibility" inherent in/equitable powers
of the district coults, and then went on expressly to state that:
" .•. a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally
from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies
to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to
correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interest,
the condition that offends the Constitution." 402 U.s. at 15, 16.
The
X'm Swann opinion then identified the areas of school board decisms which
influence racial composition, and as to which appropriate action may be taken:
new school construction, closing of old schools, faculty assignment, the
formulation of attendance zones, the pairing or clustering of schools, and
the formulation of policies on various matters. The ~ourt reserved for
special attention on the two central issues in the case, the extent to which
racial balance and the employment of pupil transportation (bussing) is required. In retrospect, perhaps the members of the Court who joined Swann

-4-

will agree that as to these issues there can be reasonably wide differences
of opinion as to what was actually held. The district court in Charlotte
had premised its desegregation plan on a "norm" - a desired goal - of
achieving racial balance of 71%- 29% in the school system, although
recognizing that some variations would be "unavoidable." This Court
approved the plan, rut expressly stated:
"If we were to read the holding of the district court to

require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right,
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged
to reverse." 402 U.S. at 24.
In addressing the related problem of whether any "one-i"ace"schools

would be tolerated, the decision was again not clear. The Court's
opinion does identify the goal as achieving ''the greatest possible degree
of actual desegregation;' but recognizes that "no per se rule can adequately
embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing

interes~involved."

402 U.S. at l.

Swann is best known for its holding with respect to the bus
transportation of pupils, although again- upon critical examination- the
language of the opinion is ambiguous. It recognized bussing as "one tool
of school desegregation, " and approved the district court's plan for ex-

-5tensive bussing. At the same time, the Court expressly said:
"No rigid guidelines as to student transportation can be
given for application to the infinite variety of problems
presented in thousands of situations." 402 U.S. at 29.
And reference was made expressly to the necessity of considering the
"health of the children " and whether the bussing proposed would "significantly impinge on the educational process." 402 U. S. at 30, 31.

B.
If a rule of reason is to be applied, x:of.tJrmk as I think is
required, where a district court is called upon to decree desegrEg~.tion
it should accord due consideration to the following:
Racial Balance
The misunderstanding - and misapplication- of Swann on this
issue has been profound. As a correct formuiation of what is required is
central to the bussing and other subordinate issues, it is necessary that
KlnliiK school authorities and courts understand the parameters of the

is sue. A requirement of racial balance, as used in these cases , would

-6mean that the student population of each school would reflect
substantially the same ratio, in terms of minority and majority
races, as the total population of the school district.
We start with the seminal decisions in Brown which contain nothing - either in holding or dicta - that supports even the
use of racial balance as a starting point. Green did say that there
should be no identifiable "black school" or "white school ; • but as
shown above there were only two schools before the court in that
case, affording an unlikely as well as unnecessary vehicle for
enunciating a principle applicable to the wholly dissimilar situation
found in major urbanized districts with massive residential segregation. It was not until Swann that the issue of racial balance was
considered by the Court. In that and its companion cases the plaintiffs
did contend for a rule requiring the substance of the racial balance
doctrine. *

*

The Court specifically rejected the demand for a racial

See,~·· Becketv. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274,1276 (E .D.
Va . ) 1969. See also WA~te_r and bl!da SQqelqff, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in' part. (Jay: as I afctate this I don't have the preBXB: cise name of the Fourth Circuit case and I think it was in 431 F . 2nd,
138 . Anyway, this is a case that was appealled to this court in Swann.)

-7balance test, holding that "any particular degree of racial balance
or mixing •.• would be disapproved ... , " but said that consideration
could be given to "mathmatical ratios" as "no more than a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy.•. " 402 U.S. at 24,25. *
The difficulty has resulted from a widespread misunderstanding
and misinterpretation of what was actually said in \\Xx Swann . It
has become customary for district courts to say, in effect, that they
are not decreeing racial balance but - pursuant to other language in
Swann - they feel compelled to approach it as far as "practicable. '' **

See Chambers opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Winston-Salem/
8:1. of ltl. v. Scott, 404 U.s. 1221, 1228 (197!).

~Forsyth

**

An example of this is found in the district court's order in WinstonSalem/ Forsyth Bd. of Ed., supra, in which an extensive bussing progiram
was ordered to "achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation. "

-f -

It should be made explicitly clear that the Constitution -

and this after all is the touchstone of the rights at issue -

u

does

not require racial balance or indeed a school system in which every
school has some mixing of the races.

Quite apart from the controlling

fact that no language in the Constitution nor in any decision applying
the equal protection clause to other situations involving racial
discrimination*, the Constitution could hardly be construed to require
an absurd if not impossible result.

Few would suggest, for example,

that it would be feasible to apply even approximately the population
racial balance in a city like Washington or Newark to every public
school therein.
The argument for racial balance also overlooks the fact
that the remedy far exceeds that whici1 is necessary to correct
*:Jay: -Try-to think of some parallel cases. One type of situation
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an example,
is that it is far more important to apply racial balance to housing
than the schools. Indeed if the Constitution requires this type of
homogenization of the population, the way to achieve it would be
to ~~I?P~ housing integration on a racial basis throughout a city.

.- 0 -

the constitutional evil.

Let us use Denver as an example.

It is

doubted that anyone would contend that, absent state action of any
kind whatever, the schools in Denver would have a substantially
different racial composition from that which actually exists.
I have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally
responsible in some degree for the extent of segregation that
exists. It can certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed
to ameliorate segregation the board could and should have taken
steps toward this end. But if one assumed a maximum discharge
of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past decades,
the fundamental problem of residential segregation would continue
to exist and this woo.ld be Dk reflected in the schools.

ROUGH DRAFT LFP, Jr.:PLS
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KEYES

IV.
The Court's opinion in this case has been awaited expectantly primarily in the hope that it will shed light and provide

~

.

~~;):.....,...._,)

guidance on two issues, namely: (i) whether state action will be

<. ~ ~~6.~ ~
found in a city like Denver where therelha'S 13eea il{) compelled

h-:f "'k..a
~~;._1-,,.. _

_J

o-1

~;,£~ r
or authorized segregation; and (ii) if so, whether the ambiguities
of Swann , construed to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive
busing, will be redefined to restore a more viable balance between
the various interests which are involved. With all deference, it
seems to me that the Court has addressed neither of these issues
in a way that will lead - so far as the judiciary may lead - to a
coherent national policy with respect to integration in the schools.
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinction
under circumstances, and upon a rationale, which can only lead to
increased and inconclusive litigation, and - especially regrettable deferment
to~

of a nationally consistent judicial position on this critical

subject. There is, of course, state action in every school district
in the land. The public schools have always been funded and operated

54.
by states and their local subdivisions.

It is true that segre gated

schools, eve1: in the cities of the South, care the product primarily
of social and economic factors - and the resulting residential
patterns.

But nevertheless there is probably not a school district

in the United States, with any significant minority school population,
in which the school authorities - in one way or the other - have not
contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which
still prevails.

So long as school authorities are told (as they

are by the Court today) that they are responsible only for such
of their de jure action or non-action as emanated from a segregatory
intent, they are unlikely to feel the slightest urgency in moving
toward desegregation.

It is only human nature for each of us to

assume that his motives are pure, especially if the Sur reme Court
says that this is the controlling rest as to one's duty.
The second issue - relating to the

2m

biguities of Swann -

was not addressed at all in the Court's opinion.

This means that

the District Court, upon making the findings which are foreshadowed
by today's opinion, will be obligated to apply Swann to the city of

No. 71-507 KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings
in the District Court, but on grounds that differ from those relied

upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major tity outside the South. It comes from
Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have not operated public
schools under constitutional or statutory provisions which mandated
1

or permitted racial segregation.

Nor is it asserted that any other

legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and housing laws)
contributed to the segregation which is at issue.

It is agreed that

the Denver School Board alone is responsible for whatever state
action may have contributed to the segregated schools which are
aclmowledged to exist in Denver.

2.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two areas
of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core city area. The
District Court considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to
75% ''Negro or Hispano students" was identifiable as a segregated
school. Wherever one may draw this line, it is undisputed that most
of the schools in these two areas are in fact heavily segregated in
the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of
Negro children.

The city wide school mix in Denver is 66% Anglo,

15% Negro and 20% Hispano. In areas of the city where the Anglo
population largely resides, the schools are

~

predominantly

Anglo, if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in
other large cities across the country in which there is a substantial
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered
by the federal courts.

There is massive segregation in the schools

of these c ities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to

3.
the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half.

The focus

of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from the South
to the country as a whole.

Unwilling as the process was in most

places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been
2

made in southern cities.

No comparable progress has been made

in most non-southern cities with large minority population primarily
because of the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts
and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which
3

denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South.

But if our

national concern is for those who attend such schools, rather than
for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than logic, we
must recognize that the evil of separate schools is no less in
Denver than in Atlanta.

4.
I

In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which

has long since outlived its time, and to formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When
~_!"~wn__!

was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the distinction between

de jure and de facto segregation was consistent with the constitutional
rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely
confined to the southern states, was officially imposed racial segregation
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied
in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable
terms that the 14th Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized
segregation of public schools. Although some of the language was
more expansive, the holding in Brown I was essentially negative:
It was impermissible under the Constitution for the states, or their

instrumentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was unmistakable de jure, and the opinion in

5.
Brown I was construed -for some years and by many courts -as
requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom of choice " as to schools
to be attended so long as the state itself assured that the choice be
4
genuinely free of official restraints.
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, did nd
retain its pristine meaning. In a series of decisions extending from
1954 to 1971 the concept of state neutrality evolved and was expandkl
t o the present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative state
action to desegregate school systems.
v.

<;~unty_~hool

The keystone case was Green

Board, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), where school

boards were declared to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.? The
school system before the Court in Green was operating in a rural
and sparsely settled county where there were no concentrations of
white and black populations, no neighborhood school system (there
were only two schools in the county), and where none of the problems

6.

of an urbanized school district existed.

The Court there properly

identified the freedom of choice program as a subterfuge, and the
language in Q_reen imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a
unitary system was appropriate on the facts before the Court.
There was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty
applied in the different factual setting of a large city with vast areas
of residential segregation, presenting problems and calling for
solutions quite different from those in the less complex rural setting
of New Kent County, Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application,
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.s. 1 (1971),
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina.
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in Charlotte,

the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas

7.
of minority groups being "concentrated in one part of the city"
( 402 U.S. at 25), and acknowledged that:
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting
pppulation, numerous schools, congested and
complex traffic patterns." 402 U.S. at 14.
Despite this recognltionof a fundamentally different problem from
that involved in green, the Court nevertheless held that the
affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and prescribed
for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84,000
pupils essentially the same remedy - elimination of segregation
"root and branch" - which had been formulated for the two schools
of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County.
In

~an~,

the Court further noted it was dealing only with

states having a long history of officially imposed segregation
and the duty of school authorities in those states to implement
Brown I. 402 U. S. 5-6.

8.
In so doing, the Court failed to admit candidly that the

evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to Green/Swam
undercut what logic once supported the de facto/de jure distinction.
In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative

duty including large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate
separate schools, the Court required these southern districts to
alleviate conditions which did not result from historic de jure
segregation. Rather, they resulted essentially from the same
phenomenon which occurred in northern and western districts:
segregated residential and migratory patterns wh ich were perpetuated
or at least not properly counteracted by any public school authority.
\Vhereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of officially
imposed segregation in that particular section of the country where
it did exist Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts
to eliminate conditions which were not regionally unique but were
similar both in their origins and effects to the rest of the country.
It is from the perpetuation of this kind of distinction in the Court's

opinion today that I take exception.

9.
II

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/
de facto distinction, applies the Green/Swann doctrine of "affirmative
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation.

The only evidence of state

action was found imarious decisions of the school board.

I concur

in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver.

I disagree, however,

with any perpetuation of the "de jure/de facto distinction and the
resulting tortuous effort to identify "segregative acts" and to
deduce "segregatory intent." I would hold, quite simply, that
where segregated public schools exist there is a duty on the duly
constituted authorities (I will usually eefer to them collectively
as the "school board") to take appropriate steps to desegreate them.
A

My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the
de jure/de facto distinction is that, in my view of the evolution of

10.
the holding in !?rown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no
longer can be justified on a principled basis. In additinn, as this
case abundantly demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary
to apply the distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right
whichis being enforced.

This is not easy, as the precedents have

been far from explicit. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance
of education, the Court said that:
"Where the state has undertaken to provide (education)
it is a right which must be made available to all on

equal terms. " 347 U. S. at 493.
In ~!OW!l II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle"

enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial
discrimination in public education" (349 U.S. at 298), and spoke
of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."
( 349 U. S. at 300).

Although this and similar language is ambiguous

as to the specific constitutional right, it meant - as a minimum -

11.
that one has the right not to be compelled by state action to attend
a segregated school system. In the evolutionary process since
1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this
original right.

Although nowhere expressly articulated in these

terms, I would now define it as the right to expect that the state
provide an opportunity for education in an integrated school system.
The correlative of this right should be the duty imposed upon the
state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively
to take reasonable action consistent with educational goals to provide
5

integrated school opportunities.
It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or denying

this right, as the case may be, depending upon whether or not a
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of
de facto rather than de jure action. If, as said in Swann "segregation
was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, there is little reason
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the
basis of a formalistic distinction.

12.

Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether
the segregation was state created or state assisted or merely state
perpetuated school be irrelevant to constitutional principle.

The

School Board exercises month-by-month, year-by-year responsibility
over the operations of the public school system. It sets policies
on attendance zones, faculty assignments, school construction,
closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. If, after
such detailed and complete public supervision, segregated schools
and thus unequal educational opportunities still persist, the
presumption is very strong that the school board, by its acts or
omissions, is in past responsible.

This responsibility need not

be proven by acts of segregatory intent which are fast becoming

too overt and risky for school authorities to engage in. It may
be proven merely by the effect of the failure of the responsible

public authority, to exercise the duty, already recognized for
one section of the country, to reasonably create integrative school
opportunities.

13.

Moreover, if the right implicated ais an opportunity to
attend schools in an integrated system, it makes littles: sense
to say that a school board's duty to provide such opportunity exists
only where there was a history of pre-1 954 laws which mandated
segregation:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area
of the nation which the opinion classifies under
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their
school system does not violate their constitutional
rights because they were born into a de facto
society, while the exact same racial make-up of
the school system in the 17 Southern and border
states violates the constitutional rights of their
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because
they were born into a de jure society. All children
everywhere in the nation are protected by the
Constitution, and treatment which violates their
constitutional rights in one area, also violates
such constitutional rights in another area. "
Indeed, the Court today recognizes for the first time the
unsoundness of drawing the line based on past history, but it clings
tenuously to the unptincipled distinction. It searahes for de ljnre
action in what the Denver School Board has done or failed to do,
and even here the Court does not rely upon the results or effects

14.
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of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent:
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent -to segregate. "(supra p.17T(Italics are the Court's).
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor " between
de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose or intent", is difficult
to reconcile in light of the opposite view announced so fiamly in

In

holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant ' motivation

of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless .
The mandate of Brown II was to desegreate schools,
and we have said that '[t)he measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis v. School
Commissioners of Mobile CountY,402 U.S. 33, 37.
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose
of motivation- of a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a
dual system.

"Though the purpose of the new school districts was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases,
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U.S.
at 462.

15.
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that the motivation
of school board action is irrelevant in Virginia and is controlling
in Colorado.

I have noted above the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia

because there was a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia,
and not in Colorado. In fact, it was arguable in Emporia that the
most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia
7
into a separate school district - were not segregatory.

Rather than

attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less
segregation.

The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent

with the de jure/de facto distinction, and commends itself in this
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality.
B

There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional XII
principle or precedent to adhere to the de jure/de facto distinction
in school desegregation cases.

In addition, there are reasons of

16.
policy and prudent judicial administration which point strongly
towards the adoption of a uniform national rule.

The litigation

heretofore centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions.
The decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does, the element
of segregatory itent, will invite unevenness and confusion in
numerous additional desegregation cases.
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists.

This will be conceded in most of them. The

litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision, on
whether segregation has resulted in any "meaningful or significant"
portion of a school system from a school board's segregatory intent.
The complex problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer.

The results of litigation - often arrived at

subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the subjective
intent of school authorities with respect to action taken over many
years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps even
capricious.

17.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.

The

courts below found evidence of de jure violations with respect to
the Park Hill schools and an absence of such violations with respect
to the core city schools, despite the fact that actions taken by the
school board with regard to those two sections was not dissimilaJ:
~l!fsSCBtkbt

It is, for example, quite possible to contend

that both the construction of Manual High School in the core-city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area operated
to serve their surrounding Negro communities and, in effect, to
merge school mdBix attendance zones with segregated residential
patterns.

Petitioner's Brief, pp. _ _. Yet findings even on such
R

similar acts will, under the de jure/de facto distinction, continue
to differ, especially since the Court has not made clearJHcdc what
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory itent" for an
initial constitutional violation. Even if it were to clarify this
question, wide and unpredictable differences of opinion among

18.
judges would be inevitable when dealing with an issue as slippery
as "intent" or "purpose", and especially when related to scores
if not hundreds of decisions made by school authorities under varying

conditions over many years.
Every act of a school board and school administration, and
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated,
is a form of state action.

The most routine decisions with respect

to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain
in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future are likely to be one or the other.

These decisions include action

or nonaction with respect to school building construction and location;
the timing of building new schools and their size; the closing and
consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of student
attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is
enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools; the
recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory

19.

personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whether, and to what extend, special schools will be
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there
will be "tracks" llhat lead primarily to college or to vocational
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic policies.
The Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity
of decision-making with respect to the construction of new schools
and the closing of old ones is illuminating:
"The construction of new schools and the
closing of old ones are two of the most important
functions of local school authorities and also
two of the most complex. They must decide
questions of location and capacity in light of
population growth, finances, land values, site
availability, through an almost endless list of
factors to be considered. The result of this
will be a decision which, when combined with
one technique or another of student assignment,
will determine the racial composition of the
student body in each school in the system. Over
the long run, the consequences of the choices
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward
school facilities, just as schools are located in
response to the needs of people. The location of
schools may thus influence the patterns of
residential development of a metropolitan area
and have important impact on composition of
innercity neighborhoods. " 402 U. S. 20-21.

20.
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory

intent and proximate cause with respect to each of these "endless"
factors.

The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily

in the prior history of the desegregation suit. But in the Denver-type
case, where no such history exists, a judicial examination of these
factors will be required under today's decision. This will lead
inevitably to uneven and unpredicable results, protracted and
inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the federal courts,
and to serious disruption of individual school systems.

c
Rather than continue to prop up a distincticm. no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element
of state action.

If one goes back far enough, it Els probable that

all racial segregation in the United states, wherever occurring
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been

21.
g

maintained or supported by government action.

But the constitutional

basis for an on-going finding of state action - regardless of h1tent or
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education is

a function of government and the schools are controlled and operated
by agencies of the state.

This is not, of course, to minimize those

causes of segregated schools far beyond the domain and control of
10

school boards.

Yet, as foreshadowed in Swann and as implicitly

held today, school boards have a duty, which overrides even the
natural and neutral causes of segregation, to minimize and ameliorate
these conditions by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation.
It is this policy which must be applied consistently on a national

basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which has outlived

its time.
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II.

I set forth in the preceding section the constitutional
right of each child to expect that public school authorities take
all reasonable steps to provide him an education in an integrated
setting. A segregated school system, regardless of history or
sectional location, stands as prima facie evidence that this
right has been violated. The question thus becomes what reasonable steps to maximize integration opportunities must school
authorities undertake, either to overcome allegations of constitutional violations or to remedy those violations which are
shown to exist. As the Court's opinion virtually compels the
finding that Denver is a "dual school system," that city will soon
confront the " affirmative duty" to desegregate its entire system
''root and branch." Green v. County School Board, 391 U.s. at
438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional
duty to entail.

-23-

A.
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question
which will confound the Denver School Board is what indeed does
Swann require.

B.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green.

Yet it affirmed a district

court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and decreed
extensive transportation of elementary as well a s secondary pupils.
Perhaps because of the rather far-reaching contours of the Charlotte/
Mecklenburg desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower
federal courts have since read Swann as requiring similar decrees .
In the context of a large urban area, with heavy residential concen-

tr ations of white and black citizens in different - and sometimes
widely separated - sections of the school distric t , extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read
a s expansively as the facts in that case might justify.

-24-

c.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require largescale or long-distance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts, I frankly state my misgivings. Nothing
in our Constitution commands or encourages any such disruption
of public education. Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad
rule of reason under which

JhrsiqJ_.

desegregation remedies must

remain flexible and other values and interests be considered. Thus
the Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U.S. at 16. School boards
in rural areas might adjust more readily to this task than those in
metropolitan districts "with dense and shifting population, numerous
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns . . , Id. at 14. Transportation orders were suspect "when the time or distance of travel
is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the education process." Id. at 31. Finally, the
age of the pupils to be transported was recognized by the Court in

-25-

Swann as one important limitation6n the time of student !ravel. Id.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation cases. And
the Court further emphasized that equitable decrees are inherently
sensitive, not solely to the absolute degree of desegregation achieved,
but to a variety of public and private interests:
.•. a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing
of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a halancing of the individual and collective interest, the
condition that offends the Constitution. Swann,
supra, at 15-6.

Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II
349

u. S.

at 229:

- 26 "In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjustin g
and reconciling public and private needs."

Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity
counsels reason, flexibility, and balance. I am aware, of course,
that reasonableness in any area is a relative and subjective
concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would
seem to embody a balanced evaluation of the obligations of public
school boards to promote desegregation with other, quite
important interests which a school board may legitimately assert.
Neglect of either the obligation or the interests destroys the
evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached. Overzealousness in pursuit of any single goal is
untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance" and "flexibility"
with which this Court has always regarded it.

- 27 B

School boards have at their disposal a variety of means
to assist school desegregation. Many of these can usefully
employed without damaging state and parental interests in having
children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where desegregative steps are possible within the framework of
a system of ''neighborhood education," school authorities must
pursue them.

For example, boundaries of neighborhood attendance

zones should be drawn to integrate, to the k extent possible, the
school's student body. Construction of new schools must not be
of such a size and at such a location to discourage the prospects

or likelihood of integration, Swann at 21.

Faculty integration

should be sought throughout the school system, Swann at 19;
Q~i~~-d states v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S.

225 (1969).

Allocation of resources within the school district

must be made fairly to all schools, regardless of racial composition.

- 28 -

An optional majority to minority transfer program, with the

state providing free transportation to desiring students, is a
further helpful integrative tool. ,Swann at 26-27.
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not
exhaustive.

They should not imply that decisions on faculty

assignment, attendance zones, school construction, closing
and consolidation, must be made to the detriment of all neutral,
non-racial considerations. But the general integrative impact
of such decisions is a crucial factor in assessing their
constitutional validity, and 'metx ''neighborhood school plans are
constitutionally suspect when attendance

DB

zones are superficially

imposed upon racially defined :oi1x neighborhoods, and when
school construction preserves rather than eliminates the
racial hegemony of given schools." Keyes v. School District
No:.._l,_D~_yer _, Colorado

F. 2d

United states v.

Boar~~f Education of Tulsa Coun~y, 429 F. 2d

__J

1258-1259.

If these decisions are made consistently with such segregatory

effect, they clearly violate the mandate of Brown I that no

- 29 -

student be denied admission to a school account of his or her
race.

c
The affirmative duty of school officials ought to enc om pas~
at a minimum, the obligations to take integrative steps of the

xk sort outlined in the above section. Such steps would not
compromise any significant, countervailing state interest.
Transportation of students to achieve desegregation, however,
presents a more troublesome problem. It may promise on the one
hand a greater degree of actual integration while it infringes on
what others regard as important personal rights.
~ann

itself recognized limits to integrative obligations.

It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any particular degree

of racial balance or mixing . . • would be disproved • . . , " and
sanctioned district court use of mathematical ratios as "no more
than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy . .

"

- 3040~

v.

U.S. at 24, 25. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Board of Education

SeQ_~

404 U.S. 1221, 1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of Burger,

C. J. ) The refusal of the Court to require precise racial balance
in schools throughout the district or the automatic elimination of
all

~

"one-race schools, " 402 U. S. at 26, is grounded in a

recognition that the state, parents, and children do have at stake
in school desegregation decrees a legitimate and recognizable

interest.
That interest might be characterized bluntly as the desire
of parents and children alike to attend community schools nearby
home.

Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at trial that

"most school systems organize their schools in relation to the
residents by having fixed school districts and some of these are
very ethnically homogeneous. " App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati
Boar~_Qf

Education, 396 F. 2d 55, 60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit

summarized the advantages of such a neighborhocxl system of
schools:

- 31 "Appellants, however, pose the question of whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly
administered without racial bias, comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
results in the creation of schools with predominantly
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighborhood
system is in wide use throughout the nation and has
been for many years the basis of school administration.
This is so because it is aclmowledged to have several
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such
as minimization of safety hazards to children in
reaching sbhool, economy of cost in reducing
transportation needs, ease of pupil placement and
administration through the use of neutral, easily
determined standards, and better home-school
communication."
The DIBix neighborhood unit does provide greater ease of
student access and convenience and economy of public administration.
These are obvious and distinct advantages, but any constitutional
legitimacy of such a system vests on more basic grounds.
Neighborhood schools,

J&:

neutraD.y administered, represent the

desires of our citizens for a sense of community in their public
education.

Public schools have been a traditional source of

strength to our nation, and that strength may in part derive from
the identification of many schools with the personal features of
the surrounding neighborhood. Community support, interest and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a neighborhood
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attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many
citizens sense a decline in the intimacy of ar our institutions home, church and school - which has caused a concommitant
decline in the fiber and character of our people. I pass no
judgment on such a vision, but I do believe that this Court should
not compel by extensive transportation of students what may seem
to many citizens a further dissolution in the

~

cohesive

personal fabric of their public schools.
Closely related to the concept of a community and BBkx
neighborhood education, are those rights and duties parents have
with respect to the education of their children.

The law has long

recognized the parental duty to nurture, support and provide
for the welfare of children, including their education. :Rilmv
J>ie.E_Ce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 535, a unanimous
court held that:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U. s.
390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. . . . The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. "
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And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s. 479, 482 (1965),
the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children
as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. " I do not believe this right
can be confined solely to a parent's choice a: to send a child to
public or private school. Many parents cannot afford the luxury
of a private education for their children, and the dual obligation

of private tuitions and public taxes.

Those who may for numerous

reasons, seek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their child
attends.

It would, of course, be impractical to allow the wishes

of particular parents to be controlling.

Yet the interest of the parent

in the enhanced parent-school and parent-child communication
allowed by the neighborhood unit ought not

mto be constitutionally

ignored.
It is relevant to observe that in the end the quality of a

community's schools depends in large' part upon the level of
public support, especially that of parents of children currently
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in the schools. In addition to attitudes towards paying increased
taxes or voting bond issues, the effectiveness of the educational
process itself is related to the attitude of the parents and to their
capacity to participate. To the degree that schools can involve
parents with their children's education, the common end of
improved schooling is surely served.

School beards may permissibly

conclude that parents whose young children have been transported
from theirX!.'eb neighborhood to some more :silx distant school, are
less likely candidates for this type of participation.
In the understandable national concern for alleviating public
school segregation, courts may have overlooked the fact that the
rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation pr ogra m
are entitled to consideration. Any child, white or black, who is
compelled to:D:DB leave his neighborhood and spend significant
time each day being transported to a distant school suffers an
:im:ptx impairment of his liberty and his :pocx privacy.

Not long

ago, James B. Conant, wrote that "[a 1t the elementary school
level the issue seems clear.

To send young children day after
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day to distant schools seem out of the question. " A. community may
well conclude that the portion of a child's day spend on a bus might
be used more creatively in a classroom, playground or some other

school activity.

Decisions such as these, affecting the quality of a

child's daily life, should not lightly be held constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mtinly on the personal interests
of parents and children which a

1!1

community may permissbly assert

to be best protected by a neighborhood system of schools. But
iJo1B.x broader considerations lead me to question just as seriously

any remedialm requirement of extensive student transportation.
Any such requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately on
their
different districts of our country, depending ontkisdegree of
~

urbanization, financial resources, and above all, their

racial complexion.

Some districts with 11\ttle or not biracial

population will experience little or no educational metamorphosis,
while others, notably in large, biracial metropolitan areas, must
undertake extensive transportation to a.chieve any meaningful degree
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of desegregation. While constitutional requirements often occasion
uneven burdens, never have they touched so sensitive a matter as
wide differences in the compulsory transportation requirements for
literally thousands of school children.
The c onstitutional argument for student transportation als o
overlooks the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil.
an example.

Let us use Denver as

It is doubtful whether absent segreg-atory state action

of any kind whatever, the schools in Denver would have a sub~tantially

d ifferent racial:m composition from that which actually exists.

I

do agree that the Denver School Board, by its action and nonaction,
may be legally responsible to some degree for the extent of
segregation that exists. But if one assumes a maximum discharge
of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past decades,
the fundamental problem of residential segregation woold persist.
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to

mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine - to apply

- 37 some retributive theory which would require a greater degree of
school integration than would have resulted from purely natural
and neutral non-state causes.
The transportation of students carries a further infirmity
as a constitutional remedy.

With most constitutional violations,

the major burden of remedial action falls on offending state
officials.

P ublic officials who act to infringe personal rights of

speech, voting, or religious exercise, for example, are obliged
to cease the offending act or practice and, where necessary,
institute corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of
remedial action, though other citizens will to varying degrees
feel its effects.

School authorities responsible for segregation

must, at the very minimum, act to

IDilBB:

cease se~retaox ~ segregatory

acts. But when the obligation further extends to the baiJp
transportation of students, the essential burden of affirmative
remedial action is borne by children who never partook of any
constitutional violation.

- 38 -

Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation, risk setting in motion unpredictable
No one
and unmanageable social consequences. tiG':lliB can estimate the
extent to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exodus to private schools, leavin g public school systems the
preserve of the disadvantaged of both races. Or guess how much
impetus such dismantlement gives the movement from inner -city
t o suburb, and the further geographical separation of the races.
ror do we know to what de gree this remedy may cause deterioration
of community and parental support of public schools, or divert
debate from quality in education to a perennially hassling issue of
student assignments.

I, for one, can make no steadfast predications.

desegregation
Yet in &~through extensive student transportation, courts
have ventured onto

E

uncertain terrain which may in the end prove

self-defeating to their own objectives.
I would not wish to impose any flat prohibition on student
transportation to achieve desegregation.

But a nel.ghborhood system

- 39 -

of schools ought, to a greater extent than heretofore, be one
legitimate community interest respected by district courts in
framing equal relief. It would be wisest, where possible, to
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue of
student transportation on their own.

Some may object that the

communities may seldom require such transportation.

Yet such

inaction may reflect legitimate, nonracial aspiratl.ons which require
a c ourt's respect.

3.
ift ~visitor from abroad, Xi
~

without knowledge of past history,.-4Ml..._observe

·)-<.b

~real difference

in the ~[ential patterns of a Denver as compared with an

.~van; t~r

an El

~ o-.---- ~ g.....</
compared with a Detroit.

Paso~

But history has played a dominant role in the development
~

I{..A..

of constitutional precedent with respect to racial segregation in
A,

A

the public schools. In every case decided by this Court from
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I)
to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S .

...

1 (1971) there was a history of state-imposed racial

~

~;furation

extending back for many years and often embodied in constitutional

The great contribution of Brown I was to hold in unmistakable terms
that the 14th Amendment forbids state compelled or authorized

~~I~~ ~"'"1 c.-j/
~~~~&
segregation of public schools.A The Court~move.Aforward from
.JL.?L~~.
Brown I e!!t'!n'l.amg
- over a penod
of years - the negative concept

~

of neutrality to the present constitutional doctrine that school boards

-

~

-- -··- ... ...... u.u5,u.L

oruwn

1

covered a period of 16 years.)

4.
,JWW have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be

1-o

necessary to convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination
A

J..

would be eliminate root and branch." Green v. County School Board,
A

391

u.s.

430, 438 (1968).

--

*

a
n
- Widespread misunderstanding existed
during the period among state ~ legislatures, school authorities
and aspggi,aUy among the lower federal courts.

.,

goin~n

*When Brown I was decided it was generally construed as
further than outlawing racial discrimination in the sense that no
child would be denied access to any school, or compelled to attend
any school, on account of race. Brown II (349 U.S.
) did
contaiR a hint that school boards were Pe~"Wti.FQQ "to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system." (349 U.S.
at 301). But for a number of years following Brown II and during the
era of "all deliberate speed", it was widely understo~ that "freedom
of choise" plans, if neutrally administered, met the standards
enunciated in the two Brown decisions. (Jay: cite some of the lower
district courts here, such as the one in the Fourth Circuit applicable
to Richmond). It was finally made ~l clear, however, in 1aee
Green - and later in Swann - that an affirmative duty exists to dismantle
duzl systems and establish unitary systems. The evolution, and
final maturing of the meaning') of Brown I covered a period of 16 years.

5.
In the course of this unfolding of the law a distinction

~e.~ ~~~~l.

*""'

devslGpe-d between de jure and de facto segregation. 'Fhis was gencrally
.

~

.

~

~~\

d,o.ec.v--IJ!!>

).unde.Petsed to be a ElrawiB!:f ef the line between segregation)mposed

. . ..._r

~~t~-t~

-~/

~-!.-'

by state action1and that which resulted from~economic~or privately
inspired residential patterns. In practice, until fMrly recently,
the thrust of this distinction was directed toward the southern states
which traditionally had dual school systems prescribed by
constitutional and statutory provisions.

The test was not whether

1-kL.~~
a school system was in fact segregated, but whetherjthis ~
~ -t.e_ ~ .ca-c- .el4.. ~ · e:.y c0L. f-:--k>
from some Elemoo.stral;)le iltate action This, in effect,

.

Ara~ulted

was the test applied both by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals in this case.

There was, however, a threshold difference

in that the asserted state action was confined solely to what the
school board did or failed to do.

The Court of Appeals correctly

concluded that there is no reason "why state-imposed

SH!!;rH!9'Red

segregation of the sort condemned in Brown should be distinguished
from racial segregation intentionally created and maintained

6.
through gerrymandering, building selection and student
by a school board. ( 45 F. 2d 990, __).

1.'a(

transfers"

The Court of Appeals then

went on to find this segregatory intent on the part of the school board
with respect to the Park Hill schools but t./:;;;j no such intent as
to the entire Denver school system or the E:ore Area schools.

This

holding is today reversed by the Court, not because of error in
stating the applicable constitutional rule but rather t>ecause of its
misapplication.

Although the Court's opinion reverses and remands

with instructions to the District Court to make further findings, the
effect of the sweeping language of the

l!ll!3JD{

majority ·opinion will

be to compelf a holding that the entire Denver school system - not
just the Park Hill schools - be desegregated.
This result is reached despite adherence to the de jure/ de facto
distinction.

Actions and nonaction by the school board was deemed

to provide the de jure requirement, and" the Court was explicit that
a school system could not be "fractionated" between some schools
that are segregated de jure and others only de facto:

7.
" . . . It is clear that a finding of intentionally
~

segregatory school board actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this
case, is sufficient to create an inference that
other segregated schooling within the system is
not adventitious. It establishes, in other words,
a prima facie case of unlawful segregatory design
on the part of the school authorities and shifts
to those authorities the burden of proving that
other segreated schools within the system are not
also the result of intentionally segregatory actions. "
(supra, p. _ _)

I do not disagree with the Court's basic conclusion that there is
substantial evidence - certainly enough to justify reexamination by
the District Court - of systemwide segregation. If the talismanic
words "de jure" and "de facto" were eliminated, the segregation
on the basis of neighborhood patterns in Denver would be
indistinguisable from that in numerous cities which have been
compelled affirmatively to eliminate all segregation "root and branch".
I

It seems to me that the time has come to abandon a

distinction which, in my view, is neither sound constitutional
doctrine nor wise policy.

The public schools of this country all

are funded and operated by state action - by state and local
governments.

The instrumentality ~ immediately in control of

8.
the school district is the school board, aclmowledged to be an
agency of government.

Every act of such a board and indeed every

failure to act, is indisputably state action, as the Court's opinion
recognizes.

The most DIBid:iK1t1dBlx routine decisions with respect

to the operation of schools, made almost daily by boards and
officials, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools
remained segregated, are desegregated or - for the long term future are likely to be one or the other.

mm obvious

These decisions include the more

matters of school building location, size, and timing;

the drawing or gerrymandering of student attendance zones; the
extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment,
promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel;
policies with respect to transfers from one school to another; whether,
and to what extent, special schools will be provided for talented
children and for other special educational interests; the determination
of curriculum, including whether there will be "tracks" that lead
primarily to college or to vocational training; and even decisions

9.
as to social, recreational and athletic policies.
Of course, no school board can change certain of the
fundamentals.

The population mix varies widely among cities.

A school board in Washington, D. C. has a vastly different problem
from one in Phoenix, Arizona.
Other intractable facts include the age and size of a city,
whether under state law it may expand its boundaries, the extent
to idxi:G:l which the inner city is populated by a minority race, the
degree of "urban flight", the :JOe{ rapidity with li1X which the racial
mix of the population within the school district changes, and state
and local laws and ordinances.

But whatever the difficulties may

be, school boards are the agencies in our society which have both
the opportunity and the responsibility for meeting constitutional
standards applicable to public education.
Acknowledging that school boards do act for the state,
the Court - pursuing the illusion of a constitutional difference
between de jure and de facto

~

segregation - distinguishes

between lawful and unlawful board action on the basis of

10.

segregatory intent:
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation trl-'
to which we referred in W Swann is purpose ~
to XJQ1;Dt segregate." (supra, at p. _ _ )
-One may be permitted a sense of surprise that the Court,
so soon after Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972) should revert to the view that the controlling fact in a
segregation is "intent" or "purpose".

Precisely the opposite appears

to have been said in Emporia:

"

"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless.
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools,
and we have said that '[t ]he measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness. 'Davis v. School
Commissioners of Mobile CoulltY,402 U. S. 33, 37.
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose
of motivation-of a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a
dual system.

****
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was
mod: found to be discriminatory in many of these

cases, the courts' holdings rested not on motivation
or purpose but on the effect of the action upon the
dismantling of the dual school systems involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U.S.
at 462.
I can perceive of no basis in law or logic for holding that
the purpose of school board action is immaterial in Emporia,

11.
Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado.

It is true that

the history is markedly different, but if the test - as the Court
says in:lba: Emporia - is the "effect" of a school B board's action
it is difficult to see the relevancy of ancient history.
(Note: At this point I will talk about the difficulties of
proof if the intent doctrine is to be applied.
this connection and see Jay's memo.

See my notes in

Then I will move on to getting

some help from my Hunton, Williams brief and to E Alex Bickel).

Hp/:: s 1c·c l 2 '2 I '1'2

No. 71-50~ Keyes v. School District
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings
f ( :_

·-l

,1

•

.C

·- -·

in the District Court, but on grounds quite -different from those
4

relied upon by the Court.' )! This is the first school
fl

-

desegregati~n 't~
'

reach this Court which involves a major city outside of the South.
It comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have
r.....~t'

never operated public schools under constitutional or statutory
J\

provisions which mandated or permitted racial segregation.*
Nor is it asserted that anybther legislative action (such as, for
J

example, zoning and housing laws) contributed to the segregation
which is at issue in this case.--- Rather, it is agreed by-a-11---concerHed
that the Denver School Board alone is responsible for whatever
§tate action may have contributed to the segregated schools which
*Article I£q< IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution expressly
prohibits "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or
color." Although the Court's opinion states that there has never
been any constitutional or statutory provision for racial segre gation
in Colorado, most states have had such provisions at various times
in the past. Certainly, there is no evidence in this record of
legally enforced or authorized segregation.

2.
are acknowledged to exist in Denver.

The predomina ntly minority schools (Negro and Hispano)
are located in two areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and
the Core area.

The Dis trict Court considered that a school with

a concentration of 70 to 75 % "Negro or Hispano students" wa~
identifiable as a segregated school.

Wherever one may draw this

line, it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two minority
residential areas are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that
their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of Negro and
Hispano children.
j._

The city wide school mix in Denver is 66 %

,~

Ango, 15 % Nego and 20 % Hispano.

•'

In areas of the city where the

Anglo population largely resides, the schools are predominantly

,n

Anglo if not entirely so. :, The situation in Denver is generally

/I

comparable to that in other large cities across the country in
which there is a substantial minority population and where dese gr e gat ion
has not been ordered by the federal courts.

There is massive

segre gation in the schools of these cities fully as pervasive as
that in southern cities prior to the dese g1·egation decress of the

3.
past decade and a halL

lit

short, -the focu s of the school descgre ga.. 1..:... ....

·c: .... -· ..

tion problem - actue, devisive and intractable - has shiften.from
\

the South to other sections of the country.

Unwilling and footdrag ging

as the process was in most places, substantial progress toward
achieving integration has been made in southern cities.* No
comparable progress has been made in most non - southern cities
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/
de jure distinction nutured by the courts and accepted complacently
by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated
schools in the South . ** But if our national concern is for Xks those
who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism

~-f-t_._ ~- 1-t-< . .-~· -L~~-<--- _,
rooted in past history, the evil is certainly no less in a Denver
-·

\

than in an Atlanta.
*Jay: The publications of the Department of Education (HEW will,
I believe, give you data as to the extent desegregation has been
achieved in the South. I believe reports of HEW also will show the
extent to which schools elsewhere remain segregated. ·..: -**Jay: Here you could quote the Ribicoff speech of a couple of
years ago - which is certain to be indexed in the Congressional
Record or could be obtained for you by the Library by asking
Ribicoff's office. You shou ld not do it yourself.

4.
In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which

has long since outlived its time, and to formulate constitutional
doctrine of national rather than merely regional application.
L L~/._;_

-A~

, v·

the.:time Brown I was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the xNx«
~

distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was

~consistent

with the constitutional rational., of that case. The

situation confronting the Court, largely confined to.

tite'-section~ of --

the southern states, was ofiicially imposed racial segregation
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied
in constitutional and statutory

provisions~ The

great contribution

of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable terms that the 14th
Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of
public schools.

Although some of the language was more expansive,

the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to
force children to attend segregated schools.

The forbidden action

was unmistakably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed -

5.
for some years and 'b y many courts - as re :.uirin g; state neutrality,
allowin g "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended s o lon g as
a ..) -;..._, ... <L . 1-t'..,- :r-·

the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official
restraints. *

But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat by
-;J 1-'

LA:,c.2 ,

L -~

1

Brown II, :w did not retain its pristine dimensions.

•

In a series

of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the essentially negative
concept of neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present

'1--c

constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative action of desegregate
school systems.

As stated in Green v. County School Board, 391

U.S. 430, 438 (1968), school boards were declared to have "the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
'f-r..;

convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
.\

eliminated root and branch. " The school systems before the Court
in Green was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county where
there were no concentrations of white and black populations, no
*Jay: Here cite Deal v. Cincinna': i School Boa rd, the Fourth Circuit
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some
of these in Bickel's book.

6.
neighbor:wod school system (there were only two schools in the
county), and where none of the problems of an urbanized school
district existed.

The Court there properly ident ified the freedom
t:L. ..._,-£(_

of choice pro gram as a~ subterfuge,/

the language in Green
--

imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system was
X]ql!XExpX

appropriate on the facts before the Court.

reason to doubt, however, whether

There was

~this

langua ge

r

-C!.
__,__.__.L L,
was appropriate and would be applied to the radically different

:(

factual setting of a large city with vast areas of residential
segregation, presenting problems and calling for solutions quite
different from those in the simplistic

XR

rural setting of New Kent

County, Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application,
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971)_,
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina.

7.
In describing the situation as to r esidential pat.terns in CharloUc,

the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in metropolitan areas
of minority x groups being "concentrated in one part of the city . ."
C·- ~(__

(402 U.S. at 25)\

The--opinion acknowledged that:
·\

"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportati on could make adjustments more r eadily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting
population, numerous schools, congested and
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U.S. at 14.
(

~ Despite this ~ recognition of a fundamentally
different problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless
held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and
prescribed for

a~

metropolitan school system with 107 schools

and some 84, 000 pupils essentially the same ::mx remedy - desegregation
"root and branch"

XX!llX ·now

- which had been formulated for the two

schools of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County.
In Swann the Court found the requisite "state action",

although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or authorizing
segregation had lon g since been repealed or nullified:

8.
"In addition to finding certain actions of the school
board to be discriminatory, the (District Court)
also found that residential patterns in the city and
county resulted in part from federal, state and local
governmental action other than school board
dec is ions. " ('surira p.~::: 'l-):- '-1- ~_· c. L '-- ~~ -·-r 7.
There was, however, a longiNxEB: history of official segregation
in the Charlotte schools and evidence that the school authorities

~;..-L' I - ''-/ ("""(.. •· ·- •.~ Ll
dp-I/
had read too expansive a meaning into the Brown directive of
"all deliberate speed. "

II

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/
de facto distinction) applies the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state mandated school segregation.

The only evidence of state

action was found in various decisions of the school board.

I concur

in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver.

I disagree, however

with the perpetuation of the "de jure/de facto distinction and the
t..-( •.....,:,

resulting tortuous effort to identify "segr~gating acts" and to

9.
deduce

jl

"segregatory intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that

I .J-.L...L-1__<:-where segregated schools exist there is a duty on the

~duly

\

~~it

constituted authorities (I will refer

tb them

collectively as the

"
"school board") to take all appropriate steps to desegregate them.

A
My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the flRH
de jure/ de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the
holding in Brown into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can
be justified on a principled basis.

In addition, as this case abundantly

demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary to apply the
distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right
which is being enforced.

This is not easy, as the precedents have

been far from explicit,f.

In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance

'

of education, the Court said that:
;,
, _·
)
( -L. J_
_ ...... ~c.- r- '·, ~
.

)

"Where the state has undertaken to provide it, it is
a ·right which must be made available to all '·on equal
terms. " 347 U.S. at 493.
In amplifying-its ear-lier- decision-in Brown II, the Court identified

the "fundamental principle" as being the unconstitutionality of
·j

10.
"racial discrimination in pubr'ic education" (349 U.S. at 298),

and spoke of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission
to public schools as soon .s: as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis." (349 U.S. at 300).

Although this and similar language is

ambiguous as to the specific constitutional right ) it meant - as a
minimum that one has the right not to be compelled by state action
.\

~

to

1/.-; ::z... i-.:_.~~ · ,

atten~ segregated

school,s

In the evolutionary process since

1

1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this
original right.

Although nowhere

expressly~

articulated

in these terms, I would define it as the right to demand that the
state provide an opportunity for education in an integrated school
system.

The correlative of this right is the duty imposed upon the

state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively
~··...I.....U..

l•

..

--

.

-~ -

to take all apirPOp-r-iate action to provide integrated school opportunities.
.

'""'~""

In a subsequent section of this opinion, I will" refer
'

~::::;!-::;,'

.

to the inevitable

,,,;-•i:Ji;£~

limitations on what a state may do - in terms of the factual conditions
confronting it and also bearing in mind other rights of equal importance.
1\,

11.
But for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that
I have identified the substance of the right in question.

1-t-- L...., d'---11~ /..o ~ ~
~reew~1l!!El

basis for vindicating or denying this right,

.1\

1\

as the case may be, depending upon whether or not a court
determines that the segregated schools are the product of de facto
rather than de jure action.

If, as said in Swann "segregation was

the R.l!Ridx evil" held to be unconstitutional there is little reason
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the
I

-

.

-

/)_ - •

1--

r.u-r~~-~

basis of aldistinction,wMeh-1-ras become

fcimali-st.iG->~~

..

•

8:"
right in every child to attend an integrated school, but its recent

/

decisions

1\

~ave ce~ainly
I

/

leaned in that

dire.ct~o~

/

m6~t

and 1ave been
/

,I

l

qualifi

'

I

primarily \what is feasible. /
But however one defines the constitutional right arti ulat ed
1

recently

in

\
frobti:E subtleties

regard to the

I

Swann\t should be available to all citizens\ ithout

~ ~

/ I
wh1ch no longer are grounded m

\

"-''

a defensible principle.

Public S«E3d schools are creatures of the

state, and :G:mlt: whether the segregation

ifi-i~s.U€

was state created

or state assisted or merely state perpetuated should be irrelevant
to constitutional principle. If the right implicated is an opportunity

~ ,..~~ a--w..~~ ~
to

../

' •'"?

atten~tegrat-ed-teh'tlms,

it makes little sense to say that a

( - - ----school board's duty to provide such opportunity (only' exists 'where
1.-- ____:

)\

the state action is rooted in the ancient history of pre-19 54 laws
which mandated segregation.

Indeed, the Court today recognizes

for the first time the unsoundness of drawing the line based on past
history, but it clings tenuously to the unprincipled distinction.
r:).... ..r.;. ...,~_ /.......,. _...... -

/.: ~ ---

It findS--the de jure action in what the Denver School Board has done

"'

I

or failed to do, a4even here the Court does not rely upon th e

)

...9.

results or consequences of the Board's conduct but feels compelled
to find a segregatory intent:
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
XX1WC to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent
to segregate. "(supra p. 17) ( 't'k-L::<. ~:-;_~;:.--;k c~: =.c-t ·~ )
The Court does not require, however, a segregatory intent with
respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds that if such
o<J.c .J'

~--

an intent is found with respect to any schools in a system, the
"\
<:._ .. --.....

'

burden - normally on the plaintiff's shifts to the defendant :s:Nk

,,

school authorities to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes
Speaking:tim for the Court) Mr. Justice Brennan
said:
"Where school authorities have been found to have
practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school
system, they may be e:h.'Pected to oppose system-wide
desegregation, as did the respondents in this case,
on the ground that their purposeful segregatory actions
were isolated and indiuidual events, thus leaving
plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise. But
at that point where an intentionally segregatory policy
is practiced in a meaningful or significant segJ;:ment
of a school system, as fH: in this case, the school
authorities cannot be heard to xxgr-reclx argue that
plaintiffs have proved only 'S.as 'isolated and individual'
unlawfully :s:~ segregatory actions.
In that circumstance, it is both fair and reasonable
to require that the school authorities bear the burden
of showing that their actions as to other segregated
schools within the system were not also motivated
by segregatory :ilx intent." (supra, p. 17, 18).

.· .•

. 1o. ·
The Court has indeeclfC come a lon g ways since Brown I.

Starting

from the solid ---a»d unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory
constitutional and statutory provisions of some states, the new
formulation - still professing fidelity to the de jure doctrine l· Lt.~ 1._ •.-...i 1 ~
_. j-t.. . . ~,._-r~- ,;,_-; t ~ . . ,{:_.:.._ c-;."-r('" - -'--'. 4. , ,
is that the proscribed state. action -exists, despite the ~ absence
'J _ ..

··I

of any segregatory law~if: (i) segregated schools in fact exis~s';
(ii) a court finds that they result from some action or nonaction by

/ .{_. . . .

.)

~+:::.
~;::z:r-""'"~'

the

school~ action; (iii) 'such action need not XRXk relate to more than
\

c.,:.: ~

,,

a "meaninful segment of the school system; and (iv) the school
/1

--

board cannot prove that its intentions were nonsegregatory. : ~ et,
-------- ·-------

-- · - ·-

_j

Cour~-till clings to,:he fiction of: distinction which no longe/

C----

volves__a__.n::_y_d__i::_ff_e_r_e__:_n_:_c..-e~.------------- ---The Court's insistance that the "differentiating factor"

between de jure and de facto segregation is "purpose or intent",
is

eepee-t~

difficult to reconcile in light of l'recisely the opposite

view announced so firmly in Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).

In holding there that "motivation"

I

/

. 11.'
~ - (which is~H

indistin guishable from

intent~

is irrelevant, the

Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation
of school a'tthorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless.
The mandate of Brown II was to dese gr egate schools,
and we have said that '[t]he measure of any desegr egation plan is its effectiveness. ' Davis v. School
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37.
Thus, we have focused up on the effect-not the purpose
of motivation--of a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a
dual system.

****
"Though the purpose of the new school districts was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases,
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. S.
at 462.

'

~- .>t-~

"lA-O

Jt-is--cliffi~lt~er.oeiv~a-

basis in law or logic for holdin g that

the motivation of school board action is irrelevant

in~

Emporia, Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado.

It

may be argued, of course, that there was a history of se gre gat ion
laws in Vir ginia and of arguably recalcitrant action by the local
school authorities.

f>

-1.::~::--~~:;
But it was also arguable in W,right that the

most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia

*

into a separate school district were not segregatory.

--------------

·\

Rather than

16.
attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the ~.§
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less
segregation.

The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent

~ r'~,., '-~"'.._.:.i,__.__::r
with the de jure/ de facto distil;ction, and commends itself both on

"
grounds of principl;; and practicality.

B

As shown above, there is no reason as a matter of
constitutional principle or precedent (until today's decision) to
adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation
cases.

In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent

judicial administration which ~ point strongly towards the
adoption of a uniform national rule.

The situation may be summarized

generally as follows: After some 18 years of litigation confined
p rimarily to the southern states, ~ desegregation plans
have been adopted and affirmative action taken to integrate the
schools, in varying degrees, in all of the major cities and most

17.
of the school districts in the South.

The greater problem with

respect to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas
outside of the South, and for the most part in cities and~
states which long since have abandoned discriminatory laws and
ordinances applicable to schools, housing, and zoning.

As in

Denver, the legal structure within k which these school systems
function is neutral, and yet segregation - varying fro .. ·1 massive to
fragmentary - is commonplace wherever substantial number of
minority citizens reside.

The litigation heretofore centered in

the South already is surfacing in other regions.

The decision of

the Court today, based entirely on school board action and inaction,
will invite the filing of numerous additional desegregation cases.
It is the business of the courts to decide cases, and

particularly to vindicate constitutional rights.

The problem,

therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the artificial
l- ~

framework in which it must be conducted under today's decision.
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated education
exists.

This will be conceded in most of them.

The litigation

18.
will focus, rather, on whether it has resulted in any "meaningful
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the
school board did or failed to do, and (ii) whether the board had a
C.~ 1- ""''l- / .... f-

segregatory intent.

..c..:~

The far- reaching problems litigating these

..,

issues are obvious to any lawyer.

/\

The results of litigation - often

arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps
even capricious.
The Denver case, decided today, is illustrative of the
problem.

Although appellate courts are normally bound by findings

of fact, especially where the testimony is compendious and involves
conflicting opinion as well as factual evidence, this Court refused
to be bound by the findings of the District Court which also had
been approved by the Court of Appeals.

Indeed, the majority

opinion, apparently concluding that there was no substantial
evider. ce to support the findings below, held that they were
"incorrect as a matter of law":

19.
"Accepting the School Board's explanation the
District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed
that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core
city schools werenot permissible since petitioners
had failed to prove '(1) a racially discriminatory
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly
existing in those schools. ' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly
incorrect as a matter of law." (supra p. 16).

&!oo--;. . . .
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With reason, ;ne

p,..-:-:. C"V-· ,.. ,.~ IU.~-

-m~yjgr~e that
1

the majority of this Court, despite

not having heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was nevertheless
correct in its judgment overruling the factual findings of the courts
below.

The point, however, is that wide and unpredictable

differences of Iii opinion among judges are inevitable when dealing
with an issue as slippery as "intent" or "purpose", and especially
when related to scores if not hundreds of decisions made by school
authorities under varying conditions over many years.
Every act of a school board and school administration, and
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated,
is a form of state action.

The most r:::-utine decisions with respect

to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain

EH

in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future -

20.

are like ly t o be one or the other.

These decisons include action

or non-action with respect to school building construction and
location; the timing of building new schools and their size; the
oa: closin g and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymande rin g
of student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood
policy is enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools;
the recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory
personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will be
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic p.Bikii policies.
<J:he Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity
of decisi on making with respect to the construction of new schools
and the closin g of old ones is illuminating:

.! . I

c-2fJ.

...

"The construction of new schools and the
closing of old ones are two of the most important
functions of local school authorities and also
two of the most complex. They must decide
questions of location and capacity in light of
population growth, finances, land values, site
availability, through an almost endless list of
factors to be considered. The result of this
will be a decision which, when combined with
one technique or another of student assignment,
will determine the racial composition of the
student body in each school in the system. Over
the long run, the consequences of the choices
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward
school facilities, just as schools are located in
response to the needs of people. The location of
,schools may thus influence the patterns of
·residential development of a metropolitan area
and have important impact on composition of
\~nercity neighborhoods. " 402 U.S. ~ 20-21.

~

In Swann the Court did not have to probe into~

segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each of
these "endless" factors.

The basis for its de jure finding there was

rooted primarily in the priorkmdx history of the desegregation
suit.

the
But in;benver type case J where no such history exists, a

judicial examination of these factors will be required under today' s
1

/~

decision.

<"-- '-- \.
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The· c.onsequencesXrut - are quite predictable-in-terms
1-o

pf. protracted and inconclusive litigation, and of. added burdens on
\
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the federal courts as-we-ll-a£ unnecessary disruption of school
./

.2Lsy~~tems.

Moreover, the predicability of decisons wlte:r>e they w#l

...
./ "-' : . (__
~\ largely on findings as to purpose or intent will become an
•[(.

1\

even less exact.~9 science, and the school boards and authorities which have n so much at stake - will simply not know whether and

to what extent the Denver rule is applicable.

c
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element
of state action.

If one goes back far enough, it is probable that

all racial segregation in the United States, wherever occurring
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been
maintained or supported by government action. * But the basis
*In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315
(1968 ), Jud ge Walter Hoffman - in an appendix to his opi11ion compiled a summary of past government segregatory action which
included examples from a great majority of states. See also
Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights 245, 254-259(Tii67); M. Wei11bcrg, Race and Place,
Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (1967). (Jay: I have not checked these).

·z.. )
l
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for an on-g-oing f.i11ding of state action - regardless of intent or
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education
is a function of government and the schools are controlled and
operated by agencies of the state.

This is not to suggest, of course, that responsibility ir1 an
odious sense rests primarily upon school boards or other state
authorities for much of the segregation which still exists throughout
the country.

The causes of segregation in the schools are complex,

and where blame is appropriate it should be on a national basis
including past generations.

In most cities today there is a high

degree of residential segregation which results in a tendency toward
comparable school segregation. Zoning and housing laws often
contributed in the past to this separation of the races.

There has

loR also been a tendency, muted somewhat in. recent years, for

different r_a cial and ethnic X!ffimtx elements of the population to
. prefer to live separate and apart.

Nor are the residential patterns

necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the

other majority.

There are cities today in which the XIpGp< population

is predominantly Ne gro, and the residential patterns remain
essentially segre gated with the whites being the minority race.
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most pervasive
cause of residential segregation wherever it is found is the disparity
~

in economic opportunity and status which continue to be so prevalent.
·1

~'~ -•-<-h: •'1 t-k.._ )k j '-<J'c _ f..-- , ··'- .
These factors which combine to separate racial and ethnic groups,
..)

i\.
were the underlying catises of the segregation found to exist in
the Denver public schools.

Yet, as foreshadowed in Swann and as implicity held Krut
today, school board have a duty which overridges even the natural
and neutral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an
affirmative policy of desegregation.

It is this policy which mt!St be

applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a
doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time.

LF1' , .h. ~ pl f'
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III.

The Court's remand in this case requires that the _;B
, istrict c'ourt
determine whether "the Denver school system is a dual school system."
If so, "respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate

the entire system 'root and branch , ' Green v. County School Board, supra,
391 U.S. at 438," supra, 22. As the opinion of the sourt virtually compels
a "dual school system" finding,* the Denver school authorities are face to
face with the type of desegregation Ol'der now familiar in southern cities ·I'\

~ough Green is cited,

it is not factually relevant for the reason

stated above. ** The controlling case is Swann, and the question which will
confront - and confound - the Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann

C._ ·

A.

require);f[rt is this question which I will now address. Swann purported to

TC

enunciate no new principles, relying heavily on Brown 1." and 2 and on Green.
A

*

After suggesting that the "deliberate racial segregation policy with respect
to the Park Hill schools" may constitute the entire Denver system a dual one,
the majority opinion "observes" that "Denver is not a school district which
might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated units." The opinion
goes on to "suggest" that "the official segregation in illmc Park Hill affected the
racial composition of schools throughout the district." Supra, 13, 14.
,;n,..=
.:.. ( '~ --~-~
-
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** In Green, a sparsely settled rural county was involved - with only two
school and 1300 pupils. The city of Denver has 100 square miles, there are
120 schools serving some 100,000 pupils.
\
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It did, without discussion, extend the. full sweep of the affirmative duty
rule of Green to a large metropolitan school district, and it affirmed a
district court order which had relied heavily on "racial ratios" and decreed
extensive busing of elementary as well as secondary pupils.

Perhaps

because of the realitively drastic contours of the Charlotte / Mecklenburg
desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower federal courts have
since read~~~~~ as requiring similar decrees.

In the context of a large

urban area, with heavy residential concentrations of white and black
citizens in different - and sometimes widely separated - sections of the
school district, extensive dispersal and busing of pupils is inevitable if
~ann_is

read as expansively as the facts in that case might justify.

I suggest that Swann was not intended to result in - nor does anything

in the Constitution require - such vast disruption of public education in our
major cities.

The Court's decision in Swann can fairly be read -not as

mandating the massive restructuring of every segregated school system but as laying down a broad rule of reason which recognizes that desegregation
remedies must remain flexible, and that other values and interests must
be considered.

It is ·illuminating to review the unanimous opinionX'.KN"

written by Chief Justice Burger.
B_EC?W_!l__!I'~

It commtned with the reaffirmative of

emphasis on thc':m: "practical flexibility" of remedies:

-3"In fashi oning and effecting the decrees, ihe courts will
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equiiy
has be e n characte rized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its reme dies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs." Brown 2, 349 U.S. at 229, as
quoted in Swann, 402 U.S. at 12.
The Chief Justice refe rred to the "massive problem" of converting from
a dual to a unitary system, and emphasized the duty on school authorities

.L _.
neverthele ss to fulfill this obligation. But in the same paragraph .there

·•<c./-<- .,. . .~(
the
was-a--reference to the "breadth and flexibility" inhere1,t in/equitable powers
·\

of the district cou:rt:s, and then went on expressly to state that:
" ... a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally
from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies
to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to
correct, by__<l:_ ~al~nci~lg__g_fJ lle ~n_diyidt1al_ a!lc! collecti'{e)nterest,
the condition that offends the Constitution." 402 U.S. at 15, 16.
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opinion then identified the areas of school board -dec isms which
.•1

l

influence racial composition, and as to which appropriate action may be

taken~

new sc hool construction, closing of old schools, faculty assignment, the
formulation of attendance zones, the pairing or clustering of schools, and
the formulation of policies on various matters. The c ourt reserved for
special attention qn the two central issues in the case, the extent to which
C<•• L'-

racial balance and the employment of pupil transportation (bussing) is re1.-v<--

quired. In retro spect, perhaps the members of the Court who joined Swann
\

28.

will agree that as to these issues the opinion is susceptible of widely
differing interpretations.

The District Court in Charlotte has premised its

desegregation plan on a "norn" - a desired goal - of achieving racial balance
of 71 % - 29 % in the school system, although recognizing that some variations
would be "unaviodable. " This Court approved the plan, but expressly stated:
"If we were to read the holding •Jf the District Court to
require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right,
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged
to reverse. " 402 U. S. at 24.

In addressing the related problem of whether any "one-race" schools

would be tolerated, the decision again was not clear.

The Court's opinion

does identify the goal as achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation, " but recognizes that "no per se rule can adequately
embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests
involved. " 402 U. S. at 26.

Swann is best known as compelling the transportation of pupils,
although I su ggest that its reputation has out distanced the reasonable
intendment of what actually was said.

The Court recognizing busing

as "one tool of school desegregation," and approved the District Court's
~ plan for extensive busing.

But the Court ca"tJtioned that:

29.
"No rigid guidelines as to student transportation can be
given for application to the infinite variety of problems
presented in thousands of situations." 402 U.S. at 29.
And reference was made e:h1n·essly to the necessity of considering the
"health of the children" and whether the busing proposed would
"significantly impinge on the educational process." 402 U.S. at 30, 31.

B

If a rule of reas : :1 is to be applied, as I

think~

is required,

where a district court is called upon to decree desegregation it should
accord due consideration to the following:*
Racial Balance
The misunderstanding - and misapplication - of Swann on this
issue has been profound.

As a correct formulation of what is required

as to racial balance is central to the bus ing and other subordinate issues,
it is necessary that school authorities and courts understand more clearly
the effective parameters.
in desegregation
·

ca ,~ es,

A requirement of racial balance, as used

would mean that the student population of each

~kRxn;mti<x~~d.xi:!:JK~

*The matters to be considered in a desegregation case are multidudinous
and will vary widely depending upon the size, demographic characteristics
and past action (or non-action) as to segregation. The subjects discussed
in this part of this opinion are selected as being perhaps the most critical
in view of Swann and its uncertain progeny in the lower courts.

30.
school would reflect substantially the same ratio, in terms of minority
and majority races, as the total population of the school district.
We start with the seminal decisions in Brown which contain
nothing - either in holding or dicta - that supports even the use of racial
b alance as a starting point.

Green did say that there should be no

identifiable "black school" or "white school", but as w. shown above
there were only two schools before the Court, affording an unlikely as
well as unnecessary vehicle for enunciating a principle applL~able to
the wholly dissimilar situation found in major urbanized districts
with scores if not hundreds of schools.

It was not until Swann that the

issue of racial balance was expressly considered by the Court. * In
that and its companion cases the plaintiffs did con tend for a rule
requiring the substance of the racial balance doctrine. **
The Court specifically rejected the demand for a racial
*Cf. U.S. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U.S. 225 (1969)
dealing with faculty desegregation.
**See, e. g. , Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (E. D.
Va.) 1969. See also Winter and Sobeloff, J. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part. (Jay: as I dictate this I don't have the precise
name of Swann at the Fourth Circuit level. I think it was in 431 F. 2d,
138. Anyway, this is a ca·se that was appealed to the C:ourt in Swann.

3/.
bala nce test, holding that "any particular degree of racial balance
or mixing . . . would be disapproved . . . , "but adding that consideration could be given to "mathematical ratios" as "no more
than a starting point in the process of ,;haping a remedy . .
402 U. S. at 24, 26. * The difficulty has resulted from a widespread
misunderstanding of "hat was intended in Swann.

Although it has

become customary for district courts to pay lip service to the
admonition against use of racial balance as a standard, many in
fact have appeared to read Swann - in light of the plan there approvedas compelling a de facto recognition that balance itself is the goal. **
*See Chambers opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Winston-Salem/
Forsyth Bd. of Ed. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1228 (1971).
**kt example of this is found in the district court's order
in Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Bd. of Ed., supra, in which an extensive

and quite unjustified busing program was ordered to "achieve the
greatest possible degree of segregation,." pursuant to the court's
interpretation of Swamu. (Jay: Cite some other examples here especially the Augusta, Georgia, case I ruled on last summer cite and note that in my opinion I accepted finding that racial
balance was not decreed. )

a.

.,\,£.,__ --

It should I be made explicitly clear that"the Constitution and after all this is the touchstone of the rights at issue - does
~t require racial balance or i-ndeed a school system in which

every school has some mixing of the races. Quite apart from
-z-c

the fact that nG -language--in -the--Gonstitution nor--in -any decision
d
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applying the equal protection clause to other situations involving
~'

1'1-<:..-t.- . . .
racial discrimination require& this,* the Constitution could
---t,..l.-4t" -..- · '

,

"
~

hardly be construed to require an abffiH>&.if-not impossible result. Few would suggest, for example, that it would be feasible
to apply even approximately the population racial balance in a"
-"' '-'--"" ~--, ~; . ·-,;.;_,
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;c-ity-+ikevWashine:ton
or NewarkJto
every public
:s~ school
\
~
~
/
.
therein.

The argument for racial balance ai_se- overlooks the fact
that th e remedy far exceeds that which is necessary to redress

*

Jay: Try to think of some parallel cases. One type of situation
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an example,
is that the fundamental cause of racial imbalance in the schools
today is residential segregation. If the Constitution requires
homoge nization of the population, the way to achieve it would be
to compel affirmative desegregation of residential patterns though admittedly ..,this would- be a revolutionary step. W -t~ I
t:L L z
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the con s titutional evil.

7.

Lel us use Denver as an example . Il is

doubted lhat anyone would contend, absent state action of any
kind whatever, that the schools in Denver would have a substantially
different racial composition from that which actually exists.

I

have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible
in some degree for the extent of segregation that exists. It can
certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed to ameliorate
segregation the poard could and should have taken steps toward

>

this end. But if one assum~d
, a maximum discharge of constitutiona! duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, the fundamental problem of residential segregation would continue to exist
and it is this situation that causes most of the school segregation.
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to
el,: c.:. f..,-:.. --;. .._.:.__
mention a dubious extension of constitutional .,theory - to apply
some XNxtro retributive theory which would require a greater

c::e:;--

degree of school integration than would have resulted from purely
natural and neutral non-state causes.

/6.
c/
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It is to be remembered that the racial mix of the population
varies widely among the cities and counties of this country.*
The demography ;- .:o constantly varies, especially within the cities
where population ratios change significantly as citizens move to
suburban areas and white and black families constantly are on the
move within the cities.

A racial balance established in a school

system for one year would rarely be valid three or four years later.
1\

An awareness of these facts explains, no doubt, why the

Court has never projected a mechanistic solution for a problem
of such delicacy and diversity.

Mr. Justice Brennan may well have

had this in mind in Green when, speaking for the Court, he said:
"There is no universal answer to the complex
problems of desegregation; there is obviously no
one plan tt .it will do the job in every case. The
matter must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances present and the options available
in each instance. " 391 U.S. at 439.
*The ran ge may well be from school districts which are perhaps
90% black (Washington, D. C. and Clarendon County, S.C.) to many
districts which are nearly all WIDi white. For the situation in
Clarendon County, S. C. see Brunson, v. Board of Trustees, No. 14, 571
CA 4 June 5, 1970) - Jay: Check to see if you have a better cite
for this case.
-

II.
d

I conclude, therefore, that the relevancy of racial balance

is little more, as Chief Justice Burger noted, than a "starting point
to decide whether in fact any violation existed".

Winston-Salem /

Forsyth Bd. of Ed. v. Scott, 404 U. S. at 1229.

Neighborhood Schools
The Denver School Board has consistently adhered to a policy
<!~ .

based on the advantages of l'IRili!x neihborhood schools.*
'
defense in this case is based

prima~

The

ily on the theory that the

neighborhood school policy was operated with total neutrality as to
w ·-z:: . .~
- - (~·:· ~:.. ;. -/ l. .. t...

T

race, and that the-lawfulness -of such a policy has-been-recognized
in the lOth Circuit.**
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**See United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa Co., 429 F. 2d
1253 (CA 10 1970); Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,
375 N F. 2d 158 (CA 10 1967); and Downs v. Board of Education of
Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (1964).

*The Court of Appeals summarized the Denver policy as ~
follows: "The goal is a centrally located school which children
living within the boundary lines must attend. Although the Board
has no written policy governing the setting of attendance boundaries,
several factors have apparently been employed. Among these
are current school population in an attendance area, estimated
growth of pupil population, the size of the school, distance to
be traveled, and the existence of natural boundaries. The Board
also attempts to draw junior high school and senior high school
boundary lines so that all students transferring from a given
school will continue their education together. " App. p. 127a.

36.
But the inquiry does not end with the ascertainment that a
neighborhood policy has been neutrally administered.
affirmative duty doctrine, a school board cannot
neutrality alone.

~

Under the
rest upon

There are many ways in which segregation can

and should be promoted without dismantling all neighborhood
schools or even abandoning the neighborhood concept as a goal to
be attained in conjunction with desegregation and other goals.

The

critical inquiry is how a particular neighborhood school policy
is structured and operated.

Has it been used to encourage or

stabilize segregation ather than to promote sound educational
ends, including the minimizing of segregation?* A board should
have wide flexibility in deciding the various matters which are
relevant both to preserving the values of neighborhood schools
and to furthering the desegregation process, including the
drawing of attendance zones, location of new schools, the closing
of old ones, student transfer policies, natural boundaries, and
the differences between the proper treatment of younger as
contrasted with older children.
*It is by no means clear in this case that the answer to this
question is satisfactory, especially as the Denver policy has
embraced junior hig-h and high schools apparently on the same
11xi:: basis a s elementary schools.

37.
A rule of reas-on, balancing interests and values with
legitimate goals, must recognize the merit of neighborhood
schools, especially for children of tender years.

Authorities

on education agree widely as to the advantages of a neighborhood
system fairly adminish; red. * The geographic neighborhood is
the most common unit of organization or urban elementary
schools. ** The neighborhood unit provides for ease of access,
minimizes costs and time of travel to and from school, and thus
maximizes the potential e».iracurricular role schools can play
in the lives both of parents and children. These factors, along
with the associational benefits of attending school with friends
which (particularly for elementary school children) relieves the
*In Deal v. Cinconnati Board of Education, 369 F. 2d 55 (CA 6)
(1966),"the Court summarizes these advantages: "Appellants,
however, pose the question of whether the neighborhood system of
pupil placement, fairly administered without racial bias, comports
with the requirements of equal opportunity if it never· l-Jeless results
in the creation of schools with predominantly or even exclusively
Negro pupils. The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout
the nation and has been for many years the basis of school
,
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have general
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such as minimization
of safc ' y hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in
reducin g transporation needs, ease of pupil placement and
adminis t ration through the use of neutral, easily determined standards,
and RR better home-school communication."

r

**New York City's relativt:ly recent emphasis on decentralization
is eviden ce of the continuing vitality of the xrei:EhxNR.I'ID neighborhood
1 or community concept.
See New York Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at 1,
"Col. 2. (Jay: You will find additional and more recent references
to New York's experimentation, and also to the views of some blacks
that racially separated schools are desirable, in the Bickel
xxN:x article s - I believe).

38.
the psychological stress of initial adjustment to school, have
often been noted by educators. *
It is not without relevance to observe that in the end the

quality of a community's school depends in large part upon the
level of public support, especially that of parents of children
currently in the schools.

In addition to attitudes towards paying

increased taxes of voting bond issues, the effectiveness of the
educational process itself is related to the attitude of the parents
and to their capacity to participate.

To the degree that schools

can involve parents with their children's education as such, or
broaden the parents' own educational horizons, the common end

*James B. Conant, nationally known authority on the public
schools, wrote that "[a ]t the elementary school level the issue
seems clear. To send young children day after day to distant
schools seems out of the question. " Conant, Slums and Suburbs,
29 (1961).

39.
of improved schooling is surely served.

*

Parents whose young

children have been removed, by busing from their neighborhood
to some remote school many miles distant, are not likely
candidates for this type of participation.

~JtY
~·1\//

~~~/v)

~:::;
d-J~ ~

~~

>

In the Court's opinion in Swann, it was recognized that:

"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as
schools are located in response to the needs of people.
The location of schools may thus influence the patterns
of residential development of a metropolitan area and
have important impact on composition of inner city
~E;ighborhoods." 402 U.S. at 21.

The Court could hardly have included the foregoing in its opinion
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had it intended to subordinate entirely the values of the rum
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borhood school to those of integration.

~tified

In a perceptive column in the Washington Post, December 25, 1972,
colum'.'list William Raspberry addressed the indispensable role of
parents in working closely with the principal and teachers of their
children's schools, a role usually impossible to assume if one's
children have been bused away many miles:

"Casting a ballot (for school board members)is no substitute for visiting schools, seeing at first hand what is happening (or not happening), offering suggestions and volunteering assistance.
"It is no accident that education is worse at those schools
where parental involvement is least. I know that in many
of the low-income neighborhoods, where the least learning
is taking place, parents often are too lildl¥ busy, too timid
or too poorly educated themselves to get very much involved in what's happening at their children's schools.

t

"But they'll have to make the time to get involved if they
eh."Pect their schools to get better. As a matter of fact,
simply knowing that his or her parents are concerned can
do a great deal to motivate a child to learn." ( i' 1.· c . .

)
~

.

,, - ·

·
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by the Court are self evident.

People do gravitate towards schools,

and in the misinterpretation that has followed Swann many who have
"gravitated" have been greviously disaPl ointed.

Similarly, the

location of schools does influence residential patterns and school
boards must ever be mindful of this as they seek not only to promote
wholesome integration now but to prevent or minimize the ever
present prospect of re-segregation.

The point need not be labored.

The legitimate interests

of parents, children, and the state in preserving the advantages
of neighborhood schools for younger children are genuine and
merit meaningful consideration.

A single-minded pursuit of

attaining maximum integration without attempting also to protect
these interests is required neither by the Constitution nor any
discernible social policy.
The Interest of Parents and Children

In the understndable national concern for alleviating the

injustice of state enforced or tolerated racial segregation in the
schools, it may be that the courts - as well as others -have overlooked the fact that the rights and interest of all parents and

41.
x children affected by a ,:esegregation program are entitled to
consideration.

A child, white or black, who is compelled to leave

his neighborhood and spend an extra hour or more each day being
bused to a distant school, suffers to some significant degree an
impairment of his liberty and his privacy, both being rights of
constitutional dimension.

The parents of such a child have somewhat

similar rights as well as legally imposed parental duties.

*

*
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nuture,
support and provide for the welfare of children, including their
education.

This was explicitly held by a unanimous court in

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

~

534, 535

(1924):
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged
by legislation which has no reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency of the
State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the ND~~X mere creature of the
State; those who nuture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recog11ize and prepare him for additional
obligations. "
-

______________,._.,_-...
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It is true, of course, that children and parents will attach
varying degrees of importance to these particular rights in 2clR
relation to where they live, their socio-economic status, the age
of the children, the quality and accessibility of the nearest school,
the extent to which integration already has been achieved and
whether this supplanted a regime of manifest discrimination in the
schools.

It would thus be impractical to weigh the individual

views of parents and children or, where the public service of free
education is provided, to allow the wishes of particular individuals
to be controlling.

But this does not mean k that the responsible

authorities - including the courts - do not have a duty to consider
and balance these rights.
In this process, it would not be inappropriate to bear
in mind that whatever may have been the sins of prior generations
in structuring a society in which racial discrimination has been
so prevalent, it is hardly the duty of courts - or the function of

43.
a just society - to impose upon the present generation of children
an undue burden of bearing the consequences of ancestral guilt.
Nor should concern for the children of any generation prevent the
fulfillment of the constitutional rights of minority children w..."r«
which have been recognized by decisions of this Court.

The

answer - commanded by the Constitution and equity principles of
fairness - is to balance in accord with a rule of reason the rights
and interests involved, and to avoid the extremism so often
inherent in instant solutions or in resolving "now" problems which
are the product of centuries of history.*

-------·------------------------------------*Jay: I am aware that the above subsection (discussing "Interests
of Parents and Children") is controversial. I would not be concerned
with this if I conclude - after further consideration - that this is a
sound and principled argument. I suggest that you explore it,
especially looking into the line of "privacy" cases starting with
Griswold. I am sure that you will find among Justice Douglas'
numerous dissents, langua ge emphasizing the broad scope of the
right of privacy. He is strongly opposed to the omnipresence of
big government directing all daily decisions of our lives.
Also, take a look at the second Deal case - 419 F. 2d 1387

at~~. 1391 for a fairly strong statement as to the "constitutional

rights" of children not to be bused. This was a pre-Swann case,
and perhaps the language is overly strong. What do you think?

/?. :/
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The Ultimate Goal - Equal Educational Opportunity
If we put aside the legalisms

Nfu>d:g~

of rights and duties,

surely there is agreement that the ultimate goal is equal opportunity
for children of all races to receive the best education the state can
-)t--

. ..-
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provide. !\As emphasized in Brown T "education is perhaps the most
j

- - --

·- -------important function of state and local governments.

But of course courts

~-----------------------------------

/

must operate within the framework of law and this Court must apply
principles derived from the Constitution by our prior precedents. In
brief summary, the relevant principles in a desegregation case are
as follows: dual or :sNgxRgxki:rnK segregated school systems are discriminatory and are proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause; and
school autl:0.rities have an affirmative duty to take appropriate steps
to desegregate such systems. These principles must be observed and
applied, not as ends in themselves but as means of achieving the educational goal. The alternative, then, to any simplistic application of what
has come to be regarded as the Swann formula, is to recognize - as inde ed

t£-r

the opinion of the Court in Swann explicitly did - there must be a balancing
1\

of interests and that reasonable discretion must be allowed in the ad-

_:4-:

,_(

ministration of a school system so long as the foregoing principle s
are no ' c ontravened and the measures taken comport with sound educational objectives.

__________

I
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Desegregation cannot properly be the end itself if, for no

other reason, it is now widely recognized that the best educational
opportunities x: for all are not achieved solely or even primarily
by racial integration.

There are, of course, educational dis-

advantages to segregation in a pluralistic society.

These include,

as Brown I emphasized, the possible "sense of inferiority" which
understandably results from any state imposed separation of the
races.

If all vestige of state ~imposition is removed there

is no reason for any feeling of inferiority merely because one
attends, by choice or because of residential patterns, a school
which may be wholly or largely attended by one race.

Indeed,

with the pride in race that all human beings are entitled to have whatever their color or ethnic origin - there may well be a greater
stimulation and sense of belonging in a racially identifiable school
so long as this is not

compelled~ ~ ~
(!>-~

The other side of this coin - namely compelled integration
where it wruld not naturally exist - also merits more thought than

47.
it may have received. · Compulsion in any form is abhored in a

free society.

It is

XN

especially unwelcome, and often deeply

resented, when children in an urbanized community are transported
long distances to serve a state policy only tenuously related to
improved education for all.

There is a difference between this

type of transportation, away from neighborhood schools to distant
ones, and the necessary transportation in rural and other areas
where schools are not conveniently located nearby.

In any event,

as every school official and teachers knows, the over-zealous
forcing of desegregation under circumstances which fracture
others'::ca:crsex: interests causes resentment and bitterness, and
tends to produce friction, discontent and even discord which
militate against educational opportunity for all concerned.
These are intangibles extremely difficult to evaluate.
But another consideration, not yet addressed specifically by this
Court, relates to the relative importance of integration of races
as compared with structui·ing a schoo1 system to minimize the
imbalance resulting from divergent socio-economic backgrounds.

48.
Most authorit es now agree that performance in the schools is
more clearly related to
discrimination.

p;:

economic status than to race or racial

There is considerable congruence between the

two but there is not necessary correlation.

(Note to Jay: At this point - I suggest that you
develop and incorporate here a paragraph or two
in the text accompanied by full footnotes, based
upon the studies and reports now available which
show in general that integration is not as vital
a factor in the educational process as had been
assumed, and that the controlling consideration
is the socb-economic background of the student.
l, The principal sources are the Coleman Report
(1966), a Coleman article in 38 Harvard
\ Educational Review 7 (1968); the reexamination
of the Coleman Report by Dr. Thomas F.
Pittigrew; a new book by Dr. Jenks (I think that
is his nam-3) which I asked the Library to order
and which I lent to Larry; and an article by Dr.
Monihan, which I believe is cited in the Bickel
t ·V 1 '~ (.,; J ,. ,, (
articles.
J
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This, of course, is a delicate and sensitive
area. I certainly do not want to overemphasize
it. Indeed, ,we-might omit it all together.! Yet,
it is certainly relevant to my general theory
that a rule of reason should be applied, balancing
all relevant interests. If the best available
evidence indicates that compelled integration
is not as productive - in terms of improved
education - as a proper socio-economic balance
or the investing of resources to remedy socio...
' ·.
l
economic deprivation, than it is foolish- for the
COUl~ts to·-insist simplistically on more and more
forced integration)
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Compulsory Busing
I come now to busin g, although little remains to be said
.--;)1. f--jc ):C: (._
if my interpretation of Swann - articulated above - is accepted .

... t.-~<--1.-<. '""·"/

The Court in Swann was unqu estionably right in describing as
,\

"one tool of school desegregation".

The transporting of school

children is as old as public education, and in rural and some
suburban settin gs busing is as indispensable as the providing of
books.

The issue, therefore, is not whether the employment of

busing or other means of transporting children to and from school
is legal

or~

appropriate.

Of course it is, where necessary

to further desegregation or other education objectives.

The gut

issue is when, under what circumstances, and to what extent busing
may appropriately be used.

The answer to this turns - as it does

so often in the law - upon a sound exercise of discretion under the
circumstances.

Or, putting it differently, the answer will vary

with fue circums tances and must be compatible with the rule of
reasoll'5.

2.
c~ j: / ' << .-
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Some courts in an excess or'zeal, m::ty well have ordered
)

far more busing of children than was reasonable or justified.
This is likely to happen particularly in

oooatw

cases where th r

Nx:IDr district court erroneously construes ~ as requiring some

----------

level of racial balance or "the greatest possible degree of actual

-------

desegregation".

The x latter phrase does appear in the Swann opinion
.. /
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(402 U.S. at 26) and if const-r-ued literally ~uld be in some cities ·.
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1 an-a-l-most- total disruption of education by the shuttling of children.

'\

Transportation is a logistical problem, and if resources are

........

~~ - ~.:--

available anything is "possible".

If enough buses are provided

tand-eDu-rts-have-not--been -reluetanLto order them}- the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation - namely, complete racial
balance - can be attained in every school, at least for the year in
question.

But this is an irrational interpretation of Swa1m, as it

--------------

would be of the Constitution itself.

--------

The Court was careful to say

-

- ·---------------

that "no per se rule" was intended; that "no rigid guidelines as to

-----------------

student transportation" could be prescribed; that the "health of

the children" and the relevance of the bm:; ing to "the educational
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process" should be considered· in formulating ai1y busing plan.
I
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402 U.S. 26, 30, 31.
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A fair reading of Swann, indeed it seems to me the only

\

!'

\

reading compatible either with the Constitution or with a rational

\

I

iI

national policy as to public education, is that a rule of reason must

\

\

be applied with a special caution to any proposal as disruptive of
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family life and interests as extensive ,b using solely for desegregation
!\

purposes.

As a

~

,;
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minimum, this Court should speak out

strongly against the unnecessary busing of children in the elementary
grades. It is at this age level that the neighborhood school ]mf
pRXKE~

performs its vital educational role.

It is with respect to

children of tender years that the greatest concern exists for their
physical and psychological health.

It is also here, at the elementary

school, Lat the rights and duties of parents are most sharply
implicated.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra.

Moreover,

the eveils of segregation - whether compelled or resulting from
I

natural causes - are less apparent at the elementary level than

r ,.

~·,

4.
when the young attain junior and high school status.

There is little

basis for any feeling of inferiority if the school system tolerates
no enforced segregation, directly or indirectly, and affirmatively
-~

t: '-.L
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aSSUreS the opportunity for an integrated school experience at the
;\

junir or high school levels and by the other techniques which are
now so commonplace. *
It is true that the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation plan

approved by the Court in Swann contemplated extensive busing of
elementary .::hildren.

As district courts have tended to look to

what in fact was approved rather than to what was said in the opinion
of the Court, it is important,-

mthe....inter'est of,clarification -,for
'

...,.-

Ll.)..:

us to say unequivocally that the -Court!s language "IKkX ~ which
fairly articulates a test of reasonableness is controlling and should
be followed.
*There can be full integration of faculties at the elementary level
without encountering the problems now being discussed. Varying
degrees of inte gration can often be attained at the elementary level,
without sacrificing the values of neighborhood schools, by some
gerrymanderin g of attendance zones , by allowing voluntary transfers,
and by arranging common participation in various special programs academic, social and athletic.

I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings
in the District Court, but on grounds quite different from those
relied upon by the Court.

This is the first school desegregation to

reach this Court which involves a major city outside of the South.
It comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have
never operated public schools under constitutional or statutory
provisions which mandated or permitted racial segregation.*
Nor is it asserted that anyother legislative action (such as, for
example, zoning and housing laws) contributed to thE! segregation
which is at issue in this case.

Rather, it is agreed by all concerned

that the Denver School Board alone is responsible fo:r whatever

s~~~

may have contributed to the segregated Hchools which

*Article J6Qr IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constituticm expressly
prohibits "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or
color. ' ' Although the Court 1 s opinion states that there has never
been a ny constitutional or statutory provision for racial segregation
in Colorado, most states have had such provisions at various times
in the past. Certainly, there is no evidence in this r 1ecord of
legally enforced or authorized segregation.

2.
are acknowledged to exist in Denver.

The predominantly minority

schools (Negro and Hispano) are located in two ar,eas of the city
referred to as Park Hill and the Core City Area.

The District Court

considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro
or Hispano student" was identifiable as a segregated schooL Wherever
one may draw this line, it is undisputed that most of the schools
in these two minority residential areas were in fac:t segregated in
the sense that their student bodies were overwhelmingly composed
of Negro and Hispano children.

The citywide school mix in Denver

was 66% Anglo, 15% ~ Negro and 20% Hispano. In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resided, the schools were
predominantly "white" if not entirely so. '\ Iri short~' the situation in
Denver was generally comparable to that in other large cities;teross
,..,,/r:t-'~t~·
.....rc:t''

the country in .which the;re is a substanUal minority ~~lation.
is in fact a segregation

br the schools which

There

results from residentl,al

·patterns which, in turn, are brought about primarily by socio-economic
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3.
In short, the situation in Denver is generally comparable to that
in other large cities across the country in which i:here is a substantial

minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered
by the federal courts.
This case presents for the first time a clear opportunity
for this Court to reexamine the distinction betwee:n de jure and de
facto segregation, a distinction which has been IDik nurtured now
for nearly a fifth of a century.

At the time ~rown _!was decided,

347 U.S. 483 (1 954), the distinction was supportable both in

constitutional~ principle and logic.

The situation confronting

the Court, largely confined to the section of the country designated
as the "South", was state-imposed racial segregatl.on in the schools
extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional
and statutory provisions.

The great contribution of Brown I was

to hold in unmistakeable terms that the 14th Amendment forbids
state-compelled or authorized ~segregation of public
schools.

Although some of the language was more E!Xpansive,

4.
the holdbg in

-g_ro~_!

was essentially negative: It was impermissible

under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to
force children to attend segregated schools.

The forbidden action

was unmistakeably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed for some years and by many courts - as

requirinl~

state neutrality,

allowing "freedom of choice ' · as to schools to be attended so long as
the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official
restraints.
by

*

But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat

~!:o~_!!_,wa:

did not retain its pristine JiB dimensions. In a

series of dec is ions extending from 19 54 t o 19 71 the essentially
neg-ative c oncept of neutrality evolved and was expanded t o the present
constitutional doctrine requiring a:.iliamtX affirmative action t o

tblaJt&ua desegrate schools systems. As stated in Green v. Count:y
~c_hool

Board1 391 U. S. 430, 438

(196~) ,

school boards were

declared to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert a unitary system in which racial~

*Jay_:_:Herecite Deal v. Cincinnati School Board, the Fourth Circuit
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some
of these in Bickel's book.

5.
discrimination would be eliminated root and

bran•~h.

" The school

system before the Court in Green was a strictly rural one in which
there were no concentrations of wh ite and black popu1ations, no
neighborhood school system as there were only two schools in the
county, and wh ere none of the problems of an urbanized school
district existed.

The Court there properly identified the freedom

of choice program a.s a subterfuge.

The language imposing an

affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system

WEtS

certainly

appropriate on the facts before the Court. If doubt existed, however,
as to whether the affirmative duty doctrine would be applied in all
circumstances where state action was found, such doubt was laid
to rest at by SwallE- v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971)
which applied the principle articulated in Green to the urban school
system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina.

The situation

as to residential patterns in Charlotte was described as follows:
!'The record in this case reveals the famillar
phenomenon that in metropolitan
:areas are often found concentrated in one part
of the city. " (supra p. 25)

~

6.

Noting that "segregation was the evil struck down. by Brown I",
anct citing Qree~ as to the "affirmative duty" to d'esegregate, the
Court

and other measures.
In so holding, the Court continued to emphasize "state

action", although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or
authorizing segregation had long since been repealed or nullified.
The Court's opinion devotes relatively little attention to the finding
of state action, noting that :
"In additinn to finding certain actions of th·e school
board to be discriminatory, the (district court)
also found that residential patterns in the <:ity and
county resulted in part from federal, state and local
governmental action other than school board
decisions. " (supra p. 7).

I

The Court's decision today applies the Green/Swann doctrine
of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board. In doing so, the
Court adhered to the distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation and found the necessary action by the Btate in various
decigions of the school board.

I concur in the con<!lusion that the

7.
state cannot escape responsibility for the segregaLtion in the Denver
schools but think the time has» come - indeed, is long overdue for abandoning as constitutional doctrine the de jure/de facto
distinction.

My reasons for this view are based on prb1ciple, on the

"'*ukack:Jiti: practicalities of proof, and on sound policy. I will
address each of these briefly.

It is necessary to identify the

constitutional right which is being enforced.

Although Brown I

said that separate educational facilities ZD "are inherently unequal

(347 U.S. 495), as noted above -the specific right identified was
not to be compelled by state action to attend segregated schools.
In the process of judicial evolution since 1954, decisions of this

Court have added a significant gloss to the original right so that it
now includes an obligation on the state - not merely to be neutral
and leave remedies to private action, but to take appropriate steps
to eliminate or minimize racial

SR@(teakluJ.

segregation in the public

schools. The Court has not gone so far as to find a full constitutional

8.
right in every child to attend an integrated school., but its recent
decisions have ce rtainly leaned in that direction and have been
qualified primarily by what is feasible.
But however one defines t e constitutional right articulated
most recently in Swann, it should be availab e to all citizens without
snttie subtleties
re gard t o the sx'latbtRs JSllk1d:tJfs which no longer ar e grounded b

a defensible principle.

Public :lUOAti schools a re creatures o:f the

stat e, and lllbl!t whether the segregation in issue was state created
or state assisted or merely state perpetuated should be irrelevant
t o constitutional principle. If the right implicated is an oppor tunity
t o attend integrated Bchools, it makes little sense to say that a
sch ool board's duty to pr ovide such oppor tunity only exists whe r e
the state action is rooted in the ancient history of pre-19 54 laws
whlch mandated s egregation.

Indeed, the Court today r ec ognizes

for the first time thE! unsoundness of drawing the line based on past
hist ory, but it clings tenuously to the unprincipled distinction.
It finds the de jure action in what the Denver School Board has done
or .failed to do, arrleven here the Court does not

1~ely

upon the

9.
results or consequences of the Board's conduct but feels compelled
to find a segregatory intent:
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between
de jure segrElgation and so-called de facto segregation
JIXIIlllt to which we referred in-. Swann is purpose or inter.t
to segregate. " (supra p. 17)
The Court does not require, however, a segregatory intent with
respect to the entire school s ystem, and indeed holds that if s uch
an intent is found with respect to any schools in a system, the
burden -normally on the plaintiff's shifts to the defendant mlk
school authorities to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes
were virturous.

SpeakingikH for the Court Mr. / ustice Brennan

said:
"Where school authorities have been found to have
practiced purposeful segregation in part o!f a school
system, they may be expected to oppose system-wide
desegregation, as did the respondents in this case,
on the ground that their purposeful segregatory actions
were isolated and individual events, thus leaving
plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise. But
at that point where an intentionally segreg-atory policy
is practiced in a meaningful or significant segxment
of a school system, as:tk in this case, the school
authorities cannot be heard to **!§BHoiK argue that
plaintiffs have proved only 'Sss 'isolated and individual'
unlawfully segxetw"*'* ~ segregatory actions.
In that circumstance, it is both fair and reasmable
to require that the school authorities bear the burden
of showing that their actions as to other segregated
schools within the system were not also motivated
by segregatory itx intent." (supra, p. 17, 18).

10.
The Court has indee~ ccme a long ways since ~·own I.

starting

from the solid and unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory
constitutional and statutory provisions of some states, the new
formulation - still professing fidelity to the de jur.e doctrine is that the proscribed state action exists, despite the u:Xk absence
of any segregatory laws if: (i) segregated schoolH in fact exists;
( ii) a court finds that they result from some actio:'l or nonaction by

the school action; (iii) such action need not :uxt relate to more than
a "meaninful" segment of the school system; and fiv) the school
board cannot prove that its intentions were nonsegregatory. Yet,
the Court still clings to the fiction of a distinction which no longer
involves any difference.
The Court's insistance that the "differentiating factor"
between de jure and de facto segregation is "purpose or intent",
is especially difficult to reconcile in light of precisely the opposite
view announced so firmly in Wright v. Council of the City of
~~o~ 407 U.S. 451 (1972).

In holding there that "motivation"

11.
(which is :bt::t!iiscbbot indistinguishable from intenO is irrelevant, the
Court said:

"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless.
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools,
and we have said that '[t}he measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness. " Davis v. School
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.""13. 33, 37.
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose
of motivation-Qf a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissiblH method of dismantling a
dual system.

*

**•

"Though the purpose of the new school districts was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases,
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. S.
at 46?,.
It is difficult to perceive a basis in law or logic for holding that

the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in iXlqa1u:
Emporia, Virginia, and is controlling in Denver, Colorado.

It

may be argued, of course, that there was a history of segregation
laws in Virginia and of arguably recalcitrant actioll by the local
school authorities.

But it was also arguable in Wright that the

most recent history -the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia
into a separate school district were not segregatory.

Rather t.han

12.
attempt to adjudicate a largely subjective Jd: issue, the Court
concerned itself the results and found that these produced a probability

of the E_!Il_l2_0ria case is plainly inconsistent with the de jure/de facto
distinction, and commends itself both on grounds of principle and
pra.cticality.
B

I come now to the practicalities of proof as a supporting reason.
for a frank abandonment of a distinction which has been largely
esmasculated by prior decisions and is no longer supportable on
principle. Here is the situation which confronts our country and
p rimarily the federal judiciary: After some 18 years of litigation
confined primarily to the southern states, desegregation plans have
been adopted and affirmative action taken to integrate the schools,
in

varying degrees, have occurred in all of the major cities and

most of the school districts.

The greatest problem with respect

to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas outside

13.
of the fklt South, anc! for the most part in cities ru1d states which have
long since abandoned conventional forms of de jure action, namely,
discriminatory laws and ordinances applicable to schools, housing,
zoning and the like.

As in Colorado and Denver the legal framework

within which the school systems function is neutral, and yet segregation
in the schools -varying from massive to fragmentary - is commonplace
wherever substantial number of minority citizens reside.

The

litigiation heretofore focused on the South already is surfacing in
a number of other regions.

The decision of the Court today, based

entirely on school board action and inaction, will invite the filing of
numerous desegregation cases.

particularly to vindicate constitutional rights. Thn problem which
concerns me, therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the
artificial framework in which it must be conducted under today's
decision.

14.
The issue ir. these cases will not be wheth.~r segregated
education exists.

This will be conceded in most of them.

The

litigation will focus on whether it has resulted in any meaningful
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the
school board did or failed to do, and (11) whether the board had a
segregatory intent.

The practicalities and problems of proof of

these issues are obvious to any lawyer.

Of greater concern, the

results - often arrived at subjectively by a court im: endeavoring
t o ascertain the subjective intent of school board members with
respect to action taken over many years -will be fortuitbus,
unpredictable and perhaps even capricious.
The Denver case, decided today, may not bE! typical but it
illust rates the point.

Although appellate courts arEl normally bound

by findings of fact, especially where the testimony is aw:t:Lpe:i«kw
compendious and often involves opinion as well as factual evidence,
this Court refused to be bound by the findings of the district court
which also had been approved by the Court of Appeals.

L'ldeed,

15.
the majority opinion, apparently concluding that there was no
substantial evidence to support the findings below, held that they
we r e "incorrect as a matter of law: "
"Accepting the School Board's explanation, the
District Court and the Court of Appeals ag:reed
that a finding of de jure segregation as to t he core
city schools was nof permissible since petitioners
had failed to pr-Ove '( 1) a rae ially discriminatory
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly
existing in those schools.' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly--icc
incorrect as a matter of law. " (supra p. 16).
One may or may not agree that a majority of this Court, not having
heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was co1rrect in its judgment
overruling the factual findings of the courts below,

The point is

that this type of disagreement among judges is inevitable when dealing
·with an issue as slippery as ''intent" or "purpose", and especially
when related to scores if not hundreds of decision.'3 may be school
authorities under varying conditions over many years.
Every act of a school board and school administration, and
indeed every failure to aet where affirmative action is indicated,
is a form of state action.

The most routine decisons with respect

16.
to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying
de grees the extent t o which schools are initially segregated, remain
in

that state,

are~

desegregated, or - for the long term

future - are likely to be one or the other. These decisions inciude
the more obvious matters such as school building construction,
location, size and timing; the drawing or gerymandering of student
attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced,
especially 0: with respect to elementary schools; the recruitment,
promotion and assignment of faculty and supervis1)ry personnel;
policies with respect to transfers from one school to ec !1-nother;
whether, and to what extent, special schools will be provided, where
they will be located, and who will qualify to attend them; the
determination of curriculum, including whether there will be
XDK ''tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training,
and the routing of students into these tracks; and i:lven deolsmK
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic policies.
The Court's discussion in Swann of the eff,a ct and complexity
of decision making with respect to the construction of new schools

17.
and the closing of old ones is illuminating:
"The c onstruction of new schools and. the
closing of old ones are two of the most important
functions of local school authorities and a.lso
two of the most complex. They must decide
questions of location and capacity in light of
population growth, finances, land values, site
availability, through an a lmost endless list of
factors to be considered, The result of t:his
will be a decision which, when combined with
one technique or another of student assignment,
will determine the racial composition of the
student body in each school in the system. Over
the long run, the consequences of the choices
will be far reaching. People gravitate toward
school facilities, just as schools are located in
response to the needs of people. The location of
schools may thus influence the patterns o:f
residential development of a metropolitan area
and have important impact on composition of
innercity neighborhoods. " 402 U. S. tix 20-21.
If we continue to pursue the illustion of a constitutional

difference between de jure and de facto segregation, and therefore
have to probe into and ascertain the intent behind countless decisi ons
of sch ool authorities wherever desegregation suits are 1linul:lt#
brought, the consequences in terms of protracted'. , lDI::x::a:1cba:
inc onclusive and disruptive litigation are quite predictable.
It

s eems especially unwise t o subject the federa l judiciary and

especially the public school systems across the country with this
a
added burden for the sake of preserving/distinction:s. which no

18.
longer serves a purpose. It is to be remembered that

3a!K

as

a court, we must be concerned with enunciating principles and
rules which can be understood and followed by the courts and, in
thts case, by the school boards and authorities which have no much
at stake.

c
Public policy, as well as concepts of a rational jurisprudence,
also supports the abandonment of a double standaJ~d with respect to
segregated schools.

The problem. of racial segregation, of which

the schools constitut'e an important segment, is a national one of
large dimensions.
as well as public

If

It is no longer sectional or regional, and solutions acceptance thereof - will be fat~ilitated if solutions

a re sought on a national basis, applying uniformity of IUiiiUl1d.t1dlx
constitutional rights.

Professor Bickel has commented on the incongruity of the
federal courts persisting in drawing the de jure/de facto distinction.
As he points out:

19.

"Outside the South . . . school segregation is
massive, and has, indeed, increased substantially
in recent years. . . caused mainly by resildential
patterns. Nevertheless, very few federal courts
have tried to intervene (and) none has done· so without
qualification. *
It is quite true, as

IUJJ2k Professor

JiHuilsd~UUQ

Bickel

suggests, that the massive segregation which exists in many of the
major cities is caused primarily by factors unrelated to government
action of any kind.

This may be less true in somE! of the southern

cities than in those located elsewhere.

Yet, if on1~ goes back far

enough, it is probable that all racial se gregation in the United
states, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the
schools, has at sometime been maintained or supported by
government action.

**

*Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress
131 (1970).

**Tn Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315
(196B);·rudge Walter ~Hoffman - in an appendix to his opinion compiled a summary of governmental segregatory action which
included some action by a great majority of the states. See also
'Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil

Rights ~ 245, 254-259 (1967); M. Weinberg, Race and P lace,
Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, E ducation and
Welfare (1967).
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But the principal cause of segregation in the schools is,
quit e simply, the tendency of racial and ethnic elE!ments of the
population to live separate and apart.

The residential patterns are

not necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the
other majority.

There are cities today in which the population is

predominantly Negro, and the residential patterm: remain essentially
segregated with the whites being the minority

rac 1~.

The causes of

this basic segregation are complex and varied, including the desire
(common to all ethnic and racial groups) to assoc:tate and live together.
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most fundamental
cause of residential segregation is the disparity in economic status
which is so prevalent.

These were certainly the dominant causes

of the segregation found to exist in the Denver public schools.
Yet, as held in _Swann and t oday in this case, the schools;
boards have an affirmative duty which overrides the natural a nd
neut ral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pu:rsuing a policy
of desegregation. It is this policy which must be applied consistently

21.

on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which

ef?~

c~ ~--~_..__J ~ ~1;2.-1- 3a
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are acknow ledged t o exist in Denver.
The predominantly minority schools (Negro and Hispano)
are located in two areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and
the Core area.

The District Court considered that a school with

a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro or Hispano students" was
identifiable as a segregated school. Wherever one may draw this
line, it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two minority
residential areas are in fact heavily segregated b1 the sense that
their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of Negro and
Hispano children.

The city wide school mix in Dfmver is 66%

Ango, 15% Nego and 20% Hispano. In areas of the city where the
Anglo population largely resides, the schools are predominantly
Anglo if not entirely so.

The situation in Denver is generally

comparable to that in other large cities across

th~~

country in

which there is a substantial minority population and where desegregation
has not been ordered by the federal courts.

There is massive

segregation in the schools of these cities fully as pervasive as
ef~

that in southern cities prior to the desegregation rbuu s of the

3.
past decade and a half. In short, the focus of thE1 school desegregation problem - actue, devisive and intractable - has shiften from
the South to other sections of the country.

Unwilling and footdragging

a& the process was in most places, substantial p1rogress toward
achieving integration has been made in southern <!!ties,.* No
comparable progress has been made in most non--southern cities
with large minority populations primarily because of the de facto/
de jure distinction nutured by the courts and accepted complacently
by many of the same voices which denounced the

4~Vils

of segregated

schools in the South.** But if our national concern is fortk:s those
who attend such schools, rather than for perpetua.t ing a legalism
rooted in past history, the evil is certainly no less in a Denver
than in an Atlanta.
* .Jay:---ne publications of the Department of Education (HEW will,
I believe, give you data as to the extent desegregation has been
achieved in the South. I believe reports of HEW also will show th,~
extent to which schools elsewhere remain segregated.
**.Jay: Here you could quote the Ribicoff speech of a couple of
years ago - which is certain to be indexed in the Congressional
R.ecord or could be obtained for you by the Library by asking
Ribicoff's office. You should not do it yourself.

4.
In my view the time has come to abandon a distinction which
has long since outlived its time, and to formulate: constitutional
doctrine of national rather than merely regional application.

At

the time Brown I was decided, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the:JdltBE
.ltisti:Nt: distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was

inconsistent with the constitutional rational of that case. The
situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the section of
the southern states, was officially imposed racial segregation
in the schools extending back for many years and usually embodied
in constitutional and statutory provisions.

The great contribution

of J?rown I was its holding in unmistakable terms that the 14th
Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of
public schools.

Although some of the language wa.s more expansive,

the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the states, or their instrumentalities, to
force children to attend segregated schools.

The forbidden action

was unmistakably de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed -

5.
for some years and by many courts - as requiring state neutrality,
allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as
the state itself allowed the choice to be genuinely free of official
restraints. *
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified somewhat by
J?!:~~_li1 .., did

not retain its pristine dimensions. In a series

of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the essentially negative
concept of neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present
constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative action of desegregate
school systems. As stated in Green v. County School Board, 391
U.S. 430, 438 (1968), school boards were declarE!d to have ''the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch. '' The school system!: before the Court
in

q~een

was operating in a rural and sparsely sHttled county where

there were no concentrations of white and black populations, no
*Jay: Here cite Deal v. Cincinnagi School Board, the Fourth Circuit
case involving Richmond, and other like cases - you will find some
of these in Bickel's book.

5.

neighborhood school system (ther e were only two schools in the
county), and where none of the problems of an urT:mnized school
district existed.

The Court there properly identified the freedom

of choice program as a Slll:lblut subterfuge.

The la.nguage in Green

imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system was
xppC!!!rpi appropriate on the facts before the Court.

There was

reason to doubt, however, whether appC!!!p*bdeuDui this language
was appropriate and would be applied to the radically different
factual setting of a large city with vast areas of residential
segregation, presenting problems and calling for solutions quite
different from those in the simplistic u rural setting of New Kent
':::ounty, Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmatiVE! duty concept
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application,
was laid to rest by Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 14 (1971)
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to
the urban school system of metropolitan CharlottE!, North Carolina.

7.
In describing the situation as to residential patte:ms in Charlotte,

the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in metropolitan areas
of minority a groups being "concentrated in one part of the city.
(402 U.S. at 25).

11

The opinion acknowledged that:

"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting
population, numerous schools, congested and
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U. S. at 14.
iEpiB Despite this

xwn~wb:X111JlXii!lJk

recognition of a fundamentally

different problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless
held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was fully applicable, and
prescribed for a liDIIIIlor metropolitan school system with 107 schools
and some 84, 000 pupils essentially the same ax remedy - desegregation
" r oot and branch 11

lVIDIX

now - which had been formulated for the two

schools of 1, 300 pupils of New Kent County.
ilx

In Swann the Court found the requisite "state action" ,

although the pre-Brown type of state laws compelling or authorizing
segregation had long since been repealed or nulll.fied:

8.
" In addition to find ing certain actions of th e school
board to be discriminatory, the (District Court)
also found that residential patterns in the city and
county resulted in part from federal, s tat '~ and local
governmental action other than school board
decisions. "(supra p. 7).

There was, however, a long:illboai: history of offic:ial segregation
in the Charlotte schools and evidence that the school authorities
had read too expansive a meaning into the Brown directive of
"a ll deliberate speed. "
II

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/
de facto distinction applies the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative
duty" to the Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state mandated school segregation.

The only evidence of state

action was found in various decisions of the school board. I concur
in the Court's holding that the public school authorities are the
responsible agency of the state, and that the affirmative duty doctrine
is equally applicable to Charlotte and Denver. I disagree, however
with the perpetuation of the "de jure/ de facto disHnction and the
resulting tortuous effort to identify "segregating a.cts" and to

9.
deduce a "segregatory intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that
where segregated schools exist there is a duty on the GCDbyx duly
constituted authorities (I will refer to them colledively as the
"school board") to take all appropriate steps to desegregate them.
My primary reason for urging the abandonment of the lin
de jure/de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the
holding in Brown into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can
be justified on a principled basis. In addition, as this case abundantly
demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary to apply the
distinction presents problems of the greatest complexity.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right
which is being enforced. This is not easy, as the precedents have
been far from explicity. In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance
of education, the Court said that:
"Where the state has undertaken to provide it, it is
a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. " 347 U. S. at 493.
In amplifying its earlier decision in Brown

n,

the Court identified

the "fundamental principle' · as being the unconstitutionality of
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I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings
in the District Court, but on grounds that differ from those relied
upon by the Court.

This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South.

It comes from

Denver, Colorado, a city and a state which have not operated public
schools under constitutional or statutory provisions which mandated
1

or permitted racial segregation.

Nor has it been argued that any

other legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and housing

2
laws) contributed to the segregation which is at issue.

The Court

has inquired only to what extent the Denver School Board may
have contributed to the segregated schools which are aclmowledged
to exist in Denver.

2.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two areas
of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core city area.

The

District Court considered that a school with a concentration of 70 to
75% "Negro or Hispano students" was identifiable as a segregated
school.

313 F. Supp., at 77.

Wherever one may draw this line,

it is undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas are in
fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are
overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo children.

The city-wide

school mix in Denver is 66 % Anglo, 14% Negro and 20% Hispano.
In areas of the city where the Anglo population largely resides, the

schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to that in
other large cities across the country in which there is a substantial
minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered
by the federal courts.
of these

(.<.-~

~fully

There is massive segregation in the schools

as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to

3.
the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half.

The focus

of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from the South
·- / !

to the country as a whole.

C--~.<-<:C i-<,..t§Zd!-.~·r-e{

Unwilling as the process was in most
!\

places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been
3
made in southern states.

No comparable progress has been made
4

in many non-southern cities with large minority populations
primarily because of the de facto/ de jure distinction nurtured by
the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices
5

which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South.
But if our national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather

~

than logic, we must recognize that the evil of separate schools
.A

is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.

4.
I

In my vie~ftho
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abandon a distinction which

f1U§Jlong sinceloutlived its time, and lor; formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application.

When

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided,
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was consistent

~:~
with the constitutional rationale of that case.
1\

the Court,

!J::J:.~ c.,fill c. J r.
Fi8 \
fO r • • the

The situation confrontin g

southern states, was officially

imposed racial segregation in the schools extending back for many
years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in unmistakable
terms that the 14th Amendment forbids state-compelled or authorized
segregation of public schools.

347 U. S. at 488, 493-49 5.

Although

some of the language was more expansive, the holding in Brown I
was essentially negative: It was impermissible under the Constitution
for the states, or their instrumentalities, to force children to
attend segregated schools.

The forbidden action was fon\iStll:~

5.
de jure, and the opinion in Brown I was construed - for some years
and by many courts - as requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom
of choice " as to schools to be attended so long as the state itself
6

assured that the choice was genuinely free of official restraints.
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, 349
U.S. 294 (1955), did not retain its pristine meaning.

In a series

of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the concept of state
7

neutrality evolved and was expanded to the present constitutional
doctrine requiring affirmative state action to desegregate school
systems.

The keystone case was Green v. County School Board,

391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), where school boards were declared
to have "the affirrr. a~.tive duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a • • • unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." The school
syst em before the Court in Green was operating in a rural and
sparsely settled county where there were no concentrations of
white and black populations, no neighborhood school system (there

6.
were only two schools in the county), and where none of the problems
of an urbanized school district existed.

The Court tA..e properly

~
identified the freedom of choice program as a subterfuge, and the
'\

language in Green imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a
unitary system was appropriate on the facts before the Court.
There was, however, reason to question to what extent t bis duty
applied in

th~~ factual setting of a large city with=~~~·. ;:_
~

'

of residential segregation, presenting problems and calling for
solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of New Kent
County, Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept
would flower into a new constitutional principle of general application..-:!>/
was laid to rest by b'wann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to
the urban school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina.
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in Charlotte,

the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas

7.
of minority groups being "concentrated in one part of the city, "
402 U.S. at 25, and acknowledged that:
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting
population, numerous schools, congested and
complex traffic patterns. " 402 U.S. at 14.
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different problem from
that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the
affirmative duty rule of Green was applicable, and prescribed
for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84, 000
pupils essentially the same remedy - elimination of segregation
"root and branch" - which had been formulated for the two schools
a:,.d •1, 300 pupils of New Kent County.
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only with

states having "a long history" of officially imposed segregation
and the duty of school authorities in those states to implement
Brown I.

402 U.S. at 5-6.

~~

In so doing, the Cour~~'Y ·- ---

~~
fandidey that the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I

8.
to Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/
de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts
as affirmative duty, including large-scale transportation of pupils,
to eliminate separate schools, the Court required these districts to
alleviate conditions which in large part did not reSilt from historic ,
state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather , the familiar root cause
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our
country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and
migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of
the schools was perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public
school authorities. This is a national, not a southern phenomenon.
And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular state had or did not
have segregatory school laws. 8
Whereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of stateimposed segregation in that particular section of the country where
it did exist, Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts to
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but are similar both
in origin and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As the
remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown, the inevitable rationale of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional
approach to our national problems of school segregation.

9.
II.

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/
de facto distinction , will require the application of the Green/ Swann
doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board despite
the absence of any history of state-mandated school segregation.
The only evidence of a constitutional violation was found in various
decisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that
the public school authorities are the responsible agency of the state,
and that the affirmatj ve duty doctrine is equally applicable in Charlotte
and in Denver. I disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de
jure/ de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the initial
tortuous effort of identifying " segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory
intent. " I would hold , quite simply, that wtere segregated public schools
exist , there is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as the
" school board") are sufficiently responsible to impose upon them a
nationally applicable duty to take appropriate desegregatory measures.

10.
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t; reason for

"

ttr~

tits abandonment of the
~'..u...· ...:a.

de jure/de facto distinction is that, in "FIIR'IJ.,...!!i:i;eww" of the evolution of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no
longer can be justified on a principled basis.

In addition, as this

case abundantly demonstrates, proof of the facts deemed necessary
to apply the distinction presents problems which the courts cannot

¢~.~twly resolve.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right
which is being enforced.
been far from explicit.

precedents
This is not easy, as thE¥'~ have
In Brown I, after emphasizing the importance

of education, the Court said that:
"Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. " 347 U.S. ,at 493.
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle"

enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial
discrimination in public education, " 349 U. S. at 298, and spoke

11.
of "the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. "
349 U. S. at 300.

Although this and similar language is ambiguous

as to the specific constitutional right, it meant - as a minimum that one has the right not to be compelled by state action to attend
9

a segregated school system.

In the evolutionary process since

1954, decisions of this Court have added a significant gloss to this
original right.

Although nowhere expressly articulated in these

terms, I would now define it as the right to expect that the state once it assumes responsibility for public education - will provide

.,

a reasonable opportunity for education in an integr~_ll._~o-~ sy~t_eni.
The correlative of this right should be the duty imposed upon the
state - not merely to outlaw dual school systems - but affirmatively

,.,o

to take reasonable action consistent with educational goals to provide
integrated school opportunities.

It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or denying
this right, as the case may be, depending upon whether or not some

12.
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of de
facto rather than de jure action. If, as in Swann "segregation was the
evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is little reason
for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the basis
of a formalistic distinction.
Public schools are

XHXS

creatures of the state, and whether the

segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely stateperpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The school

~~~~~

board exercises mesth ~~-by..y-ear. responl!ibility over the
A.

~q~-~~- ~ ~ c:.u-J.JL .:.......__ HI..P ~
,{operations of the public school system. It sets policies on attendance

zones, faculty employment and assignments, school construction,
closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. School board
decisions [are];;bviousl;}_not the sole cause of segregated school conditions.
But if, after detailed and complete public supervision, segregated
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school
board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible.
Where state action and supervision is so pervasive and where,
after years of such action, schools remain thoroughly segregated,
this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a consti-

tllr~$ rl

f

tutional violation. The burden th

• on the school board to

demonstrate it is operating an "integrated school system" (note
10 supra).

t
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and the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in those states
with state-imposed segregation at the time of the Brown decision. The
history of state-imposed segregation is more widespread in our country
--J<..C<-Ct:1:t' 'J·'-'· ~

than the de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally c ared to s '

ii,

As one commentator has noted:
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation
all arose in cities - Cincinnati, Gary and
Kansas City, Kansas - where racial segregation
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local
law. [Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F .2d
55 (CA 6 1966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964);
Downsv. BoardOfEduc., 336U.S. F.2d988 (CAlO
1964), cert. denied, 380U.S. 914, Bellv. School
City, 3'"24F.2d2'09(CA 7 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924] . Ohio discarded its statute in 1887,
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not untiLthe
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in
Mississippi are required to bus their children to
distant schools on the theory that the consequences
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply
in Gary , Indiana, where no more than five years
before Brown the same practice existed with
presumably the same effects." Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and EmRirical
Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275,297 (1972).
Not only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate inequitably
on communities in different sections of the country: it disadvantages
minority children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated:

14.

"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area
of the nation which the opinion classifies under
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their
school system does not violate their constitutional
rights because they were born into a de facto
society, while the exact same racial make-up of
the school system in the 17 southern and border
states violates the constitutional rights of their
counterparts, or even their imR.k blood brothers,
because they were born into a de jure society. All
children everywhere in the nation are protected by
the Constitution, and treatment which violates their
constitutional rights in one area, also violates
such constitutional rights in another area . "
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, 467 F .2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972)
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board
of Educ., 380 F .2d 385 , 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin
J., dissenting). 12

15.
The Court today does move for the first time toward
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings
ten-nously to

~f-s
~unprincipled
1\

l

distinction. It searches for de jure

action in what the Denver School Board has done or failed to do,
and even here the Court does not rely upon the results or effects
of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent:
''We emphasize that the differentiating factor between
de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent
to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 17) (italics are
the Court's).
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor"
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose or intent"
is difficult to reconcile in light of the opposite view explicitly
announced as recently as in Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). In holdingfixk there that
"motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation
of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless.
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools,
and we have said that '[t)he measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness. ' Davis v. School
Commissioners of Mobile Cou~02 U.S. 33, 37.

13

16.
Thus, we have focused upon the effect - not the
purpose or motivation - of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.

*****
" Though the purpose of the new school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases,
the courts' holdings rested not on motivation or
purposes but on the effect of the action upon the
dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper. " 407 U. s.
at 462.

I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that the motivation
of school board action is irrelevant in Virginia and controlling in
Colorado.

I have noted above the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia

because there was a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia,
and not in Colorado.

In fact, it was arguable in Emporia that the

most recent history - the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia
into a separate school district - were not segregatory.

14
Rather

than attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or
motivation, the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results
and found that these were likely to be of more rather than less
segregation.

The rationale of the Emporia case is inconsistent

17.
with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality.

B.
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional principle
to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation cases.
In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration
which point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national rule. The
litigation heretofore centered in the South already is surfacing in other
regions. The decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits
in ll7.hti which there can be little hope of uniformity of results.
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them, The litigation
will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision on whether segregation
has resulted in any "meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems
involved in litigating this

18.
issue are obvious to any lawyer.

The results of litigation -often

arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
b-1'- ~ 1-.:s- ~ 

subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken/\
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and 11 1 I 1
even capricious.

The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.

The

courts below found evidence of de jure violations with respect to
the Park Hill schools and an absence of such violations with respect
to the core city schools, despite the fact that actions taken by the
w-.:..->4!_,

school board with regard to those two sections wa,s not dissimilar.
It is, for example, quite possible to contend that both the

construction of Manual High School in the core city area and
Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area operated to serve
their surrounding Negro communities and, in effect, to merge
school attendance zones with segregated residential patterns.
Petitioner's Brief, pp. 80-83.

See

Yet findings even on such similar

acts will, under the de jure/ de facto distinction, continue to differ>

19.

~

especially since the Court h a s ¢ d e clear what

suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for an
initial constitutional violation.

Even if it were possible to clarify

this question, wide and unpredictable differences of opinion among
judges would be inevitable when dealing with an issue as slippery
as "intent" or "purpose", and especially when related to hundreds
of decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions
over many years.

This Court has recognized repeatedly that it :s:X is "extremely
difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, •

•••i'-llli'•.llli'•·~4

.-41,ili.lliiffil!ll
.
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or collection of different motivations, that

lie behind a legislative enactment, " Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,

u.s. __,

(1973); United states v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a single statute will be

20.

(

Every act of a school board and school administration, and

indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated,
must now be subject to scrutiny.

The most routine decisions with

respect to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect
in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially
segregated, remain in that condition, are desegregated, or - for
the long term future - are likely to be one or the other.

These

decisions include action or nonaction with respect to school building
construction and location; the timing of building new schools and
their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or
gerrymandering of student attendance zones; the extent to which a
neighborhood policy is enforced, especially with respect to
elementary schools; the recruitment, promotion and assignment of
faculty and supervisory personnel; policies with respect to
transfers from one school to another; whether, and to what extent,
special schools will be provided, where they will be located, and
who will qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculum,

21.
including whether there will be ''tracks" that lead primarily to
college or to vocational training, and the routing of students into
these tracks; and even decisions as to social, recreational and
athletic policies.
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory

.,.J
intent

XHX

factors.

proximate cause with respect to each of these • "endless"

The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily

in the prior history of the desegregation suit.

402 tJ. S. at 5-6.

But in the Denver-type case, where no such history exists, a
judicial examination of these factors will be required under today's
decision.

This will e lead inevitably to uneven and unpredictable

results, protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens
on the federal courts, and to s erious disruption of individual
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c.
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences
indicated above, we should acknowledge that whenever significant
public school segregation exists there is strong prima facie evidence

~constitutional violation.

"'

It is true, of course, that segregated

schools - wherever located - are not solely the product of state
eA,.,-{irr

action or inaction. Indeed, as indicated~1 there can be little
doubt that a principal cause of the pervasive school segregation
found in the major urbans areas of this country, whether in the North,
West or South, are the socio-economic influencEEwhich have concentrated
our minority citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile white
majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school
authorities have continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school

syste~

and, as one distinguished judge has noted, "where the figures

[showing segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a prima facie
case of discrimination is established." United States v. Texas Education
~ LJHff,873

I
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Moreover, as foreshadowed in Swann and

as implicitly held today, school boards have a duty...--:: ltillt s: u z · h s ?Usn
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and ameliorate

conditions by pursuing an affirmative policy

of desegregation . It is this policy which must be applied consistently
on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction which
has outlived its time.
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KEYES
III

The preceding section addresses the constitutional right of
each child to expect that public school authorities take all reasonable
; .,._ prolftdh•j

steps tu tns:il!l:e bim an education in an integrated

s c.l..to61 s ~.ste~.
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iyAh-. regardless of history or sectional location, stande

as prima facie evidence that this right has been violated. The question
thus becomes what reasonable steps to maximize integrative oppor-

Je.,. •.,.sfnif,

.-.

tunities must school authorities lindorteb'- either to overcome 11 g
~

r•

of constitutional violations or to remedy those violations which

are shown to exist. In short, what specifically is the nature and scope
of the remedy?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on remand
that Denver is a "dual school system," that city will soon confront the
"affirmative duty" to desegregate its entire system "root and branch."
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. at 438. Again, the critical
question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

•
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A,
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question which
will confront and confound the District Court and Denver School Board
i s what indeed does Swann require. Swann purported to enunciate no
new principles, relying heavily on Brown I and,!! and on 9reen.

Yet

it affirmed a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial

ratios" and sanctioned extensive transportation of elementary as well
as secondary pupils. Perhaps because of the far-reaching contours of
the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation decree approved by this
Court, lower federal courts have since read Swann as requiring similar
decrees.

17

In the context of a large urban area, with heavy residential

concentrations of white and black citizens in different - and widely
separated - sections of the school district, extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann is read as expansively as many
courts have been reading it to date.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-scale or
long-distance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts,
I record my profound misgivings. Nothing in our Constitution commands
or encourages any such disruption of public education. Fortunately,
&wann also laid down a broad rule of reason under which

desegregation remedies must remain flexible and other values and
interests be considered. Thus the Court recognized that school
authorities, not the federal judiciary, must be charged in the first
instance with the task of desegregating local school systems. 402
~ .jll t-

U.S. at 16. School boards in rural

Q.Ie•

areas~

adjust more readily

to this task than those in metropolitan districts "with dense and shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic
patterns." Id. at 14.

Transportation orders were suspect "when the

time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of
the children or significantly impinge on the education process." Id. at
31. Finally, the age of the pupils to be transported was recognized
by the Court in Swann as one important limitation on the time of
student travel. Id.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation cases. 18 And
the Court further emphasized that equitable decrees are inherently

-4 -I.Jt.

sensitive, not solely to the • • • degree of desegregation achieved,

"'

~

but to a variety of public and private interests:
1\

... a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial
of a constitutional right. The task is to correct,
by a balancing of the individual and collective
interest, the condition that offends the Constitution.
Swann, supra, at 15-6.
Those words echoed a similar expression in _!\rown II
349 U.S. at 229:
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and rec one iling public and private needs."

Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity
counsels reason,

flexibility~nd

that reasonableness in any -

balance. I am aware, of course,

area is a relative and subjective con-

cept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to
embody a balanced evaluation of the obligation/ of public school boards
to promote desegregation with other,

~~rtant interests which a

~

community may legitimately assert. Neglect of either the obligation or
the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which e-q uitable remedies

17

....g_

must be approached.

19

Overzealousness in pursuit of any single

goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance" and
"flexibility" with which this Court has always regarded it .

B.

-k>.

<*'~....:/ ~ e:£Jl:;.J-o
School boards have at their disposal a variety of rre

~hool desegregation.

ansr

Many of these can be Woil&iw.Uy employed

~A,.'..D.f

~ ;ithout damaging state and parental interests in having children attend
schools within a reasonable vicinity of home . Where desegregative
steps are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood
education," school authorities should pursue them. For example,
boundaries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn to integrate, to the extent practicable , the school's student body. Constructicn
of new schools should be of such a size and at such a location as to encourage the li•lii!J!lUil!
i~gration

ill"

likelihood of integration, Swann at 21. Faculty

should be attained throughout the school system, Swann at 19;

United states v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225
(1969). An optional majority to minority transfer program, with the

-28-

state providing free transportation to desiring students, is also a
helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system. Swann at 26-27.
It hardly need be said that allocation of resources within the school

district must be made with scrupulous fairness among all schools.
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integrative impaet of such
school board decisions is a crucial factor in assessing their constitutional validity.

20

For example, "neighborhood school plans are

constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods, and when school construction
preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony of given schools. "
Keyes v . School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,

21

- - - F.2d - - -

United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County, 429 F .2d

---

12 58-12 59. If these decisions are made consistently with such segregatory
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at a minimum, the obligation• to take integrative steps of the sort
outlined in the above section. Such steps would not compromise any

£,e le.-..e to;

Q.,

significant, countervailing state interest.A transportation of students

~
~ to maximize mtegrahon,

however, presents a vastl!

'.

ore, omplex

problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of actual
...4»4 • ,............ 22

desegregation ,

while it infringes what may fairly be regarded as

important personal rights.
The transporting of school children is as old as public education, and in rural and some suburban

settings ~

is as indispensable

as the providing of books. It is presently estimated that approximately
half of all American children ride buses to school for reasons unrelated
to integration.

23

There is a difference, however, in transportation

~~~

plans voluntarily initiated by local school boards and those imposed
~

by a federal court. The former may represent a convenient means of
access to the school nearest home; the latter often require distant trips

J4

~~ ~

~ -Jf-

t;:o further integration. 24 Yet the Court in Swann was unquestionably
right in describing bus transportation as "one tool of school desegregation." 402 U.S. at 30. 25 The crucial issue is when, under what
circumstances, and to what extent such transportation may appropriately
be ordered. The answer to this turns - as it does so often in the law upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances.
Swannitself recognized limits to integrative obligations. It
noted that a constitutional requirement of "any particular degree of
racial balance or mixing ... would be disproved ... , " and sanctioned
district court use of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy ... " 402 U.S. at 24, 25.
Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Board of Education v. Scott , 404 U.S. 1221,
1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of Burger, C. J.). Thus particular schools
may be all white or all black and still not infringe constitutional rights

;-.~Jed

if the system is genuinely aee

Pli ~ li t 9 1i

and school authorities are pur-

suing integrative steps short of extensive and disruptive transportation.
The refusal of the Court to require • • • racial balance in schools

schools," 402 U.S. at 2 6, is grounded in a recognition that the state,
parents and children all have at stake in school desegregation decrees ·
legitimate and

n attend community schools nearest home. Dr. James
Coleman testified for petitioners at trial that "most school systems
organize their schools in relation to the residents by having fixed
school districts and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 396 F.2d 55,
60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit summarized the advantages of such a
26
.
neighborhood system of schools:
"Appellants, however, pose the question of whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly
administered without racial bias, comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
results in the creation of schools with predominantly
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighborhood
system is in wide use throughout the nation and has
been for many years the basis of school administration.
This is so because it is acknowledged to have several
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such
as minimization of safety hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in reducing transportation
needs, ease of pupil placement and administration
through the use of neutral, easily determined standards,
and better home-school communication."

'

~

The neighborhood

-32 -

scho~ovide• greater ease of parental

-

and student access and convenience, as well as greater economy of
public administration. These are obvious and distinct advantages,
but the legitimacy of the neighborhood concept rests on more basic
grounds.

27

Neighborhood schools, neutrally administered, reflect the
deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public
education. Public schools have been a traditional source of strength
to our nation, and that strength may derive in part from the identification of many schools with the personal features of the surrounding
neighborhood . Community support, interest and dedication to public
schools may well run higher with a neighborhood attendance pattern:
distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a
decline in the intimacy of our institutions - home, church and school which has caused a concommitant decline in the unity and communal
spirit of our people. I pass no judgment on this viewpoint, but I do
believe that this Court should be wary of compelling in the name of

-33constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in the traditional,
more personal fabric of their public schools.
Closely related to the concept of a community and neighborhood
education, are those rights and duties parents have with. respect to
the education of their children. The law has long recognized the parental
duty to nurture, support and provide for the welfare of ehildren, including their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534,
535, a unanimous court held that:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control. . . . The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965),
the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as
one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." I do not believe recognition of this right
can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send a child to public or

-34-
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private school. -

parents cannot affJrd the luxury of a private

education for their children, and the dual obligation of private tuitions
and public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons,
education for their children should not be forced to forfeit all interest
or voice in the school their child attends. It would, of eourse, be impractical to allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parent-school and parentchild communication allowed by the neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force of law.
It is relevant also to observe that in the end the quality of a

community's schools depends in large part upon the level of public
support, especially that of parents of children currently in the schools.
In addition to attitudes towards paying increased taxes or voting bond

issues, the effectiveness of the educational process itself is related to
the attitude of the parents and to their capacity to partic ipate. To the
degree that schools can involve parents with their children's education,
the common end of improved schooling is surely served. School boards

-35-£/
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may permissibly conclude that parents whose young children have been
transported from their neighborhood to some more distant school are
less likely candidates for this type of participation.
In the understandable national concern for alleviating public

school segregation , courts may have overlooked the faet that the rights
a nd interests of children affected by a desegregation program also are
e ntitled to consideration. Any child, white or black , who is compelled
to leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each day being
transported to a distant school suffers
his privacy. Not long ago , James B. Conant, wrote that "[a] t the
elementary school level the issue seems clear. To send young children
day after day to distant schools seems out of the question."

28

A

community may well conclude that the portion of a child's day spent
on a bus might be used more creatively in a classroom, playground or
s ome other extracurricular school activity. Decisions such as these,
affecting the quality of a child's daily life, should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.

-36-

To this point I have focused mainly on the personal interests
of parents and children which a community may believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system of schools. But broader considerations
lead me to question just as seriously any remedial requirement of
extensive student transportation solely to further integration. Any such
requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately on different school
districts of our country, depending on their degree of urbanization,
financial resources, and their racial complexion. Some districts with
little or no biracial population will experience little or no educational
disruption, while others, notably in large , biracial metropolitan areas,
must at considerable expense undertake extensive transportation to achieve
the type of integration frequently being ordered by district courts. 29 At
a time when public education generally is suffering serious financial malnutrition, the economic burdens of such transportation can be severe, requiring both initial capital outlays and annual operating costs in the millions
of dollars.

30

And while constitutional requirements have often occasioned

uneven burdens, never have they touched so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory transportation requirements for literally hundreds
of thousands of school children.
The argument for student transportation also overlooks the fact

-37that the remedy exceeds that which may be necessary to redress
the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as an example. The Denver
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible
for some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes a maximum
discharge of constitutional duty by the Denver Board over the past de~
31
cades,-. fundamental problem of residential segregation would persist.

It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to mention
a dubious extension of constitutional doctrine - to apply some retributive
theory which would require a greater degree of forced school integration than would have resulted from purely natural and neutral non-state
causes.
The transportation of students carries a furth,3r infirmity as
a constitutional remedy. With most constitutional violations, the major
burden of remedial action falls on offending state officials. Public
officials who act to infringe personal rights of speech, voting, or religious
exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the offending act or practice
and, where necessary, institute corrective measures.

It is they who bear

-38the brunt of remedial action, though other citizens will to varying
degrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for segregation
must, at the very minimum, act to cease segregatory acts. But when
the obligation further extends to the transportation of students, the
full burden of the affirmative remedial action is borne by children and
parents who are quite innocent of any constitutional violation.
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy as
student transportation solely to maximize integration, risk setting in motion
unpredictable and unmanageable social consequences. No one can estimate
the extent to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten an
exodus to private schools, leaving public school systems the preserve of
the disadvantaged of both races. Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives the movement from inner-city to suburb, and the further
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know t what degree this
remedy may cause deterioration of community and parental support
of public schools, or divert dis-.j ssion from the paramount goal of quality
in education to a perennially hassling debate over who is transported where.
We do not even know to
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what extent,...racial balancing in public schools will be necessary or
effective in reducing racial inequality

.l I can make no steadfast

predications. Yet in pursuit of maximum integration through extensive
tUl'JG.I.,v1ve.JJ
student transportation, courts have ventured onto
,\"' ' terrain in

a manner which in the end may prove self-defeating to the desired objectives.
I would impose no flat prohibition on student transportation to
further desegregation. But a neighborhood system of schools ought , to
a much greater extent than heretofore, be one legitimate community
interest considered by district courts in framing equitable relief.
Transportation orders should be applied with a special caution to any
proposal as disruptive of family life and interests - and ultimately of
education itself - as extensive intra-city transportation of elementary
age children solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum, this
Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary
transporting of children in the elementary grades. It is at this age level
that neighborhood education performs its most vital educational role.

-40-

It is with respect to children of tender years that the greatest concern

exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here,
at the elementary school, that the rights and duties of parents are
most sharply implicated.
While greater transportation of secondary school students
might be permitted, even at this level the desire of a community for
racially neutral neighborhood schools should command judicial respect.
It would be wisest, where there is no absence of good faith, to permit

affected communities to decide this delicate issue of student transportation on their own. Legitimate, nonracial aspirations embodied in a
neighborhood school concept are entitled to judicial respect.

-If/ ~

..

_]£:

The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on two issues, namely: (i) whether and to what
extent a uniform judicial approach will be taken to our national
problems of school desegregation and (ii) if so, whether the
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uniformly in favor
of extensive transportation , will be redefined to restore a more
viable balance between the various interests whieh are involved.
With all deference, it seems to me that the Court today has addressed
neither of these issues in a way that will lead to a rational, coherent
national policy with respect to integration in the schools.
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinction
under circumstances, and upon a rationaLe,. which can only lead to
J

increased and inconclusive litigation , and - especially regrettable to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this critical
subject. There is , of course, state action in every school district
in the land. The public schools have always been funded and operated
by states and their local subdivisions . It is true that segregated

-42schools, even in the cities of the South, are in large part the product
of social and economic factors - and the resulting residential patterns.
But there is also not a school district in the United States, with any
significant minority school population, in which the school authorities in one way or the other - have not contributed in some measure to the
degree of segregation which still prevails. Instead of :recognizing the
reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school districts
throughout the country, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of the country
and on minority children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swannand the
judicial downgrading of legitimate community interests in framing
equitable decrees. In the absence of a more flexible and reasonable
standard than that imposed by district courts, purporting to follow Swann,
the desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and other major

-43It is well to remember that the course we are running is a long
one and the goal sought in the end - so often overlooked - is the best
possible educational opportunity for all children. Communities deserve
the opportunity to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality
education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over extensive
student transportation.
The single most disruptive element in education today is the widespread use of compulsory transportation, especially at elementary grade
levels. This has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic
educational ends, dividing and embittering communities, and exacerbating
rather than ameliorating inter-racial friction and misunderstanding. It
is time to return to a more balanced evaluation of the interest of our society
in achieving desegregation - • • • • with •••llill• those legitimate
interests a community may assert in non-racial neighborhood and community
education. This will help assure that desegregation is aceomplished by
rational action, better understood and supported by parents and children
of both races. For the long term, this will promote an enduring quality of
integration so essential to its genuine success.

J ....... . , ..... .....
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FOOTNOTES (No. 71-507 Keyes)

1. Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution has
expressly prohibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account
of race or color. "
2.

See, e. g. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of

Education, 402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971): "We do not reach . . . the
question whether a showing that school segregation is a consequence
of other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by
school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial
action by a school desegregation decree. "
3.

According to the 1971 HEW estimate, 43. 9% of Negro

pupils attended majority white schools in the South as opposed to
only 27. 8% who attended such schools in the North and West.
Fifty-seven per cent of all Negro pupils in the North and West
attend schools with over 80% minority population as opposed to
32. 2% who do so in the South.

118 Cong. Rec. ~;l.45.
""'-""'

-

4.

·---------

The 1971 HEW Enrollment Survey dramatized the

segregated character of public schools in many non-southern
cities.

The percentage of Negro pupils which att1mded schools

more than 80% black was 91. 3 in Cleveland, Ohio.; 97. 8 in
Compton, California; 78. 1 in Dayton, Ohio; 78. 6 :in Detroit,
Michigan; 95. 7 in Gary, Indiana; 86. 4 in Kansas City, Missouri;
86. 6 in Los Angeles, California; 78. 8 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
91. 3 in Newark, New Jersey; 89. 8 in st. Louis, Missouri.

The

full data from the Enrollment Survey may be found in 118 Cong.
Rec. S-144-8, Jan. 20, 1972.

3.

5.

As Senator Ribicoff (D. -Conn. ) recognized:

"For years we have fought the battle of integration
primarily in the South where the problem was severe.
It was a long, arduous fight that deserved to be
fought and needed to be won.
"Unfortunately, as the problem of raeial
isolation has moved north of the Mason-Dixon line,
many northerners have bid an evasive farewell to
tbe 100-year struggle for racial equality. Our
motto seems to have been 'Do to sou~rners what
you do not want to do to yourself. '
"Good reasons have always been offered, of
course, for not moving vigorously ahead in the
North as well as the South.
"First, it was that the problem was worse in
the South. Then the facts began to show that that
was no longer true.
''We then began to hear the de facto-de jure
refrain.
"Somehow residential segregation in the North
was accidental or de facto and that made it better
than the legally supported de jure segregation of the
South. It was a hard distinction for black children
in totally segregated schools in the North to understand, but it allowed us to avoid the problem."
118 Cong. Rec. S. 2542, Feb. 24, 1972.
6.

See, e. g., Bradley v. School Board, :!45 F. 2d 310,

316 (CA 4 en bane, 1965):
"It has been held again and again . . . that the

Fourteenth Amendment prohibition is not against
segregation as such. . . . A state or school
districts offends no constitutional requirement when
it grants to all students uniformly an unrestricted
freedom of choice as to school attended, so that
each pupil, in effect, assigns himself to the school
he wishes to attend.'' (The case was later vacated
and remanded by this Court which expressed no view
~f the merits of the desegregation plans submitted. •
382 u.s. 103, l05 (1965).

4.
See also Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 324

r.

2d 209 (CA 7

1963); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CA 10 1964);
Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA 6 196Ei).
7.

For a concise history and commentary of the evolution,

see generally A. Bickel, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA

8. As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article, "Residential
Segregation," Scientific American, August 1965 at 14:
"No elaborate analysis is necessary to conclude
from these figures that a high degree of residential segregation based on race is a universal
characteristic of American cities. This segregation is found in the cities of the North and West
as well as of the South; in large cities as well
as small; in nonindustrial cities as well as industrial; in cities with hundreds of thousands
of Negro residents as well as those wi.th only a
few thousand; and in cities that are progressive
in their employment practices and civil rights
policies as well as those that are not."
In his book, Negroes in Cities, Dr. Taeuber stated that residential
segregation exists "regardless of the character of local laws and
policies and regardless of other forms of discrimination." Id. at
outlawing all forms of state-sponsored segregation in
everything from the spectator section of a courtroom
to golf courses. The minimal proposition that emerged and about time it was that it should emerge -was that
the state may not, by titlqJ legislation or administratively,
classify the population along racial lines. "

10. The term "integrated school system" is used generally
to denote a system possessing most, if not all, of the following
characteristics: there would be, of course, no laws, regulations
or policy supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown (a condition manifestly invalid and no longer
existing overtly anywhere).

The school board would have pur-

sued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educational goals, the affirmative duty principle enunciated in Green.
This duty would require that a school board take such appropriate
affirmative measures to (i) integrate fully faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, quality of inJ, • ..i- -fie. J:.sf·,...; c.'f j
; (iii) utilize its authority to

draw attendance zones to promote integration; (iv) locate new
schools, close old ones, and determine the size and grade categories
of schools with this same objective in mind;
.3
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and (vi) resort to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially
at the secondary level, as is compatible with sound educational goals .
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or

inclusive ; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils
may justifiably be confident that invidious disc rirn.ination is
neither practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean - and indeed
could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our
major metropolitan areas - that every school must have some
racial mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black
is not a " segregated" school in the legal sense if the system itself
is a genuinely integrated one as described herein.
The characteristics and affirmative obligations of an
integrated school system are spelled out more fully in Section

rn,

infra.

5.
lilsastt

a;·'

The author continues:
"True, the earlier the policy of segregation was
~
· '· .
abandoned the less danger there is that it continues
to operate covertly, is significantly responsible for
present day patterns of residential segregation, or
has contributed materially to present community
attitudes toward Negro schools. But there is no
reason to suppose that 1954 is a universally
appropriate dividing line between de jure segregation
that may safely be assumed to have spent itself and
that which may not. For many remedial purposes,
adoption of an arbitrary but easily administrable
cutoff point might not be objectionable. But in a
situation such as school desegregation, where both
the rights asserted and the remedial burdens imposed
are of such magnitude, and where the resulting
sectional discrimination is passionately resented, it
is surely questionable whether such arbitrariness is
either politically or morally acceptable. "

--------------------------------See Bickel, supra,

H»

n. 7, at 119:

"If a Negro child perceives his separation as
discriminatory and invidious, he is not, in a
society a hundred years removed from slavery,
going to make fine distinctions abod the source
of a particular· separation. "

13.

The Court does not require, however,, k a segregatory

intent with respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds
that if such an intent is found with respect to some schools in a
system, the burden - normally on the plaintiffs - shifts to the
defendant school authorities to prove a negative: namely, 411111!a

6.
that their purposes were benign, anle, pp. 17-18.
The Court has fef'tlmately come a long wa.y since Brown I.

discriminatory constitutional and statutory provisions of some
states, the new formulation - still professing fid•~lity to the de jure
doctrine - is that desegregation will be ordered despite the absence
of any segregatory laws if: (i) segregated schools in fact exist;
(ii) a court finds that they result from some action taken with

segregatory intent by the school board; (iii) such action need not
relate to more than a "meaningful segment" of the school system;
and (iv) the school board cannot prove that its intEmtions with respect
to the remainder mc of the system were nonsegregatory.
14.

See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F. 2d

570, 574 (CA 4 1971) where the court of appeals noted "there was
no findin g [by the district court] of discriminatory purpose.
15.

As one commentator has expressed it:

"

7.
"If the courts are indeed prepared to inquire into
motive, thorny questions will arise even if one assumes
that racial motivation is capable of being proven at
trial. What of the case in which one or more members
of a school board, but less than a majority, are found
to have acted on racial grounds? What if it appears that
the school board's action was prompted by a mixture of
motives, including constitutionally innocent ones that
alone would have prompted the board to aet? What if
the members of the school board were not: themselves
racially inspired but wished to please their constituents,
many of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are
classified as unconstitutional de jure segregation, there
is little point in preserving the de jure-de facto
distinction at all. And it may well be that the difference
between any of these situations and one in which racial
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant,
from the standpoint :bo of both the moral Clllpability of
the state officials and the impact upon the children
involved, to support a difference in constitutional
treatment. " Goodman, supra n. 11, at 284-285.
~In

Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274,

1311-1315 (E. D. Va. 1969), Judge Walter Hoffman compiled
a summary of past public segregatory action which included
examples from a great majority of states. He concluded that
"only as to the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington,
Nevada, and Hawaii does it appear from this nonexhaustive research
that no discriminatory laws appeared on the books· at one time or
another. " Id. at 1315.
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17.

See, ~· ~·, Thompson v. School Board of Newport News,

F. 2d _ _,

(1972) where the CA 4 en bane, upheld a

district court assignment plan where "travel time, varying from

--

a minimum of forty minutes and a maximum of one hour, each way,
would be required for busing black students out of the old City
and white students into the old City in order to ac ieve a racial
balancing of the district. " This transportation was decreed for
.children from the third grade up1
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In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., ·166 F. 2d 890, 895

(1972), the CA 6 affirmed a district court assignment plan which
daily transported 14, 000 children with "the maximum time to be
spent on the buses by any child [being] 34 minutes . . . , " presumably
each way.

But as Judge Weick noted in dissent the CA 6 instructed

the district judge to implement yet further desegregation orders.
Plans presently under consideration by that court call for the
busing of 39, 085 and 61, 530 children respectively, for undetermined
lengths of time.

Id. at 895-6.

•

Petitioners before this Court in Potts v.

u.s.

l~lax,

No. 72-288,

(197 _) contended that the implementation

of the CA 5's directive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2:d 865 (1972) would
require bus rides of up to two hours and 20 minutes each day and a
round trip of up to 70 miles.

Pet'n. at 14. While respondents

contend these figures represent an "astounding inflation, " Response

tiM-~~~
at 7, transportation oh11
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18.

lp
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du seems inevitable .

'IDI See United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467

F. 2d 848, 883 (CA 5 1972) (Bell, J., concurring in an opinion
in which eight judges joined):
"In our view the remedy which the district court
is required to formulate should be formulated
within the entire context of the opinion in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
. . . . (emphasis added.)"
19.

The relevant inquiry is "whether the costs of achieving

desegregation in any given situation outweigh the legal, moral and
educational considerations favoring it . . . . It is clear . . . that
the Constitution should not be held to require any transportation
plan that keeps children on a bus for a substantial part of the day,

consumes signific ant portions of funds otherwise spendable directly
on education, or involves a genuine element of danger to the safety
of the child." School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of
Government Responsibility, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 422 , 443 (1972).
20. This should not imply that decisions on faculty assignment , attendance zones, school construction, closing and consolidation , must be made to the detriment of all neutral, non-racial
considerations. But these considerations can, with proper school
board initiative , generally be met in a manner that will enhance
integrative opportunities.
21. A useful study of the historical uses and abuses of
the neighborhood school concept isM. Weinberg , Race & Place
(1967).
22. In fact , due to racially separate residential patterns
that characterize our major urban areas it is quit~~ unrealistic to
think of achieving in many cities substantial "racial balance"
without a degree of student transportation which would have the
gravest economic and educational consequences.

- as

Professor Bickel notes:

"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic
conditions are such that no policy that a court can
order, and a school board, a city or even a state
has the capability to put into effect, will in fact
result in the foreseeable future in racially balanced
public schools. Only a reordering of the fmvironment
involving economic and social policy on the broadest
conceivable front might have an appreciable impact."
Bickel, supra, n. 7 at 132.

23.

Estimates vary.

Swann, supra, at 2£1, noted that

"eighteen millinn of the Nation's public school children,
approximately 39 %, were transported to their schools by bus in
1969-1970 in all parts of the country. " Senator Ribicoff, (D. Conn. )
c.-

~L~

1M it'

i:ll student of this......... problem, stated that "two-thirds of

"'

all American children today ride buses to school for reasons
unrelated to integration. " 118 Cong. Rec. S. 2543, Feb. 24, 1972.
24.

Historically, _ .distant'• tran sportation was wrongly
S~j,.c!fAT.·oo~~.

used to promote

•

•

"Negro children were generally

considered capable of travelling longer distances to school and
without the aid of any vehicle.

What was too far for a white child

became :x2IEC reasonably near for a Negro child, " Weinberg, supra,

n. l-.1_ at 8 7,
apt~enre
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This deplorable history has led some to argue that integrative
bus rides are justified as atonement for past segregatory trips and
that neighborhood education is now but a code-word for racial
segregation.

But misuse of neighborhood schooling in the past does

not imply it has no valid non-segregatory uses for the present.
Nor would wrongful transportation in the past justify detrimental
transportation for the children of today.
25.

Some communities had transportation plans in effect

at the time of court desegregation orders.

See Swann, supra, at 29,

n. 11; Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33,34-35
(1971).

Courts have used the presence or absence of existing

transportation in a district as one factor in framing and implementing

dese gregation decrees. See, ~- ~- , Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Bd.
of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1225 (1971) (Chambers opinion
of Burger, C. J. ); United states v. Watson Chapel School District,
446 F. 2d 933 , 937 (CA 8 1971); Northcross v. Board of Educ.,
444 F. 2d 1179, 1182-1183 (CA 6 1971); Davis v. Board of Educ.,
328 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E. D. Ark. 1971). Where a school board
is voluntarily engaged in transporting students, a district court is,
of course, obligated to insure that such transportation is not
undertaken with segregatory effect.

Where,~

also, voluntary

transportation programs are already in progress, there may be
greater justification for court-ordered transportation of students
for a_c_omparable time and distance to achieve greater integration.
26.

The term "neighborhood school" should not be supposed

to denote solely a walk-in school or one which serves a children
only in the surrounding blocks.

The Court has noted, in a

different context, that "the word 'neighborhood' is quite as
susceptible of variation as the word 'locality. ' Both terms are

elastic and, dependent upon circumstances, may be equally
satisfied by areas measured by rods :z: or by miles." Connally v.
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926).

1n the school

context, "neighborhood" refers to relative proximity, to a
preference for a school nearer, rather than more distant from
home.
27.

I do not imply that the neighborhood concept offers

the only, or even the most preferable way to organize a school
system.

I do contend that, where a school board has chosen it,

federal judges should accord it respect in framing remedial decrees.

[

28.

Slums and Suburbs, 29 (1961).

29.

See n. 22, supra.

30. In Memphis, for example, which has no history
of busing students, the minimum transportation plan ordered
by the courts will require, in the School Board's estimate, an
initial capital expenditure of $1, 664,192 br buses plus an annual
operating cost of $629,192. The Board estimates that a more
extensive transportation program to be considered by the district

1

court will require initial capital investments of $8,924,000 and
annual operating costs of $1,783,490. The most drastic transportation plan before the district court requires estimated annual
operating costs of from $2,354,220, $2,431,710 or $3,463,100
depending on the Board's transportation arrangements. Northcross
v. Board of Education of Memphis City Sch., supra, at 898 (Weick,
J. dissenting).

)f.

s-. "'. ~~

~~.

32..

~/ls

/ W-y~ fv t.A,.;/tl-0.( ~-:l ~ cJuai)j..o_._
fOlumnist William Raspberry has noted, it

~~-~ l.o -~~

may{ i~' 6lackl f:6 eay--tftat tlw.y cannot be properly educated
A

A.

ol-o G~~
unless they are bused long

distances~

ssa!ftet with white
-\

children:
"It has long seemed insane to me for black
people to pursue whites from this neighborhood
to that and clear on out of the county because of
some unspoken belief that black children could
not get a proper education in the absence of white
children." Id.

Such statements do not diminish the desirability and
constitutional necessity of maintaining an integrated school system .
But if the system is genuinely desegregated, racial balance in

or

the sense of substantial mixing of races in all Im:k!!IRisXKx a district's
II

schools is not mandated by anything in the Constitution.

55.

Denver.

There is, for the reasons I have indicated, a gap of

vast and ill defined dimensions between a fair reading of what the
Court said in

~ann

and the way district courts have felt compelled

to apply it to southern cities.

It is important, not just to Denver

but for the school boards and the courts in other cities which are
xxxiti awaiting the outcome of this case, for us to acknowledge

that gap exists, and to endeavor to afford a far more comprehensible
me.asure of guidance than is now discernible.
In the absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard

than that imposed by district courts, professing to follow Swann,
the desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and other
major cities in various sections of the country may well involve
even more extensive busing than has been witnessed up to this
time.

It is well to remember that the course we are running

is a long one and the goal sought in the end -

oox so often over-

looked -. is the best possible educational opportunity for all
children.

The disrpution of public education over the past eighteen

years since Brown was necessary in view of the recalcitrancy so

56.
so prevalent in theSouth. ' Indeec, the disruption was a price
necessarily paid by the South to correct the profound injustice of
affirmatively imposed racial dis<:rimination in the schools.

~ut

this disruption should not now be imposed needlessly upon the rest
of the country.

Indeed, it cannot be tolerated mueh longer anywhere

without g-rave consequences to public education gelllerally - in terms
of the quality :tk of the schooling, its s upp,)rt by the pu lie , and
even its continued ability to attract and retain competent and
dedicated teachers and ~doinistrat or·s .

The time has come for the federal courts - ill equipped
to formulate educational policy - to encourage and allow a far larger
measure of discretion and control by school board~: and professional
educational auth orities.

The single most disruptive element in the hlstory of
dese.<Ire;;ati :::m is the extensive use oi bus in::;, especially at elementary
'!Tade levels.

This has distracted and diverted the attention of all

~oncerned from the basic educational ends, it has divided and

~~hierewere, in the years of transition after the shock of Brown I's
reversal of Plessy, the interludes of "massive resi.stance" and
abortive " interposition ". (Jay: You can embroider this a bit).

L.r .t' ,

Jr,: f'f:!

Rider A , p. 12 Keyes
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Eut i ~ a school systerr. be arE t!H;; fa1:: iliar indie ia of seg regatio h.
with a large percentage of its schools all or predominantly atb.:mded
hy cl ildren of one race; with facultie~:: and administrative perso:anel

not renuinel:r integ·rated; and with little evidence that over the ~.''9ar E
the schoo . board has acted affirmatively, in its long-J:-ange planning
a s wen as current operations, to facilitate and encourage as widely
a s reasonably practicable an integrated opportunity; t:1en, the

Drf'-

s umption is strong that the school board by its acts or omissions has
failed in its c1uty t ameliorate the consequences of tlw predominant
residentia l patterns mentioned above. In view of the pervasiveness
of state action and responsibility with respect to public schools if
these indicia of segregation remain in a particular school syste rr~,
th is Court is justified in finding a prim~ facie case of a constitutional
violation.

Rider A, p. 11 Keyes
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Jay , consider
:\n<iing a note
(to be ~ey~d tc

the next to

t~e

last sentenc e in
the paragraph
ending on p.ll)
as follows:
9a. The term integrated sc hool s ystem '' is used generally to de not e
a system possessing most, if not all, of the following c tlarac.:ens tics:
there .voula be, of course, no laws, regulations or _policy .;:uppG tive
of the type of "legalized" segregation c ondea.ned in Brm•m {a ccndition manifestly invalid and no longer ex1stir.g overtly a ny-;vhere; .
The school board would have pursued, within the limits of a

r'..l :~

of reason consistent with educational goals, the affirn:tative duty
principle enunciated in Green. This duty would equire a school
desegregatory
board to take SUCh appropriate
::~ s

C)

Qxug;r~and integrativ•~ "r: ea ~·.lreS

integrating fully faculties and administration; (ii) assuri;l{;

equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula

opport1L1i~ i~s ;

(iii) utilize its a uthority to draw, and even gerrymander, atte nda nc€

zcne s to pr omote integration opport•lnities; locate ne w schoo:s, c -.ose
o·,d ones, a nd dete r L.ine the s ize and
w itn t;1i s

sa::~ e o~ j e ct ; v e

~ !'ade

categories ·')f sc l 1oo::::

in :r '.. !1j ; assu ::-e lh e eli rY, ina tio n co{ :1ll ves tiges

2.

to sJch reasonable transportation of pupils ,

e~pecl;:.tlly

at

t1r;

Eeconc'.ar y leve'., a::: iE' -::orr_patible ·vita sounj e::l.uca.tior.a'. goals .

These specifications are not

intencl~rl

tc

"~

eit"ler i efinitive o··

inclusive; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of
an

i.nte!)·rat~!cl

ju~tifiably

sclJ.ool system, in which all citizens and pupils ma)·

be confident tha t invidious dfficrir.1ina.tion is nei ther

practiced nor tolerated.

This does not mean- and indeed cculd

not n:.ean in view of the residential patterns of mos t of our :mzjnr
ru~tl~ opoUtan

mixinr .

areas - that every school must have some raciai

school which happens to be all white o r a !I black is

not necessarily a ''sep-regated·' school in the legal s ense if thE:
syste m itself is a

~<enuinely

integrated one as described herein .

1n such a school system, every pupil - rega rdless of race - rray

~ave (a)

the assur 2.nce of beinv educated in a nondisc rin:inatory

~nvi ronro ent ,

a::;

q

and (b) the further assuranc e - not as a certainty b.1

nroilability, dependillf· upon the circurnstanc:eE - of attenrlillf

one or mcrP. mixed idm:BM:la schools as he

p rof[r e~ses

from th e

essentially neighborhood elementary school to the more broadly
.
.
high schools .
commumty-based Junior and senior

.tuaer

A,

p.

~

Keyes

This means that school authorities, consistent with sound educational
goals, must make and implement their decisions with the view generally
of enhancing integrated school opportunities. The term "integrated
school system" presupposes, of course, a total absence of any laws,
regulations or policies supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown . A system would be integrated consistently
with constitutional standards when the responsible authorities have
pursued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educational
goals, the affirmative duty principle most fully articulated up to this
time in Swann.

This duty would assure that Jia:JDalx decisions re-

lating to the most relevant aspects of the operation of a school system
be taken consistently with sound educational goals, one of which must

include a conscious effort to further integration. 'I'hese decisions
would relate, among other thiJ18s, to school attendance zones, selection
and assignment of faculty and administrative personnel, school construc tion programs, student transportation and the like. There must
be a scrupulous effort to assure equality of facilities, instruction and

curricula opportunities throughout the district.

2.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either definitive and inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens and
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination is neither
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed could not
mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas - that every school must in fact be a.n integrated unit.
school
A SIDxbt which happens to be all or predominantly white or all or
predominantly black is not a "segregated" school i.n an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.

*

Note to Jay: Somewhere, perhaps keyed to an appropriate point in this
rider, we might add a note substantially as follows:
" The terminology customarily used by this Court in Brown
and subsequent decisions has referred to 'desegregation'
and the 'duty'to desegregate,' apparently avoiding delibe!l"ate ly
the term 'duty to integrate.' But all of these cases, until the
present one, have involved dual systems in the sense that state
prescribed segregation existed as of 1954. Now, however, that
a majority of the Court in today' s decision have extended the
affirmative duty doctrine to a school system which was never
dual in the sense of that term heretofore used , nothing o:f substance remains to a distinction between a duty to desegre•gate
and a duty to integrate. To be sure, Swann purported to hold

3.

out the hope that once a system had become' unitar~'
there would be 'full compliance with this Court's
decision in Brown." 402 U.S. at 31. But the logic-indeed the holding - of today' s decision will require
that no school board at any time in the future will be
free to disregard its duty to maintain, within reason
and due regard for essential educational goals, the
type of integrated system generally described above.
There will, as the Court in Swann suggested (402
U.S. at 32), dem•graphic changes in our 'growing,
mobile society' so that few communities will remain
from year to year in exactly the same factual setting.
The circumstances will be relevant, of course, to tho
reasonableness of the action taken by eeheH-alllboflt~ts
school authorities. It will not, however, relieve therr.\
of their constitutional duty.

Ll'".P, Jr. :pst
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there is in fact substantial segregation in a school district
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This means that school authorities, consistent with sound educational
goals, must make and implement their decisions with the view generally
of enhancing integrated school opportunities. The term "integrated
schobl system" presupposes, of course, a total absence of any laws,
regulations or policies supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown . A system would be integrated consistently
with constitutional standards when the responsible authorities have
pursued, within the limits of a rule of reason consistent with educational
goals, the affirmative duty principle most fully articulated up to this
time in Swann.

This duty would assure that .tbur::a:Julx: decisions re-

lating to the most relevant aspects of the operation of a school system
be taken consistently with sound educational goals , one of whi<:h must

include a conscious effort to further integration. These decis:lons
would relate, among other thill8S, to school attendance zones, selection
and assignment of faculty and administrative personnel, school construction programs, student transportation and the like. There must
be a scrupulous effort to assure equality of facilities, instruction and

curricula opportunities throughout the district.
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The principal reason for abandonment of the ae jur~/ de facto
distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the holding in Brown I
into the affirmative duty doctrine, it no longer can

hi~

justified on a

principled basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for metropolitan
school districts, Swann focused on an area where

th~~

basic ca.uses of

segregation in all sections of the country are not only similar,. but
also largely irrelevant to the existence of historic, state-imposed
the
segregation at the time of/Brown decision. Further, the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory student transportation went far beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school
se!gregation for which former state segregation laws were even
responsible. Finally, this case abundantly demonstrates that the
facts deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present
problems which the courts cannot fairly resolve.

H1<1er
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Keyes

c.
Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum,
the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort outlined in the
above section. School boards would, of course, be free to develop and
initiate further plans to promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic
society such as ours, it is important that no racial minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that students of all races learn
to play, work and cooperate with one another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage
school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in
promoting the recognized values of integrated school conditions.
A constitutional requirement of extensive student transportation solely to maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of
actual desegregation, while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded
as important community prerogatives and personal rights . The Equal
Protection Clause does require that racial discrimination find no place
in the decisions of public school authorities. It does not command
that school authorities undertake widespread student tra.Ilsportatlon
solely for the sake of greater integration.

20
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The principal reason for abandonment of the ae

jure~/ de

facto

distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the holding in Brown I
into the affi rmative duty doctrine, it no longer can be justified on a
princ iple d basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for met ropolitan
school districts , Swann focused on an area where the basic causes of
segregation in all sections of the country are not only similar, but
also largely irrelevant to the existence of historic , state-imposed
the
segregation at the time of,/Brown decision. Further, the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory student transportation went far beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school
segregation for which former state segregation laws were even
responsible. Finally, this case abunda.ntly demonstrates that the
facts deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present
problems which the courts cannot fairly resolve.
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c.
Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum ,
the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort outlined in the
above section. School boards would, of course, be fr ee to dev·elop and
initiate further plans to promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic
society such a.s ours, it is important that no racial minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that students of all races learn
to play, work and cooperate with one another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage
school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in
promoting the recognized values of integrated school conditions.
A constitutional requirement of extensive student transportation solely to maximize integration, however,

prf~sents

a vastly more

complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of
actual desegregation, while 1t infringes on what may fairly be regarded
as important community pr erogatives and personal rights. The Equal
Protection Clause does r equire that racial discrimination find no place
in the decisions of public school authorities. It does not comm::md
tha t school authorities undertake widespread student t ransportation
solely for the sake of greater integration. 20

2.

The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either definitive and inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens 1md
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination is neither
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean - and indeed could not
mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas - that every school must in fact be an integrated unit.
school
A SDbaJi which happens to be all or predominantly white or all or
predominantly black is not a "segregated" school i.n an unconstitutiona! sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.

*

Note to Jay: Somewhere, perhaps keyed to an appropriate point in this
rider, we might add a note substantially as follows:
" The terminology customarily used by this Court in Brown
and subsequent decisions has referred to 'desegregation-'and the 'duty'to desegregate,' apparently avoiding delibelt'ately
the term 'duty to integrate.' But all of these cases, until the
present one, have involved dual systems in the sense that state
prescribed segregation existed as of 19 54. Now, however , that
a majority of the Court in today' s decision have extended the
affirmative duty doctrine to a school system which was never
dual in the sense of that term heretofore used, nothing o:f. substance remains to a distinction between. a duty to desegre)gate
and a duty to integrate • To be sure, SWann purported to hold

3.

out the hope that once a system had become' unitar~'
there would be 'full compliance with this Court's
decision in Brown." 402 u.s. at 31. But the logic-indeed the holding - of today' s decision will require
that no school board at any time in the future will be
free to disregard its duty to maintain, within reason
and due regard for essential educational goals, the
type of integrated system generally described above.
There will, as the Court in Swann suggested (402
U.S. at 32), demegraphic changes in our 'growing,
mobile society' so that few communities will remain
from year to year in exactly the same factual setting.
The circumstances will be relevant, of course, to thtl
reasonableness of the action taken by eeheH-a1:dho!'tUt\oS
school authorities. It will not, however, relieve therr\
of their constitutional duty.
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a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of our
society in achieving desegregation with other educational and
societal interests a community may legitimately assert. This
will help assure that integrated school systems will be established .
and maintained by rational action, will be

bettl~r

understood and

supported by parents and children of both races, and will promote
the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential to its
genuine success. Indeed, for the long term, a more balanced
approach may be necessary to prevent serious deterioration of
the quality of public education so essential to the viability ,of our
de moe ratic institutions.

But if, after detailed and complete public supervision, segregated
schools still persist, the presumption is strong that the school
board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible.
Where state action and supervision is so pervasive and whE!re,
after years of such action, schools remain thoroughly segregated,
this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. The burden then falls on the school board to
demonstrate it is operatag an "integrated school system" {note
10 supra).

8.
to Green/Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/

----
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IDe jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts

as affirmative duty, including large-scale transportation of pupils,
to eliminate separate schools, the Court required these districts to
alleviate conditions which in large part did not rerult from historic,
state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather, the familiar root cause
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our
country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and
migratory pattera s the impact of which on the racial composition of
the schools was perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public
school authorities. This is a national, not a southern phenomenon.
And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular state had or did not
have segregatory school laws.

8

Whereas Brown I rightly addressed the elimination of stateimposed segregation in that particular section of the country where
it did exist, Swann imposed obligations on southern school districts to
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but are s imilar both
in origin and effect to conditions in the r e st of the country. As the
remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown, the inevitable rationale of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional
approach to our national problems of school segregation.

9.
II.

The Court's dec ision today, while adhering to the de jurE>/
de facto distinction, will require the application of the Green/ ~~
doctrine of "affirmative duty '' to the Denver &::hool Board despite
the absence of any history of state-mandated school segregation .
The only evidence of a constitutional violation was found in various
decisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that
the public school authorities are the responsible agency of the state,
and that the affirmative duty doctrine is equally applicable in Charlotte
and in Denver. I disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de
jure/ de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the initial
tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory
intent. " I would hold, quite simply, that wrere segregated public schools
exist, there is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as the
··school board") are sufficiently responsible to impose upon them a
nationally applicable duty to take appropriate desegregatory measures.

-·----- --~·-·-· ___ _! -- ~~---·-
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2.
require that the legitimate community interests in neighborhood
school systems be accorded far greater respect. In the balancing
of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree,
transportation orders should be applied with special caution to any
proposal as disruptive of family life and interests - and ultimately
of education itself - as extensive transportation of elementary age
children solely for desegregation purposes.

As a minimu,m this

could should not require school boards engage in the unnecessary
transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary age
children. It is at

this~

age level that neighborhood education performs

its most vital educational role. It is with respect to children of
tender years that the greatest concern exists for their physical
and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school

31
that the r ights of parents and children are m ost sharply indicated.
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Indeed, authorities increasingly are in doubt as to the extent
to which forced racial balancing in the public schools will be effective
per se in improving educational opportunity and reducing racial
inequality.

Note to Jay: I wonder if we shouldn't put this sentence in the footnote
citing Jenks as the authority. I haven't read Jenks so be sure what
I have said is an accurate statements. I do think in the introduction
or summary at the front of the book which I did read that Jenks
went even beyond what I have said in this note. But this is as far
as I would like to go.
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Here is a rough shot at a draft of a note describing what is
necessary for a prima facie case:

:m prima ft'a!::iie cp~&se

of constitutional violation exists

when pervasive segregation is found to exist to a significant degree
in the particular school district. It is recognized, of course, that
these terms are relative to provide no precise standards. But
circumstances, demographically and otherwise, vary from district
to district and hard and fast rules should not be formulated.

The

existence of a substantial percentage of schools populated by students
from one race only or predominately so populated, should trigger
the inquiry. If, upon closer examination, the system appears to
lack the principal indicia of an integrated school system (as defined
~pra,

p.

), this would suffice to establish a prima facie or

presumptive violation.
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There is controversy, increasing in recent years, as to the
extent to which integration in the schools per se results in a better
education for anyone.
see

If

For samples of some of the relevant literature,

Equality of Educational Opportunity, Office of Education,

U.S. 1leptJnrxH Department of Health Education and Welfare (1966),
~ known as the "Coleman Report"; Coleman, The Concept of

Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 Harv. :lEduc. Rev. 7, 17
(1968); Coleman on The Coleman Report, Education Researcher,
March 1972, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 13, published by American
Educational Research Pssociation, Wash. D. C. ; Cohen, Defining
Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C. L.A. L. Rev. 255 (1969);
and C. Jenks, Inequality (1972).
endorse

l!l

any of its implications.

I mention this controversy not to
Indeed, the time span covered

vi-

by the studies we too brief and the empirical data too fragmentary
for final conclusions.

Moreover, our society is committed - as

indeed it must be - to a national policy of integration.

But the

uncertainty of scholars as to the effect of school integration per se

2.
upon educational opportunity and achievement is relevant, at least
peripherally, to the basic assumption of this opinion: that the
ultimate goal of public schools is not integration but the best available
educational opportunity for all on equal terms; that school systems
must be genuinely integrated (as herein defined) but also they must
be structured for the highest educational achievement for all; and
that, in structuring such a system, the school authorities must be
allowed a wide measure of freedom and discretion to consider all
relevant interests than that

8.
.--,
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E ut for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that
T have identified the substance of the right in question.
I can perceive no basis for vindicating or denying this right,
as th e case may be, de pending upon whether or not a court
cteter!1' lnes that the segregated schools are the product of de facto
rather thar1 de jure actlon. Tf, as s a id in

~wan!l

"se gregation was

the :tnnl:klK evil'" held to h e unconstitutional t here is little reason
for perpetuatinv the evil in some sections of the country on the
basis of a distinction which has become for malistic rather than
substantive.

12.
court determines that the segregated schools are the product of
de facto rather than de jure action.

If, as in Swann "segregation

was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is
little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country

Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether the
segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely stateperpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle.
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segregation is more widespread in our country than the de jure/
de facto
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distinction~to admit. As one commentator has

noted:
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"the three court of appeals decisions denying a
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation
all arose in cities - Cincinnati , Gary and
Kansas City, Kansas -where racial segregation
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local
law. [Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. , 369 F. 2d
55 (CA61966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964);
Downs v. BoardOfEduc., 336 U.S. F. 2d 988 (CA 10
I964'}, cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914; Bell v. School
City, 324 F. 2d 209 (CA 7 1963), cert denied, 377
U.S. 924]. Ohio discarded its statute in 1887,
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not until the
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in
Mississippi are required to bus their children to
distant schools on the theory that the consequences
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply
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in Gary, Indiana where no more than five years
before Brown the same practice existed with
presumably the same effects. " Goodman,
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and ~ Empirijil Analysis, 60 Cal. L.
~ 1/
Rev. 275, 297 (1972).
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As the Fifth Circuit
fil

stated:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago,
Los Angelese, Boston, New York, or any other area ·
of the nation which the opinion classifies under
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their
school system does not violate their constitutional
rights because they were born into a de facto
society, while the exact same racial make-up of
the school system in the 17 Southern and border
states violates the constitutional rights of their
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because
they were born into a de jure society. All children
everywhere in the nation are protected by the
Constitution, and treatment which violates their
constitutional rights in one area, also violates
such constitutional rights in another area. "
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972)
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board
of Educ. 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin
J. , dissenting) . • 'I} 11-
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with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality.
B

There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinct ion in school
dese gregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy
and prudent judicial administration which point strongly toward
the adoption of a uniform national rule.

The litigation heretofore

centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions.
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portion of a school system from a school board's "segregatory
intent. " The intractable problems involved in litigating this
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Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences
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all racial segregation in the United States, wherever occurring
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been
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maintained or supported by government action.

This is not, of

course, to minimize those causes of segregated schools far beyond

~Mr.>re.o.te...-,_;
the domain and control of school board~ ~as fOreshadowed in
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a duty, which
overrides even the

~ ~J::L
~~
~l and neutral causes ofJsegregation, to
~
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minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an affirmative
policy of desegregation. It is this policy which must be applied
consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal
distinction which has outlived its time.
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b ut for purposes of the present analysis, I will assume that
T have identified the substance of the right in question.
I can perceive no basis for vindicating or denying this right,
as the case may be , depending upon whether or not a court
:leterrr ines that the segr egated schools are the product of de facto
rather than de jure action.

U, as said in ~;van~ "segregation was

the ffYR:idK: evil '' held to r.e unconstitutional there is little reason
for perpetuatin!! the evil in some sections of the country on the
basis of a distinction which has become formalistic rather than

substantive.
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court determines that the segregated schools are the product of
de facto rather than de jure action.

If, as in Swann "segregation

was the evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U.S. at 15, there is
little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country

Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether the
segregation was state-created or state-assisted or merely stateperpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle.
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The

School Board exercises month-by-month, year-by-year responsibility
over the ?er@•M of th4:>ublic school system. It sets policies
on attendance zones, faculty employment and assignments, school
construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters. Sc),•• J
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is justified in finding a .~ prima facie case of a constitutional
violation.
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noted:
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"the three court of appeals decisions denying a
constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation
all arose in cities - Cincinnati , Gary and
Kansas City, Kansas -where racial segregation
in schools was formerly mandated by state or local
law. [Deal v~ Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. , 369 F. 2d
55 (CA61966), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964);
Downs v. BoardOfEduc., 336 U.S. F. 2d 988 (CA 10
~ cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914; Bell v. School
City, 324 F. 2d 209 (CA 7 1963 ), cert denied, 377
U.S. 924]. Ohio discarded its statute in 1887,
Indiana in 1949, and Kansas City not until the
advent of Brown. If Negro and white parents in
Mississippi are required to bus their children to
distant schools on the theory that the consequences
of past de jure segregation cannot otherwise be
dissipated, should not the same reasoning apply

1
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in Gary, Indiana where no more than five years
before Brown the same practice existed with
presumably the same effects. " Goodman,
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and ~ Empiriil Analysis, 60 Cal. L.
~II
Rev. 275, 297 (1972).
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As the Fifth Circuit
stated:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago,
Los Angelese, Boston, New York, or any other area
of the nation which the opinion classifies under
de facto segregation, would receive little comfort
from the assertion that the racial make-up of their
school system does not violate their constitutional
rights because they were born into a de facto
society, while the exact same racial make-up of
the school system in the 17 Southern and border
states violates the constitutional rights of their
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because
they were born into a de jure society. All children
everywhere in the nation are protected by the
Constitution, and treatment which violates their
constitutional rights in one area, also violates
such constitutional rights in another area. "
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA 5 en bane 1972)
quoting United States v. Jefferson County Board
of Educ. 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA 5 en bane) (Gewin
J. , dissenting) . • II /L-
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with the de jure/ de facto distinction, and commends itself in this
respect both on grounds of principle and practicality.
B

There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school
desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy
and prudent judicial administration which point strongly toward
the adoption of a uniform national rule.

The litigation heretofore

centered in the South already is surfacing in other regions.

The

~

decision of the Court today, emphasizing as it does the!\element
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists.

This will be conceded in most of them.

The

litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's decision on
whether segregation has resulted in any "meaningful or significant"
portion of a school system from a school board's "segregatory
intent. " The intractable problems involved in litigating this
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As shown above , there is n o reason as a matter of

constitutional principle or precedent (until today's decision) to
adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in school desegregation
cases.

In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent

judicial administration which

~

point strongly towards the

adoption of a uniforn1 national rule.

The situation may be summarized

Q;enerally as follows : After some 18 years of litigation confined
p rimarily to the southern states,

9esft~

desegregation plans

have been adopted and affirmative act ion tal<en t o integrate the
schools, in varying degrees, in all of the major cities and most

17.
of the school districts in the South. The greater problem with
respect to segregated school systems now lies in the urban areas
outside of the South, and for the most part in cities ancbisd:Jita:ec
states which long since have abandoned discriminatory laws and
ordinances applicable to schools, housing, and zoning. As in
Denver, the legal structure within k which these school systems
function is neutral, and yet segregation - varying from massive to
fragmentary - is commonplace wherever substantial number of
minority citizens reside. The litigation heretofore centered in
the South already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today, based entirely on school board action and inaction,
will invite the filing of numerous additional desegregation cases.
It is the business of the courts to decide cases, and

particularly to vindicate constitutional rights. The problem,
therefore, is not the litigation itself, but rather the artificial
framework in which it must be conducted under today's decision.
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated education
exists.
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This will be conceded in most of them. The litigation
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will focus, rather, on whether it has resulted in any "meaningful
or significant" portion of a school system from (i) something the
school board did or failed to do, and ( ii) whether the board had a
segregatory intent. The far reaching problems litigating these
issues are obvious to any lawyer.

The results of litigation - often

arrived at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to action taken
over many years - will be fortuitous, unpredictable and perhaps
even capricious.
The Denver case, decided today, is illustrative of the
problem.

Although appellate courts are normally bound by findings

of fact, especially where the testimony is compendious and involves
conflicting opinion as well as factual evidence, this Court refused
to be bound by the findings of the District Court which also had
been approved by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the majority
opinion, apparently concluding that there was no substantial
evidence to support the findings below, held that they were
"incorrect as a matter of law":

19.
"Accepting the School Board's explanation the
District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed
that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core
city schools werenot permissible since petitioners
had failed to prove '(1) a racially discriminatory
purpose and (2) a casual relationship between the
acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly
existing in those schools.' 445 F. 2d at 1006. This
assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly
incorrect as a matter of law." (supra p. 16).
With reason, one may agree that the majority of this Court, despite
not having heard the evidence or seen the witnesses, was nevertheless
correct in its judgment overruling the factual findings of the courts
below. The point, however, is that wide and unpredictable
differences of 111 opinion among judges are inevitable when dealing
with an issue as slippery as "intent" or "purpose", and especially
when related to scores if not hundreds of decisions made by school
authorities under varying conditions over many years.
Every act of a school board and school administration, and
indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated,
is a form of state action.

The most routine decisions with respect

to the operation of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying;
degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated, remain
Jllll

in that state, are desegregated, or - for the long term future -

20.

In Swann the Court did not have to probe into

S!t!§XRiai!CK:f

segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each of
these "endless" factors.

The basis for its de jure finding there was

rooted primarily in the priorkisdx history of the desegregation
the
suit. But in;benver type case where no such history exists, a
judicial examination of these factors will be required under today's
decision.

The consequences iJDt are quite predictable in terms

of protracted and inconclusive litigation, and of added burdens on
the federal courts as well as unnecessary disruption of school

20.
are likely to be one or the other.

These decisons include action

or non-action with respect to school building construction and
location; the timing of building new schools and their size; the
aa closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering
of student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood
policy is enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools;
the recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory
personnel; policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will be
provided, where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend
them; the determination of curriculum, including whether there
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational
training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even
decisions as to social, recreational and athletic pDit policies.
The Court's discussion in Swann of the effect and complexity
of decision making with respect to the construction of new schools
and the closing of old ones is illuminating:

21.

systems.

Moreover, the predicability of decisons where they will

be largely on findings as to purpose or intent will become an
even less exacting science, and the school boards and authorities which have

B

so much at stake - will simply not know whether and

to what extent the Denver rule is applicable.

c
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the consequences
indicated above, I suggest that we acknowledge that whenever
significant school segregation exists there is an adequate element
of state action.

If one goes back far enough, it is probable that

all racial segregation in the United states, wherever occurring
and whether or not confined to the schools, has at sometime been
maintained or supported by government action. * But the basis
*In- Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304, 1311-1315
(1968), ,Judge Walter Hoffman - in an appendix to his opinion compiled a summary of past government segregatory action which
included examples from a great majority of states. See also
Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights 245, 254-259 (1967); M. Weinberg, Race and Place,
Office of Education, u. S. Department of Health,.. Education and
Welfare (1967). (Jay: I have not checked these).
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for an on-going finding of state action - regardless of intent or
purpose - rests quite simply upon the fact that public education
is a function of government and the schools are controlled and

operated by agencies of the state.
This is not to suggest, of course, that responsibility iB an
odious sense rests primarily upon school boards or other state
authorities for much of the segregation which still exists throughout
the country. The causes of segregation in the schools are complex,
and where blame is appropriate it should be on a national basis
including past generations. In most cities today there is a high
degree of residential segregation which results in a tendency toward
comparable school segregation. Zoning and housing laws often
contributed in the past to this separation of the races. There has
Dl also been a tendency, muted somewhat iB recent years, for

different racial and ethnic :&1l:mbt elements of the population to
prefer to live separate and apart. Nor are the residential patterns
necessarily related to one race or group being minority and the

23.

other majority. There are cities todaY in which theXJPDIK population
is predominantly Negro, and the residential patterns remain

essentially segregated with the whites being the minority race.
It is generally agreed, however, that the single most pervasive

cause of residential segregation wherever it is found is the disparity
in economic opportunity and status which continue to be so prevalent.
These factors which combine to separate racial and ethnic groups,
were the underlying casses of the segregation found to exist in

the Denver public schools.
Yet, as foreshadowed in

Swa~ and as implicity held mul

today, school board have a duty which overridges even the natural
and neutral causes of segregation, and requires appropriate action
to minimize and ameliorate these conditions by pursuing an
affirmative policy of desegregation. It is this policy which must
applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a
doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time.

:~

8. As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article ,''Residential

Segregation," Scientific American, August 1965 at 14:
''No elaborate analysis is necessary to co~lude
from these figures that a high degree of residential segregation based on race is a universal
characteristic of American cities. This segregation is found in the cities of the North and West
as well as of the South; in large cities as well
as small; in nonindustrial cities as well as industrial; in cities with hundreds of thoU~ands
of Negro residents as well as those with only a
few thousand; and in cities that are progressive
in their employment practices and civil rights
policies as well as those that are not."
In his book, Negroes in Cities,

Dr. Taeuber stated that residential

segregation exists "regardless of the character of local laws and
policies and regardless of other forms of discrimination." Id. at

10. The term "integrated school system" is used generally
to denote a system possessing most, if not all, of the following
characteristics: there would be, of course, no laws, regulations
or policy supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown (a condition manifestly invalid and no longer
existing overtly anywhere).

The school board would have pur-

sued, within the limits of a rule of reason coneistent with educational goals, the affirmative duty principle enunciated in Green.
This duty would require that a school board take such appropriate
affirmative measures to (i) integrate fully faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula opportunities; (iii) utilize its authority to
draw attendance zones to promote integration; (iv) locate new',
schools, close old ones, and determine the aize and grade categ:ories
\

\

of schools with this same objective in mind; (v) assure the elimination
r[)f

all vestiges of segregation in athletic and recreational activities; .

and (vi) resort to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially
at the secondary level, as is compatible with sound educational goals .
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or

inclusive; rather, they are indicative of the characteristics of
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils
may justifiably be confident that invidious discrimination is
neither practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed
could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our
major metropolitan areas - that every school must have some
racial mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black
is not a "segregated" school in the legal sense if the system ifself
is a genuinely integrated one as described herein.
The characteristics and affirmative obligations of an
integrated school system are spelled out more fully in Section
III, infra.
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a.

It should be made explicitly clear that the Constitutionand after all this is[ the touchstone of the rights at issue - does
not require racial balance or indeed a school system in which
every school has some mixing of the races. Quite apart from
the fact that no language in the Constitution nor in any decision
I

applying the equal Ilrotection clause to other situations involving
racial

discriminati~n requires

this,* the Constitution could

hardly be construed to require an absurd if not impossible resuit. Few would suggest, for example, that it would be feasible
to apply even approf-mately the population racial balance in a
city like Washington or Newark to every public :Biduuddh school
therein.
The argument for racial balance also overlooks the fact
that the remedy far exceeds that which is necessary to redress

Jay: Try to think of some parallel cases. One type of situ~l.tion
which comes to mind, and which may be mentioned as an exall\lple,
is that the fundamental cause of racial imbalance in the schoo1a1
today is residential segregation. If the ConstitUtion requires
homogenization of the population, the way to achieve it would be
to compel affirmaUlve desegregation of residential patterns though admittedly ,is would be a revolutionary step.

b.
the constitutional evil. Let us use Denver as an example. It is
doubted that anyone would contend, absent state action of any
kind whatever, thalt the schools in Denver would have a substantially
different racial composition from that which actually exists.

I

have agreed in Parts I and II of this concurrence that the Denver
School Board, by its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible
1

in some degree for the extent of segregation that exists. It can
certainly be said that if an affirmative duty existed to ameliorate
segregation the board could and should have taken steps toward
this end. But if one assumed a maximum discharge of constitu1

tiona! duty by the Denver Board over the past decades, the fundamental problem of Jesidential segregation would continue to exist
and it is this situation that causes most of the school segregation.
It would indeed be a novel application of equitable power - not to

mention a dubious eXtension of constitutional theory - to apply
some uDmi retribufive theory which would require a greater
degree of school integration than would have resulted from purely
natural and neutral npn-state causes.

c/
It is to be remembered that the racial mix of the population

varies widely among the cities and cotmties of this country.*
The demography also constantly varies, especially within the cities
where population ra~ios change significantly as citizens move to
suburban areas and white and black families constantly are on the
move within the citi,s. A racial balance established in a school
system for one year 1would rarely be valid three or four years later.
An awareness of these facts explains, no doubt, why the

Court has never projected a mechanistic solution for a problem
of such delicacy and

~iversity.

Mr. Justice Brennan may well have

had this in mind in Green when, speaking for the Court, he said:
"There is no universal answer to the complex
problems of dbsegnlgation; there is obviously no
one plan that will do the job in every ease. The
matter must l1e assessed in the light of the
circumstances present and the options available
in each instance." 391 u.s. at 439.

he

from school districts which are pemaps
*The range may well
90% black (Washington, D. C. and Clarendon County, S. C. ) to many
districts which are m~arly alllllld white. For the situation in
Clarendon County,--S. C. see Brunson, v. Board of Trustees, No. 14, 571
CA 4 June 5, 1970) - !Tar: Cheek to see if you have a better cite
for this ease.

d
I conclude, therefore, that the relevancy of racial balance
is little more, as Chief Justice Burger noted, than a "starting point

to decide whether in fact any violation existed". Winston-Salem/
Forsyth Bd. of Ed. 'V· Scott, 404 U. S. at 1229.

Neighborhood

School~

The Denver School Board has consistently adhered to a policy
based on the

advanta~s

of Bibb: neihborhood schools.* The

defense in this case J:s based primarily on the theory that the
neighborhood school policy was operated with total neutrality as:to
race, and that the lawfulness of such a policy has been recognizeci\
in the lOth Circuit.**\

**See United States v . Board of Education of Tulsa Co. , 429 F. 2d
1253 (CA 10 1970); BJara of-EdUcation of Oktahoma City v. Dowell,
375 If F. 2d 158 (CA 10 1967); and-Downs v. Board of Education:of
Kansas City, 336 F. 2? 988 (1964).

*The Court of Appeals summarized the Denver pollcy as m!iml
follows: "The goal is \a centrally located school whieh children
living within the boundary lines must attend. Although the Board
has no written policy 'overning the setting of attendance boundaries,
several factors have ~pparently been employed, Among these
are current school ~ulation in an attendance area, estimated
growth of pupil populapon, the size of the school, distance to
be traveled, and the existence of natural boundaries. The Board
1
also attempts to draw. ~unior high school and senior high school
boundary lines so that all students transferring from a given
school will continue th ir education together." App. p. 127a.
1

The
defense in this ease is ~fM'f n...t,.., ....n ....

-

........ - ..

e.
But the inqub!·y does not end with the ascertainment that a
neighborhood policy
affirmative duty

~as

been neutrally administered. Under the

doc~rine,

a school board cannot rest upon neutrality

alone. There are many
ways in which desegregation can be promoted
I
without dismantling ~ll a neighborhood schools or even abandoning
the coocept as a

goa~

The critical inquiry

to be attained in conjunction with other goals.

f.s

into how a particular neighborhood school

policy is structured fiD-d operated. The drawing of the attendance
I

lines is a critical factor. A board also has wide flexibility in
deciding the various 1matters mentioned earlier in this opinion,
including the

loeati~of

new schools, the closing of old ones,

student transfer polikies, natural boundaries and the like.
A rule of

rea~on,

recognize the merit

balancing interests and values, must

br neighborhood schools,

especially for

I

children of tender yJars. Authorities on education agree widely
I

as to the advantages of a uk neighborhood system fairly
administered. In n Jal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369

I

I

f.

F. 2d 55 (CA 6}(1966}, tile
Court summarized these advantages:
I
(Copy Begin to End, page 60. )
As Deal was decided pJ."'ior to Green and Swann , it is no longer
permissible merely to

~perate

a neighborhood "without racial

bias. " A school board must discharge its affirmative duty, but
the advantages of neighborhood schools are no less as a result
of these decisions and they deserve due consideration by a school
board in discharing its duty. This is especially true with respect
to elementary schools for all of the reasons so obvious to anyone
who has been either a parent or a teacher of elementary age children. *

In a perceptive column in the Washington Post, December 25, 1972,
columnist William Raspberry addressed the indispensable role of
parents in working clos~ly with the principal and teachers of their
children's schools, a ro~e usually impossible to assume if one's
children have been bused away many miles:
·

"Casting a ballot (for school board members)is no substitute for visiting schools, seeing at first hand what is happening (or not hapMning), offering suggestions and volunteering assistance. ,
"It is no accident that education is worse at those schools
where parental involvement is least. I know that in many
of the low-income nbighborhoods,
where the least learning
I
is taking place, parents often are too mdiJ busy, too timid
or too poorly educat~d themselves to get very much involved in what's happening at their children's schools.
I

"But they'll have to f.lake the time to get involved if the-y
expect their schools [to get better. As a matter of fact.
simply knowing that th is or her parents are concerned can
do a great deal to motivate a child to learn."

t. ~In the Court'~ IIJit opinion in Swann, it was recognized that:

"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as
schools are lbcated in response to the needs of people.
schools may thus influence the patterns
The location
of residential development of a metropolitan area and
have important impact on composition of inner city
neighborhood~." 402 U.S. at 21.

pf

The Court could hardly have included the foregoing in its opinion
had it intended to

su~ordinate

entirely the values of the neighborhood

school to those of in~egration. The truths identified by the Court
are self evident. liiiiDplx People do gravitate towards schools, and
in the misinterpretanon that has followed Swann many who have
gravitated have been ldisappointed. Similarly, the location of schools
does influence residential patterns and school boards must ever
be mindful of this.

Ke1es

The Interest of Parents and Childeen
In the understandable national concern for alleviating the injustice

of state enforced or tolerated racial segregation in the schools, it may
be that the courts - as well as others -have overlooked the fact that
other interests are implicated. These are the rights and interests of
the parents and children; without regard to race, who are most directly
concerned by desegregatil.on decrees. The law has long recognized the
parental duty to nuture, support and provide for the welfare of children.
There can be no doubt that this embraces such matters as when, where
and how they are educated. In Pierce . v . ,,,, Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1924), 534, 535, a unanimous court held:
(Copy from that opinion, Begin to End,
starting at bottom of p. 534 over to
point marked End on p. 53 5.)

The parental rights and duties described by the Court are correlative, and
the prescribed duty can hardly be discharged if the parent is denied the
right to exercise some participation in matters that affect the child's
interest. As the Court stated so strongly in Brown , few interests in our
society are as vital as that of education. All of this is not to say

-and we

-3-

The Ultimate Goal - Equal Educational Opportunity
If we put aside the legalisms ~ of rights and duties,

surely there is agreement that the ultimate goal is equal opportunity
for children of all races to receive the best education the state can
provide. As emphasized in Brown 1 "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. But of course courts
must operate within the framework of law and this Court mast apply
principles derived from the Constitution by our prior precedents. In
brief summary, the relevant principles in a desegregation case are
as follows: dual or ••er•eakiu« segregated school systems are discriminatory and are proscribed by the Equal ProClection Clause; and
school autlurities have an affirmative duty to take appropriate steps
to desegregate such systems. These principles must be observed and
applied , not as ends in themselves but as means of achieving the educationa! goal. The alternative, then, to any simplistic application of 'oWl at
has come to be regarded as the Swann formula, is to recognize - as indeed
the opinion of the Court in Swann explicitly did - there must be a balanc img
of interests and that reasonable discretion must be allowed in the ad-

-40-

IV.
I come now to the extent to which district courts may
decree the compulsory transportation of pupils in an attempt
to achieve a desegregated school system. The Court in Swann
was unquestionably right in describing such transportation as
"one tool of school desegregation." The transporting of school
children is as old as public education, and in rural and some
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing of books.
The issue, therefore, is not whether the employment of busing or
other means of transporting children to and from school is legal
or appropriate, where necessary to further desegregation or other
educational objectives. The crucial issue is when, under what
circumstances, and to what extent busing may appropriately be
used. The answer t0 this turns - as it does so often in the law upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances. Or,
putting it differently, the answer will vary with the circumstances
and must be compatible with the rule of reason.
Transportation is a logistical problem, and if resources are
available, anything is "possible.·· If enough buses are provided

-41-

(and courts have not been reluctant to order them ), the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation - namely, complete
racial balance -~be attained in every school, at least for the
year in question. But this is an irrational interpretation of Swann,
as it would be of the Constitution itself. The Court was careful
to s ay that " no per se rule" was intended; that "no rigid guidelines
as to student transportation" could be prescribed; that the "age"
and ' 'health of the children" and the relevance of the busing to
"the educational process" should be considered in formulating
any busing plan. 402 U.S. 26, 30, 31.
I would hope this would mean that a rule of reason must be
applied with a special caution to any proposal as disruptive of
family life and interests - and ultimately of education itself - as
extensive intra-city transportation of elementary age children
solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum, this Court
should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary
transporting of children in the elementary grades. It is at this
age level that neighborhood education performs its vital educational

-42role. It is with respect to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological
health. It is also here, at the elementary school, that the rights
and duties of parents are most sharply implicated. While greater
transportation of secondary school students might be permitted ,
even at this level the desire of a community fort racially neutral
neighborhood schools should command judicial respect.
It is true that the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg desegregation
plan approved by the Court in Swann contemplated extensive busing
of elementary children. As district courts have tended to look to
what in fact was approved rather than to what was said in the opinion
of the Court, it is important for us to reiterate that Swann fairly
articulates a test of reasonableness which is controlling.

-44-

schools, even in the eities of the South, are in la r ge part the
product of social and economic facto rs - and the resulting
residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in
the United States, with any significant minority school population,
in which the school authorities - in one way or the other - have not
contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which
still prevails. Instead of recognizing the reality of similar multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the country,
the Court persists in a distinction whose duality operates unfairly
on local communities in one section f>f the country and on minority
children in the others.
The second issue - relating to the ambiguities of Swann means that the District Court, upon making the findings which are
foreshadowed by today' s opinion, will be obligated to apply Swann
to the city of Denver. There is, for the reasons I have indicated,
a gap of vast and ill defined dimensions between a fair reading of
what the Court said in Swann and the way district courts have felt
compelled to apply it. It is important, not just to Denver but for
the school boards and the courts in other cities which are awaiting
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This means that school authorities, Cij&istent

w~

ienerally

with a view of enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of course,
a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies supportive of
the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown.

A system

would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the
responsible authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate
-faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality
of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula opportunities
throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance
J

zones to promote

integratio~pv) locate new schools,

close old ones,

and determine the size and grade categories with this same objective

undertake the transportation of students, this also must be with
<-1£iorfv..;t;~ .J
'Wtt
integrative
]
in mind.

2.
The fore going

prescriptio~

is not intended to be . _ either

definitive or all-inclusive, but rather an indication of the contour
characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens
and pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination
is neither practice nor tolerated.

not mean - and indeed could not mean in view of the residential
patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas - that every school
must in fact be an integrated unit.

A school which happens to be all

or predominantly white or all or predominantly black is not a
"segregated" school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself
is a genuinely integrated one.
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TThe terminology customarily usea' by this Court in Brown and
subsequent gecisions has referred to "desegre tion" and the
"duty to desegregate, " apparently avoiding de berately the ,
1
term "duty to integrate. " But all of these c es, until the present
\ one, have involved dual systems in the sen e that state prescribed
\ seg.Fegation existed as of 1954. Now, h~ ver, that a, fnajority
\ . of. the Court in today'.s decision has extended the affirmative duty
doctrine to a school system which was never dual in' the sense of
, that term as heretofore used, nothing of substanc~' remains to
a distinction between a duty to desegregate and ~/duty to integrate.
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Defaulting school authorities would have, at a minimum,
cJ-r~ r >;. J, v~

the obligation to take aif'In
the above section.

au, e steps

of the sort outlined in

School boards would, of course, be free to

develop and initiate further plans to promote school desegregation.
In a pluralistic society such as ours, it is important that no racial

minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that students
of all races learn to play, work and cooperate with one another in
their

El!IX

common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in this opinion
. . , f'c.

is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding

3t..~J-J~
constitutional•lllllil•ill• in

~

promotin~ro:::cognized

i'll ; h,m~/

values of

constitutional requirement of extensive student transportation
solely to maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater degree of
actual desegregation, while it infringes on what may fairly be
regarded as impqrtant community prerogatives and personal rights.
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to Green/Swann undercut whatever logic once supported the de facto/
In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts

including large-scale transportation of pupils ,
to eliminate eparate schools, the Court required these districts to
ns which in large part did not result from historic ,
segregation. Rather , the familiar root cause
of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our
one of segregated residential and
--·~ / .... .rl

not a southern phenomenon . And

i'

is

rgely unrelated to whether a

g
particular state had or did not have segre

tory school laws.

Whereas Brown I rightly addressed th elimination of stateimposed segregation in that particular section o
it did exist , Swann imposed obligations on southern chool districts to
eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but re similar both
in origin and effect to conditions in the rest of the country.
medial obligations of Swann extend far beyond the elimination o
growths of the state-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown ,j~~.--,-•

~~ ~~ """'di--~ ~
.Id1 s ·J ·

a t '

I

p ~a

uniform , constitutional approach to our natio

problems of school segregation.

9.
II

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the de jure/
~
~

(c~ .. ~e.. ~

facto distinction, fe:peshaeews applicli::i.on of the Green/ Swann
doctr e of "affirmative duty" to the Denver School Board despite
the absen e of any history of state-mandated school segregation.
nee of a constitutional violation was found in various
~

decisions of the chool board.
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term "integrated school system" is used generally to denote

a system possessing most, if not all , of the following characteristics:
there would be, of course, no laws, regulations or policy supportive
of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown (a condition manifestly invalid and no longer existing overtly anywhere).
The school board would have pursued, within the limits of a rule
of reason consistent with educational goals , the affirmative duty
principle enunciated in Green . This duty would
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old ones, and determine the size and grade categories of schools
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with this same objective in mind; assure the elimination of all vestiges
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of segregation in athletic and recreational activities; and resort

"

to such reasonable transportation of pupils, especially at the
secondary level , as is compatible with sound educational goals.
These specifications are not intended to be either definitive or
inclusive ; rather , they are indicative of the characteristics of
an integrated school system, in which all citizens and pupils may
justifiably be confident that invidious discrimination is neither
practiced nor tolerated. This does not mean- and indeed could
not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major
metropolitan areas - that every school must have some racial
mixing. A school which happens to be all white or all black is
not
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.,Appellants,
however, pose the question of whether the neighborhood system of
pupil placement, fairly administered without racial bias, comports
with the requirements of equal opportunity if it neve rtl-J.eless results
in the creation of schools with predominantly or even exclusively
Negro pupils. The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout
the nation and has been for many years the basis of school
Jeote.rc.-l.
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have goRe I al
valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such as minimization
of safety hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in
reducing transporation needs, ease of pupil placement and
administration through the use of neutral, easily determined standards,
and HR better home-school communication."
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(KEYES)

In Swann the Court properly emphasized a concern for

" basic fairness" in fashioning a desegregation decree. This must
mean - indeed the Constitution requires - that the remedies decreed
must be fair to all children, their parents and the school authorities
who will have to administer the decree. A court of equityXlfx does
not correct one injustice by imposing another.
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This school desegregation case concerns the Denver,
Colorado, school system. That system has never been
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision
that mandated or permitted racial segregation in public
cducation. 1 Rather, the _gravamen of this action,
brought in June 1969 in the District Court for the
District of Colorado by parents of Denver school children. is that respondent School Board alone. by usc of
various techmque~l'l,uch as the manipu lati~ of student
(Datfendance zones,~hool site selection an~ neighborhood school policy, ~d Q.f maintained racially or
ethnically (or both racially m1d ~ segregated
schools throughout the school district, entiffing peti'honers to a decree ct1rcctmg desegregation of the entire
school district.
To the contr:u~- , Art. IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution exprohibit::; "any clas;:;ifira t ion of pupils . . . on account of
rare or color." A~ carl~- as 1927, til(' Colorado Supreme Court held
1hat a Dennr practice of excluding black students from school programs at Manual High School and More~· Junior High School violated state hw. Jones v. JVcwlon, S1 Colo. 25, 253 P. 38(3 (1927).
1

pre,;~]~-

~~-(A~J-~--~~ ~~ o/~ C$-JJ-/~ ~
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The boundaries of the school district are co-terminus
with the boundaries of the City and County of Denn"r.
There were in 1969 119 schools~ with 96.580 pupils
in the school system. In early 1969, the respondent
School Board adopted thref' resolutions designed to desegregate the schools in the Park Hill area in the northcast portion of the city. Following an election " ·hich
producPcl a Board majority opposed to the resolutions.
the resolutions 'wre rescinded and replaced " ·ith a Yoluntary student transfer program. Petitioners then filed
this action. requesting that an injunction be issued against
the rescission of the resolutions and that the respondent
School Board be ordered to desegregate and afford equal
educational opportunity "for tlH' School District as a
whole.'' App .. at 32a. The District Court found that by
the construction of a ne"·· f0iat1vely small elementary
school. Barrett. m the niicklfc of the ~egro community
w~f ~Hill. by the gerrymandering of student attei1Cfancc zones~)y the usc of so-called "optional zones.''
a11d by the excessiw USE' of mobile classroom units,
among other things. the respondent School Board had
engaged o\·er almost a decade after 1960 in an 111lconstifubonaT pohcy of deliberate racial segregation wi!h
respeet to the Park [ hll schools.: 'l'he court thereforE'
orclrred the Board to desegregate thosE' schools through
the implementation of the three rescinded resolutions.
303 F. Rupp. 270 (1960); 303 F. Rupp. 280 (Hl69).
Segregation in Denver schools is not limited. howf'YCr.
to the schools in the Park Hill area.. and not satisfied
"ThNP :lrr 92 <>lemrntar~· ,:rhook 1.5 junior high ~c ·hool". 2 junior,:pnior high ...:rhool<.:. and 7 ,:pnior high ,:c·hool". Tn :Hldition. tlw Honn!
op<>r:it<'" :Ill OpportunitY ::.:!'hool. ~ ~ ~fNropolit:1n Youth EduC"ation
Ccntc•r. and an Airrraft Tr:1ining F:1cility.
:: The ~o-cai!Pd "Park Hill -c·hooV' :ll'<' BaiT<>It. Strdman, Hni!Ptt.
Smith. Philip~, and Park Hill Flrm<>ntary Schook and Smilry Junior
High Si·hool. F:1"l High Srhool "<'!'\'<'." thp ar<>a but i" lo(':1tPd out~idr of it.
(Srr appe ndix.)
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with their succe~s in obtaining relief for Park Hill. petitioners pressed their prayer that the District Court order
de~egregation of all ~egregated schools in the city of
Denver. particularly the heavily segregated schools in
the core city area.'' But that court concluded that its
fin cli;;g of a purposeful and systematic program of racial
segregation affecting thou~a nels of students m the
Parf\: H1lf area did not. in itself. impose on the
School Board an affirmative duty to eliminate segregation throughout the school ciistnct. Instead. the court
fractiOnated the chstnct and heid that petitioners must
make a fresh showing of de ju1·e segregation in each ~a
of the clty for \Yiuch they seck relief. Moreover. tlw
District Court held that its finding of intentional ~egrega
tion in Park Hill " ·as not in any sense material to the
question of segregatory intent in other areas of the city.
rnd er this restrictive approach. th e District Court concluded that petitioners' evidence of intentionally discriminatory School Board action in areas of the district
other than Park Hill was insufficient to "dictate the conclusion that this is de jure segregation which ca11s for
an all-out effort to desegregate. It is more like de facto
segregation. \Yith respect to '"hich the rule is that the
court cannot order desegregation in order to proYid e a
\ better balance." 313 F. Supp .. a.t 73.
Xc\'ertheless, the District Court went on to hold that
the proofs established that the segregated core CitY
schools " ·ere educationally inferior to lnc-pr(:dominantly
"w~r "Anglo" schools r;- oth er part~ of the district-that is, "separate facilities . . . unequal in the
·• The oo-eall <•d ·'('orr ('it\· ~rhool~'' whirh :trr ~aid to br sr~r e~:1ted
are Boui<'Yard. Hr~·ant-\Yrb~tc•r. Columbin r. Crofton. Ebert, Elmwood, El~·ri:l, F:1irmont, F ain·irw. Garclf'n l'larr, Gilpin. Greenler.
H:trrington, ~1itrhell , RmrdlrY. Rw:tm'l'a. Whittirr . W~·att, and W~-
man Elemrnt nr~· School~: B:1krr. Co!r. :md ~Iorr~- .Junior High
Schools: and East , We"t. :tnd ~1anual Hi~h Schools. (See appendix.}
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quality of education pro,·idecl." !d., at 83. Thus. the
court held that, under the doctrine of Plessy Y. F-e;guson,
163 U. S. 537 ( 1896), respondent School Board constitutionally "must at a minimum offer an equal educational
o])'j)'O"rtunity," ibid., and. therefore, although all-out desegregation "could not be decreed, .. . the only feasible
and constitutionally acceptable program-the only program v..·hich furnishes anything approaching substantial
equality-is a system of desegregation and integration
"·hich provides compensatory education in an integrated
environment." 313 F. Supp., at 96. The District Court
then formulated a varied remedial plan to that end n·hich
\Yas incorporated in the Final Decree."
Respondent School Board appealed. and petitioners
cross-appealed, to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. That court sustained the District Court's finding that the Board engaged in an unconstitutional policy
"The first of the District Co\1!'1 ·~ four opinions. ::!0::! F. Supp. 279,
.ltd,· 31, HJ69. nnd gmntrd petitioners' npplication for a
prrlimin.u:-• injunction. TlH' 8rrond opinion. 30::! F. Supp. 2~9. was
filrrl Au~ust 14, 1969. :111d mndr ~upplemental findings nnd conelu~ions. Thr third opinion. 31:~ F. Supp. 61, filed l\Iarch 21. 1970,
wn~ the opinion on thr merit~. The fourth opinion , 313 F. Supp. 90,
m1~ on rem eel~· and w .1~ filrd J\1n,· 21 , 1970. Thr District Court
filrd nn unreported opinion on Oetobrr 19. 1971, in which rrlief was
rxtendrd to Hallett and Strdman Elrmentar~· School:; which were
found b)' thr court in ib .Tul,· 31. 1969. opinion to be purposefully
~rg regatcd but wrrr not imludrd within thr ~rope of the three 1969
Ilo:nd resolution~. The Court of Appc:tlo filed fi,·e unreported opinions: on Augu:'t .5, 1969. neal ing prelimin[lr~· injunction:': on Augu~t 27 , 1969 . ~t:1~·ing prcliminar~· injunetion ; on September 15,
19(i9, on motion to amrnd ~ tn~·: on October 17, 1969 , den~·ing Motion~ to Dismis.•: and on l\farrh 26. 1971 , granting staY. l\lR. JusTICE BRENNAN, on August 29. 1069 , filed [Ill opinion rrin~t[lting preliminary injunction, 396 P. S. 1215 (1969), and on April 26, 1971,
thi~ Court entered a per r·uriam order ,·:trating the Court of Appeals'
St[l ~·, 402 U. S. 182 (1971).
wn~ filed
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of deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park
Hill schools and affirmed the Final Decree in that respect.
As to the core city schools, however, the Court of App~ reversed the lega1 deterrl1Ii1atlon of the D1strict
Court that those schools were mam tamed m vwla tion
o,f the Fourteenth Amendment because of the unequal
ed'i:icahonal opportunity afforded, and therefore set aside
so much of the Final Decree as required desegregation
and educational improvement programs for those schools.
445 F. 2d 990 ( 1971). In reaching that result, the Court
of Appeals also disregarded respondent School Board's
deliberate racial segregation policy respecting the Park
Hill schools and accepted the District Court's finding
that petitioners had not proved that respondent had a
like policy addressed specifically to the core city schools.
We granted petitioners' petition for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' judgment insofar as it reversed that part of the District Court's Final Decree as
pertained to the core city schools. 404 U. S. 1036 ( 1972).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in that respect
is modified to vacate instead of reverse the Final Decree.
The respondent School Board has cross-petitioned for
certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it affirmed that part of the District Court's
Final Decree as pertained to the Park Hill schools.
School District A-o. 1, etc. v. Wilfred Keyes et al., No.
71-572. The cross-petition is denied.
I

Before turning to the r~:imar uestion we decide today,
a \\'Ord must be said about the District Court's method
of defining a "segregated" school. Denver is a triethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, community.
The overall racial and ethnic composition of the Denver
public schools is 66 7c Anglo. 14 ~~ Kcgro and 20 '/'o His-
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pano.G The District Court. in assessing the question of
de jure segregation in the core city schools. preliminarily resolved that :X egroes and Hispanos should not
be placed 111 the same category to establish the segregated character of a school. 313 F. Supp.. at 69.
Later, in determining the schools that were likely to
produce an inferior edueational opportunity. the court
concluded that a school \Yould be eonsidered inferior
only if it had "a concentration of either Xegro or Hispano students in the general area of 70 to 7;) percent.''
!d., at 77. We intimate no opinion whether the District Court's 70 to 75 /r requirement was correct. The
District Court used those figures to signify educationally
inferior schools. and there is no suggestion in the record
that those same figures \H're or would be used to define a
"segregated" school in the de jure context. \\That is or is
not a segreg~l10ol \Yill nece~sari!Y depend on the fa<js
of each particular case. In adcliton to the racial and ethnic composition of a school's student body, other factors
such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and
staff and the community and administration attitudes to-

----------

"Thr partir;; h:tn' u~rd thr 1rnn" ".\nglo." "::\rgro." and "Hi:::p:mo" throughout 1he rreord. IY<' ;:h:111 thrrrforr u .-'r tho.-r trrms.
"Hisp::mo" is thr term n~rd b,· thr Color:tdo Drpartmrnt of Ednration to rcfrr to n per.-on of Spani,.:h. :\Trxir:111, or Cnh:m hcriUtge.
Color:1do DPp:trtmrnt. of Fcltwation. Human Rt>btion" in C'olorado .
. \ Hi,tori c:li Hrcord 208 (HHiS). In thr Sontlmr,.:t. thr "Hi;:pano,.:" are morr rommonl,· rrfc·rrrd to "" ' ·Chicano,.:'' or " :\fc.xicanAmrrir:1n~."

The more sprC'ifiC' rac·iaJ :tnd ethnic· c·ompo,.:ition of the· Drm·rr
pnblir "rhool~ i,.: a,.: folio\\'":
A nolo
I /i.~/)11/W
.Ycom
(''
(' I
Pupils
c;.
\'o.
"\"o.
"\"n.
r
Eknwntary
81.119
fil.S
8.201
2:1.0
l.'i.2
12 ,570
Junior High
fi~.l
1..J.,S..J.:"
2$0:l
18...J.
:J.SriS
17.0
Rrnior High
l-t.SS2
72.S
2.4..J.2
12.0
15.2
8.101
Tot:1l
(i.'i.l
G3,-H9
nu:l2
l..J..l
19 ..129
20.2
(
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\mrd the school must be taken into consideration. The
District Court has recognized these specific factors as elements of the definition of a "segregated'' school, id., at
74. and
may therefore infer that the court \Yill consider them again on remancl.
\Ye conclude. however. that the District Court erred
in separating Kegroes and Hispanos for purposes of
dcfimng a "segregated" school. \Ye haYe held that Hispanos constitute an" identifiable class' for purpose;-Qf
the Fourteenth Amendment. HernanCtez Y. Texas, 34'7
r. fZ 475 (1954). See also United States Y. Texas Edu(C.·\.5 1972) (en bane):
cation Agency. - F . 2d -

,,.c

Cisneros Y. Corvus Christi Independent School District,
F. 2cl (CA5 1072) (en bane); Alvardo Y. El
Paso Independent School District, 445 F. 2d 1011 (CA5
1971); Soria. , .. Oxnard School District, 328 F. Supp.
155 (CD Cal. 1971); Romero Y. Weakley. 226 F. 2d 390
(C:\9 Hl55). Indeed. the District Court recognized this
in classifying predominantly ITispano schools as "sel!regated'' schools in their 0\\'11 right. But there is also
much evidence that in the Southwest Hispanos and
Xegroes have a great many things in common. The
United States Commission on CiYil Rights has recently
published two Reports on Hispano education in tlw
Southwest.' Focusing on students in the States of Arizona. California. Colorado. N e\Y Mexico. and Texas. the
Commission concluded that Hispanos suffer from the
same educational inequities as Xegroes and American
Indians. 8 In fact, the District Court itself recognized
rnitrd Stntr~ Commi,:,:ion on Ci\·il Right~. :vrrxirnn-Amerirnn
Eduration Stud~-. Ethinir l,:ol:dion of :\frxir::m-.-\ merir:tns in the
PubliC' School~ of thl' Southwe"t (..\.pril Hl71): rnitPd States Commi""ion on Ci\·il Tiight~. ::\fPxi(':11!-.-\merican Education Series, Tlw
1-nfini,;hrd Education (Ort ohrr 1970).
R Thn Connni~sion'~ fir,:t Heport. on p. 41, i"llll111l:trizes its finding~:
" The bnsic finding of thi,: rrport i~ that minorit)· students in the
Southwe.>t-l\Texicnn-Amrriean~, bbrkci, American Indians-do not
7
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that "one of the things \Yhich the Hispano has in common
\Yith the Negro is economic and cultural depri\·ation
and discrimination. " 313 F. Supp. , at 69. This is agreement that, though of different origins, Negroes and Hispanos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in
treatment when compared " ·ith the treatment afforded
Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think petitioners are entitled to have schools " ·ith a combined
predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the
category of "segrega tee!' ' schools.
II

In our view, the only other question that requires our
decision at this time is that subsumed in uestion 2
of the Questions Presentee
y petitioners. namely,
wh ether the District Court and the Court of ~ls
a])l)hed an mcorrect legal standard in addressin )etitioners' contention t at respondent School Board engaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate
segregation in the core city schools. Our conclusion
is t1iat those courts did not apply the correct sta ndard
in addressing that contention.
P etitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this
case that in the case of a school system like Denver's,
where no statutory dual system has ever existed. plaintiffs
must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but
also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action. Petitioners proved that for almost a
decade after 1960 respondent School Board had engaged in
an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregatiqn
in th e Park Hill schools. Indeed , the District Court
founCfthatowtrtb]etween 1960 and 1969 the Board 's policies
with respect to those northeast Denver schools sho\Y an
obt ain th e benefit s of public education at a rate equal to that of
their Anglo classmates."

71-507-OPINION

KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1 , DENVER, COLO .

9·

undeYiating purpose to isolate Negro students" in segregated schools "while preserving the Anglo character of
rother l schools." 303 F. Supp., at 294. This finding
did not relate to an insubstantial or trivial fragment
of the school system. On the contrary, respondent
School Board was found guilty of following a deliberate
seg1:e"gation policy at schools attended, in 1969, by
37.69"7r· of Denver's total X egro school population, including one-fourth of the Xegro elementary pupils, o\·er
tv>o-thirds of the Xegro junior high pupils, and over
t\Yo-fifths of the Negro high school pupils. 9 In addition ,
The Board was found guilt~· of intentional srgreg;ttionist acts of
one kind or another \\·ith re:.:JWC't to the ~r hools listed below. (As to
Colo an d East, the conclusion rests on the rescission of the resolutions).
9

PUPILS 1968-1969

Anglo
Bnrrrt1
Strclman
Hallett
Park Hill
Philips
Smi l e~· .Jr. High
Cole Jr. High
East High
Subtotal Elementar~·
Subtotal Jr. High
Subtotal 8r. High

J.:egro

Ilispano

Total

76
684
307
360
46
1.409

410
634
63-t
223
203
1.112
884
1,039

12
25
41
56
45
74
289
175

432
686
751
963
555
1,546
1,219
2,623

1,095
406
1,409

2,105
1,996
1,039

179
363
175

3,378
2,765
2,623

717

8,766

1

_,
'r

Total
2,910
5,139
The total N cgro school enrollment in 1968 was:
Elemrntary
8,297
Junior High
2,89:1
Senior High
2,442
Tim~, the abo\·e-mcntioned
Elementa ry :25.36% of all
Junior High (58.99% of all
Senior High 4:2.55% of all
Total
37.69 % of all

~choob

K egro
Kegro
Negro
Kcgro

included:
elementary pupils
junior high pupils
senior high pupils
pupib

3 1 . lo 'f

'-1o

cr/,.r

~~

7~1~
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therr \Yas uncontrowrted e\·idrnce that teachers and
staff had for years been assigned on a minority teacherto-minority school basis throughout the school system.
Respondent argues, ho,,·evrr. that a finding of stateimposed segregation as to a substantial portion of the
school system can be Yiewecl in isolation from the rrst
of the district, and that e.-en if state-imposed segregation
does exist in a substantial part of the Denver school
system, it does not follow that the District Court could
predicate on that fact a finding that the entire school
system is a dual system. ·w e do not agree. We haYc
never suggested that plaintiffs in school desegregation
cases must bear the burden of provmg the elements of
de JUre segregation as to each and e.-ery school or each
and every student"" withinilic school system. Rather,
,,.e have held that where plaintiffs prove that a "Ci:iiTent
conchtwn of segi·egatecl schooling exists \nt111n a school
district where a dual system \Yas com 1e1lecl or authorized
by statute at the time o our decision in Brown Y. Board
S. 483 (1954) (Brown /). tlw
of I:'ducat1'on, 347
State automatically assumes an ''affirmati.-e du t~ '"to
eff£e~cJt~u~a7te~a~r.tr=a~n~s~Itr.I~o~n~to~~a~ra~c~I~a~ll~y~n~o~n~c~h~sc~r~I~,n~~ato;f
school system." Brown Y. Board o) E'Bucatwn. M0 (r. S.
294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). sec also Green Y. County
School Board, 391 U. S. 430. 437-438 (Hl68). that is,
to eliminate from the public schools "·ithin their school
system "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."

r.

Swann Y. Charl.otte- J11ecklenburg Board of Education,
402 lT. S. 1. 15 (1971).
This is not a c~e. hom'ver. \Yhere
a statutory dual
sy~effi" has eYer exist~e~ertheless. \Yhere plaintiffs
pron' that the sc.h...ool authorities ha.-e carried out a snte~tic nrogram of ';grrgatio'"'; affecting a substantial portion of the students. schools. teachers and facilities "·ithin
the school system. it is only common sense to conclude
that there exists a predicate for a finding of the exist0nce
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of a dual school system. Several considerations support
this conclusion. First, it is obvious that a practice of
concen tra ti ng ~ egroes in certain schools by structuring
attendance zones or designating "feeder'' schools on the
basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other
nearby schools predominantly "·hitc.'" Similarly, th e
practice of building a school-such as the Barrett Elementary School in this case- to a certain size and in a
ccrtai n location. •-.-.MM-.Jii.-'-'illli8••....tll•••!6!!ii•Mt.,.__>c:-.-.-..~.""·ith conscious knowledge that it would be a
segregated school."' 303 F. Supp., at 285. has a substantial
reciprocal effect on the raci.:tl composition of other nearh~schools. So also. the usc of mobile classrooms. the drafting of student transfer policies. the transportation of students, and the assignment of faculty and staff. on racially
identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking
scl'!_ools according to their racial composition. and this. in
turn. together with the clements of student assignment
and school construction. may haYe a profound reciprocal
effect on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods " ·ithin a metropolitan area. thereby causing further racial concentration within the schools. \\-e
reeognizecl this in Swann " ·hen '"e said:

---w..

-

"They f school authorities l must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population grO\Yth, finances. land values. sitE' availability.
through an almost endless list of factors to be
a fo rmN St·hool Hoard J>r r~ idrnt who te~tified for the reput. it: "Onrr yon C'h:tlll!<' 1hr bo ttnd :t r~· of :m~· onr school,
it i~ :tffeet inl! all t hr ~<" hook ... " Tr~timmt~· of :\Jr~. Lois Heath
.Tohn~on on dirrrt rxamination. App .. at 9.'ila-952a.
8imilarh· . .T udl!o \Yi~clom ha~ re(· rnt I~· ~t:t trd:
'0

.\~

~pondrnt~

" Infection :tt onr "rhool infrrt" all ,-rhooJ,. To take thr moo't simpl r
rx:tmplc, in a. t,,.o ~r hool ~~·~tcm, all hln('k~ at one ~r hool me:tns :tll
or almo,:t all whites at th r othrr." [;niter! States\'. Texa.s Ed1tcation Agency, F. 2d - , - (CA5 1972) .

!

•
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considered. The result of this \Yill be a decision
which, when combmecl " ·ith one technique or
another of student assignment, will determine the
racial composition of the student body in each
school in the system. Over the long run. the consequences of the choices " ·ill be far reaching.
teor le gravitate_ to,Yan..l school fac1htws , just as
schools are located in response to the needs of
people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a
metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods.
"In the past, choices in this respect have been
used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining
a st~-:segregated school system. In addition to
the classic pattern of building schools specifically
intended for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools
which appeared likely to become racially mixed
through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This \Yas sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white suburban
expansion farthest from Negro population centers
in order to maintain the separation of the races
\Yith a minimum departure from the formal principles of 'neighborhood zoning.' Such a policy does
more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body of a ne\Y school. It
may well promote segregated residential patterns
\\·hich, ·when combined ·with 'neighborhood zoning,'
further lock the school system into the mold of
separation of races. Upon a proper shmYing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy."
402 U. S., at 20-21.

I

---

(, In short, common sense dictates the conclusion that
( racially inspired school board actions" )1a ve an impact
-~--
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beyond the particular schools which are the subjects
of those actions. This is not to say, of course. that
there can never be a case in "·hich the geographical
structure of or the natural boundaries '"ithin a school
district may have the effect of dividing the district into
separate, identifiable and unrelated units. Such a determination is essentially a question of fact to be resolved
by the trial court in the first instance. but such cases
must be rare. In the absence of such a determination,
proof of state-imposed segregation in a substantial portion of the district will suffice to support a finding by
the trial court of the existence of a dual system. Of
course, where that finding is made. as in cases involving
statutory dual systems, the school authorities have an
affirmative duty "to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system." Brown II, supra,.
at 301.
On remand, therefore, the District Court should de- J
cide ~he :first instance whether respondent School
Board's ~!eliberate racial segregation policy '"ith respect
to the Park Hill schools constitutes the entire Denver
school system a dual school system. We observe that
on the record now before us there is indication that
Denver is not a school district which might be divided
into separate, 1 en 1 a le and unrelated units. The Distnc
our s ate , m 1ts summary of fin ings as to the
Park Hill schools, that there was "a high degree of interrelationship among these schools, so that any action by
the Board affecting the racial composition of one '"ould
almost certainly have an effect on the others." 303 F.
Supp. , at 194. And there was cogent evidence that the
ultimate effect of the Board's actions in Park Hill '"as
not limited to that area: the three 1969 resolutions
designed to desegregate the Park Hill schools changed
the attendance patterns of at least 29 schools attended
by almost one-third of the pupils in the Denver school
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system. 11 This suggests that the official segregation in
Park Hill affected the racial composition of schools
throughout the district.
On the other hand, although the District Court did
not state this or indeed any reason why the Park Hill
finding was disregarded \\·lwn attention \Yas turned to
the core city schools-beyond saying that the Park
Hill and core city areas \Yere in its vie''" "different"the areas, although adjacent to each other. are separated
by Colorado Boule,·arcl. a six-lane high,my. From tlw
record, it is difficult to assess the actual significance of
Colorado Boulevard to the Denver school system. Th0
Boule,·ard runs the length of the school district. but at
least t\YO elementary schools. Teller a.nd Steck, have attendance zones which cross the Boulevard. Moreover. the
District Court. although referring to the Boulevard as "a
natural di,·icling line ." 303 F. Supp .. at 282. did not feel
constrained to limit its consideration of de jure segregation in the Park Hill area to those schools east of the
Boulevard. The court found that by building Barrett
Elementary School west of the Boulevard and by establishing Colorado Boulevard as the eastern boundary of
the Barrett attendance zone. the Board \Yas able to
maintain for a number of years the Anglo char::tcter of
the Park Hill schools. This suggests that Colorado
Boulevard is not to be regarded as the type of barrie1·
that of itself could confine the impact of the Board 's actions to an identifiable area of th e school district. 1wrhaps
because a major high,Yay is generally not such an effective
buffer between adjoining areas. Cf. Davis \'. Board of
School Commissioners of Mob ile County, 402 r. S. 33
( Hl71 ). Bot this is a factual question for resolution by
the District Court on retnancl. In any e\·ent. inquiry
\\·hcther the District Court and the Court of Appeals
SrC' tlw rhrtrt at 4-1-.'i F. 2d lOOS- 1009. which imli catC'~ th:1t
31./G/ pupil" attPmlccl the ~r hoo!:• affected b:~· th<' r e:-;o luti on~.
11
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applied the correct legal standards in addressing petitiottcrs' contention of deliberate segregation in the core
city schools is not at an end even if it be true that
Park Hill may be separated from the rest of the Denver
school district as a separate, identifiable and unrelated
unit.

III
The District Court procecded on the premise that the
finding as to the Park Hill schools was irrelevant to the
consideration of the rest of the district. and began itf'
examination of the core city schools by requiring that
petitioners pro\'e all of the essential elements of de jure
segregatiOn-that IS, sta1'ecl simply. a current c0117lition
of seg;:egation--re;ulting from intentional state action
directed specifically to the core city schools. The
segregated character of the core city schools could
not he and is not denied. Petitioners' proof shO\Yed
that at the time of trial 22 of the schools in the corecity nrt'a \H'rc less than 30 }; in .\nglo enrollment and
11 of the schools "·ere less than 10 5{ Anglo.'" Petitioners also introclueccl substantial eYidence demonstrating the existence of a disproportionate racial and
ethnic composition of faculty and staff at these schools.
On the question of segregator~' intent. petitioners
presented evidence tendi~ to sho\\· that the Board,
through its actions over a period of years, intentional1y
created and maintained the segregated character of the
core city schools. Respondents countered this eYiclence
by arguing that the segneg ion ii1 these schools is 1,~
re,31lt o a racia
neu ra 1eighborhood school policy''
and the acts of \Yhich petitioners complain are explicable

.z

1
" Tn addition to thr:;r 22 ~ehool..:. "rr :n::l F. Supp., at 7S. two
mon• "chool..:, Elni:1 anrl Smrd!!'~· Elcmrnta IY School~. became lc..:s
1hnn 80 % .\n~lo n ftrr thr Di~i rid Court'~ clcci,ion on the merit~.
Thr,-r two ~chao!~ wrrr tlul" inl'!ncl!'cl in thr Ji,-t of ~rgrrgatcd schools .

313 F. Supp. , at 92.
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'"ithin the bounds of that policy., Accepting the School
Board's explanation, the District Court and the Court
of Appeals agreed that a finding of de jure segregation
as to the core city schools \\·as not permissible since petitioners had failed to prove " ( 1) a racially discriminatory
purpose and (2) a casual relationship bet,Yeen the acts
complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly existing in those schools." 445 F. 2d, at 1006. This assessment of petit{oners' proof was clearly incorrect as
a. matter of la,y\ Z-.
~
~titioners had already proYed the existence of intentional school segregation in the Park Hill
schools, this crucial finding vYas totally ignored \Yhen
attention turned to the core city schools. Plainly, a
finding of intentional segregation as to a 11ortion of a
school system is not devoid of probative value in assessing the school authorities' intent with respect to other
parts of the same school system. On the contrary,
where, as here. the case involves the same school board,
a finding of intentional segre ation on its part in one
po~tion of a school system is hig ly relevant. to the
issue oT the board's intent with res ecttOOtlierseregated schools m t 1e system. This is merely an application -;±- the-wen-settled evidentiary principle that "the
prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a
part of a scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possibility that the act in question was done with innocent
intent." II Wigmore, Evidence 200 (3d eel. 1940).
"EYidence that similar and related offenses "·ere committed ... tend [s] to show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent." Nye &
.Vissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 618 (1949).
And "[t]he foregoing principles are equally as applicable to civil cases as to criminal cases, ... " II Wigmore,
supra, at 300. See also McCormick, Evidence 329
(1954).
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"Moreover, in some instances, a finding of illicit intent
may relate to so substantial a portion of the item under
consideration that it justifies an inference of illicit intent
as to the remainder. See, for example. the cases cited in
II ,,~igmore . supra, at 301-302. Applying that principle
to school desegregation cases, it is clear that a finding..sf
intentionally segregatory school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case. is sufficient to create an inference that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes,
in other words. a prima facie case of unlawful segregatory
design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to
those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result
of intentionally segregatory actions. This is true even
if it is determined that different areas of the school
district should be vie,Yed independently of each other
because, even in that situation, there is high probability
that where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregatory policy in a meaningful portion of
the school system, similar impermissible considerations
have motivated their actions in other areas of the system. We emphasize that the differentiatin factor bet~1 de jure segrega wn an
so-called de facto
segregation to which we referred in Swann 1 :' is purpose
or j!_ltent to segregate. Where school authorities have
been found to have practiced purposeful segregation
in part of a school system, they may be expected to
oppose system-\Yide desegregation. as did the respondents in this case, on the ground that their purposefully
segregatory actions were isolated and individual events,
thus leaving plaintiffs \Yith the burden of proving otherwise. But at that point " ·here an intentionally segregatory policy is practiced in a meaningful or significant
1

"

402 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1911).

~

~
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segment of a school system. as in this case. the school
authorities can not be heard to argue that plaintiffs haw
pro,·ecl only "isolated and individual" unla,yfully segregatory actions. In that circumstance, it is both fair and
reasonable to require that the school authorities bear the
burden of showing that their actions as to other segregated
schools within the system \\·ere not also moti,·atcd hy
segrcgatory intent.
This burden-shifting pri nci plr is not ne\Y or nowl.
·~
There arc no hard and fast standards goycrning the
allocation of the burden of proof in every situation.
The issue. rather. "is merely a question of policy ancl
fairness based on experience in the different situationR."
IX \Yigmore, Evidence ~ 2486 (3d eel. Hl40). In the
context of racial segregation in public education, the
courts, including this Court, have recognized a -variety
of situations in which "fairness" and "policy'' require
state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions
or conditions \\·hich appear to be racially motiYated.
Thus, in Stemm, supra, 402 U. S .. at 18. \Ye obscn·ecl
that in a system " ·ith a "history of segregation.'' " where
it is possible to identify a '\,·hite school' or a 'Xegro
school' simply by reference to the racial composition
of teachers and staff. the quality of school buildings
and equipment, or the organization of sport aetivities,
a prima facie case of Yiolation of suhstanti,·c constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is
shown." Again. in a school system \\·ith a history of
segregation. the discharge of a disproportionate]~· large
number of Xegro teachers incident to desegregation has
been held to raise an inference of discriminatio11 which
"thrusts upon the School Board the burden of justifying
its conduct by clear ancl co1wincing eYiclence.'' Chambers '\'. Hendersonville City Board of Education, 3G4
F. 2cl 189, 193 (CA4 1966) (en bane). See also United
States Y. Jefferson County Board of Education, 872 F.
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2d 836. 887-888 ( C\.5 1966). aff'cl en bane, 380 F. 2d
:38,) ( 1967). cert. denied. 389 U. S. 840 (1967); Xorth
Carolina Teachers' Association "· Asheboro City Board
of Education, 393 F. 2d 736, 743 (CA4 1968) (en bane);
Williams Y. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578. 585 C\YD La.
1969); Bonner Y. Texas City Independent School D1'strict, 305 F. Supp. 600. 621 (SD Tex. 1969). Nor is
this burden-shifting principle limited to former statutory
dual systems. See. e. g., Davis Y. School District of the
City of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734. 743. 744 (ED ::\1ich.
1970). aff'd. 443 F. 2d 573 (CA6 1971). cert. denied,
404 r. f'. 913 ( 1971); [; nited States Y. School District
Xo. 7.51, 301 F. Supp. 201. 228 (XD Ill. 1969), mod. on
other grounds, 432 F. 2cl 1147 (CA7 1971). cert. denied,
402 1.~. S. 943 (1971). Indeed, to say that a system has
a "his tory of segregation" is merely to say that a pattern
of intentional segregation has been established in the
past. Thus. be it a statutory dual system or an allegedly
unitar~' system 'Yhere a meaningful portion of the system
is found to be intentionally segregated. the existence of
subsequent or other segregated schooling within the
smne system justifies a rule imposing on the school
authorities the burden of proving that this segregated
schooling is not also the result of intentionally segregatory acts.
In discharging that burden. it is not enough. of conrsc ..
that th0 school authorities rel t~)'OJJSome allegedly lo_g- ~ . racml y neutral explanation for their actions. Their ~
burde~1ce proof sufficient to support a finding
that segregatory intent was not among the factors
that motivated their actions. The courts below attributed much significance to the fact that many of the
Board's actions in the corC' city area antedated our clecision in Brown. \Ye re.iect any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of i7i'tent. If
th~tions of &:hool allTiiO'i·ities were to ~y degree moti-

71-.jO/-OPINION
::!0

T\EYF.~

v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,

DE~VER,

COLO.

Yater! by segregatory intent and the segregation resulting
from those actions continues to exist. the fact of remoteness in time certainly docs not make those actions any
less "intentional."
This is not to say. however. that the prima facie case
may not be met by evidence supporting a finding that a
lesser degree of segregated schooling in the core city area
" ·o uld not have resulted even if the Board had not acted
as it did. In Swann, '"e suggested that at some point
in time the relationship between past segregatory ;cl,s
and pre~'egation may become so attenuated as to
be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation
" ·arranting judicial intervention. 402 r. S .. at 31-32.
See also Hobson Y. Han sen, 269 F. Supp. 401. 495 (DC
Hl67) , aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U. S. App.
D. C'. 372. 408 F. 2d 175 (1969)_, ., \Ve made it clear,
hO\YeYer, that a connection bet\Yeen past ·segregatory acts
ai;ct'Jxesent segregati~ay be pre;elrt even ,\·l1ei"1 not
apparent and th~t -cl~se-e~an~ination is required before
;onC"hfcling that the connection does not exist. Intentiona] school :segreo-ation in the past may have been a
factor in creating a natura environmen or t 1e growth
of further segregatiOn.
1us, if respondent c ool Board
c~gregatory intent, it can rebut the prima
facie ca:-e only by shmYing that its past segrcgatory acts
did not create or contribute to the current segregated
condition of the core city schools.
~

J

'' It may be that tlw Di;;trict Court and Court of Appeals were
test in holding that prtitioner~ had fa iled to proYe
that thr Board'~ actions "caused" thr rurrrnt condition of segregation in the rare rity ~chook But if so, ce rt a in!~· plaintiffs in a school
dr~rgrrgation casr are not required to proYr "cause" in the sense
of ''non-attenuation." Thn t i ~ a factor which becomes releva nt
on!)· after past intentional actions rc.,tdting in segregat ion ha,·e been
e"lablisheu. At th:tt stagr, th e burden becomes the ~chool authoritir,;' to show that the currrnt sr.g rcgation i" in no mt)' thr result
of tl10~e past scg rcgator~· actions.
app l~ ·ing thi~
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The respondent School Board invoked at trial its
"neighborhood school policy" as explaining racial and
ethnic concentrations \Yithin the core city schools. arguing
that since the core city area population had long been
Negro and Hispano, the concentrations were necessarily
the result of residential patterns and not of purposefully
segregatory policies. \Ye h e no occasion to consider in
this case ·whether a "neighborhood school policy" of itself
wiil justify racial or ethmc concentrations in the ~ce
ofafl]-;-·(fi~that school mill"1orities have committed acts
constituting de jure segregation. It is enough that "·e
hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dispositive where. as in this case, the school authorities have
been found to have practiced de jure segregation in a
meaningful portion of the school system by techniques
that indicate that the "neighborhood school" concept has
not been maintained free of mauipulation. Our observations in ~vaJ0 supra, at 28, are particularly instructive on this score:
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be
no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, "·ith
no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools~.
But al 1mgs are no equa 111 a sys em that has
been deliberately constructed and maintained to
enforce racial segregation. . . . 'Racially neutral'
assignment plans proposed by school authorities to
a district court may be inadequate; such plans may
fail to counteract the continuing effects of past
school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites or distortion of school size in
order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. \Yhen school authorities present a district
court \\·ith a 'loaded game board.' affirmative action
in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones

.

,.
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is proper to achien• truly non-discriminatory assignments. In short. an a!'signment plan is not acceptable simply becaul'e it appears to be neutral.' '
Thus. respondent School Board haYing been found to
have practiced deliberate racial segregation in schools attended by 0\·cr one-third of the Xcgro school population,
that crucial finding establ islws a prima facie case of intPntional segregation in the core cit.v schools. Tn such
case. respondent's neighborhood school policy is not to be
determinati\·e "simply because it appears to be neutral."

IY
In summary. the District Court on remand. firsL, \\"ill
afford respondent School Board the opportunity to proYe
its contention that the Park Hill area is a separate.
ideiltifiablc and unrelated section of the school district
that should be treated as isolated from the rest of the
district. If respondent School Board fails to JH'o\·e that
contention, the District Court, second, \Yill determine
\\"hether respondent School Board's conduct oYer almost
a decade after Hl60 in carrying out a policy of deliberate
racial segregation in the Park Hill schools constitutes
the entire school system a dual school system. J.L.i!le
J?istrict Court determines that the Denver school system
is a dual school system. respondent c 100 Board has
~y to desegregate the entire system
"root and branch.''
ounty School Bonn, supra,
30T u~cc-"Ut"438. If the District Court determines,
ho\Yever. that the Den \·cr school system is not a dual
school system by reason of the Board's actions in Park
Hill. the court. third, \\·ill afford respondent School Board
the opportunity to rebut pctitio11ers' prima facie case
of intentional segregation in t'he ~ore city schools raised
by the finding of intentional segregation in the Park Hill
schools . There. the Board 's burden is to sho\\" that its
policies and practices with respect to school site location,

f

,.
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school size. school renovations and additions, student attendance zones, student assignment and transfer options,
mobile classroom units. transportation of students, assignment of faculty and staff, etc., considered together
and premised on the Board's so-called "neighborhood
school'' concept. either "·ere not taken in effectuation of
a policy to create or maintain segregation in the core city
schools. or, if unsuccessful in that effort. \vere not factors
in causing the existing condition of segregation in these
schools. Considerations of "fairness" and "policy" demand 110 less in light of the Board's intentionally segregatory actions. If respondent Board fails to rebut petitioners' prima facie case. the District Court must, as in
the case of Park Hill, decree all-out desegregation of
the core city schools.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to
vacate instead of reverse the parts of the Final Decree
that concern the core city schools. and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion."'
It is so ordered.
).1R. JrsncE
this case.

WHITE

took no part in the decision of

':Ve therefore do not rPach and intimate no YiP\Y upon tllf'
of the holding of the Di~trict Court, premi:::ed upon its prroneous finding that. the situation "i;: morC' like de facto segregation,"
813 F. Supp., at 73, that ne,-crtheiC'i'S, although all-out desegregation
"could not be decreed, . . . the only feasible and constitutional!~·
acceptable program . . . i~ a sy;:tem of desegregation and integration which provides compensator~· education in an integrated enYironment." Id., at 96.
n
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JVIR. Jui::iTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ
from those relied upou by the Court.
/
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver. Colorado. a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial
segregation.' Xor has it been argued that any other
le islati ve actions (such as zoning and housing laws)
contributei!)to the segregation which is at issue." The
1
Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution has expres~ly prohibitl'd "any cla~~ification of pupils . . . on account of rncc or
color."
"Sec, e. g.. Sll'ann "· Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.
402 U . S. 1, :2:3 (1971) :

"We do not rt>ach . . tlw que~tion whNhcr a ~hawing that ~chool
;;egregation i~ :1 con~ecptenre of othE'r t~·pp~ of .:;tatr action, without
an~· di~rriminator~· action h~· ~chool authoritif',.:, i~ a constitutional
\'iolation rrquiring rrmcdial arti011 b~· a ,.;rhool c]p,;pgregation clE'rrE'E'. ''
Tlw term .. ~tatr action." :1" u"ed IH'rein , thu,.: rt>fer,.; to ac·tion~ of tlw
;tppropriatt' puhlic ~rhool attthorit iP;: .

(1~(/'~',)~
J·

&
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denvet<
School Board may have contributed to the school segregation which is acknowledged to exist in Denver.
The predominantly minority schools are located in twQ
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court considered that a school
with a concentratiou of 70 to 75 r.;'t "X egro or Hispano
students" \\'as identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F. Supp .. at 77. Wherever one may draw this line. it ~.;
undisputed that most of the schools in these two are~./3
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children . The city-,vide school mix in Denver is 665'(
Anglo. 14 ;/r Negro. and 20o/r Hispano. In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in which there
is a substantial minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There
is segregation in the schools of these cities[ fulli
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the dese regation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus
·of the school desegfPgation probl~m has no' s ifted from
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footclragging as the process \vas in most places. substan.tial progress toward achieving integration has been made
in southern States." Xo comparable progress has been
made in many non southern cities with large minority
a Aerording to rhr 1971 HEW r~timate. ~~.9% of Xegro pupil,;
: :1ttmded majorit)· white ~rhoob in tlw South as oppo,;ed to onl)·
:27.89( who attended ~ueh ~rhool~ in the i\orth and We,;t, Fift)·,;p,·rn perrenr of all :\egro pupil:< in the :\'orth and We,;t attend
"('hool" with owr 1-:0o/,- minorit1· population a,; opposed to :32.2%
·. who do ~o in tlw South. 111' Co ng. Rer. 81~5.

y
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populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure
distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices vvhich denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South:' But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver
than in Atlanta.
·L The 1971 HEW Enrollment Survey dramatized the segregated
charactE'r of public school ~~·~tern~ in man~· nonsouthern citi~. The
]>rreentage of :\egro pupil~ which attended ~chool~ more than 80%
black wa~ 9L3 in Cleveland, Ohio; 97.1:' in Compton, California;
78.1 in Da~·ton , Oh10; 78.6 in Detroit, :\[ichigan; 95.7 in Gary,
[ndiana; 86.4 in Kansas Cit~·, i~Ii"::;ouri; 8fi .6 in Lo::< Angele::;, California ; 78.8 in :VIilwaukee, Wi~consin; 91.3 in Newark, New .Ter::;ey;
1'9.8 in St. Louis, Mi,souri. Tlw fu ll data from the Enrollment Surve~· rna~· be found in 118 Cong. Rrc. Sl-!..J.-1-!8, .Tan. 20, 1972.
''A" Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rrrognizrd:

"For ~·rar~ we haYP fought the battlr of intrgration primarily in
tlw South whrre the problrm wa::; ;:;evE'rE'. It wa::; a long, arduou::;
fight that dE':::E'rvro to bE' fought and neE'dE'CI to bE' won.
'·U nfortunatE'!~·. a::; the problE'm of racial i"olation ha,; mo,·rd north
of the \Ia~on-Dixon line. man~· northernrr~ have bid an rvasive
farewrll to the 100-year ,;trugglP for racial equalitY. Our motto
;:;rrms to h;we brrn ·Do to ,;outhemers "·hat you do not want to do
to ~·our~elf.'
'·Good rE'a"ons ha\'e ahn1~·~ been offNed, of roursr, for not moving
dgorou~l~· ahead in the Xorth a,; wrll a::; the South.
"First, tt wa~ that the problPm was wor"e in thr South. Then
the fact~ began to ~how that that wa::; no longer true.
"We then brgan to hear thr de facto-clr jurr refram.
"Somehow residrnt ial segregat ton Ill the i\ ort h was acrtclrntal or
de facto and that made it bE'ttcr than thr I E>ga ll~· ,;upported clr jure
~Pg rrg at ion of thE' South.
It wa~ a hard distinction for blaek children
111 totally sf'greglltrd ~rhool~ in tht' :\orth to under~tand , but it
allowrd u~ to a\'Oid thr prob!Pm." llS C'ong. Rrc . S:2542, Feb. 24,

1972.
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954). was decided. the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting th e Court, largely confined to the outhern
States. was officially imposed racial segregation in the
schools extending bark for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 e. S .. at 488 . 493- 495. Although some
of the language was more expansive. the holding in
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States. or their instrumentalities. to forc e children to attend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in
Brown I was construed- for some years and by many
co urts-as requiring only state neutrality. allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints."
"8<'c·, e. g .. B radley , .. !',chool Board. :345 F. 2d
en bane. 1965) :

:no, :316

(CA4

ha~ b<'E'n lwld agai n and again .
. that thr Fourteenth
AmPndmPnt prohibition 1~ not aga inst ~rgrpga tion as such. . . .
A ;;tatE' or school district offp nd<i no const itutional rcquirPmcnt
when it grants to all ~t udcnt ~ uniform!~· a n unre~tr i ct E'd freedom of
choi ce as to school attmdcd, i<O that eac h pupil , in effect, assign~ him~elf to thP ~chao) hE' wishPs to at t E'ncl. '' (The case was latN vacatect

··It
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But the doctrine of Brow11 !, as amplified by Brown Ii,
349 1:. ~- 294 ( 1955), did not retain its original meaning.
fn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative
state action to desegregate school systems.' The keys
stone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S.
430. 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch. " The school system before the Court in Green
\\·as operating in a rural and sparsely settled county
where there were no concentrations of white and black
populations, no neighborhood school system (there v,:ere
only two schools in the county), and none of the
problems of an urbanized school district. ~ The Court
properly identified the' freedom of choice program
there as a subterfuge. and the language in Green imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system
~-as appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was. however, reason to question to what extent this duty
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a
and rrmandrd b~- thi~ Court , which ('XprE>~~ed no virw on the mrrib
of thr dr~rgrrgation plan~ ~ul>mittrd.) :31-\2 U. S. 103, 105 (1065).
Srr al~o Bell \'. School City of Gary. Ind .. :324 F. 2d 209 (CA7 196:3) ;
Doll'ns v . Board of Educ. , :{:36 F. 2d 9Sf' (CAlO 1964): Deal v.
Board of Edu('., :)69 F. 2d 55 (CAfl 196fl) .
7
For a ronci~r hi,;ton· a nd cummPnt a ry on the E>Yolutwn. ~E'e genrrall~· A. BirkE>l , TIJP Suprrmr Court and tlw Idea of l'rogres~ , pp .
12fr-130 (1970) .
' Srr abo the companion ca ,;r~ in Raney 1· . Board of Education .
:391 ll . S. H :3 (196R) , and Monroe v. Board of Comm 'rs. :391 U.S.
450 (l96R), neither of ll'hich mvolvPd large urban or mrtropolitan
arra~ .
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation.
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of Xew Kent
Cou11ty. Virginia.
But the doubt as to wheth er the affirmative duty concept v,;ould flower into a new constitutional principl e of
general applicati011 was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 "C". ~. 1 (1971). in \Yhich the affirmative duty articulated in Green \ms applied to the urban
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. Xorth Carolina.
ln describing the residential patterns in Charlotte. the
( 'ourt noted the "familiar ph enomenon" in the metropolitan areas of minority groups being "co ncentrated i11
one part of tht> city." 402 C . S .. at 25. and ackno,,·ledgecl
that:
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population . numerous schools. congested and complex
traffic patterns. " 402 L'". S .. at 14.
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different
problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was
applicable. and prescribed for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils esse ntially
the same remedy-elimination of segrega ti011 "root and
branch ··_,,·hich had been formulated for the t\\·o schools
and 1.300 pupils of Xew Kent County.
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only
\\·ith States having "a long history '' of officially imposed
segrega tion and th e duty of school authorities in those
;-;tatl'S to implemrnt Brown 1. 40:2 ~C :-l., at 5- 6. l11 so
doing. thP ( 'o urt refrain<'cl <'VC' Il from considering wh ether
t ht> <'volution of ronl"titutioJlal dortrine from Brown I to,
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Green / Swarm undercut whatever logic once supported
the de facto / de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southeru school districts an affirmative duty. entailing large-scale transportation of pupils. to eliminate
segregation in the schools. the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions v,:hich in large part did not
result from historic. state-imposed de jure segregation.
Rather. the familiar root causr of segregated schools in all
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migra'"
tory pattems the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools \\'aS often perpetuated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This
is a national. not a southern phenomenon. And it is
largely unrelated to whether a particular ~tate hacl or did
not ha vr segregatory school la,,·s."
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country \vhere it did exist. Swann imposed obligations
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As
"A~ Dr. Karl TaPUbC'r ,-tatt·~ in hi~ article, Rr:'idPntial 8Pgrrg:ttion,
Scirmifir AmPrican, August 19(15, at 14 ·

"No Plaboratp anal~·sis is necrss:u~· to concludE' from thrsE' figurp::;
that a high dPgrPE' of rP~idPntial "PgrPgation basPd on race· i~ a univrrsal charaetPristic of Amrrican citir~. Thi~ ::;pgregation i" found
Ill the citiE'~ of thf' :\forth and Wrst a~ wrll as of tilE' South; in largE'
cit if'~ a:< wrll a;; small; in nonindu"'trial cit if'::< as WE'll a;; indu"'trial; in
rit iE':s with hundrE'cls of thou:'and~ of .:\I'E'gro rPsidPnts a:; well a:; those
with on!~· a fpw thou:<and: and in cit iPs that are progrP:<si,·p in thPir
E'mplo~·mpnt practice and rivil right" policie" a:< WE'll a;; thosr that
are not."
In hi~ book. :\pgror,.; in C'ItiC':' (l9ti5). Dr. TaPul)('r ::<tatE'd that n·:'id<'ntial ::;q~;r<'gation rxi"'" "rrgardlr"s of thr charactC'r of lora! law"
:1nd polirir~ and rrgarrllr"" of othrr form" of dit'crimination. '' ld ..
at :)f)
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swann
points inevitably towards a uniform. constitutional ap- ·
proach to our national problems of school segregation.

n
The Court's decision today. while adhering to the
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various decisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that the public school authorities are the responsible
agency of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doctrine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it is
equally so for Denver. I would not. however, perpetuate
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent.'' I would
hold. quite simply, that where substantially segregated
public schools exists. there is a prima facie case that t'he
duly constituted public authorities (I will usually refer
to them collectively as the "school board") are sufficiently
responsible '" to impose upon them a nationally applicable
burden to demonstrate they are operating a genuinely
nondiscrimna tory school system.
'"A pnma facir catie ~ con~titutional viOlation rx1~t~ when ~egre
~afion IS found to exist to a ~ignificant degree in thP particular
"chao! di~trict. It i::; recognized , of cour:oe , that thi::; term i::; rrlatin•
;mel pro,·ides no precisP "tandarcl::;. But circumstance~. demographicall.\· <Inc! otherwise, var~· from district to di~trict and hard and
fa::;t rule:; tihould not be formulated. The existence of a sub~tantial
percentage of ::;chool" populat r d b~ · "t udent::; from onp race on!~· or
predon1inatrly ~o .JlopuiHted , ;;hqul(! n:1~ger thr ·mlJIIlry,
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A
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine.
the distinction no longer can be jm:tified on a principled
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt
\Vith a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic
cauEes of segregation \\·ere generally similar to those in
all Eections of the country. and also largely irrelevant
to the existence of historic. state-impoEed segregation at
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory
student transportation \.vent well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school segregation for which
former state segregation laws were ever responsible.
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly demonstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure
discrimination present problems of subjective intent
which the courts cannot fairly resolve.
At the outset. one must try to identify the constitutional right which is being enforced. This is not easy.
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education.
the Court said that:
"Such an opportunity. \>,·here the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 347 lJ. S .. at 493.
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental prin~
ciple" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial discrimination in public education.''
349 U. S .. at 298. and spoke of "the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 349 r. s . .

~
I

(

)
(
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at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right. it means- as a minimum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system." In
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right.
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms.
I would now define it as th e right. derived from the Equal
Protection Clause. to expect that the State-once it assumes responsibility for public education- will provide a
reasonable opportunity for ed ucation in an integrated
school system. This means that school authorities. consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils. must make and
implement th eir customary decisions with a view toward
<'nhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system'' presupposes. of
course. a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized '' segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the respon sible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i ) integrate
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities. quality of in struction and curricula
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their
authority to draw attendance zo nes to promote integration; and ( iv J locate new schools. close old ones. and
11

See Bickel, 8upra. n. 7. at 11~->:

"It [ thr problem of ~;ch ool de,rgregat ion I ha ~ not bern that :<im plr . . becau~e the laconic opinion in Brou·n v Board of Educatwn wa:< it"elf not that ,;Jmpl r. Onr ,;trai n in it became ev idr nt in
,;ub:<equrnt drcisions outlawing a ll form:; of :;tate-:;pon:;ored ~eg rega 
tton in ('VP r~·thi ng from thr "Jlrctator ><rrt ion of a courtroom to golf
cour:;e,;. The minimal propo,ition tl1<1t r mrqz;ed-a nd a bout time
it wa~ t hat it :;hould rmrrgr-wa,; th at tlw :<tate rna~· not, by lrgii;]atlon or ;tdmin i,trat iwl~·. rJa,;~;if\ tiH' population along racia l line,,'''
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determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to
undertake the transportation of students. this alw must
be ,,·ith integrative opportunities in mind.
The foregoing prescriptio11 is not intended to be either
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of
the COiltour characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens aile! pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial cliscrimiilation is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school sy~tem does not
mean- and indeed could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly
white or all or predominantly black is not a "segregated"
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one.
Having ~chool boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination. subtle or
othenYise. will find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts .i uclging past school board actions
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best
able to assure an absence of such discrimination while
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent .. , Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent'' provide~ inadequate
assurance that minority children will not be ~hart
changed in the decisions of those entrusted \vith the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan-
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones. faculty
m ployment and assiglunen ts. school construction. closings and consolidations. and myriad other matters.
:-lchool board decisions obviously are not the sole cause
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed
and complete public supervision, substantial school segregation still persists. the presumption is strong that the
.school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part
n'sponsible. Where state actioll and supervision are so
pervasive and where , after years of such action. schools
remain thoroughly segregated. this Court is justified ill
finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation.
The burden then must fall on the school board to demollstrate it is operating an " integrated school system."
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time
of tlw Brown decision. The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread in our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted .
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City.
Kansas- where racial segregation in schools was
formerly mandated by state or local Jaw. [Deal v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966),
cert. denied. 377 e. :-l. 924 ( 1964); Do'W!lS v. Board
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 ( CAlO 1964). cert. denied. 380 l'. S. 914. B ell \'. School City, 324 F. 2d
209 ( CA7 1963). cert. denied. 377 F. S. 924.] Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and
Kansas City not until the advent of Bmwn. If
1\iegro and white parents in Mississippi are required
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
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that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary, Indiana, where no more
than five years before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects." Goodman. De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297
(Hl72).'"
X ot only does the de jure/ de
inequitably on communities in
country: more importantly. it
children as \Yell. As the Fifth

facto distinction operate
different sections of the
disadvantages minority
Circuit stated:

"The "X egro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Boston, X ew York. or any other area of the
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto
segregation. would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society. while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
in the 17 southern and border states violates the
constitutional rights of th eir counterparts, or even
.~~

Th r author cominur,.; ·

'·Trur, thr Parlirr the polic~· of ~cg regat ion Wati abandoned the less
danger thPrr i~ that it continurti to operatr roverti~·, is ~ignificantly
rPspom;ible for present da~· patt e rn ~ of residential ~egregation , or h a~
rontributed materially to pre~ent rom munit~· at titudes toward Negro
~r hool~ . But there i~ no rea::;on to ::;uppo::;e that 1954 is a universally
;tppropri atP diYtding !me bet\\'PPn dP jurr segrega tiOn that may
~a fpJ~· be as::;um ed to hav0 ~pP nt itsrlf a nd that which may not .
For man~· rPmr dial purpo~r~. adoptwn of an a rbitrar~· but rasily
adm inist rablr eutoff point mtght not be objrctionablr. But in a
~it uatio n such as school d~rgregation, where both the nghts a ·srrted
a nd thr remedial bnrc!Pn~ impo~ed are of such magnitudr, a nd wherr
the rp~ulting ~c·rtional di~rrimination i ~ pa ::;sio n atei~· resented, it is
~mp]~· que~tionabh• whethrr ~11ch arbit rarine::;~ ~~ r tthrr politically
01 moral! ~· arreptablr "
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their blood brothers, because they were born into
a cle jure society. All children everywhere in the
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treatment which violates their constitutional rights in
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in
another area.·· Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 ( CA5 en bane,
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Educ. , 380 F. 2d 385. 397 ( CA5 en bane)
Gewin. J .. dissenting).' '
The Court today does move for the first timr toward
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure
action in what the Denver School Board has done or
failed to clo, and even here the Court does not rely upon
the results or effects of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent: "
"vVe emphasize that the differentiating factor be~
tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto
"' Srr Birkrl. supra. 11. 7. at 11\J:
:1 :'\rgro child prrrri1·r~ hi~ ~<'parat 1011 a::: di:::crimlllator~· and
invidiou:::, ]l(' i::: not, in a ~ocirt .1· a hundrrd ~·rar:; rrmon•d from
~l<ll' rr_, .. going to makr finr di~tinrtion:; about thr ~ourcr of a particular ~rparation. ''
'' Thr Comt toda~· doP~ not requirP, howPvrr, a ~E'grrgator\ intrnt
with n·~pE'rt to thr rntirr ~rhool ~~·~trm, and imlrrd holds that if ,;uch
an JnU•nt i~ found \Yith rr~prrt to :::omr :::choob 111 a "~· :;trm, thr burdrn- normall~ · on the plaintifL;-~hift" to the defrndant "rhool authoritir~ to pron· a negatin•: namrly. that thPir purpo~r~ wrrr
lwnign. Old <' . pp . 17-lS.
Tlw Court ha::: rom<· a long W<\~· ~Jn<·r BTou·n I. Starting from
t hr una~~ailahiP de JUre ground of tlw di:::crnninaton· ron~titutionaf
and ~tatutor~ · pr01·i:::1on::: of ,.;om<' Stat<'", the llP\Y formulation-~till
profr~:::ing fidelitY to tlw dt' jure doetnnr-1::: that dP:::rgregation will
br ordPrwl dr~pitP til(' ab;-;Pn<·<• of am· ,.;pgrrgaton· law~ if: (1) ~rgrr
gatt•d ,r!Jool~ in fact rxi"t: (11) a romt find' that the~ · re~ult from
:<Oll1P art1on taken II'Jth ~pgrrgator~ · Jllt<'nt h~· th<' 'rhool board;·

··If

>
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p.@ ) ))
. .- .... C"
</
1
(italics are the Court's) .
, ~o
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor"
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so (
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, ?
407 F. R. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motivation'' is irrelevant. the Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate
schools. and we have said that '[t]he measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis
v. School Commissiorn ers of Mobile County, 402 U.S.

33, 37.
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.
"Though the purpose of the new school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or purposes but on the effect of the aj ion upon the dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper.') 407 U. S.,
at 462.
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in
(iii) ,;uch actio n rrlat e~ to a ny "' rn ra ningful ~egment '' of the school
''·' ·~ trm : and (iv) thP :'ChooJ board cannot provp that its int entions

ll'ith r!'~j)('Ct to the rpmaindrr of 1hr ~y~trm wrre nonseg regatory.
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued,
of course. that in Emporia, a prior constitutional violation had already been proven and that this justifies the
distinction. The net result of the Court's language, however, is the application of an effect test to the actions of
southern school districts and an intent test to those in
other sections. at least unti l an initial de jure finding for
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to
perpetuate any such dual standard. \\'e should hold forthrightly that significant segregated school conditions in
whatever section of the country are a prima facie violation of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted
~lsC'where:

"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that 110
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes
our credulity to say that mere chance resu lted in
there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The
result bespeaks discrimnation , whether or not it u•as
a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury
commissioner.'' Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
482 (1954). (Emphasis added .)

B
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration which
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent. 'vill invite numerous desegregation suits in which there can be little hope of uniformity of resull,
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The issue in these cases \vill not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them.
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent.'' The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the·
subjective intent of school authorities with respect .to·
action taken or not taken over many years-will be·
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations·
\Yith respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools.
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is. for example, quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city·
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80- 83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will,
under the de jure/de facto distinction. continue to differ,
especia.lly since the Court has never made clear vYhat
uffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for
an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were possible to clarify this question. wide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or
"purpose.·· especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities under varying con~
rlitions ovPr many ,Vf'arfl.
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation,
or collection of different motivations. that lie behind a
legislative enactment." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 "G. S.
214. 224 ( 1971); McGinnis v. Royster, - l " . S. - . (1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 C 8. 367. 381
( 1968 ) . Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a single statute will be compounded in a judicial review of
years of administration of a large and complex school
system_,-. Every act of a school board and school administration. and indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny.
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools. made almost daily, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated.
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or-for the
long term future-are likel y to be one or the other. These
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building construction and location; the timing of
building new schools and their size; the closing and con' ·'A~

onr commentator ha~ rxprr~~<'d it:

'·If thr courts are indred prrparrd to inquirr mto motive, thorn~·
qur:::tion:-: will arise rven tf on<' a,:~umr"' that racial motivation i~
rnpablr of bPing proven at trial. What of the ca~e m which one or
mon• mrmbers of a school board, but lr~~ than a majority, arr found
to havr artrd on racial ground~ 1 What if it apprar~ that thr ~chool
board'~ action was promptrd b_,- a mixturr of motives, including con,:titutionall~- innocent onr"' that aiOIH' would havr promptrd thr board
to art') What if tlw membrr::: of thr ,:chool board werr not themsrlvr" racial!~- in"'pired but "'i"'hrd to plra~e thetr con~tituent,: , man~·
of whom thr~· knew to br so? If such rase::: arr clas~ified as uncon:::titutional dr jure srgrrgatton, there j,: little point m presrrving
thr dr jurr-de facto distinction at aiL And It may well be that thr
diffrrrncr brtween am· of t he~r ~ituat10ns and one m whtch racial
motivation IS altogrt hrr lackmg i" too in,:ignificant. from the "'landpoint of both thr moral culpabilitY of t IH• ~tat<' official~ and thr
impact upon the childrrn invoh-rd, I o 'llj)port a difference Ill co nstitutional trratmcnt." Goodman. supra. n, 11 , at :284-2R5.

1\.EYE:-i
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,.;olidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neigh~
IJOrhood policy is Pnforcc'd; the recruitment. promotion
and assif!;nlnent of faculty and supervisory persOJlllf'l;
policies with respect to transfPrs from one school to
Ullothrr; \Yhether. and to what rxtPJlt. special schools \Yill
])(' provided. ,,·here thf'y will be located. and who will
qualify to attf'JH! them; the d<'termination of curriculum.
includi11g wlwtlwr there \\·ill lw "tracks" that lead priIJlarily to collq;e or to vocational training. and the rout-·
i11g of stmknts i11to these tracks; and even decisions as
to ~ocial. rf'creational and athletic policies.
l11 8u·ann thP Court did 11ot have to probe into segre~
gatory i11tent and proximate cause with respect to each
of thrsP ''endless" factors. Thr oasis for its de jure find~
ing tlwrP \\· a~ rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 40:2 C :--\., at 5- (1. But in a case of
the present type. \Yhere no such history exists. a .i udicial
examination of these factors will be required under today·~ decision. This " ·ill lead inevitably to uneven and
unprC'clictahlP results. to protracted and ineonclusiYe liti~
gation. to added burdens on the fed e ral courts. a1HI to
SC' riou s di sruption of individual school systems. ] n the
ahsC'nCr' of national and ob.wctive standards. school boards
anrl admini~trators \\·ill remai11 in a state of uncertainty
allCI dimrray. speculating as to what is requirPd and \\·hen
litigation \\·ill f'trikP .
Hather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounclpd in principk. and contributing to the consC'qtiC'JlC'<'S itlflirated abovr. \\'(' should ackno\\·leclgP that
\\'hC'JH',·er sign ifica11t public sc hool Pcgregation exists there'
i~ prillla facir e\·idencr of a eonstitutional violation. It
is true'. of course. that segregated schools- wherevrr
located- are 110t solely the product of the actio11 or
inaction of public school authoriti<·s. lndPed. as i11rli-
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cated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country. whether in the ~orth,
\\-' est. or South. are the socio-economic influences which
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner
cities while the more mobile white majority disperse to
the suburbs. But it is also true that public school authorities have continuing, detailed responsibility for the
public school systems"; and, as Judge John Minor
Wisdom has noted. "where the figures [showing
segregation in the schoolsJ speak so eloquently, a
prima face case of discrimination is establishPd.';
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848.
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
which has outlived its time.

III
The preceding section addresses the constitutional ob- )
ligation of public authorities in the school districts
throughout our country to operate integrated school systems. When the schools of a particular district are
tn Indeed , if one• goes back far enough , 1t i~ probable that all racial
:segregation, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the
schools, has at :;orne time been supported or maintained b~- government action. In Becket v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 13111315 (ED Va. 1969) , Judge Walter Hoffman compiled a summary
of pa;;t public segregatory act10n which mcluded examples from a
great majority of States. He concluded that ·'only as to the states
of Maine , New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, Nevada , and
Hawaii docs it appear from th1~ nonexhaustive research that no discriminatory laws appeared on thr book~ at one time or another."
!d.., at 1315,

'

71-501-C0;\1 C' UR & DISSE!\'T
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTHICT ~0. 1, DE;\TVETI, COLO.

2i

found to be substantially segregated. there is a prima
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demonstrate that they have in fact operated an integrated
system as this term is defined above. supra, p. - . If
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case, the question then become what reasonable affirmative steps district courts may require to place the school
system in compliance \\'ith the constitutional standard.
ln short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the
remedy?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver is a "dual school system," that city
·will then be under an "affirmative duty" to desegregate
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County
School Board, 391 r. S., at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

.s

A
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary a~
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have since
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation deofler,.,_
___..:..c:_
re:....:e:.=s_'__
' "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
17

Sel', r. Q., Thompsou v. School Board of Ne1cport Neu·s. F . 2d - , - (1972), wl1f're tlw CA4 en bauc, upheld a di:strict court.
a~:;ignment plan where "travel timr , var~·ing from a minimum of
fort)· miuutl'~ and a maximum of onr hour , rach wa~·. would be required for bu~iug black student~ out of thr old Cit~· and white student,; into thr old Cit~· 111 ordrr to achirn' a racial balancing of the

•
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desegregation. '' 402 U. S .. at 26. In the context of a
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different- and widely
:;:eparated-:;:ections of the :;:chool district, exten:;:ive dis~
persal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading
it to date.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such disruption of public education.
Fortunately, Swann alw laid down a broad rule of reason
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the
Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S., at
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust more
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts
di ~t ri ct." Thi~ tran,.;portat10n was decrec•d for children from the t hird
gradr up , involving children as ~·o tmg as right ~·ea rs of age.
In Northrross \'. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F . 2d 890, 895
( 197:2) , thr CA6 affirmrd a di ~ tri ct court assignment plan whi ch
c!ail~· tnmsportrd 14,000 children with "t lw m aximum time to br
,.;prnt on tlw bu,;p~ b~· any child fbemg I :3~ minut e~. . . ," pre~umabl~· each wa~·. But a" Judgr Weick Jtotrd in di:osent the CA6
ln~ truct rd the district judge to impl r m rnt ~·rt furtlwr de:oegr rga tion
orde r ·. Pl a n~ prr::;rntl~· undrr con~ idrrat ion b~- th at court call for
thr bu::;ing of 39,01:;5 and 61 ,530 children rr::; p rct tvely , for undrtrrmined lengt h::: of tune. / d., a t 895-986.
Petitionrrs before this Co urt in PottiS v. Flax. X o. 72-288, ce rt.
deniPd, U. S. (197-), co nt ended th at tlw implem entat ion
of t he CA5 '~ dirPct iw in Flax v . Potts. ~6~ F . 2d 865 (1972), would
rrquire bus rid!'~ of up to two hours and 20 minutes rach d ay a nd
a round trip of up to 70 mil es. P et ttion , at 14. While respondents
contend these figure~ rrprrscn t a n · ·a~t o uncling mflation ," R r::;ponse,
~t 7, transportatiOn of a n tr rattonal magni tud e ::;pem ::; inevita ble ..

71-507-COl\CllH & DISSENT
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTHICT XO. 1, DEXVEH, COLO. 23

"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools,
congested and complex traffic patterns." /d., at 14.
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process.
I d., at 31. Finally. the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as one important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases.'' And the Court further emphasized that equitable
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other
public and private interests.
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interest,
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann,
supra, at 15-16.
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II,
349 U. S .. at 229:
11

111 fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally. equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
"Srr ['11ited States, .. Texas Educatwu Agency. 467 F. 2d ~48, 883
(C'A5 197:2) ( Brll. .f.. concurring in an opimon 111 ll'hirh ~rven other
.indge~ iomrd) :
"]n onr ,·iew the rcnwcl~· winch tlw (h~trict court i~ rf:'quired to
formnlatr shonid be formniatecl ll'ithin the entirl' context of the
opmion m Swann \'. Charlotte- !If etklenburg Board of Educat iolt . • • • I_Empha~i,- added. ["

-

-.

-
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for adjusting and reconciling public and priv&te
needs."
·Thus in school desegregation cases. as elsewhere. equity
counsels reason. flexibility and balance. See. e. y. , Lemon
v. Kurtzman U. S. ( 1973 ) L I am aware, of
course, that reasonableness in any ar~a is a relative and
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to promote desegregation with other, equally important educational interests which a community may legitimately assert. Neglect
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached.H' Overzealousnes" in pur uit of any single
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance " and "flexibility" with which this Court has always
regarded it .

B
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty
to operate an integrated school system, district courts
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensue.
Many of these can be taken effectively without damaging state and parental interests in having children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where desegregative steps are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood education." school
authorities must pursue them. For example. bound19
The relevant mquiry is .. whether the co~t~ of achieYing de~egre
gation in any given :;ituatw n outweigh the legal. moral a nd educational con~iderations favoring it . . . . It ~~ clrar . .
that thP
Const itution should no t be held to require any tran:;porta tion plan
t hat keeps children on a bu~ for a subst antial part of the da~· , con::;ume:; sign ifi cant portion:-: of funds otherwise spendablr directly on
educat ion , or mvolves a ge nume element of danger to the sa fety of
the child.'' School Desegregation After Swann: A Theo r~· of Gov('rnment Respomi!bility, :39 U. Chi L. RPv. 421. 42:2, 443 (1972).
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's student hody. Construction of new schools should be of
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integra=
tion should be attained throughout the school system,
Swann, at 19 ; United States v. Montgomery County
Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 ( 1969). An optional
majority to minority transfer program. with the State
providing free transportation to desiring students. is also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that allocation of resources within the school district must be rr.ade
with scrupulous fairness among all schools.
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integrative
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans
are constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods,
and when school construction preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony of given schools.''"" Keyes
v. School District LYo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. 2d - .
United States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County,
429 F. 2d - . 1258- 1259. ~
( This does not imply that decisions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school construction. closing and
consolidation , must be made to the detriment of all neutral. nonracial considerations. But these considerations
ran. with proper school board initiative, generally be
met in a manner that will Pnhance the degree of school
desegregation .
"r' A usrful ~tud~· of the hi~torical u~e~ and a bu~es of the neighborhood school romept is .M. Weinbrrg . Iher & Placr (1967) .
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Defaulting school authorities would have. at a minimum , the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort
outliuerl in the above section. School boards would. of
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to
promote school desegregation . In a pluralistic society
such as ours, it is essential that no racial minority feel
demeaned or discriminated against and that students of
all races learn to play . work , and cooperate with one
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in this opi11ion is meant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the recognized values of integrated school
conditions.
A ronstitutional requirement of extensive student
transportation solely to achieve ([0tegrati£?? however.
prese nts a vastly more complex problem. It promises
on thf' one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation ,
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as
important community aspirations and personal rights.
The Equal Protection Clause does indeed require that
racial discrimination not be tolerated in the decisions
of public school authorities. It does not command that
sehool authorities undertake widespread student transportation solely for the sake of maximizingetegr;tiOli·.n
"' In fact. duf' to racia ll~· ~f'pa ratf' re::;ide nti al patterns that r harnrtrnzr our major urban arra~ it I::; qu ite unreali:;tic to think of
achiPYing in mam· ritif'::; ::;ub::;tantJal intf'gration througho ut t he
:;rhool di::;triet with out a drgref' of ::;tudf'nt tran::;portation which
would ha\·f' thf' gravr::;t f'conomir ancl educat iona l con::;eq ue nce::;,
A,; Profp::;::;or Birkel notr~ .
'· In mo~t of the larger urban area::;, demographic cond itions a re ~uch
that no polir~· that a court ran ord er , and a :::ch ool board, a city or
rYe n a ~tHtP has the capabilit y to put into effect, will in fact re::;ult
in t]](' forPsreable future in raci a ll y balanced public ::;choob. Only
!I rrordrnng of the Pnvironment mvoh·ing economic and social policy-
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportation
has no place in public school systems or as a permissible
desegregative tool. The transporting of school children
is as old as public education, and in rural and some
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing ~
of books. It is presently estimated that approximately
half of all American children ride buses to school for
reasons unrelated to integration."" At the secondary
level in particular, where the schools are larger and serve
a wider, more dispersed constituency than the elementary.
school. some form of public or privately financed transportation is often necessary. There is a difference. however. in transportation plans voluntarily initiated by local
school boards for educational purposes and those imposed by a federal court. The former usually represent a ~
necessary or convenient means of access to the school
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for no
purpose other than to further integration. "3 Yet the
on the broade::<t conceivable front mtght have an a ppreciable impact."
Bickel , supra. n. 7, at 13:2 .
"" E::;timate;; vary. Swauu, supra, at :29, noted th at "eighteen million of the Xation 's public sc hool children, approximately 39%, were
transpo rted to their school::: by bus in 1969-1970 m aU parts of the
co untry. '' Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this
probl em, ::;tated th at " two-thirds of all American children today ride
bu::;es to school for rea~ons unrelatrd to integration." 118 Cong. Rec.
82543, Feb . :24, 1972.
"" Hi~to ri ca ll~- . di;;tant transportal ion wa~ wrongly used to prom ott> ~egregation. ";\iegro childrr n were generally considered capable of tra\·elling longer di"ta n ce~ to school a nd without the a id of any
ve hicle . What was too far for a white child became reasona bly nrar
fo r a ~egro ehild," Weinberg, supra, n . 2 ~
Thi ~ deplorable ht::;tor~· hns led ~orne to a rgue that mtegra tive bus
ridrs an· justified a,- a ton em<• nt for p ast ~eg regator~· trips and that
neig hborhood ed ucation 1" now but a code-word for racial segregation . But misuse of tran:;portatwn 111 the pa~t does not imply neighborhood ::;chooling ha:; no valid non~egregatory use:; for the _present.
X or would wrongful tra nsport a \ion Ill t he pa~t .i n~t ify detrimental
t ran><porta twn for the children of t orla \'.

71-507-CO:\C(TH &

DISSE~T

!\:EYES v. SCHOOL DTSTRJC'T :\0. 1, DEXVER, COLO.

2

Court in Swann was unquestionably right in dPscribing
bus transportation as "onP tool of school desegregation."
402 r. S .. at 30."~ The crucial issue is when. under what
circumstances. and to what extent such transportatioll
may appropriately bP orclen.. d. The answer to this
turns-as it does so often in the law-upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances.
Swann itself recognized limits to integrative obligations. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing ... would
be disproved . . . . " and sanctioned district court use
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting point
in the process of shaping a remedy .... " 402 l!. S., at
24. 25. Thus particular schools may bP all white or
all black and still not infringe constitutional rights
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authorities are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to
require racial balance in schools throughout the district
or the automatic elimination of all ''one-race schools.''
40:2 r. S .. at 26, is grounded in a recognition that the
State. parents. and children all have at stake in
Sotn(' communit ie~ had t ra n~port a tion plan~ in dfert a I I h(• time
of court de~egregation order~. Sc•r 8wam1, ~upra. at :29, n. 11; Davis
\'. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. :33, 34-:35 (1971).
Comt ~ ha I'P u~ed t lw pre~enC'r or ab~rn<·c· of PXi~t ing t ra n~porta I ion
in a di~tnct a~ one factor 111 frami11g and tmplementing; de~rgregation
decree~. 0'nited States ,._ Watwn Chapel :)chua! Distnct. -l4() F. 2d
9:n. 9:37 (CA.S 1971) ; Northcro~s v. Board of Educ .. .J.4+ F . 2d 1179,
11K1-118:3 (CA6 1971); Davis ,._ Board of Educ .. :328 F. Supp. 1197,
1203 (ED Ark . 1971). When• a ~rhool board t;; Yoluntaril~· engagrd
Ill tran;;portmg st udents, a dt~tnct rourt 1~, of course, obligated to
in~ure that ;,;urh transportation t:; 1101 unclrrtakrn \\'It h :;egrega tor~·
eff<·ct. Wherr , al~o, voluntary tran~portation programs are already
in progre~" · thrre may be grPat<'r .iu"'tificatwn for court-ordrrPcl transport at ion of :;tudrnt::; for a comparable time aurl distance to arh1ew
~reater integration,
24
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school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable
interests.
The personal interest might be characterized as the
desire that children attend community schools near
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55. 60 (1966), the Sixth Circuit summarized
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of
schools: "5
"Appellants, however, pose the question of whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly
administered without racial bias. comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
results in the creation of schools with predominantly
or even exclusively Negro pupils. The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout the nation
and has been for many years the basis of school
administration. This i'3 so because it is acknowledged to have several valuable aspects which are an
aid to education, such as minimization of safety hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil
placement and administration through the use of
~ 5 Thr trrm "neighborhood ~chool'' ~hould not be supposetl to
denote solei~· a walk-in :::chool or on<' which serves children only in
the :;mrounding blocks. The Court has noted, in a different context, that "the word ' neighborhood' is quite as susceptible of variation a~ thr word ·localit~· · Both terms are elastic and, dependent
upon circum:;tance:::. may be equall~· satisfied by areas measmed by
rods or b~· mile~ . " Connally v. Geueral Canst. Co., 269 U. S. :385,
395 (1926) . In the ;,chool context , "neighborhood" refers to relative
proximity , to a preference for a school nearer. rather than more
distant from home.
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neutral, easily determined standards, and better
home-school communication."
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of
parental and student access and convenience, as well as
greater economy of public administration. These are
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds."0
Xeighborhod school systems. neutrally administered, reflect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public education. Public schools have
been a traditional source of strength to our Nation, and
that strength may derive in part from the identification of
many schools with the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood. Community support, interest and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
the intimacy of our institutions-home, church, and
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in the
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely rPlated to the concept of a community and
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties parPuts have >vith respect to the education of their children .
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture,
support. and provide for the welfarP of children, includ"" 1 do not implY that th0 Iwighborhood roncept offer:; the onl.'·,
or <'V<'II tlJP mo~t prrfrrnbl0 wa~· to organizr a ~c hool system. I do
cont0nd that. whrrr a ,;rhool board hn>" rho~en it , frderal judgrs
"Jwuld arrord 1t rP;<pPrt 111 framing rrnwdial drcrPes .
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510, 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. 1Yebraska, 262
1!. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. . . . The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.''
And in GriswoLd v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482
(1965) . the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.'' I do not believe recognition of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send
a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a private education for their
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons
seek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their
child attends. It would. of course. be impractical to
allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parentschool and parent-child communication allowed by the
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force
of law.
In the understandable national concern for alleviating
public school segregation , courts may have overlooked
thP fact that the rights and interests of children affected
by a desegregation program also are entitled to consideratiou. Any child. white or black. who is compelled to
leavP his neighborhood and spend significant time each
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day being transported to a distaut school suffers an im-·
palrment of his liberty ahd his privacy. Not long ago ,
James B. Conant wrote that "[aJ t the elementary school
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day
after day to distant schools seems out of the question."~'
A community may well conclude that the portion of a
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular
school activity. Decisions such as these, affecting the
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal
interests of parents and children which a community may
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to ques-.
tion just as seriously any remedial requirement of extensive student transportation solely to further integration.
Any such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately
on the school districts of our country, depending on
their degree of urbanization, financial resources. and their
racial composition. Some districts with little or no biracial population will experience little or no educational
disruption. while others, notably in large, biracial metropolitan areas. must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integration frequently being ordered by district courts.~ ·' At a
time when public education generally is suffering serious
financial malnutrition, the economic burdens of such
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
dollars."" And while constitutional requirements have
" ' Slum~ and Suburb~, 29 (19!11) .

"' Ser n. :22, supra.
__.9
A
""In \lem\mi~ , for rxample , which ha::; no hi::;tory of hu-ing ~tu
rlent~ . tlw minimum transportation plan ord erPd b~· t11P comts will
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often occasioned uneven burdens. never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as ,,·ide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children.
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as au example. The Denver School Board, by
its action and nonaction , may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the
Denver Board over the past decades. the fundamental
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It
is indeed a novel application of eq uitable power- not to
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrineto require so much greater a degree of forced school integration than would have resulted from purely natural
and neutral nonstate causes.
The compulsory transportation of students carries a
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. \Vith most
constitutional violations. the major burden of remedial
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials
\\"ho act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or
religious exercise, for example. are obliged to cease the
offending act or practice and. where necessary . institute'
corrective measures. Tt is they who bear the brunt of
rPquire. in thP School Board'~ P~timate, an initial capit;d expPnditmP
of $1 ,66-!,192 for bu~e~ plu~ an annual operating ro~t of $()29.192.
The Board r,;t imatp~ that a more Pxtrnsivp tran;;portation program
to be considPred b~· the di~t n et court II' ill rPqmre initial capital in,·estment;; of $:3 ,924,000 and :111nual operating rost,.: of .'1.7~:3,490.
The mo~t dra~tir tran~po rtat ion plan beforr the district court rrquirp,.;
e,.:timatrd annual operating ro,.:t:.: of from $2,:354,220, $2 ,-±:ll.7JO . or
dl·pending Oil thr Board'~ tfHil:;j)Ortation armngPmrnt~.
Northcrass \'. Board of Eduration of Mrmphi8 Cit!! 8ch .. Sl),Jira. at
S98 (WPick . .f. di~srnting).
'
'" ~C'P 11. 9 . .supra.
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remedial action. though other citizens will to varying (kgrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for
segregation must. at the very tuinimum. act to cc>ase segregatory acts. But when the obligation furthc>r extends
to the transportation of students. the full burden of thr
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents ,,·ho did not participate itt any constitutional
violatiotl.
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as studc>nt transportation solely to maximize intrgration.
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable
social consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exouus to private schools. leaving public school systems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races.
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
the movement from innercity to suburb. and the further
geographical separation of the races. X or do v.·e kno"·
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
community and parental support of public schools. or
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in
rducation to a perennially devisive debate OYer ,,·ho is
to be transported where."'
The problem addrc>ssed in this opinion has pc>rpkxecl
courts. school officials. other public authorities. and students of public education for nearly two df'nades. The
problem. especially sincr it has focused on thr "busing
issue ... has profoundly disquieted the public wherevc•r
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no
pretf'ttsr of knowing the best answers. Yet. the issue in
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of eottPtitutional la\\'. As to this issue. r have 110 doubt \\·hat., Tndc·Pd . authoritir~ inrrra~in12:!~· arr in doubt n,; to thr· c·xtrnt
to which grt>atrr racial balancing in public .-;rhool" will IJp 11c·r·p,;~an ·
or rffpctivP in rrducing ra('ial mrqual1t~· . ::-;c'< ' , e. (! .. ( ' . . JPnk.:,.
lnrquality. pp. :25:~-:.W5 (197:2) ,
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ever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history
or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
of young and teenage children to achieve a single interest,
as important as this interest may be. We have strayed,
quite far as I view it. from the rationale of Brown I
and II , as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of] public and
private needs,'' Brown II, 349 F. S., at 229.
I urge a return to this rationale. This \\'Oulcl result,
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree. transportation orders should be applied with special caution to
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interestsand ultimately of education itself- as extensive transportation of elementary age children solely for desegregatio11
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood
education performs its most vital educational role. It
is with respect to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here. at the elementary schooL
that the rights of parents and ehildrPIJ are most sharply
implicated."2
"" Thrrr ma~· well br adn1ntagl·~ in commrnring til(' intrgrati\'P
l'Xperirner~ at an rarl~· agr , a.-< youn11: rhildrrn ma.1· bP lr~8 likrl~·
than oldrr rhildrPn and adult~ to drnlop an inhibiting racial ron~rtou~nr~~. Thr~r advantagP:< ~hould br con:<idrrpd a" "rhool board~
makr thr variou~ drri::<ion~ with tlw , · jpw to al'hil·ving nnd ]H('"rn·-
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\Vhile greater transportation of secondary school students might be permitted. even at this level the desire of
a comm.unity for racially neutral neighborhood schools
should command judicial respect. It would ultimately
be wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate,
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school
concept are entitled to j uclicial respect.

IV
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on t\\·o issues. addressed in this opinion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform
judicial approach should be taken to our national problems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive transportation. should be
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the
various interests which are involved. \Vith all deference,
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither
of these issues in a way that will lead to a rational.
coherent national policy with respect to integration in
tlw schools.
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto /
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a
rationale. vvhich can only lead to increased and incon clusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every
school district in the Janel. The public schools have
ing an 1ntrgratrd ~rhool ~.~·~trm. Supra. p. - . But in the balancing of nil n•lr1·ant interrA~. thP advantage~ of an earl~· integral iw PXpl'riencl' mu~t and in all fairne~;; ~boule!. be weighPd agnin~t
othPr rplr1·am adYantagr~ <tnd cli~adnllltagr~ and in light of tl](l
rlrnwgraphir rhnrartPri~tir~ of tlw particular community ,
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al\\'ays been funded and operated by States and their
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools.
c·ven in the cities of the South. are in large part the
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting
residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in the 1Jnited States, with any significant minority
8chool population. in which the school authorities-in
one way or the other-have not contributed in some
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails.
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar, multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of
th<> country and on minority children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. fn the
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than
that imposed by district courtv after Swann, the
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and
other major cities may well involve even more extensive
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time.
It is well to remember that the course we are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this
goal of quality eel uca tion. free from protracted and
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transportation. The single most disruptive element in education today is the widespread use of compulsory transportation . especially at elementary grade levels. This
has risked distracting and eli verting attention from basic
educational ends, dividing and embittering communities,
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial
friction an(t misunderstandinp:. [t is time to return to

71-507-COl\CUH &
38 KEYES

1'.

DISSE~T

SCHOOL DISTHICT J\""0. 1, DENVER , COLO.

a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
of our ~ociety in achieving d_esegregation with_ other legi~i:... /
mate mterests a commumty may assert I JC_nonr~cial _J
neighborhood and community education . This will help
assure that integrated school systems will be established
and maintained by rational action, and will be better
understood and supported by parents and children of
both races. For the long term, this will promote the
enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential
to its genuine success.

/

~

~

~--

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-507
Wilfred Keyes et al..
Petitioners.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States
v.
Court of Appeals for
, 'chool District No. l , Denver,
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[March

1973]

MR. JusTicE PowELL concurnng in part and dissenting
m part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver. Colorado, a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial
segregation. 1 Kor has it been argued that any other
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws)
contributed to tlw segregation which is at issue." The
Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution has expressly prohibited ·•any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or·
color."
1

t

402

Sec, e. g.. S1cann \'. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwu ..

u. s

1, 23 ( 1971 )

"Wr do not reach .. . tlw que~twn whether a showi ng that ~chooi
segregation i~ a con;;equencc of other t~·pe::< of :;tate actwn, Without
an~· discriminator~· actwn b~· ;;chool authorit1e;;, IS a con~titutionai
vwlation requiring remedial action b~· a ~c hool de::<egregation drcret:> .'"
Tlw tt:>rm "~tate action,'' as u;;t:>d ht:>rein. thu~ rder:< to actions of 1 he·
appropriatP public ;;choo] anthoriti<'s.
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C'ourt has inquired only to what extent the Denver
public school authorities may have contributed to the
school ~egregation which is acknowledged to exist in
Denver.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court con~idered that a school
with a concentration of 70 to 75 o/r "Negro or Hispano
students'' was identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children. The city-wide school mix in Denver is 66 o/r
Anglo. 14 % Negro. and 20 o/r Hispano . In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the
schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is genera.lly comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in which there
is a substantial minority population and \.,·here desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There
is segregation in the ~chools of many of these cities fully
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footdr·agging as the proce~s \vas in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made
111
outhern titates." ~o comparable progress has been
made in many nonsou thern cities \Vith large minority
:, According to thr 1971 HEW e~t nnatr , 43.9~ of :\Tegro puptls
at t<•ndrd majonty \vhitr sc hool ~ In the South a~ oppo~ed to only
'27.8% \\'ho attended ~urh srhoob in the North and We~t. Fiftyscvr n prrrent of all :\Tegro pupil" 111 the North and We~t attend
"chool" with over SO% minority populatio n as opposrd to 82.2%
who do "o in the South. 11/o: Cong. Hrl' . 81~5.

ii-507-CONClJH & DISSE:--.rT
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT ~0 . I. DENVER . COLO.

.3

, populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure
. distinction nurtured by thE> courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South .'' But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver
than in Atlanta .
ThE' 1971 HEW Enrollment 8un·e~· drama.tizf'd thE' segregatf'd
character of public :-:rhool ~~·:-:tern '"' in man~· non,.;outhPrn citiP:-:. Thr
perrpntagr of 1\pgro pupil,.; which a ttPnded ::;choob more than 80%
black wa:-: 91.3 in CJpn•land . Ohio ; 97.8 in Compton, California ;
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio: 78.11 m DC'troit , :\Iichigan : 95.7 in Gar~· .
Indiana; 86.4 in Kan::;a:-: Cit~·, :\Iis,.;ouri; 86.6 in Lo~ AngriPs, California ; 78 .8 in :\Iilwaukrc, Wiscon,.;in ; 91.:3 in- Newark, New .T r m·~·:
i-:9.8 in St. Loui,.; , .'di~,.;ouri . Thr full dat a from the Enrollmrnt Surn·~· rna~ · br found in 118 Cong . RPe . SH+-148, .Jan . 20. 1972.
r. A~ Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn .) rrcogmzrd :
1

"For ~·rar~ wr have fought the battle of mtpgratton primaril~· in
thr South wherE' thP problem was ,.;rverr. It wa~ a long, arduou~
fight that dr:'en·rd to bP fought and nePdr d to br woiL
"U nfortunate!~·. a~ thr problrm of ra c~al 1:-:olatwn ha:-: moved north
of the :\[a~on-Dixon I inr, man~ · nort }l('rner::; have bid an Pnt,.;ivP
farewell to thP 100-~·rar ~truggle for rac ial rqualit~·. Our motto
"<'E'lll" to havP brrn ·Do to "outlwmer" wh at ~·ou do not want to do
to your~rlf. '
"Good n•a"on" havp alwa~·~ bPPII offprrd, of cuur,.;e, for Ilot movlllg
\ · igorou"l~· ahead in the 0Jorth a~ wrll a~ thr South .
'' Fir"t. It wa'"' that thr probl em wa" wor'"'e 111 tlw South. Thr n
~hl' fart~ brgan to "how that thnt wa~ no longer trm·
" WP thrn began to hrar tlw d<• fneto-d<· jure refi·a m
"Somrhow rp,.:idPntial "egrrga tion in th(• :\orth 11·a" aceJdent:ll ur
rlr facto and that mall r It bPttrr than thr lrgall~· "npported dr juri:'
~eg rrgafion of the South. It wa,.: a hard di::<t mrtion for blnrk children
lll tot a l!~ · "('grPgHtPd "chool" m th<• :\orth to und eiAand. but it
allowed II." to n1·oid tlw prohiPm " 118 C'ong Hrc S:Z-542. Frb. 2-+ .
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Tn my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, a.nd formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the souther11
States. was officially imposed racial segregatiou in the
schools extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some
of the language v,;as more expansive. the holding in
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States. or their instru~
mentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in
Brown I was construed-for some years and by many
courts-as requiring only state neutrality, allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the
~tate itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints.';
·~See, e. u.. Bradley v . Srhool Hoard. :3-!5 F. :2d
en banr. 1965) ·

:no.

316 (CA-l

" It ha;:; been held agam and agnm ,
that th e Fourteenth
.\mendment prohibition i~ not ngain~t ~rgregation n~ :-;uch
A ~tntr or ~rhool di~tri c t offend~ no eon;:;titutwnal requirement
whrn it grant;:; to all ~tudrnt~ uniformly an unre;:;tnctrd freedom of
cho1cr n:< to ;:;chool attendrd, ~o that each pupil , m etfrct, a"~Igns him~df to the ~chool he wi"hr" to attrnd ." (The ca:sc wa ;:; later vacated.
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But the doctrine of Brown I , as amplified by Brown Il ,
349 U.S. 294 (1955), did not retain its original meaning.
Tn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative
state action to desegregate school systems.' The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U . S.
430, 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch. " The school system before the Court in Green
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county
where there were no concentrations of white and black
populations, no neighborhood schoo l system (there \\'ere
only two schools in the county), and none of the
problems of an urbanized school district.' The Court
properly identified the freedom of choice program
there as a subterfuge, and the language in Green imposmg an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a
and r('manded by thi~ Court, which expre~~ed no VIE'W on the mc•nt~
of tlw dP~egregation plan~ ~ubm1tted.) :382 U. S. 10:3, 105 (1065) ,
See abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind., 32-l F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963) ;
Downs \'. Board of Educ., :3:3() F. 2d 988 (CAIO 196+); Deal v .
Board of Educ .. .369 F . 2d 55 (CAll 1966)
' F'or a conci,.:e hi~tor~· and comme nt a r~· on the evolution, ,.;pe gpnc ·rnll~· .-\. Bickel , The SuprPme Comt. and the Idea of Progre~::; , pp
12()-j;{Q ( 1970)
' ~!?P abo the compamon ca~P" in Raney \' . Board of Rducatwn .
:391 U. S. ++:3 (196S) , and !1louroe \'.Board of C'omm 'ro. :391 t:. S.
+50 (19(iS). neither of which uwoh·pd large' urbnn or metropolitan
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation.
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of ~ ev,· Kent
County. Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept would flower into a new constitutional principle of
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 U. 8. 1 ( 1971), in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. North Carolina.
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, tlw
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in
one part of the city,'' 402 U. S .. at 25. and acknowledged
that :
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous ~?Chools. congested and complex
traffic patterns.' ' 402 F. S .. at 14.
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different
problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils essentially
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County.
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only
with States having "a long history'' of officially imposed
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those
i-itates to implement Brown I. 402 U. S .. at 5-6. In so
doing. the Court refrained even from considering whether
the evolution of constitutional doctrin e from Brown 1 to
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Green! Swann undercut whatever logic once supported
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative duty. entailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate
segregation in the schools. the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions which in large part did no t
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation.
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the same : one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This
1s a national, not a southem phenomenon. And it is
largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did
not have segregatory school laws."
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country where it did exist, Swann imposed obligations
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As
''A::< Dr. Karl Taeuber ::Hate;; in hi" article , He"Identwl Segregation.
Scientific American, Augu~t 1965, at 14 :
•· No elaborate analysis is nece:;:;ary to concludt• from the~c figure~
that a high degree of re:sidential ~egregation bH~ed on rnre 1" a univer~al charactenstic of American citie~. This segregat ion 1,; found
in the cities of the North and We"t a;; well a:; of the South; m large
W1e~ a;; well as small ; in nonindu~trial citie:; a" well a,; mdu"trial ; m
cine~ with hundreds of thousand::< of ~egro resident.' a~ well ns tho::;e
wtth on!~- a few thousand; nne! m citie::< thHt are progre:<:>i\'C' in their
emplo~·ment pmctice nne! cn·il nghts polirie" a;; well a:< tho~e thnt
are not."
1n lu,; book, 1'\egroe" in C'nie:< (1965), Dr. Tneub('f :<tilted that re"i-

drnwd "egregntion exJ:;t:< "regardle::;~ of the character of local law~
and polif'JP:< and regarrllP:<::; of othn form:< of rli:<cnmmation ." /rl ..
;It :~I),
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawPd in Brown , the rationale of St~'aJIII
points inevitably toward s a uniform . constitutional approach to our national problem of school segregation ,

TT
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to th<:i
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application
of the Green/ Swam1 doctrine of "affirmati ve duty " to th e
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation . The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various de~
cisions of th e school board. I concur in the Cou rt 's posit1on that the public school authorities are the responsible
age ncy of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doetrine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it 1s
eq ually so for Denver. I would not, however. perpetuate
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory inte nt.'' I would
hold. quite simply, that where segregated public schools
exist within a school district to a substantial degree. there
is a prima facie case that th e duly constituted publi c>
a uthorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as
the "school board") are suffici ently rPspon sible to impose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon1"

A pnma facw ca~e of con~t ttutton ;t! \·iolatJon ex t,.:t,.: \\'hen ~egre
gatlo n J,.: found to <I ,.:u!J:;tnntwJ urgrep in the :;chool,; of a part! C'II iar dtstnct. It 1,.: rrcognizPd. of co m :;r , that thi" trrm i" rPint l\'l' and proYide:; no prrei"r standa rd:;. But rircumstanrP"', clemo.gmp hl r and o th r rwi ,.:e, \·an· from di:;t ri ct t o di,.:trict a nd hard and
ia:;t rule,.: ,.:hould not be formula trd. The rxi~ten ce of a suh~tantial
pr rce nt agr of ::;chool " popul<lted b~- st ude nt " from onr ntrr onl~· or
ptw!omin atel ~· "o populated. should trigger thr mquiry .
10
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated school system.
A

The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of
the holding in Brown 1 into the affirmative duty doctrine.
the distinction no longer can be justified on a principled
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant
to the existence of historic. state-imposed segregation at
th e time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory
sturlent transportation went well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school segregation for which
former state segregation laws were eve responsible.
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abun ant y c emonstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure
discrimination present problems of subjective intent
which the courts cannot fairl~"y_:_r.:
es::o::..;l.:.v:::.e.:...:-::---:~-----At t e ou se . o
ry o 1 entify the const1tu~
tiona] right which is being enforced. This is 110t easy.
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Bro11m I, after emphasizing the importance of education.
th e Court said that ·
":::luch an opportunity. where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 347 G. S .. at 493.
In Brown 11, the Court identified the "fundamental principle·· en uncia ted in Brown 1 as being the unconstitutionality of "racial discrimination in public education.' ·
349 r. S .. at 298 , and spoke of "the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
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as practicable 011 a nondiscriminatory basis. " 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it means- as a mini mum- that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system.ll In
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right,
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms,
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards
will operate integrated school systems within their respective districts. This means that school authorities.
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and
implement their customary decisions with a vie~· toward
enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system" presupposes. of
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized'' segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate
faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their
authority to draw attendance zones to promote mtegration; and ( iv) locate ne",; schools, close old ones. and
8l'f' Bickf'l, oupra. n. 7. <1t 11~:
''It rtJw problem of ~chool desl:'gregationl ha~ not bl'en that simple . . brcausl:' the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Educatio11 wa ~ 1tself not th a t simpll' . Onr strain in It became r,·ident in
subsequent dcciswns outlawing all forms of state-spon~orrd segregation m e , ·f' r~·t hing from the spectator src tion of a courtroom to golf
eour::;rs. Tlw mmimal propo~ition that emrrgrd-and about time
lt wa~ that It should emergr- waH that tlw statr rna~· not , b~· legislation or admimstratively, class1fy the popnlation alo11g rarml Jines.''
11
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determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind. Where schbol authorities decide tcJ
itll(iertake the transportation of students. this also must
be with integrative opportunities in mind.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of
the con tour characteristics of an integrated school sygM
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not
mean-and indeed could not mean ih view of the resi:.
dential patterns of most of our ma]or metropolitan
areas-that every school must in fac~ be an . integrated
unit. A schooi which happens to be all or predominantly
whitE' or all or j)recibminantly black is not a "segregated"
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one,
Having school boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination. subtle or
otherwise. will find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions
with a vie>v to their general integrative effect will be best
able to assure au absence of such discrimination while
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate
assurance that minority children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted with the nonrliscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti~
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan=

/(
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty
employment and assignments. school construction, closings and consolidations. and myriad other matters.
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed
and complete public supervision, substantial 8chool segregation still persists, the presumption is strong that the
school board , by its acts or omissions. is in some part
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so
pervasive and where. after years of such action. segregated schools continue to exist within the district
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation.
The burden then must fall on the school board to demonstrate it is operating an "integrated school system.''
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and
the conseque11t, affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States ;vith state-imposed segregation at the time
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread in our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted:
" the three court of appeals decisions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City.
Kansas-where racial segregation 111 schools was
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v.
CinC?:nnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966),
cert. denied. 377 I'. S. 924 ( 1964); Downs"· Board
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 (CAlO 1964). cert. denied. 380 C S. 914. Bell \'. School City, 324 F. 2d
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949, and
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If
~egro and white parents in Mississippi are required
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more
than five years before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects." Goodman. Dt> Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275·, 297
(1972) .1 "
Kot only does the de jure/ de
jnequitably on communities in
country~ more importantly. it
children as well. As the Fifth

facto distinction operate
different sections of the
disadvantages minority
Circuit stated :

"The X egro children in Cleveland. Chicago. L6s
Angeles. Boston. X ew York. or any other area of the
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto
segregation. would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society, while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
m the 17 southern and border states violates th~
'~

Tlw author rontmur~ :

·'T rur, the (•a rlier the polic.' · of :;egregation wa~ abandoned the less
danger thrrr i~ that it rontinur~ to oprrMr ro,·ertl~·. i~ ,;ignificantly
n•;.;ponsihlr for pn•,;e nt da~· pattern>' of re,;id r ntial >'eg rrgation , or has
eontributrd rnatrriall .'· to pre~ent communit~· attitudr~ tO\\·arcl Xegro
,:('hool,;. But therr 1~ no rra~o n to ;-;uppo,;r that 195-+ i~ a uni\'e r,;ally
a ppropnatr di,·iding lin r brn,·een clr jurr ,;eg regation that m a~·
"af(')~· lw ~~~~mned to haw• ~pent it self and that which may not.
For man~· remrclial purpu;-;e~. adoption of an arbitrar~· but ea,;il~·
ad mint ~t rabl e ('Utoff pomt might not br objertionable
But in a
"ttuat1on ~ urlt a,; ~r hool d~rgregation. whrre both tlt r nghto: a~srrted
a nd the rrmrdial burdrn,; impo~rd nrr of such magnitude, and whrre
1hr re,;ult ing ,;pet tonal di"cnmma tion i,; pa~,.;iona tel~· re,;rnted. it 1~
.~urel~' quc;-;tionable whrtlwr ~ u ch arLitrarinPs~ J,..: dthcr politically
or morally a ec·c•ptablr "
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constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even
their blood brothers, bec~us~ they were born into
a de jure society. Ali- chilarel1 everywhere jn the
nation are protected by the Constitution. aiH1 treatment v,·hich violates their constitutional rights ii1
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in
anoth er area.'' Cisnero.s v. Corp?fS Christi Independent School District, 467 F. 2d 142. 148 (CA5 en ban e,
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County
Board of Bduc., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CA5 en bane)
Gewin, J.. dissenting) ,'"
The Court today does move for the first time toward
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure
action lll what th e Denver School Board has done or
failed to do . and even here the Court does not rely upo11
the results or effects of the Board's conduct but feels conipelled to find segregatory intent : '"
" We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-call<'d de facto
'" Set· Birkrl , oupra. 11 7, at 119 :
"If a Negro rhild prrcr1ve~ hili ;;eparation a~ di~rrmunator~· and
im·1diou,.;, hr 1 ~ not , m a ~oc iet~· a hundrrd .H'ar~ n•mov rcl from
,.;laver~·. gomg to makt' fine cli~tinction~ nbo nt thr ''lllll'l'l' of n pnrticular ~:>rparat ion "
,. Thr Court toda~· dor,.; not rf'quirC' , huwt·n·r. a ~pgrC'gatur\· mt<'111
1\'ith rr~pC'ct to thC' r ntire ~r hool ;; ~·,.;trm . and i1tdrrd hold,.; 1hat if ,.;nch
an 1ntr nt 1 ~ fou nd \\'tth rr~ prct to ~omr sehoul~ 111 a ~,·~trm. th C' bnrden-normalh· on thr plamtiff~-l:'hift ::; to th r cldPndant ~c hou! allthoritJr,.; to pro,·r a nrga tivf': namelv. that thPtr 1111rpo,.;<•:; w<·n·
hf'mgn, ante. pp 17- li\.
Thr Conrt ha::; COlllC' a long wa~· ~ I Ill'<' 8 rull' ll !. :::\tart ing from
the una ~,.;n il abl P de ;ure ground of tlw di;;cmnin;tton· <·on~titlltional
and statutor~· proVI;;ion,.; of ~onw Statt·~. tlw liP\\' formul<ttion-~till
profe,.;wtg fideltt~· to thr de ;ure clortrinC'-i~ that dr,.;<·gn'gation will
be orderPd de:;pttP the ab"r ncP of an~· ,.;t•gn·ga 1 or~· !a"'" if: ( i) "l'grr·g'a ted ~ehoo],.; in fact PXi<'t : (it) a cou.rt find~ that t ht';· rP,.;u[t frun~
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segrcga tion to \\'hich we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate. '' (Court Opinion, p. 18)
(italics are the Court's 1.
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor ''
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia ,
407 P . S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motivation'' is irrelevant. the Court said:
" In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate
schools. and \Ve have said that '[t]he measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.· Davis
v. School CommissioneTs of Mobile County, 402 U.S.

33. 37.
"Thus. we have focused upon the effect-not thf'
purpose or motivation- of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.
" Though the purpose of the 11ev\' school distnct was
found to be discriminatory iu many of these cases. the
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur}Joses but on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of the dual school system iilvolvecl. That
"·as the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper.
407 1r. S ..
a.t 462 .

T can discern

tJO basis in law or logic for holding that
the motivation of school hoard action is irrelevant in

~0 111<' ~1ctw n tak011 II'Jth <'l'gregntur.\· llltl'nt h~· the "rhool hoard :
(ni) <'Uch actwn rPint<'" to nnY "meaningful ~egment" of tlw ~chool
"·''"l<'m ; aJHi (!\') tlw .,chool ho;Jrd ca nnot pro,·p that It<' Jlltl'ntion:<
,,·it h n ·~p(•rt to the rernaindPr of t h<• <'\":<t<·m wen· l!Oil~<·grrgatory,
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argu0cl.
of course. that in En17J0ria a prior constitutional violation had already been proven and that this .JUStifies the
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho\\·C'ver. is the application of an effect test to the actions of
southem school districts and an intent test to those in
othC'r sections. at least until an initial de jure finding for
those' districts can be made. Rather than straining to
perpetuate any such dual standard. we should hold forthrightly that significant segregated school conditions in
\vhatever section of the country are a prima facie violation of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted
t>lse"·here :
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular
jury or during some particular period. But it taxC's
our credulity to say that nwre chance resulted iu
there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The
result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was

a, co11scious decision on the part of any individual JUry
r·o111tnissioner." Hernandez v. Te::ras, 347 C S. 475.
482 ( 1954) . (Emphasis ac!clec! l

B
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutiOnal
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration which
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits in which there can be little hope of unifQrmit:v of re15ult ,
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them .
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's
decision on vvhether segregation has resulted in an y
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to
action taken or not taken over many years-will bE'
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts below found evidence of de JUre violations
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools.
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is, for example. quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will,
under the de jure/de facto distinction. continue to differ .
especially since the Court has never made clear what
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent'" for
an initial constitutional violation . Even if It were possible to clarify this question. \\·ide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges '":ould be inevitable
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent'" or
"purpose." especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities Ulldf'r varying eonditions over many vears
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation,
or collection of different motivations. that lie behind a
legislative enactment. '' Palmer V. Thornpson, 403 e. S.
r . S. - . 214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster, (1973); United States v. O'Brien , 391 C R. 367, 381
( 1968). Whatever difficulties exist vYi th regard to a single statute will be compounded in a judicial review of
years of administration of a large aiid complex school
system."' Every act of a school board and school administration. and indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny .
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools. made almost daily, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated.
remain in that collClition, are desegregated. or-for the
long term future- are likely to be one or the other. These
uecisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building construction and location; the timing of
building new schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of
' ·' A~ onr comm('ntaror ha~ rxpn·~:-;ed it.

"If thr court~ arr mdrrd prrp:HPd to inq111re mto mottw. thorn)·
qurstions will ari~r e1·en 1f onr a::-:~umr~ that ra(·ial motn·atwn i~·
rapablr of bemg provrn at trtal. What of thr case 111 1Yh1rh one or
morr mrmbrr" of a ~rhool board , but lrss than a majorit)·, are found
to haw actrd on racwl ground~·> What if it appPars that the :;rhool
hoard 's actwn ll"a~ promptrd bY a mixt11n· of motll"e~ . mcluding con;;titlltJOnall)· innocrnt one:-; that alone 1\"0illd han' promptrd the board
9
to act
What 1f thr members of the tichool board ,,·rrr not thrm~rh·es raciall)· m~pirrd but \\'l::<hrd to plra~<· thrir (·onst1tuent::< , many
of II' hom t hr)· knew to bP :,:o '1 If such ra~r~ a rr da~:;ifird a~ uncon~htutional de Jurr spgrPgatlon , thrrc i~ littlr poult 1n pre:;prving
thr de .ime-dr facto cli>'tinction at all. And 11 ma)· 1\"PII br thnt thP
diffcrrnrr betll"rrn an)· of t he~c ~1tuation~ and one 111 wh1rh racJal
mot1ntwn IS altogrthrr lacking 1~ too m:;ignificant. from rhr ~tand
pomt of both thr morn! l'ulpabllitl" of the· ~tatP officwl~ and the·
llll]Xl.et upon thr children im·oh·rd , to ~upp o rt a diffPrPncr in ron -stttutwna l trra tment " Goofjma n , supra. 11 11. at :?X+-2H5_
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student attendance zones; thr extent to which a. neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment. promotion
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel:
policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whetlwr. and to ·what extent. special schools will
be provided. where they will be located. and who ''"ill
qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculunL
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training. and the routing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as
to social. recreational and athletic policies.
ln Swan 11 the Court did not have to probe in to segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each
of these "endless'' factors . The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 402 l ' . :-i .. at 5-6. But in a case of
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial
examination of these factors will be required under today 's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and
unpredictable results. to protracted and inconclusive litigation. to added burdens on the federal courts. and to
serious disruption of individual school systems. ln tlw
absence of national and objective standards. school boards
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty
and disarray , speculating as to what is required and when
litigation will strike .
('

Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and contributing to the consequences indicated above. we should acknowledge that
when ever public school segregation exists to a substantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school board. lt
is true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever
located- are not solf'ly tlw produ ct of the actio11 or
inaction of publie school authoriti<•s. IndP<'d . as indi-
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cated earlier. there can be little doubt that principal
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth.
vVest. or South. are the socio-economic i11fluences '"hicb
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school boards have
continuing. detailed responsibility for the public school
system \\'ithin their district 'n and, as Judge John Minor
\Visclom has noted. "v.:here the figures lsho\\·ing
segregation in the schoolsj speak so eloquently. a
prima face case of discrimination is established.''
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 .
873 ( CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
\Yhich has outlived its time.

T11
The preceding section addresses the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the school districts
{J ._..
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys\
terns. When the rhools of a particular district a·~

/

u; Indl'ed , if one gor~ back far rnough, n ~~ probable that all rac~al
~egregat ion , whereyer ocrurnng and whet her or not confined to thr
::;chook ha,; at ~orne time been ~upportrd or maintained b~· go,·rrnmrnt al'tion . In Berket , .. &·hoot Board. :m~ F. Supp. 127·1-, 1:311 -

J:ns (ED \'a . 1969) , .Tudgr Waltrr Hotfm;ln eompi!Pd a ,;ummar~·
of pa,;t publ!e ,;egregator~· action whirh mcludPd Pxampl{'~ from a
great ma.iority of Starr,;. He roneluded that "on!~· a:o: to the ,;tatr~
of l\Iame . \few Hnmp~h1n• , \'ermont. \\ra~hmgton. :'-JrYada. and
Hawaii cloP~ ir apprar from tbi~ nonexhaustive re~earch that nodi:'erimnwtor~· law:,: :1ppenrrd on thr boob at onp tim(' or anotlwr _"
!rl., at 1:315.
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found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima
facie case that this obligation has not been met. Th e
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demon~
strate that they have in fact operated an integ~
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. -;(· If
·
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case. the question then becomes what reasonable affinnac
-tive~steps district courts may require to place the school
system in compliance \vith the constitutional standard.
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the
·emedy'?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver is a "dual school system,'' that city
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregat<:'
its entire system "root and branch.' ' Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

Ea
1

Je___

A
The controlling case is Swan'/1, supra, and the questiOn
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require .
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily 011 Brown I and !I and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary a~
\\·ell as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation decrees 17 " to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
See, e. g .. Thompson v. Sehoul Board of Xell'port Nell'~. F . 2d - , - (1972), where the CA4 en ba11c. uph<'ld a di~tnct court
a~~IgJUnPnt plan when• "travel time, varying from a mmimum of
fort~· mmutP~ a nd a maximum of one hour, pach wa)·, would hP rP4UirPd for bu~mg black ~tudents out of th e old Cit~· and white stuqrnt,.; into the old City 111 order to arlm•ve a nicml balancmg of the
17

desegregation." 402 1:. S., at 26. In the context of a
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different-and widely
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
ansively as many courts have been rPading.,)<'
To_the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound
mis 1vmgs. Xothing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such disruption of public education.
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason
under '"'hich desegregation remedies must remain flexible
and other values and interests be considered. ~Thus thP
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with tht>
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. ~., at
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust mon·
readily to this task than those in metropolitan distnct8'
dist nct. " Thi:; tran:sportation wa~ drcrred for children from the th1rd
grade up, involving children ~~~ young as right yrar:s of 11gr.
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ. , 466 F. :2d R90 , ~95
( 197:2), the CA6 affirmed a di~trict court 11:s:signment pl11n wlmh
dail~· tmn:sportrd 14,000 children with "the maxnnum tnnP to bP·
~prnt on the bu:se,; b~· an~· child I bring I :34 minutr~. .
," prr~umabl~· rach wa~·. But '" .Judgr Weick notrd in dt:s:srnt the CA6
tn"tructPd the di::;trict judgr to implement ~·et furth<'r dr~rgrrgation
ordrr~. Plan~ presrntl~· undrr con~ideration b~· that court call for
t hr bu:sing of :39,01'5 and 61,5:30 children re,;prctiwl~ ·, for undrtrrmmrd length,; of timr. !d .. at R95-98fi.
Prtitioner,; brfor<' thi:s Court in Potts \'. Fla.r . Xo 7:2-2i'tl, cert.
denird, r. S. - (197-), contended that thr implrmrntatwn
of th<' C'A5'~ clirectiw in Flax , .. Potts. 464 F. :2d ~65 ( 197:2), would
n•qutrP bu,; ridr~ of up to two hour,; and :20 minutp~ each da~· and
a round trip of up to 70 miiP~ . Petitio11 , at 14. Whilr re~pondents
contend thr~e figurr::: rrpr<'~rnt an "a::;tounding mflat ion," He,;pon~e.
(ll (. tl':ln~portat\on of :1 ~ignifi('ant magnitur]p >'('<'Ill~ l!l P\' Itab](',
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools,
congested and complex traffic patterns.'' !d., at 14.
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process.
!d., at 31. Fina.lly, the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as one important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid .
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases." And the Court further emphasized that equitable
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other
public and private interests :
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct. by a
balancing of the individual and collective interest.
the condition that offends the Constitution . 8wann .
.;;upra, at 15- 16.
Those words echoed a similar expression in Bro11•11 ll ,
349 U. S., at 229 :
" In fashioning and effecting the decrees . the court1:5
will be guided by equitable principles. Tradition ally, equity has been characterized by a practical
fl exibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
Se<' L'nited States " · Texa~; Education Agency. -l-117 F . :.!d i\-l-8. Xc\~{
~<' \'<' ll ot lwr
Judg<'~ jo inrd):
1

'

(CA5 1972 ) (Bell. .J ., concurring m a n opinion in wlu ch

" ln our \'I<'W the r<'m<'dy which tlw district court 1~ n•quin'd t o

formula!<' ~ houlcl bt• formulat('d within tlw entire route.rt or the
opmwn Ill Swamt , . Charlotte-Mer-klenburg Board of Er/ucntim'. . . . LEmphasi~ aclcl<·d.j"
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for adj usti11g and reconciling public and private
nreds."
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity
counsels reason. flexibility a11d balance. See. e. g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman.- V. S . - (1973). I am aware. of
course. that reasonableness in any area is a relative and
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to
_.._.____,,~1 with other. equally important
ucational interests which a community may legitimately assert. Xeglect
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhancfecf spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached.'" Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlP
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balaiiCl' .. ami "flexibility" ~hich this Court has alwayy

:;,--r~'at'(lt>(~ +t.

B

-

50

Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty
to operate an integrated school system. district courts
lllust insure that affirmative dcsegregative steps ensue
~Iany of these can be taken effectively without damaging state and parental interests in having children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
vYhere clesegregative ste]JS are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood education." school
authorities
" ' Tlw rp}(•,·ant inquir~· i~ "ll'hNhrr th(• co~t~ of arhl('nng: dr~<·g:rP
g:ation in <In~· giwn ~ituation outwrigh tlw }(•gal. moral and f'durnt ion a} ('Oll:<tdrra t ion,: fa ,·oring: It .
• . It i~ c!Pa r .
t h;lt t hP
Con~tttutton "hould not br hrld to rpquir<' am· tran~portation plan
that k<'f'Jl~ childn•n on a bu" for a "ub"tantial part of thl' da~·. ron .-nttnf'~ ~igntfieant portion~ of fund" oth<'nYi"P "PPndabk dirPctly on
('ducat IOII. or ill\·oln·~ a gc·nuinr Plrmrnt of dangPr to thr ~afl't~· of
th<• C'hild." Srhool Dr"rgrrgntion Aft<'r :Swann: .-\ Tlwor_,. of Co,·\'rnmrnt Rr·~pon~ihtlit,\·. :39 (". Chi L J{r,·. -t!l. -tU. -H:~ ( HJ/:2) .
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should bf' drawn
to integrate . to thE' extent practicablE'. the school's student body. Construction of new schools should bP of
such a size and at such a Ioca tion as to encourage the
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integration should be attained throughout the school systPm.
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County
Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 ( Hl69) . .-\.n optional
majority to minority transfer program. ,,·ith the Statf'
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
8wann. at 26-27. It hardly need be repeatPd that alloca~
tion of resources within the school district must be marl<'
\Yith scrupulous fairness among all schools .
.The above examples are meant to bP illustrativr. not
f>Xhaustivc. The point is that the over-all integrative
impact of such school board df'cisions must be assessed by
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans
arf' constitutionally suspect whf'n attendancE' zotH'S an'
superficially imposed upon racially defined twighborhoods.
and when school construction presPrvf's rather than elimtnates the racial hegemony of gi w n schools ... "'' K eyfs
v. School District Xo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F . 2d - ,
l 'n'ited States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County,
429 F. :2d - . 1258- 1259. This does not imply that
deci t:ions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school
construction. closing and consolidation. must be made
to the detrinwnt of all nf'utral. nonracial considPrations
But these considerations can. 11·ith proper school board
initiative. generally bf' met in a manner that will rnhance
the degree of school dPsegregatio11
""A \l~pful ~tud~· of tlw lu~ton ral \1~('~ and ah\I~P~ or tlH• ll(' lghhoi·hoorl ~r hool eoncf'pt 1~ \I WrmiH•rg , Hac-<' (\: Plarr t 19()7 l ,
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Ddaulti ng school authonties \\·ould have. at a minimum. the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort
outlined in the above section. School boards would. of
course. be free to develop and initiatr further plans to
promote school desegregation. In a pluralistic society
such as ours. it is essent1al that no racial minority frel
demeaned or discriminatC'd against ami that students of
a ll races learn to play. work. ancl cooperate with on<'
another in their cmnmo11 pursuits and endeavors. :\'othing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the recognized values of integrated school
('Ondition~ .

A r·o11stitutional requ1rr men t of extensive. student
/
transportation so lely to achieve' integration~
presents a vastly more eomp lex problem. It promisf's
on the one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation.
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as
important community aspirations and personal nghts. A
The Equal Protection Clause does mcleed require that
racial discrimination not be tolerated in tlw deciswns
of public scho.ol authorities. k )Poes not command that
f3._u._:T
school authonties undertake widespread student transportation solely for the sakr of maximizing integration ."'

L

"' In !art, du r to rarialh· ~rpar:ttc• I'P~a!Pnnal pattrrns that rharH<'IE'rihc' our major urban an·n~ 11 t,; quttP unreah~tH· to thmk of
ac·htr 1·i ng in mam· eittr~ ~uh~tantwl tntrgration throughout the·
~rhool dtst nrt ll'lthout a dr12:n·c · of ~~ udPnt tran~portat ion ll'hieh
ll'ould haYr the gravr~t pronomtr and Pducational r·on~rqll<'llf'f'~
.-\ s l'rofr~,.:or Birkf'l notP~

·Tn mo~t of the lar~er urban :tl'<'a~. d!'mogra phte rondttton::; arr ~urh
that no policy th at a romt ran onl<>r. and a ~rhool board, a rtty ot·
<'l·rn :1 ~tat<' ha,.: tlH~ rapabi!Jt~· to put into ptfpct, will m fart rr~ult
111 thP for<'"<'P:!ble futurp 111 raet : tll~· balatH'Pd puiJIH· ::;e hool.-<.
Only
il l'('ordf'ring of t hP Pll\' II'Ollmc· nt tn1·oj l'lllg Pc·onomH· and ~oet:d po!Jr\'

z_}--

_,

')'"

This obvio sly doE's not nwan that bus transportatiOn
~~
has no placE' i 1 public school systems orA&tl a permJssJbl ~ ~
desegregative ~· The transporting of school children
is as old as public f'ducation, ami in rural and som('
suburban settings it 1s as indispensable as the providing
of hooks. It is presently estimated that approximatE'ly
half of all American children ride buses to school for
reasons unrE'lated to integration."" At the secondary
lE'vel in particular, wherE' thE' schools are larger and servP
a wider. more dispersed cottstituency than the elE'mentary
school. some form of public or privately financed trans~
portatibi1 is often nE'cessary . 'rhere is a differencE'. however . in transportation plattS voluntarily initiated by local
school boards for educational purposes and those imposed by a federal court. Thf' former usually represcn t a
nE'cessary or convE'nient means of access to the school
nearest honw; the latter often requirE' lengthy trips for no
purpose otlwr than to furth('r tntegration "" Yet tlw
on thr hroade~<t roncPJY:tblr front m1ght have an appn~etahk impact "
B1rkPl, supra. n. / , at J:l:2
"" E~tunatr~ 1·ar~·. Swami. !iUpra. at :2\:!. not re! that "rlght<•<•n million of thr :\atwn '~ public ~<rhool children, approx1matrl~· ::!9 %, ,,·en·
transpo.rtrd to their ~r hoob 1)\· bu~ 111 HHi9-l970 m all part~ of thl'
cot tnt r~· ." ::knator H ibH·off (D .-Conn.) a thoughtful ~tudr nt of t hi~
proiJirm .... tatPd that "two-thu·d,.; of all Ampncan childrrn todaY ridr
bu,.;r~ to ::;rhool for re;Json::; llllrPhttPd to Illt~·gration . .. Ill' Cong. RPr
8254:3. FPh 24. 19/2
"" Ht::'tonralh , dt~tant t ran~porta t ion wa~ wronglY ttsrd 1o promotP ~<rgrpgation . ":\pgro ch!ldrr!J w<·n· genrrall~· con~Idrrrcl t'a]l·
aiJIP of trawllmg longPr dt~tanrr~ to ~chool and II'Ithout thr mel of an~
1·rhicle What 1\'a~ too far for <I 11·hitP ch tlcl bPcamP rra~ottabl~· near
lor a :\egro child." iVPmbt>r~~:. wpra. tl. 20. at ,-;7
Th1" dPplorablr ht~tor~· ha~ lPd ~ontt• to argur that mtpgratn·p btt~
ndp,; arp Jlt~tifiPd a~ atottrmPttt for pa:;t ~Pg regator~· tnp~ and that
ttetghborhood educattott "' ttOII' hut a codP-worcl for racwl :;cgrcgnt tOll. But mi~tt:'P of tra tt~port at tOll 1n t hr pa~t cloP~ ttot tmpl~· ttcighhorhood ~chool ing ha,; no nil id IIOil~rgn·ga tor~· u~r" for t lw pre~ent
'\or would 1\Tongful t rall~]lortat 1011 Itt the pa ... r Jlt~t1f1· dNnlll<'tHal
ti'<Jtl~port;ttJOtt for thP dllldrett of torl<ll .
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('ourt in Swanu was unquestionably right in describing
bus transportation as '' one tool of school desegregation."
40:2 ·c S .. at 30."' The crucial issue is when. under \\'hat
circumstances. anJ to what extent such transportation
may appropriately be orc!Ned. Tlw answer to thi
turns-as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exer•
cisr of discretion under the circumstances.
Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative obligations. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing .. . \Vould
l1f' disproved . . ," and sanctwned district court usP
of mathematical ratios as " no more than a startmg point
in the process of shaping a remedy. .
402
S .. at
24. 25. Thus particular schools may be all \d1lte or·
all black and st1ll not mfringt• constitutional nghtl:'
Jf the system is genu1nely integrated and school authorities are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and
disruptive transportation. Thr refusal of thr Court to
require racial balance 1n schools throughout the distnct
or the au tom a tic climination of all "one-race schools. "
402 r. S .. at 26. IS grounded 111 a recognition that the
~tate . pare nts. and children all have at stake m

e.

"' :-lorn<' C'OI11111\lllittr~ had tr;\ !l ~ port at ton plan~ in df<·C't at tlw t!tlH'
of C'Olll't ciC'~egrrgatiOII ordrr~. Srr ::iu'Q111l, oupra. at 29, n. 11, DaVIS
1· .

&hoof Crmnn'rs of Mobile ('ounty, -!0:2 ll. S. :3:3 , :3-1--:35 (1971)

( 'ou rt ~ ha 1·r· u ~rd t lw pr<'~I'IH'f' or a IJ"·n<·<· of PXI~t l!lg t rn 11~port at tun
in a dt~tl'l!'l a ~ on<· faetor Ill framing and tmplemPnting dPsPgrrga tton
dPCI'PP>'. l "tut ed States ,._ ll'ats1111 Chap el School Di8tnct. 4-!0 F . :2d
H:n. 9:37 (l':\1' 19 71) : Xorthcro:;:; 1'. Board of Educ., 4-!-! F 2d 1179,
11S:2-11S:) (('..\() 1971): Da 1•18 , .. Board of Educ .. :3:2.-.: F . Supp. 1197 ,
1:20:) (ED .-\rk. 1971)
Wh C' rr ;t .--rhool board ~ ~ ,·oluntanl~- r ngagrd
111 t ran>'porting ~t ud rnt>', a d1,;tnrt C'Ol! rt I>', of <·our~<'. obluratrd to
Jll>'lll'r that ~uch tra n"p ort atto n I>' not uncl!'rtakrn wtth ~rg rrga tor~·
Pffr!'t. \YhC'r<'. abo, 1·olunt ; tr~· tran"portation programs arr alrra cl~
111 progn'""· tlt<'n' ma~· hr grratc·r Jll>'ltfi!'attull for rourt-orc!Nrd tran"port;ltton of ~tuc!Pnt" fur a I'OIIIfJ!lrah!e till/!' a11d rhstance to ar hwq ·
~J'(·;tter !lltr·grat ton_
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school desegregatiOn decrf'es legitimate and recogmzablf'
interests.
The personal m terest might be characterized as the
desire that children attend community schools near
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools m
relation to the residf'nts by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55, 60 ( H)66). the ~ixth Circuit summarized
tlw advantageR of Ruch a neighborhood system of
Rchools: "··
":\.ppellants. however. pose the question of whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly
aclministerf>d without racial bias. comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it neverthe less
rf>sults in the creation of schools with predominantly
or f'W lt exclusively :\egro pupils. The neighborhood systr>m IS in wide use throughout the natio11
and has been for many years the basis of school
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have several valuablE' aspects which are an
aid to f'clucation. such as minimization of safety hazards to children in rcachmg school. economy of cost
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil
placement and admtnistratwn through the use of
"'' Tlu· tl'rm "tll'ighhorhood ~chool '' ~hould not be ~uppo~Pd tu
r!t•notP ~olel.1· a ll'alk-m sehool or onr ll'htrh :;ern·~ <·hildren on!~· 111
thP ~IIITo11mhng blocks. Thr ( 'omt ha~ not<'d, m <1 thtfrrrnt contrxt, that "thr ll'l>rd ·neighborhood' 1~ q11JtP a~ ""~rPpttblr of varlatton a~ tlw ll'ord ·Joraht~·
Both term,.; arp p]a,.;ttr and , deprndrnt
upon C'Il'C'IIm~tanr<'~ . ma~· bt· rq11alh· ,.;atisfiPcl b~· nrra:; mrm;urrd b.1
rocb ur bl' tniiP~ " Collllal/ !J \' Oe11era/ Co11,;t. Co .. :2fi9 lJ . 8. :385.
:)95 tl9:2ti)
In thr ~rhool rontPxt. "IIPt).!;hhorhood" refer~ to relatll'<'
proxtmtt.l' , to a prf'i'PrPIICP for :1 ~<'hool ll!' :ll'Pr. rathN t haJJ mon·
r!I~t:tiii from honk.
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neutral, easily determined standards, and bette!'
home-school communication ,.
The neighborhood school docs provide greater ease of
parental and student access and convenience, as well as
greater economy of public administration. These are
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of
the neighborhood concPpt rests on more basic grounds."''
.\'eighborhod school syst<'ms . neutrally administered. rf'fiect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public Nlucation. Public schools havP
heen a traditional source of strength to our :'\ation. and
that strength may clerivC' in part from the identification of
many schools IYith the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood. Community support. interest and
dedication to public schools may lYell run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
the intimacy of our institutions- home. church. and
school- which has caused a concomitant decline in the
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of constitutional la11· what may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely related to tlw concept of a community and
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties parents have with respect to the education of their children.
The Jaw has long recognized the parental duty to nurture.
support. and provide for the welfare of children. includ""I do 11ot nnp]y that thr IH' tghborhood l'OIH'P]lt mu~t hr PmbodiPd
rvpry ~rhool ~Y:>tPm . But \\'hrn• a ~rhool board ha~ rhot<Pil it .
fedrral .im\gP~ ~hould accord 1t rl'~p<· <·t 111 framlllg rPnwdtal deer<·<·~.
lit
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mg their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
r . S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that :
{lUnder the doctrine of Meyer v. f..' ebraska, 262
r. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1022 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
Pducation of children under their control. . .
The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 1.!. S. 479. 482
( 1965). the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." r do not believe recognition of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send
a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a private education for their
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and
public taxes. Those who may for 11umerous reasons
seek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice iu the school their
child attends. It would. of course, be impractical to
allow the \·vishes of particular parents to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent i11 the enhanced parentschool and parent-child communication allowed by the
neighborhood unit ought not to he suppressed by forre.
of ]a,,·
In the understandable natwnal concern for alleviating
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected
hy a desegregation program also are entitled to consideration . Any child. white or black . who is compelled to.
]Pave his nei~hborhood and sprnd sig11ificant tinw f'ach
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an ime
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Xot long ago .
James B. Conant wrote that "laJ t the elementary school
level the issue seems clear. To send young children clay
after day to distant schools seems out of the questioil." "'
A community may well conclude that the portion of a.
child 's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal
interests of parents a.nd children which a community may
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to questiOn just as seriously any remedial requirement of extensive student transportation solely to further integration.
Any such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately
on the school districts of our country. depending on
their degree of urbanization . financial resources. and their
racial composition. :-iom0 districts with little or no bJracial population >Yill experience little or no educational
disruption. while others. notably in large. biracial metropolitan areas. must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integration frequen tly being ordered by district courts."' At a
time \vhen public education generally is suffering seriou~
financial malnutntion. the econonuc burdens of such
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
dollars."'' And whilf' eonstitutional requirements hav0., Shtm,- a nd Submh,-. 2!:) ( 19fil)
"·' 8<·<' 11. :21 , supra .
"" ln \[<·mpht,- , for <'xamplr , whil'h ha ,- no hi~ton· of hu~Jng ~111r!Pnt:<, th r mmimum tran"portatJon plan ordPrPd b~ · tlw comt::: will.
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often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children .
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceeds that \Vhich may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by
its action and nonaction. may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the
Denver Board over the past decades. the fundamental
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It
Is indeed a novel application of equitable power-not to
menti011 a dubious extension of constitutional doctrineto require so much greater a degree of forced school in~
t<'gration than would havC' resulted from purely natural
and neutral nonstate causes.
The compulsory transportation of students carries a
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. With most
COilstitutional violations. the major burden of remedial
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials
who act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or
religious exercise. for example. are obliged to cease the
offending act or practice and, where necessary. institute
eorrective measures. It is th<:'y who hear the hrunt of
rPqlllrr, 111 t hr Sc·hool Boa rei'~ <'~tunatr , an tmtwl capital rxprndl111n•
of $l,H6-!,192 for bu~r~ plu~ an Hnnu<tl operating ro~t of ~629.192
Tlw Board r~tunatr:< that a morr r;o.1rn~in• tran~portatwn program
to lw ron~tclrrrd b~· thr di~t nC't romt will rrqutre mitial capital m\'<'mnPnts of 8:3.92-!,000 nne! a nnual oprrating co~t~ of $1,7tl:3,-!90
Thr mo~t clra~ttr tran:<portatwn plan beforP thr clistnrt ('0\11'1 rpquirr:<
r:<t unntrd annual oprrating ro:<t~ of from $2,:35-!,220. 82,.-1:31 ,7 10. or
:S8,..J.o:3JOO dPpe nding 011 thr Board',; tran,;portntion arrangrmrnts
.\' orthcross \·. Bua.rd of Ed u!'ation of !11 em phis ('ity Srh .. -~II Jira.
II. 17 , HI K9K (\>\'pjc·k .. J., dt~:<Plllllli!)
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renwdial action. though othPr citizens \ Ill to varying d(•grePs feel its effects. School author· ies responsible for
segregation must. at the very minin m. act to ceasE> segrpgatory acts. But when tlw obli ation further extends
to the transportation of students the full burd0n of the
affirmativE> remedial action is bor:ne by children and parents who did not participatE> in any constitutional
violation .
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration ..
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable
social consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent
to \\·hich dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sysr-:-\
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races~~
-------~" guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
/ ~
the movement from innercity to suburb. and the further
';;~ ·
p.,
1
geographical separation of the races. ~r: do we,\know
.....; ,_ ~~
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
~~
community and parental support of public schools. or
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality tn
educatiOn to a perennially devisive debate over who is
to be transported vvhere.
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed
~
rourts. ~chool_officials, othe_r public authorities. and stu~
dents of pubhc educatwn for nearly two decades. Thr
,;-/
problem. especially since it has focused on the "busing
ty-rf
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever
~
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no
pretense of knowing the best ans\\'ers. Yet. the issue in
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of con"titutional law . As to this issue. I have no doubt whatPver. TherP is nothing in tlw Constitution, its history
or- until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
Qf yQung and tPenagP rhilclren to achievp a singlE> interPst,
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as Important as this interest may be. We have strayPJ.
quite far as I view it. from the rationale of Brou!ll 1
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of! public and
private needs." Brown ll , 349 U. S., at :229.
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result,
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered
student transportation in furtherance of desegregatioll.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree. transportatiOJI orders should be applied >vith special caution to
a11y proposal as disruptive of family life and interestsand ultimately of education itself- as extensive transportation of elementary age children solely for desegregation
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary t.ransJlOrtation away from their neighborhoods of elementary
age children .'' It is at this age level that neighborhood
education performs its most vital educational role . 'It
.is \\'ith respect to children of tender years that th e
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school.
that the rights of parPnts and ch1ldren arP most sharply
lrn p licatc'd .'"
"Thrre ma~· \\'ell hP advaniage:, in rommf'ncing th<• intrgratin•
at an Parly agf' , as ~· oung children ma.1· br IP~s likt> l~ ·
I han oleiN rlulclrrn a nd adult::; to dt>vt>lop an lllhibiting racial ro n~r Jou :-: n p~:-:. ThP:<r advantagE's should bt> consiclert>d a;:; :<chool board:-:
_
makf' llw vanous decisions with thr Vlf'W to arh1enng and prt'"E'rv\ 10
n1g an mt egra trd school ~y::;tem . Supra, p. ~ L-=-a ncmg of all rrlrYant mte re~t", thr advantage" of an earl~· mt rgra tivr rx pPnrnc!' must , and 111 all finrnrs;; ~hould, lw weighPd aga1n~t
othrr rrlPYant advantage;:; and disadvantag<'"-and in l1glu of llw
cif'mograplur rharactrnsrir~ of thf' partwular r·ommnnlll' ,
<'XJlf'nf'ncr~
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'W hile greater transportation of secondary school studellts might be permitted. even at this level the desire of
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools
should command judicial respect. It vvould ultimately
he wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to
permit affected conununities to decide this delicate issu
of student transportation on their own. ~.
· ~~~0€1-seheel

e~~~I'€Spfflk-

JV
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on two issues. addressed in this opiuion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform
judicial approach should be taken to our national problems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost unifonnly in favor of extensive transportation. should be
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the
various interests which are involved. With all deference.
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither
of these issues in a v,:ay that will afford adequate guidance to the courts below in this case or lead to a rational.
coherent national policy with respect to integration in
the schools.
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto/
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a
rationale. which can only lead to increased and iuconclusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every
school district in the lallcl. The public schools have
ahYays been funded a11d operated by States and their
local subdivisions. 1t is true that segregated schools.
c·ven i11 the cities of the South. are in large part the
product of social and economic factors- aud the resulting
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in the United States. with any significant minority
school population. in which the school authorities-ill
Oile way or the other-have not contributed in somfi
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails.
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of
the country and on minority children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. fn the
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than
that imposed by district courts after Swann, thf~
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and
other major cities may well involve even more extensive
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time.
It is well to remember that the course \Ve are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom ancl
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this
goal of quality education. free from protracted and
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transportation. The single most disruptive element in educa~
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory transportation. especially at elementary grade levels. This
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities.
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other edueational and societal interests a community may legitimately assert. This w·ill help assure that integrated
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school Ey!"tems \\·ill bP establishc'd a11d maintained by
rational action. will be better understood and supported
hy parents and chilrlrf'n of hoth races. and will prornote
the rnduring qualities of an i r1tegratrd society so PSS<'ntial to its genuine sucees::;.
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PowELL concurring in part and dissenting

in part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court. but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions 'vhich mandated or permitted racial
segregation. 1 Kor has it been argued that any other
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing la\VS)
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." The
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution ha>; cxpres~ly prohibited "any classification of pupils
. . on account of race or
color ."
1 Sec, e. g .. Stcann Y . Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwu ..
-102 U. S 1, 23 (1971)
··wr do not reach .. , til<' que:;twn whether a showmg that :schoor
~egregation i~ a con~equencc· of other t~·pe~ of state action , Without
an~· diijcriminator~· action b~· ijc hool authoritie:s , IS a constitutional
v10lation requiring remedial action b~· a :school de,;egrrga tion dl.'crl.'e :r
Tlw trrm .. ~tatf' action,'' a~ u~l.'d lwrf'in, thu~ rf'fN,; to action~ of the·
appropriatt• public school a11thori.t1<'~ .
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Court has inquired only to ·w hat extent the Denver
public school authorities may have contributecl to the
school segregation which is acknowledged to exist in
Denver.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court considered that a school
with a concentration of 70 to 75o/r "Negro or Hispano
students'' was identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children. The city-v.:ide school mix in Denver is 66o/r
Anglo, 14o/c Negro. ancl 20o/r Hispano . In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in which there
IS a substantial minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footdragging as the process was in most places. substantial progress to\vard achieving integration has been made
lll southern States." );To comparable progress has been
made in many nonsouthern cities "·ith large minority
., Acrordmg to thP 1971 HEW <'~tm1atP, 43.9 % of ~Pgro pupils
attl'ndPd majont~· whit<' school,; m thP South m; oppo,;ed to only
27 .8';i( who attPnded >'urh ~rhoob in tllf' Xorth and We,;t. Fifty:<C'\·en pl'rrPnt of all "NPgro pupil:< Ill tlw ::\forth and WP~t attend
"<"hool>' with ovPr SO% minority population a~ opposed to 82.2%
1\'ho rio ,;o in the South . llk ( 'ong . Her . Sl-t5
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, populations primarily because of the de facto / de jure
. distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices >vhich denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South.·' But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality, we must recognize that thP
evil of operating separate schools is no lrss in Denver
than in Atlanta.
1

1 Thr
1971 HEW EnroJlmrnt Surwy drama.tizf'd thr srgrcg;ated
eharartrr of public ~rhool ~~·~tern,; in man~· nonsouthern citi~. ThP
JH'rrrntage of 1\rgro pupib which attrndrd :;chool~ morr than 80%
black wa~ 91.3 in Clrvrland. Ohio; 97.8 in Compton , California:
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio: 78.fi m Drtroit, :\[ichigan ; 95.7 in Gar~· ,
Indiana: 86.-! in Kan:;a~ Cit~·. :\Ii,;l:;ou ri ; 86.6 in Lo~ Angrlrs, California: 7~.8 in :\Iilwaukrr , Wiscon,;in; 91.:3 m Newark, New .ler~ry:
S9 .~ in St. Loni:s, .\fis:-<ouri. Thr fnll data from the Enrollment Snrn·~· ma~· br found in 118 Cong . Rrc. S14+--148 . .Tan. 20, 1972.
''As Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rPcogmzrd:

"For ~·pa r:-< wr haw fought thr battlr of mtegratwn primaril~· in
thP South whPrP thr problrm was ,;evere. It was a long , arduou:-<
fight that dr:-<rn·ed to br fought and nrrded to be won
"lf nf ortuna tel~·, a::: t lw problrm of ra cial !<:'olatwn ha:-< moved north
of the .\fa,;on-Dixon linr , man~· northrrner::: have bid an P \'a~iw
farrwrll to thr 100-~·ear strugglr for racial equalit~· . Our motto
srrm" to havP brrn ·Do to "o ntllPl'll('l'~ what ~·on do not wanr to do
1 o your,;p]f'
uGood rrasons havr ahn1~·" hr<•JJ off<•rrd, of cour"P, for not mov111g
,· ig;orou"!~· :till' ad in t hr North a,.; wrll a" t hr South .
'· Fir"t. 1t wa:-< that thr problrm wa:-< wor:::r m thr South . ThPn
~lw facts brgan to "how that that w:t:-< no longer trnt".
" W<· tlwn began to !war tlw d<• farto-dP jurr rpfram
"Somrhow rl'~idrntial :-<Pgrrg:lt 1011 in t lw :\ ort h wa" acc1dPntal or
dr facto and that madr it brt trr than tlw lpgal!Y :-<upportPd dr jure
:-;egrl'gation of the South. It ,,·a,.; a hard di::;tmction for black chilclrrn
Ill totall~· ~rgrPgatPd :-<chools 111 till' \'orth to under:-<tand, but it
allowrd us to :n-oid thl' problrm ·· 111' Cong Hrc 825-!Z. Frb. 24 ,
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[n my vie\V we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the southem
::)tates. was officially imposed racial segregation in the
schools extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some
of the language was more expansive, the holding in
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States. or their instrumentalities, to force children to a.ttend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in
Brown I \Yas construed-for some years and by many
courts-as requiring only state neutrality , allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints.';
·~ Se<~,

e. g .. Bradley v. School Hoard.

:~45 F. :2d :HO, 316 (CA4

en bane. 1965) ·
that the Fourteenth
"It ha,: been lwlcl again and agam .
.\menclment prohib1tion i~ not again~t ;;egregation a~ such
A ,.;tatr or school cli~trirt otfrncl~ no constitutwnal requirement
\\'hen it grants to all student::; uniform]~· an unre::;tncted freedom of
ch01cr a::< to tiChool attPnded, ~o that each pupil , m effect, a,:sJgnR him.-;df to the ,.;chool hP \\'i,.;he,.; to att end ." (The ca:;P wa ,; later vacated
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But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II,
349 F. S. 294 (1955), did not retain its original meaning.
Tn a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 thE'
c.oncept of state neutrality was transform0d into the
present constitutional doctrinE' requiring affirmative
state action to desegregate school systems.' The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S.
430, 438 ( 1968), vvhere school boards were declared to
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." The school system before the Court in Gree11
\\·as operating in a rural and sparsely settled county
where there were no concentrations of white and black
populations, no neighborhood school system (there were
only two schools in the county), and none of thE'
problems of an urbanized school district :' The Court
properly identified the freedom of choice program
there as a subterfuge, and the la11guage in Green imposmg an affirmative duty tD convert to a unitary system
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was. however, reason to question to what extent this duty
would apply in the vastly different factual setting of a.
and n·manded by thi~ Court, which rxpres~ed no nrw on tlw mC'nt:-;
of tlw dP~egregation plan~ ~ubmittrd.) :382 U. S. 10:3, 105 (1D65) .
SeP abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind., :32-! F. :2d 209 (CA7 1963) ;
Downs , .. Board of Educ .. :3:3() F. 2d 988 (CAlO 19o.J.): Deal v.
Board of Educ .. 369 F . 2cl 55 (CAH 1966)
' For a concise Jm;tor~· and comnwnt<u~· on the PYolution, ,.;er grn(• rall~· ..\.. B1ckel. Tlw SuprPmP Comt. and thr ldPa of Progrr~~. pp
12f)-no t 1970l
'Ser nbo thP companion ea~P~ 111 ltauey \'. Board of Educatw11 ,
:)91 U. S . H :3 (196R), and !llouroe \'.Board of Comm 'rs. :391 U. S .
.J.50 (196.S). neither of which 111voh·rd largC' urban or mrtropolitan
"l'('ll,.; ,
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation,
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of ~ ew Kent
County. Virginia .
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept would flower into a new constitutional principle of
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971), in v.:hich the ~
~ duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. North Carolina .
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, the
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metropolitan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in
one part of the city,'' 402 U. 8 .. at 25. and acknowledged
that :
1

'Rural areas accustomed for half a century to thr
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population. numerous 9<)hools. congested and complex
traffic patterns. ' ' 402 U. S .. at 14.
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different
problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green \vas
applicable , and prescribed for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84.000 pupils essentially
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools
and 1.300 pupils of Ne'" Kent County .
. _ ~
In Swann, the Court further noted it was ~ only
with States having "a long history'' of officially imposed
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those
:-itates to implement Brown /. 402 U. S .. at 5- 6. In so
doing. the Court refrained even from consideriug whether
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brow11 I to
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Green! Swann undercut whatever logic once supported
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative duty. entailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate
segregation in the schools. the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation .
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This
1s a national. not a southem phenomenon. And it is
1argely unrelated to whether a particular State had or dirl
not have segregatory school laws."
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As
"A~ Dr . Karl TaPuber ~tatE'~ in hi~ article, HP~IdE'ntml Segrpgation.
SciPntific AmPrican , Augu~t 1965, at 14 :
•·No elaboratE' analysis is nccp:;:;ary to conclude from the~c figure~
that a high degrE'e of rPsidPntial ~egrPgation ba~E'd on racE' 1~ a univer~al characteristic of American citiP;;. Thb segregation t:; found
in ti1E' r1tiE'S of thE' North and WP:::t as WE'll as of the South: in largE'
CltiE'~ as WE'll a::: small ; in nonindu:;trial cities a::: \YE'll a::: mdu:::trial; m
ritie~ with hnndrE'c!s of thousands of NPgro resic!Pnt::; a:< \\'E'll as those
wtth onl~· n fp"· thousand ; and m cit if's that are progrp~:;iw in their
Pmplo~·mpnt practicE' and cn·il rights polirie,.: a,; wpl) a:-: tho::;E' that
;trE' not ."
lll Ill:; book . l'\egroE'~ in C'tri<'~ ( 19(i5) , Dr . TaPub<·r ,.:tated that r!':::tdE'tltial segrPgation f'XI,.:t,; ·' regardlf'HS of thE' charactE'r of lora! hnv~
and poliriP~ and rf'gard!P~~ of otlwr form~ of diHrrtmuwtton ." !!/ ..
;t
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawPd in Brown, the rationale of Su•ann
points inPvitably towards a uniform. constitutional approach to our national problem of school segregation,

TI
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to the
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application
of the Green/ Swami doctrine of "affirmative duty '' to the
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various de·
cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's positJon that the public school authorities are the responsiblP
agency of the State. and that if the affirmative duty do('trine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it lS
0qually so for Denver. I >Yould not, however. perpetuate>
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "srgrt'~
gative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent.' ' l would
hold. quite simply, that where segregated public schools
0xist within a school district to a substantial degree. then•
is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public>
a uthorities ( r will usually refer to them collectively as
the "school board") are sufficiently respo11sible "' to impose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demon'"A pnma factc• cm.;p of eon~titutlona! \·ioiatton ext~t~ when ~rgn•
gatlo n 1~ found to a ~ ub~tant m! drgrre in the ~c hool ~ of a partic ul a r dt~tnct. It 1~ rero~~:nizrd. of coun;c·, thnt thi~ trrm '" rrl at tn· and proYide" no prPri,.;r ~ tandard;;. But rirrum;;taiW<'>' , drmogra phtr nne! otherwi~r. var~· from di~trirt to di~trirt and hard and
l:lt<t rul r;; ~houkl not hP formulatrd. Thr exi ~ tenre of :1 suh,.;tantial
prrcrntagr of ,.;rhoob populat Pd b~ · "tudPnt,.; from onr racr on!~· or
prN!ominatriY ~o populatPd. ~hould trigger thr mquiry .
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated school system.

A
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure!
de facto rlistinction is that, in view of the evolutio11 of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrinE'.
the distinction no longer can be justified ou a principled
basis.
ln decreeiug remedial requirements for the
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt
with a metropolitan. urbani7.ed area in which the basic
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in
all sections of the country, and also largely irrelevant
to the existence of historic, state-imposed segregation at
the time of the Brown decision. Further, the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory
student transportation went well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school segregation for which
former state segregation laws were ever responsible.
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly demonstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de jure
discrimination present problems of subjective iutent
'"hich the courts cannot fairly resolve.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutiOnal right which is being enforced. This is not easy.
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Brown !, after emphasizing the importance of educat,ion.
the C'ourt said that
"l:)uch an opportumty, where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.'' 347 {T. S .. at 493.
ln Bro'WII II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle" enunciated in BTOWI! l as being the unconstitutwnali ty of "racial discrimination in public education, ..
349 r. S .. at 298. and spok0 of "the personal interest
of the plaintifls in admission to public schools as soon
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. '' 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a mini mum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system.'[ In
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original ri~ht;,
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms,
I would now define it as the right. derived from the Equal
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards
will operate integrated school systems vYithin their respective districts. This means that school authorities .
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and
implement their customary decisions with a view toward
enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their
authority to draw attendance zones to promote wtegration; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and
11 Sl:'r Birkl:'l , supra. n. 7. at 11~:
'·It [thl:' problem of ~chool cll:'~l:'grl:'gatwn I has not bl:'en that ~im
pll:'
bl:'causl:' thl:' laconic opinion in Brou•n v. Board of Educatwn wa~ 1t:;elf not that ::;implr. Onl:' st rain in 1t beraml:' l:'vidrnt in
~ ub~l:'qlll:'llt decisiOns outlawing all forms of state-::;pon~orl:'d segrl:'gation 111 e\·l:'rything from the spectator sl:'ction of a courtroom to golf
cour~l:'S. Tlw tmmmal propo~ition that !:'merged-and about time
tt wa~ that It should l:'mergr-wa~ that the stat!:' ma.\· not , h)· ll:'gislation or administrativl:'l)·, rlass1fy tlw population along rartal lines.''
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determine the size and grade categories v.•ith this same
objective in mind. Where schbol authorities decide to
t111dertake the transportation of students. this also must
be with integrative opportunities in mind.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either
definitive or aU-inclusive. but rather an indication of
the contour characteristics of an integrated schooL syg~
tent in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not
mean-and indeed could not mean ih view of the resi·dential patterns of most of our ma.]or metropolitan
areas-that every schooL must in fac~ be an . integrated
unit. A schooi which happens to be all or predominantly
white or al1 or i)reciominantly black is not a "segregated "
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one .
Having school boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination . subtle or
otherwise. ,..-ill find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best
ablP to assure an absence of such discrimination while
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent. " Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequatp
assurance that minority children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted with the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti,.
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the lo ng range plan.,
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ning as well as the Jaily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty
employment and assignments. school construction, closings and consolidations. and myriad other matters.
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause_ __
of segregated school conditions. But if. after..(detailed
and complete public supervision, substantial ~chool segregation still persists, the presumption is strong that the
school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so
pervasive ami where. after years of such action, segregated schools continue to exist within the district
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation.
The burden then must fall on the school board to demonstrate it is operating an "integrated school system.''
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and
the consequent. affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States with state-imposed segregation at the timE>
of the Brown. decision. The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread in our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
rceogmze. As one commentator has noted:
"the three court of appeals dec1sions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
arose in cities-Cincinnati, Gary and Kansas City,
Kansas-where racial segregation 111 schools was
formerly mandated by state or local ]a,.,·. [Deal v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ ., 369 F. 2d 55 (C'A6 1966),
cert. denied. 377 e. S. 924 ( 1964); Downs Y. Board
of Educ. , 336 F. 2cl 988 (CAlO 1964). cert. denied. 380 l'. S. 914. Bell \'. School City, 324 F . 2d
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied , 377 C S. 924.] Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more
than five y0ars before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects." Goodman. De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev . 275·, 297
(197:2) .1 "
Kot only does the de jure/ de
jnequitably on communities in
eountry: more importantly, it
children as \vell . As the Fifth

facto distinction operate
different sections of the
disadvantages minority
Circuit stated :

"The Negro children in Cleveland. Chicago. Los
Angeles. Boston. )I ew York, or any other area of the
nation which thE' opinion classifies under de facto
segregation, would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society. while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
Ill the 17 southem and border states violates the
'~

Tlw author

rontmue~ ·

·'True , tht (•arlier th e polic~· of :;egregation wa~ abandoned the less
danger th ere i~ that it continue~ to operHte cowrtly, i~ ,.;ignificantly
r<'~pon~iblP for pre:;ent da.\· pattPrn~ of re,.;idential segregation, or has
ro ntrihuted matPriall .\· to pre,.;C'nt communit~· attitude~ toward Xcgro
~e hool ~. Hut there ~~ no rC'a~on to .-mppo,.;e that 1954 i~ a lllltYer~ally
nppropmtt<' di,·iding linP bet\\'Pt>n dP jurp ~egregntion that m a~·
~afe l~· be ••~~umed to haw ~pent it~elf and that which ma~· not.
For man~· remedial purpo~es, adoption of an arbitrar~· but ea;,;i]~·
a dmim ~tmbl e cu toff point might not be objectionable. But in a
,< Jt\latton "urh a" ~rhool desegrrgation. wlwrr both tlw nght~ a,.;,.;ert ed
and tlw rrmrdial bmdrn~ imposrd an• of ~ueh magnitudr, a nd where
tlw rp~ulting sertwnal dis r rinunation i~ pa:;:;io nat e l~· rrsr nt <'d. it 1~
:.,urPI~· 4U<'~tionable wlH'tiH'r sueh a rl>lt rarines~ 1~ ritlter politicall y
or m orally atcPptable "
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constitutional rights of their counterparts. or even
their blood brothers, bec\).US~ they were born into
a de jure society. All- childre'n everywhere in tlw
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treat
ment which violates their constitutional rights i1i
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in
another area.'' Cisneros v. Corp'lj-s Christi Independent School District, 467 F. 2d 142. 148 (CA5 en bane.
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County
Board of Eauc., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CA5 en bane)
Ge'"'·in. J .. dissenting) ."'
The Court today does move for the first time toward
breaking down past sectional disparities. but it clings
tenuously to its distinctioll. lt searches for de jure
action in what the Denver School Board has clone or
failed to do. and even here the Court does not rely upon
the results or effects of the Board's conduct hut feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 1•
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facio
' " SPl' BwkPl, wpra. n 7, at 119 :
'·If a Negro child perretve~ hi,; cieparation a~ rli~crmlltwtor~· and
invtdiou,;, he 1~ not , 111 a ;;ociety a hundred ~·ear~ remo,·Pd from
~lavrr~· . gomg to mak<' finr di~tinrtion~ about tlw ,;olll'<'l' of a partiCular ,;eparation ,.
11 Tlw Court toda~· doe" not rrquirc , howl·vrr, a ~rgn~gatur~· tntPnt
with rr~pC'rt to thr entirr ;;rhool ~~·~tem. and indrC'cl hold~ that if ~u('h
an mtrnt 1~ found wtth rc;;pect to ;;ome "rhool~ m a ~~·~tC'm. the' burden-normal!~· on the plamtiff"-:;hift;; to the df'fl~ndant ~rhool authorittC',; to praY!' a negative': name!~· . that thc·tr purpo~l·~ \Y<•rc·
lwmgn , ante. pp 17- 18.
Thr Court ha:; camP n long wn~· ~III('<' 8roll'JI l. F>tarttng from
tlw una~,;ailablr de ;ure ground of tlw di,;rnminatorY run~tttnt wnal
and ~tatutor~· provi:;ion,; of ~om<· Stat<'~, thr liP\\' furmulation-~tilt
profe~smg fidPIIt~· to t hr de jure dart rinP-i~ that dP~c·grPga t ion "·ill
be orderrd de;;pJtf' the ab,;r11rr of an~ · ~<'gn·gatorY law~ if: (i) ,;('grc•g'a tcd ~chool~ in fact Pxi::<t : (it) a rou.rt find" that th<'y r<'~ult front
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion. p. 18)
(italics are the Court's J.
The ( 'ourt's insistence that the "differentiating factor'
between de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent'' is difficult to reconcile with the language in so
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of E-mporia,
407 "C. S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said:
" In addition , an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless . The mandate of Brow11 II ,x,·as to desegregate
schools. and we have said that ' [ t] he measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.· Davis
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 P . S.
:33. 37.
"Thus. ,,.e have focused upon the effect-not thP
purpose or motivation- of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a. permissible method
of dismantling- a dual system.
" Though the purpose of the new school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases. the
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or purposes but on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
"·as the focus of the District Court in this case, ancl
we hold that its approach was proper.
407 P . S ..
a..t 462.
f can discem no basis in law or logic for holdmg that
the motivation of school hoard action is irrelPvant in
,:o mP ;\('liOn takPtl IYJth ·"'f'!l; I'Pgator~· mtPnt b~· the "rhool hoard :
(ni) "urh artJoll rrlatP" to an1· "meamngful :;egment" of tlw ,:rhool
"~'"tc•m: and (n·) tlw "('hool bo;!rd ea mwt pro1·p that It" mtPnt\on,:
,,·it h rP"pc·rt tc> the n•maindPr of t hP ,:y,;tc·m WN<' uon~c·grpg:a t <H~ · .
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·virginia and con trolling in Colorado. It may be argued.
of cour~e. that in Emporia a prior constitutional violation had already been proven and that this justifies the
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho\vever. is the application of an effect test to the actions of
southern school districts and an intent test to those in
other sections. at least until an initial de jure finding for
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to
perpetuate any such dual standard. we should hold forthrightly that significant segregated ~chool conditions in
,.,,hatever section of the country are a prima facie violation of constitutional rights. As the Court ha!" noted
elsewhere:
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular
jury or during some particular period. But it taxC's
our credulity to ~ay that mere c/w:nce resulted i11
there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. Thl:'

result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was
a, conscious decision on the part of any individual JUry
('01/1/lltSSWiler.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 r. S. 475.
482 (1954).

(Emphasis added . )

B
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutiOnal
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration vvhich
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today. emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits in which there can he little' hopP of
fQnnit,v of rf'~ult.

mu-
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists. This \vill be conceded in most of them .
The litigation '"ill focus as a consequence of the Court's
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to
action taken or not taken over many years-will be
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts below found evidence of de JUre violations
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools.
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is, for example. quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communitie~
aml. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will,
under the de JUre/ de facto distinction. continue to differ.
especially since the Court has never made clear v,:hat
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for
an initial constitutional violation Even if It \\'ere posSible to clarify this question . \Yide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges v;ould be inevitablP
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent'' or
"purpose." especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities undH varying eonclitions over many years.
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation,
or collection of different motivations. tha.t lie behind a
legislative enactment.'' Pal111er v. Thompson, 403 t'. S.
214. 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- r . S. - . (1973); United States V. O'Brien, 391 r. S. 367. 381
(1968). Whatever difficu lties exist with regard to a single statute will be compounded in a judicial review of
years of administration of a large and complex school
system."' Every act of a school board and school administration. and indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny .
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools, made almost daily. can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated.
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or- for thf'
long term future-arc likely to be one or the other. These
uecisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building construction and location; the timing of
building ne"· schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of
'"' A~ ot1r eonmwntator hn~ rxpr<'~~t·d it .
.. If t hr rourt~ a rr mdeed prrpn rPd to inqu1rr nlto motiw. thorn~·
question:< will ari~e even If onr ft:<~tmw,; that mrial mottvatwn i~
rapablr of bemg proven at trw!. What of the ea,.:c· m wh1rh one or
morr mrmber~ of a ~rhool board, but Irs~ than a majorit~· . are found
to hnYr acted on racwl ground~·~ What tf it appear;; that thr :;choof
hoard 's actwn wa~ prompted bY a m1xtun• of moti\"C'~. Including con,;tJtutwnai!Y innocrnt one" that alonr would haw promptrd thr board
to net? '\rhat If tlw member~ of thr :;chool board IYC'fC' not thrm~C'!n'~ rarwll~ · m,;ptred but II"I:<hed to piPa~P thrir eon~tituent :;, many
of whom t hr~ · knrw to bP ~o ., If :<urh ca~r~ a rr cla~~ifird as uncon:<titutional dr JtirC' :-<rgrPgntton . thPrP i:; lntlr pomt 111 prr~pn· mg
tlw dr jmP-dr facto distinctiOn at all. And It ma~· 11"<'11 br that thl'
diffcrpnrr brtwern an~· of 1hP:<e :<ituations and onr m wh1rh rarwl
motn·atwn ~~ nltogethN larking " too m~ignifirant. from tlw ,;tandpomt of both thP moral culpabiiit~· of tlw :-<tatr officml" and the·
impn r t upon thr children lllYoh·Pd, to ,;upport a diffPrPIH'C' m roll-·
StltlliiOnal trrn tment " n oorim:l ll , supra. II 11. at :2X4--2S5_
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student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment. promotion
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel:
policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whether, and to what extent. special schools will
be provided. \Vhere they will be located, and who will
qualify to attend them; tlw determination of curriculunl,
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training. and the rout•
]ng of students into these tracks; and even decisions as
to social. recreational and athletic policies.
Ln Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory intent and proximate cause \vith respect to each
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 402 LT. :-i .. at 5-f\. But in a case of
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial
examination of these factors will be required under today's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and
unpredictable results, to protracted and inconclusive liti ~
gation . to added burdens on the federal courts. and to
serious disruption of individual school systems. In the
absence of national and objective standards. school boards
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty
and disarray, speculating as to what is required and when
litigation '"ill strike .

c

Rather than continue to prop up a distmction no longer
grounded in principle. and contributing to the consequences indicated above . we should acknowledge that
whenever public school segre!!ation exi!:its to a sub:-tantial degree there is priwa facie evidence of a constitutional violatio11 by the responsible school board. lt
is true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever
located- art' not solely the product of thr action or
inaction of public sch ool a uth oritH'f'. li1deC'd , as indi-
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cated earlier. there catt be little doubt that principal
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth.
West. or South. are the socio-economic influences "·hich
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school boards havf'
continuing. detailed responsibility for the public school
system within their district Jn and. as Judge John Minor
v\' isdom has noted, '\vhere the figures l shO\\·ing
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently. a
prima face case of discrimination is established."
United States v. 1'exas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 .
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover. as foreshadmved itl
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis vvithout regard to a doctrinal distinction
which has outlived its time.

Ill
The preceding section addresses the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the school districts
throughout our country to operate integrated school systems. When the schools of a particular district are
tn

lndPPd, if onp goP~ bark far enough,

It 1~

probable that all racwl

~egregation, wherevE'r ocrurnng and wlwthE'r or not confined to the

,.;chook ha~ at ,;omE' ttmE' bPPn ~upported or maintained b~· go\·Prnmcnt action. In Becket Y :School Board. :)0~ F . Supp. 127-l, l:H 1]:{15 (ED \'a. 1969), .TuclgC' Waltrr Hoffman compilPcl a ~ummar~·
of pa,.;t public ,.;pgrPg:Hor~· action \\'hirh mcludPcl C'Xample~ from a
gn·at majority of State~. He concluc!Pd that "on!~· a:; to the ,..;tate"
of l\latnP, :\ew Hamp~htn' . \'crmont. Wa~hington, :'\r\·ada. and
Hawaii dol'~ it appear from thi" notwxhandiw rr~earch that no cli~
crimmator~· law~ np]watwl on the boob at onP tim<> or anotlwr."
!rl., at 1:315.
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found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demoiistrate that they have in fact operated an integrated
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. - . If
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case. the question then becomes vvhat reasonable affinna=
tive steps district courts may require to place the school
system in compliai1ce with the constitutional standard.
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the
remedy'?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver is a "dual school system." that city
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregatt'
its entire system "root and branch.'' Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

A
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the questiOn
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and JJ and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily oi1 "racial
ratios'' and sanctioned transportation of elementary as
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation decrees '' " to achiew the greatest possible degree of actual
17
S!'e, e. g .. Thompson v. School Board of 1\'P trport Neu·~. F. 2d - , - ( 1972) , where the CA4 en bauc. uphrld a dist n ct court
a '~ig;nm< •llt plan where "travel time, \·arying from a mmimum of
fort~· mmutP::; alld a maxtmum of one hour , each wa~·, would bP n•4lllf<'d for bu::;mg black ~tudent' out of the old Ci t~· and whit e stuf[mt:< into thC' old Cit~· 111 order to ach ieve a racwl balancmg; of th e
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desegregation.'' 402 C S .. at 26. In the context of a
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different-and widely
separated-sections of the school district. extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
is read as expansively as many courts have been rPading
it to date.
To.the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound
misg1vmgs. i\othing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such disruption of public education.
Fortunately, Swa11n also laid down a broad rule of reasOIJ
under v,:hich desegregation remedies must remain flexible
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. ~-; at
16. School boards in rural areas
t adjust more
readily to this task than those in metropolitan distnct~
di:stnct ." Thi:s tran~portation wa~ drcreed for childrrn from the th1rd
grndr up, involving children a::; ~·oung a~ eight yrar:; of age.
In N orthcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ ., 466 F. :2d 890 , ~95
(197:2), the CA6 affirmed <1 di"trict court a:;:;ignment plan wll!Ch
daily tran:;ported 14,000 children with "the maxnnum tnm· to 1)('·
~prnt on the bu:;e~ b~· nn~· child I being I :34 minute~ . .. ." ]Jre~umabl~· rarh \Ya~·. But a" .Judge Wrick notC'd in d1::::::ent tlw CA6
lll~trurted the di:::trict judge to implrment ~·et fmthrr de~C'grC'gation
ordC'r~. Plan:; prr:;rntl~· under con~ideration b,· that court call for
the bu:;ing of :39 ,0~5 and 61 ,5:30 children re:::pecti,·el~·. for undetrrnunrd lrngth::: of timr. !d .. at 895-981-l.
Prtitionrr" before thi::: Court in Potts v. Fla.r, :\o. 7:2- :2i'\i'\ , crl't .
dc·nied , l'. S. (197-), contended that thr implrmentatwu
of tlw CA5',.: dirrctive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d i-165 (197:2) , would
f('(Jilli'C' bu~ ride" of up to two hour" and 20 minutr~ rach da~· anrl
a round trip of up to 70 milr~. Prtition, at 14. \Vhilr rr~pondcnt s
contrnd tlw,.:r figurr,: repn·~ent an "a,.:tonnding infbtion ." He~pon~e .
111 ( . 1 rnn~portat\on of a ~ignifieant magnirml<' ~<'<'Ill~ lllC'\'liHhil' ,
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools,
congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at 14.
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process.
!d., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as one important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases." And the Court further emphasized that equitable
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other
public aml private interests:
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interest.
the condition that offends the Constitution. 8wa1111 .
.~upra, at 15-16.
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brou•n I I ,
349 l . S.. at 229 :
" In fashioning and effecting the decrees , the court::;
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
'' Sef' L'nited States " · Texw; Education Agency. -!til F . ~d iH~ . •~~~
(CAS 1972) (Bell ..1., eonrurring man opinion in wl)]('h ~f'YPil otll('r
.JUdgP~ joined) :
.. ln our new the remedy which thr di~trict court ~~ r!'quirc•cl iu
formula!<' ~hould be formulatf'd within the ent~re conte:rt of tht'
opmwn Ill Swauu ,. Charlotte-M er-k/enbvrg Boarrl of Erlucntim, . . . . LEmpha~i~ nddf'd .J "
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for adJusting and reconciling public and private
nreds .. ,
'Thus in school Jesegregation cases, as elsewhere, equrty
counsels reason . flexibility and balance. See. e. {.J., Lemon
Y . Kurtzman , - 1J. S . - (1973).
I am aware. of
course. that reasonableness in any area is a relative anJ
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to promote desegregation with other, equally important educational interests which a community may legitimately assert. ~eglect
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must bP
approached."' Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlP
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance" and "flexibility" with which this Court has always
r<"garded it.

B
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty
to operate an integrated school system. district courts
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensue
:V[any of these can be taken effectively without damaging state and parental interests in having children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where clesegregative steps are possible vYithin the framework of a system of "neighborhood education." school
authorities must pursue thrm. .For Pxample. bound"' Th<• rPI<'\·ant inquiry i~ "\\'hrther rill' C'O~t~ of aC'h]('nng dr~Pgn•
gation in an~· given ~ituation out\\'righ tlw legal, moral and <•clu<·at ional C'On~idrra tion~ fa ,·oring It.
. . It i~ ci<'<l r .
t h:l t t hr
C'o11,;titutwn ~hould not bl' held to rrquir<' an~· tran,;portation plan
that kePp~ rhild rPn on a bu,; for:\ ~ub,;tantial part of tlw da~·. con ~ump~ ~ignifiC'ant portion~ of fund~ othPnYi~e >'pendahlP din•rtl~· on
rdurat 1on , or ill\·oh·r,; a gl·nuinr Plrmrnt of danger to thP ~afl't_,. of
tlw rhild." Sf'hool Dr,;rgrPgation Aftrr s,,·ann: :\ ThPon· of Co,·r:rnmPnt Hr>~pun~ihilit:·, :)9 P . Chi L. Hr,· . .J:2l. -1:2:2. H:{ ( 197:2).
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should })(' dra\Yil
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's student body. Constructio11 of ne'" schools should be of
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integration should be attained throughout the school system.
Swann, at 1!J; United States v. Montyomery County
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 ( 1~)()9 ). An optional
majority to minority transfer program, "·ith the State
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
8wann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca•
tion of resources within the school district must be made·
with scrupulous fairness among all schools .
.The above examples are meant to be illustrativr. 11ot
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integratiw
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate
has been met. For example. ''neighborhood school plans
are constitutionally suspect \\'hen attendance zones arr
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods.
and \Yhe11 school construction preserves rather than elinunates the racial hegemony of given schools." "" Keyes
v. School District .Yo. 1, Denver Colorado, F. :2d - ,
l 'll'ited States v. Boa.rd of Education of Tulsa County,
42~) F. :2d . 1258-1259. This does not imply that
decisions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school
constructio11. closing and consolidation. must be mack
to the cletrinwnt of all neutral. nonracial considerations
But these considerations ca11. \\·ith proper school board
initiative. generally be met in a mallller that ,,·ill enhance
the degree of school df'segrpgatio11 .
""A 11~dlll "1 ttcl:-· of tlw lu~toncal 11"''" and aln1""" of thr m•tghhol'·
hoOf[ ,-chool eonccpt lc' .\1 V\'r!lllH'rg. Ha ("(' (\: l'btr·r ( 19(17! .
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c
DPfault1ng school authontiPs \\·ould have. at a mmJ·
mum. the obligatio11 to take affirmative steps of the sort
outlined in the abow section. ~chool boards ''.:ould . of
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to
promote school desegregation . In a pluralistic society
such as ours. it is essrnt1al that no racial minority fPt>l
rlemeant>cl or discrimiiJated against and that students of
all races learn to play. work. aile! eooperate with oiH'
anotlwr in their common pursuits and endeavors. "\"othing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards 1n promoting the rrcognized values of integrated school
conditions.
A tonstitutional requtrement of rxtensive student
transportation solely to achievr integration. howevrr.
presents a vastly more eomplex problem. It promises
on the 011e hand a greater degree of actual desegregation.
while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as
important community asp1rations and personal nghts.
Thr Equal Protection ClausP does 1ncleecl require that
raeial discrimination not bt> tolerated in the deciswns
of public school authoritirs. It does not command that
sc hool authorities undertake widespread student transportation solely for the sakr of maximizing integration ."'
"' In !act, dur 10 raciall~· ~rparatl• n:> ~!(lPnlml pattern~ that l'ilaral'teriZI' our major mhan an·n~ It 1 ~ qtlltC' llllrrali~tle to thmk of
al· h1r1·ing in man~- rit1C'~ ~uh~tantial IIIt Pgra tion throughout tlw
.-chool ch~t net without a drgn·<· of ~t ud P nt tran~portation wl11ch
II'Ollld han• tlw gntve~t pconomi c and Pducational I'Oll~rqut•ncp,..
.-\ s l'rufr~~or HiekPI not <'~
·]n mo,;t of th e largPr mban ;tr<'a'. dPmographH· conditiOn~ :ll'f' ~urh
thar no polit-.1· that a court 1':\n ordrr, and a ,;chou! boa rd , a rn~· Ol'
P1·c•n a ~tate• hM tlw capability to put into ptfert . will Ill fact rr"ult
JJt tlw forr~PC'ablP future lll ral'wll ~· ba lnn l'ed pub]I<' ~l' hoob.
On!~ ·
i! rt•o nlPring of th P rnl·rronmPnt Im·o]nng ('(·onomH· and ~oculi poltrv
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportatwn
'
/
has no place in public school systems or as a permissibk 0 .~
~.
desegregative ~The transporting of school children
is as old as public education. and in rural and some
suburban settings it IS as indispensable as the providing
of books. It is presently estimated that approximately
half of all American children ride buses to school for
reasons UIIrelated to tntcgration ."" .-\t the secondary
level in particular. where the schools are larger and servP
a \vider. more dispersed constituency than the elementary
• _ . _ L,.; ~
chool. some form of public or privately financed trailS: _ - ~r-~
portatioi1 is often necessary . 1~here is a..(difference . howPver. in transportation plans voluntarily initiated by local
school boards for educational purposes and those im~
posed by a fed eral court. Tlw former usually represe nt a
Itecessary or convenient mea ns of access to the school
11earest home ; th e latter often require lengthy trips for Illl
purpose other than to further Integration "" Yet thr'
on tlw hroadt>:'t concrn·:tbk front rmg;hr ha1·(· an a ppn•cia blt• impaC't '
BH"ke! , supra. n. I . a t t:~:2
"" E::<trmatr;:; 1·a rY .'i!l'a11n, ;-;upra. at :2\:J, notru that "erghtt•t•n mil lion of thr :\at1011'" publrc ::;chooJ chr!drr n , approximatPI~- :~9%, 11·rn•
tran,;purtNl to thPir ;:;chool" In· bu;:; Ill l\!119- 1970 m all part' of thr
('OIIlltr~·. ·• SPnator H Ib1coff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful ~ t\IC!Pnt of t hi~
proiJirm. ,;tatrd that "two-third,; of all A111cnca n chilclrrn toua~· ndP
bu;:;c,; to "chool for rea ~o n" tllll't'iat<'d to Intt'gmtion ... ll R Co ng . R(•f•
8:25-t{. Frh :24, 197:2
"" 1:-Tr"tonr•:dh·, d1~tant tran,portation wa~ wrong!~· ll"<'d to promotP ~Pg;rt'g:ttion . ":\rgro clllldrPJ• ll'(•n• genrrall~· ('011~J(irrrd cap:tbiP oft l':l\'Ciimg; long;Pr di ~t:t nr t'::< to ,;chool and Without th<' n1d of an~
,-r hicl<•. What wa~ too far for a whitt' child b<•c:1111<' rPa~o nabl~ · nea r
tor :1 :\pg;ro child .'' WPinlwrg, supra. 11 . :20. at ~~
Tht:' dPplorab!r ht ;-;tor~· ha~ it'd ;-;om l' to argur that mt t'g ratlvP bu,.,
nd p;-; arr Jll"titi r d n" a ton rm(• nt for past ,;pg regator ~ · tnp,; and th:tt
nr tghborh ood ('duration '" now hut :1 codr-word for racwl ::<<'1/:f<'g:t tion . But rni,u,;(' of tran,portntion Ill th <' pa,;t dors not nnpl~ · rwigh horhood :<choolin g ha" 11 0 l'alrd non,.;pg;rPg)lton· u~r~ for th r prt',;<' Jlt
\or would wrongful tran,;portatJOI1 111 tlH• pa~t Jll"tlh drtnmrntal
Jrnn:<portat\011 for tlw l'luldr<'l1 of trH[:I ),
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Court in Swann was ut1questionably right in describing
!;us transportation as " one tool of school desegregation."
40:2 r . s .. at 30."' The crucial issue is '"hen. under \\'hat
circumstances. and to what extent such transportation
may appropriately be ordered. Tlw answer to thi
turns- as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exerr
eise of discretion und er the circumstances.
Swann itse1f recognized limits to clesegregative ob ligations. lt noted that a constitutional requirement of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing .. . would
be disproved . . ... and sanctiOned district court usf>
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a startmg point
in the process of shaping a remedy. .
402 l!. S .. at
24. 25. Thus particular schoo ls may be all \Yhlte or
all black and st1ll not mfringe constitutional nghts
if the syste111 is genumely integrated and school authori- /
ties are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive a tj /
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the CourtJ to
require racial balance 1n schoo ls throughout the district
or the &~+tomati{ elwunatwn of all aone-race sCl1001S: c
40:2 F. S .. at 26. 1s grounded 111 a recognition that the
;-\tate. parents. and ehildrPtl a ll have at stake m
" ' :-;orne• c·ommtmitiP~ had tran~purt ;HIOil plan~ in Pfft·rt at tlw tllli P
ol court riP~c·grrg:ttiOll ordrr~ . Srr ::)tcwul. supra. at 29, n. 11. DaVls
'' · &hoot Colllm'rs uf Mobtlt> ('ount!f. ~02 ll. S. :3:3, :3+-:35 (1971)
<'ourt~ hn1·c· u~Pd tiH' prP~t·nc·c• or ah~<·nt·P of rx1~t1ng trH II ~JHll't:ttlon
in a di~tn<·t :to' <HIP f:tl'tor Ill framing and tmplPnwntmg dP~t·grrgatwn
d<'crf'r~. l '111ted ::ltatt's \' . ll'at.~otl Chapel Srhool Di:;tnct. Hti F. 2d
\-H:l, \):3/ (l'.-\1' 1911): Sorthrross ,._Board of Educ .. ~-t-l F 2d 1179,
11~:2- JL-.::l (('Ali 19/1) : Dauts ,._ Board of 8duc .. :QK F . Supp. 1197 ,
120:1 (ED Ark. 1911)
\Yh <' n ' a ~chool hoard ~~ ,· oluntnnl~· rngag;C'd
111 t ran:'port ing :' tudrnt~ . a dl:'tl'tct l'OIII't j, , of l'0\11'~<' , ohlw:atcd to
Jll:'lll'r th:tt ~uch tran~portatton I:' not tmdc•rtnkPn With ;:;rg;rrgator~·
rffrct. \\'hPr<'. :tl:'o , ,·oluntar\· tran~portntion program~ nrr alrC'ady
It! progn·~"- th<'n' mn~· hP grratt•r Jl!."tlficatloll for c·ottrt-urd<'t'Pcl trail:'·
port ntton of "' ud<·nt" for n !'OIIIf!nl'nhle t1111e a/Ill distance t u arh t<'l'!'
)l;l'<·ater Jllt<'g;ranop_

]
-

LAV

~
-..

~

/J -.'i07-CO~CU1{ & DISSE~T

KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT ::\0 1. DENTER. COLO

29

school desegregatiOn decrees legitimate and recogmzable
interests.
The personal w tercst might be characterized as the
desire that children attend community schools ncar
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 154\:la. h1 Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( 1966). the ~ixth Circuit summarized
thP advantages of such a neighborhood system of
schools: "''
"Appellants. however. pose the question of \vhether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly
administerf'cl without racial bias. comports with the
requirenwnts of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
rPsults in the creation of schools with predominantly
or eve11 exclusively \'egro pupils. The neighbor~
l1oocl systPJn IS 111 wide use throughout the nation
and has been for many years the basis of schoo]
administration. This is so because it is acknowlf'dged to have several valuable aspects which are an
aid to education. such as minimization of safety hazards to children in reaching school. economy of cost
i 11 reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil
placenwnt and administratiOn through the use of
"'' Tlw t!'rnt "n!'ighl,orhood ~rhool '' ~hould not br ~nppo~rd to
dl'note ~olrl~ · a walk-m :;chool or onr wlurh ~rrYr~ ('htldrC'n on!~· 111
thp ~urroundmg bloch. Tltr Court Ita~ noted. Ill a dttfrrrnt contrxt. that "the word ·neighborhood' 1~ quitr a~ ,.;u~crptlblr of varta tlon a~ till' ll'ord ·]ocaltt~· · Both tPI'IIW arP ela~ttc and , deprndrnt
upon ctrc·um~tancr~. ma~· lw r<ptall~· ,.;att:sfi<•d b~· arE'a~ mE'a,urE'Cl b~
rod,; or b~· mtlr~ . " ronnally \' Unll!ral Con~t. Co .. :2()9 tT . S. :385.
;)95 ( 19:2())
!11 tlw ~rhool cutltPxt. "nrighborhood'' rdrr~ to rrlattn>
proxnntt \'. to a prPfrrPII<'I ' for a ~('hool tt<•n n·r. rat hn than morl'
f[t~tant from hom1 ·.
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neutral, easily determ111ed standards, and betttlr
home-school communication ,.
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of
parental and student access and convenience. as well as
greater economy of public administration. These are
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic groumls."''
~eighborhod school systems. neutrally administered. reflect the deeply felt desire of citizeus for a sense of community in the1r public education. Public schools havf'
been a traditional source of strength to our :'\ation. and
that strength may derive i11 part from the identification of
many schools \\'ith the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood. Community support. interest and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
tlw intimacy of our institutions-home. church. and
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in tlw
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this
Court should be wary of compelling in the name of coustitutional la\Y v.:hat may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely related to the concept of a community and
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties parents have with respect to the education of their children.
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture.
support. and provide for the welfare of children. includ"" 1 do not unph· that thr ll<'tghborhood concPpt m11~t hr rmbodi('(l
Jll <'H' r~· ~rhool ~,·~tem . But wlwrp a ~chool board ha~ cho~('ll it.
f<'riNnl .imlgP~ ~hould accord 11 rP~Jl<'<' t 111 framing rPmrdtal deer<'<'~.
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mg their education . Tn Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268
r. S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous C'ourt held that :
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. lY ebraska, 262
r. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. . .
The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled v.:ith the high duty. to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482
( 1965), the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to eel ucate one 's children as one chooses is made applicable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments... I do not believe recognition of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send
a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a private education for therr
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons
eek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their
child attends. It \Vould , of course, be Impractical to
allow thr wishes of particular pare nts to be controlling.
Yet the interest of th e parent in the enhanced parentschool and parent-child communication allowed by the
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressPd by forre

-----:--:-o,
,-------------...,•&sl~~

of Ia\\'
In tlw Li IHiCPstawla!J.¥P na twna] concern for alleviating
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked
tlw fact that the rights and interests of children affected
by a dese~regation program also are entitled to consideration . Any child . white or black . who is compell ed tq
]Pavp his n<>ighborhood and spend si~nificant tinw Pach
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clay being transported to a distant school
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. Xot long ago .
.James B. Conant wrote that "laJt the elementary school
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day
after day to distant schools seems out of the question.""'
A community may well conclude that the portion of a.
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal
interests of parents ami children which a community may
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to question just as seriously any remedial requirement of extensive student transportation solely to further integration .
•-\ny such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately
on the school districts of our country. depending on
their degree of urbanization. financial resources, and their
racial composition. ~om!:' districts with little or no blracial population will experience little or no educational
disruption. \vhile others. notably in large. biracial metropolitan areas. must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportatiou to achieve the type of integration frequen tly being ordered by district courts."" At a
time ,,·hen public education generally is suffering seriou&
financial malnutntion. the econonuc burdens of such
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
dollars."" :\11d while eonstitutional requirements havP"' ~lt11w and Suburb,-, 2\:l ( HWl 1

:21, ,;up1·a.
"" ln :\f<•mphi~ , for Px:unplr, 1\'hil'h ha~ no hi,tor~· of hu~mg "turlPnt>'. th<' mmimum tran~portatJon plan ordf'frd h~· tlw court~ will.
" ·' 8PP 11.

\
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often occaswned uneven burdens. never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as >vide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children .
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board. by
its actio11 and nonaction. may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by thE'
DC'nvcr Board over tlw past decades. the fundamental
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It
is indeed a novel application of equitable power- not to
mentio11 a dubious extension of constitutional doctrineto require so much greater a degree of forced school intf'gration than would havf' rf'sulted from purely natural
and neutral nonstate causes.
Tlw compulsory transportation of students carries a
further infirmity as a coiistitutional remedy. With most
C'Onstitutional violations. the major burden of remedial
action falls on offending state officials. Public officials
who act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or
religious exercise. for example, are obliged to cease the
offPnding act or practice alH.l . where necessary. institute
eorrf'ctivP mPasures. lt is they who hPar the brunt of
n•qutrr. Ill 11tP School Board '~ l'~tnnatc•, an mtttal capital rxpendttun·
of $1,fiG-l,19:2 for hu~P:s plu~ an annual operating co~t of $(i:29.19:2
Tlw Board r~nmatr~ that a morr extrn~iv<• tran:;portatwn program
to hr ron~tderrd b~ · tlw di~t t'll't court \Yill rrqurre mit in! c;tpital rn\'P~tllll' nt,.: of S:3.9:2-l,OOO and annual oprrnting co,;t,.: of $1 ,78:~,4!:)0
Thr mo~t dra ~tic tran~portatron plan beforr thr di"tnct court rrquirr:;
P ~trrnatrcl annual oprratmg C'O~t,.: of from $:2 ,:35-±,2:20, $:2 ,-±:31,710, or
$8,4(i:3,100 drpencling on thr Board ',.: trnn:;portation arrangl'ment~
.\' orthtro"" Y . Boa.rrl of Erl uratio11 of .11 etll phis C'ity S.rh .. -'IIJ!ra .
n. 17, at K9iO: (W<'I('k, .J , dr~~<'lltlllf!)
"'S<•<' 11 ~l. supra
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remedial action. though other citizens will to varying d(•grees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for
egregation must. at the very minimum, act to cease segregatory acts. But when the obligation further extends
to the transportation of students. the full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who did not participate in any constitutional
violation .
Finally. courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration ..
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable
social consequences. X o one can estimate the extent
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
(_~
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school sys~- j
tems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races~ ~
~r guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
tlw movement from innercity to subur . and the further
geographical separation of the races. ~or do we know
to 'vhat degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
community and parental support of public schools. or
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality tn
<'clucatwn to a perennially devisive debate over who IS
to be transported where.
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed
courts. school officials. other public authorities, and students of public eclucation for nearly two decades. Thr
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever
<'Xtensive transportation has been ordered . f make 110
pretense of knowing the best aiiS\Yers. Yet. the issue in
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of constitutional law. As to this issue. I have no doubt whatever. There is nothing in the Constitution. its history
or-until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
Qf yQung and teenage children to achievp a singlP interest.
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as 1mportant as this interest may be. We have strayNl,
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown I
and I l, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of! public and
private needs." Brown JJ, 349 U. S .. at 220.
T urge a return to this rationale. This would result,
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered
:student transportation in furtherance of desegregation.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable Jecree. transportation orders should be applied \Vith special caution to
a11y proposal as disruptive of family life and interestsand ultimately of education itself-as extensive transpor~
tation of elementary age children solely for desegregation
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood
education performs its most vital educational role. 1t
)s with respect to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school.
that the rights of parents and children are most sharply
hnplicatPd."'
" ThPrf' maY well l:w advantage~ in commencing thP integrati\"l'
at an early age , a,.; young children ma~· be le~~ likely
than oldPr children and adult ~ to dPvelop an 111hibitmg nl<'tid con ~rlou:<nP~:< . The:<P advantagp:; ::;hould bP con~tderPd a~ "chool board~
ma kP t hl' va no us decisions With t l1P VIPW to ach1Pvmg and prP:;Prv lng; an mtegrated school ,;y::;tem . Supra , p. But m tlw bal un cmg of all rp]evant mtPre::;t ::;, thP adv a ntage~ of an Pari~ · mtPgra t\vp rxp<•nrnc<· mu st, and 111 all fiurne::;s "hould. lw weighed aga1n"t
other rdPYant advantages and di sadvantagl'" and in hght of t lw
dPmograph1r rharacten ~ tir;. of thP partlrular r·ommllllll\ ',

l ' Xpenence~

~ Gifl.-Vl-~fu_~ ~
'

'
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\Vhile greater transportation of secondary school stucleuts might be permitted. even at this level the desire of
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools
~hould command judicial respect. It would ultimately
he wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate.
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school
foncept are entitled to judicial res~

JV

l~--

- l~~

The ex1stmg state
as failed to shed light and
)rovide guidance on two ssue~essed in this opin~
-........,
_ ~: (i) w ~
aml-to · ~ e~tet¥i-=tl unifeHfr V
c:::r-- j~
to our national problem{ of school desegregation and ( ii) ·
whether the
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost unifonnly in favor of extensive transportation. should be
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the
various interests which are involved. With all deference.
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither
of these issues in a vvay that will afford adequate guid,.-----_....:a~':.:.lC::,:e:. . to
: ,~t.he courts below in this case or lead to a rational.
coherent national policy• with rE"speet to;{ii1tegratiem in
tlw 8 %.lz51 Pr.
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto /
de )'UTe distinction under circumstances. and upon a
rationale. which can only lead to increased and inconclusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent JUdicial position on this
"::::..----4>-1'~.-l subject. There is. of course. state action in every
school district in the land. The public schools ave
always een funded and operated by States and their
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools.
E·ven in the cities of the South. are in large part the
product of social and economic factors-a nd the resulting
u
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in the United States. with any significant minority
school population. in which the school authorities-ill
bite way or the other-have not contributed in some
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails.
Lnsteacl of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the
country. the Court persists in a distinction whose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of
the country and on minority children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In tlw
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than
that imposed by district courts after Swann, the
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and
other major cities may well involve even more extensive
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time.
It is well to remember that the course we are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this
goal of quality education. free from protracted and
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor~
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa~
tion today is the widespread ust> of compulsory transportation . especially at elementary grade levels. This
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities.
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other educational and societal interests a community may legitimately assert. This will help assure that integrated
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school ~ystems will br establi~hed and mailltained by
ratioiial action. will be better understood alld supported
hy parellts and children of both rare:::. and will promote
the rnduring qualities of all illtegratrd society so ess<'ntial to its genuine sueres::;.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I concur in the remand of th1s case for further proceedings in the District Court but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach tlu
Court which involves a major city outside the South . It
comes from Denver, Colorado. a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial
segregation. 1 Nor has it been argued that any other
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws)
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." Thf>
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Constitution has expn'ssly prohibited "any classificatwn of pupils . . . on account of race or
color"
2 See, e. g.. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwn,

402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971)
" We do not reach . . the questiOn whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without
any discrimmator~- action by school authorities, IS a constitutwnal
violation requiring remedial action by a school desegregatiOn decree:··
The term "state actwn ," as used herein, thus refer~ to actiOn~ of the
appropnate public Rrhool authonttes
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denver
public school authorities may havP contributed to the
school segregatio11 which is ackno>dedgecl to exist in
Denver.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court considered that a school
with a concentration of 70 to 75% "Negro or Hispano
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F . Supp., at 77. \Vherever one may draw this line, Jt is
undisputed that most of the schools 111 these two area~
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their tudent bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children. The rity-wicle school mix 111 DPnwr is fio %
Anglo. 14 % r\egro. and :2Wir Hispano. 111 areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides, the
schools are predominantly Anglo, if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is gf'nerally comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in v.:h 1ch there
is a substantial mmority population and wherr desegregation has not bee11 ordered by the federal courts. There
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully
as pervasive as that 111 southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past clec·a de and a half. The focus
of the school desegregatiOn problem has now shifted from
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footdragging as the process was in most places. substantial progress toward achieving i
· ~ 1as een made
in southern States." Xo romparable progress has been
made in many nonsouthern cities v,:ith large minority
According to the 1971 HEW e~t1mate, 43.9 % of :;~ro pupils
attended majonty white ~rhool~ in the South a~ opposed to only
27. % who at•ended ~urh ~rhoob 111 the ;\lorth and West. Fifty::;even percent of all Xegro pupib 111 the i\orth and We::;t attend
Rc hool~ With over HO% mmority population a~ oppo~ed to 32.2%
,who clo so in the South
LIS Cong . Rec. Sl45
3
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populations 1 primarily because of the de facto / de jure
distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South." But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality. vve must recognize that the
evil of operating separate schools is no lPss in Denver
than in Atlanta
4
The 1971 HE\\r Enrollment Stn·,·r~· dramattzrd thr ;;egreg:1trd
charactrr of publtc ~('hool ~~·::;tems In man~· nonsouthrrn cities. Thr
prrcrntage of J\egro pupib winch allPndrd ::;chools morP than RO o/r
black wa~ 91.:{ 111 Cl!'I'Pland. Ohw; 97 .K 111 Compton , California ,
78.1 in Da~·ton. OhiO . 7~.() m Drtroit, :-riclngan . 9.5 7 m Gary .
Indiana; Sfl.4 in Kan~a~ Ci1v, :'lli~:;oun; 8fl .ti in Los Angrle:;, Callforma: 78.8 in :\filwauker , Wi~con,;m; 91.:3 111 \"r11·nrk, Xew .Jrr,.:py
89.8 in St. Loui~ , :-li::;~olll'l. Thr full data from thr Enrollment Survr~· rna~· br found 111 lli-1 Cong Rrc. Sl-t+-1-!8, .Tan. 20 , 1972.
"A::; Srnator Ribicoff (D -Conn.) rrcognrzed ·

"For year,; we• han· fought the battle• of mtrgratiOII pnmnril~ 111
the South whrn• thr prohkm wa" ;-;e•n•rr. It wa~ a long, arduou~
fight that elP:;PrvPd to be· fought and lll't-drd to be· II'OII.
"lT nfortuna t rh·, a' tlw prohlPm of ra <'I:\ I i,.:oln t wn ha~ mol' Pel no1tl1
of the :\Ia"on-Dtxon Iill(• , man.1· nort berner,.: ha 1·e Lid ;\!1 <·1·asrvt>
fare\\'t'll to thP 100-~·par ~trngglP for rnewl el.Juaht~ · Om motto
seem::; to haw bren ·Do to ;-;outhrmrr~ what you do not \\'ant to do
to ~·our~rl f. '
''Good rrason~ h:Wt' nlwa.1·::; hl'<'ll offPrPcl. of rom~e . for not moving
vigoron::;l~· nhrad m tllC' \"orth a~ 11·c•ll a" thr South.
" Fir;-;(. It wa~ that t hr problrm wa~ wor~r 111 tlw South Then
the fact" beg:1n to ~how that that wn, no longrr true.
'' W(' thrn began to hPar thl' dP faeto-dP .JIIJ'l> rrfram .
"Somrhow re~identwl ~rgn·ganon 111 tlw :\orth wa~ nrcidentnl or
de facto and that mndr it brttrr than tllC' IPgall~· supported de jure
,;egrrgation of th(• :::lout h. It wn~ a hard distinction for black children
m totall~· ~Pgr('gatrd ~rhool::: m tlw \"orth to underAnnd. but 11
allowed u,; 10 a1·oid thP problrm." liS Cong Her 82.5~2. Feh. 2-1
1972 .
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. Whe11 Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.
483 (1954). was deciclt>d. thf' Jistinction betwf'Pn de jure
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that casP. The situation confronting the Court. largPly confined to tlw southern
States, was officially imposed racial sPgregation in the
schools extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was 1ts holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 C . S., at 488. 493- 49i) . Although some
of the language was more expansive. thf' holding 111
Broum J was essentially negative It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States. or thPir mstru~
mentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools.
The forbiclden action was de JUre, and the opinion in
Brown I was construed-for some years anrl by many
courts-as requiring only state neutrality. allowing "freedom of choice'' as to schools to be attended so long as the
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints "
6
Src, e. g .. Bradle y v. Sdwol Board. :3~5 F . 2d :1 10. 316 (CA~
en bane. 1965) .
"It has brrn hrld again n nrl again . .
that t hr Fourteenth

AmendmPnt prohibition i~ not agnin~t ~<·.grrgation a~ ,,uch . .
A stat e or ~chool di~trict offpnd~ no ron~titutionnl rrqtmcment
when it grant~ to nil ~tudrnt~ uniform!~· a n unrr~trictrd frrrdom of
choi ce a~ to thr ~chool attrn dPd . ~o th;tt Pnch pupil , Ill rffPct. a~~ ign ~
hnn~Pif to thr "chool hr wi~hP~ to attrnd"
tThr ca"r \\'a~ lat rr
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But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown I!,
349 U. S. 294 ( 1955). did not retain its original meaning.
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the
concept of state twutrality was transformed into the
present constitutional doctrine rf'quiring affirmative
state action to desf'gre!!ate school system~. " The keystone case was Green v. ( 'uuuly 8chool Roard, :~91 r. S.
430, 438 (1968). when· school boards ,,·err tkelared to
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convPrt to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root ami
branch."' The school systPm before the Court in Green
was operating i11 a rural and sparst•ly settled county
"·herE' thE're werE' no concentrations of white and black
population~. no neighborhood school system (there were
only two schools in thE' county). and 110ne of the
problems of an urbanizPd school district.' The Court
properly iden tifiPd thP freedom of choicE' program
therE' as a subterfuge. and the language in Green imposing an affirmativt' duty to cottvert to a unitary system
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was. however. reason to question tu what E'xtcnt this duty
would apply in tlw vastly different factual setting of a
vacated and rrmandrd b~· tin~ Court, whtrb expre::;~rd no virw on thr
merits of the de~egrrgatton plan~ ~ulnm1 trd . ) :)s2 ll . S. 10:3, 10.">
(1965) . Ser abo Bell ,. _ ,'ichoo/ City of Gary. huf .. :Q-+ F. 2cl 209
(CA7 196:3) . Doa•ns ,._Board of Rduc .. :):m F. 2d 9i{~ (CAJO 19Ml :
Deal v . Board of Educ .. ;~()9 F 2d 55 (CMi 19661
7
For a rom·t~r histor~· and rommf'ntar~· on thf' f'\·olutiOII, :,;('l' genrrall~· A. Biekrl. Thr Supremr Court. and tllf' Idea of Prog;rr~s. pp
126-1:30 ( 1970)
8
See abo the rompanion ra~e~ 111 Rm1 ey \". Board of Hducation.
:391 tr. S. -+-+:3 (196H} , and !llonroe ,. Board of Cormn 'rs. 391 P . S
450 (1968). nrttber of whteh mvoh·ed largr urban or mf'tropolitan

.areas.
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large city with extensive areas of resideutial segregation,
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of Xew Kent
County. Virginia.
But the doubt as to whethPr the affirmative duty concept would flower into a new coustitutional principle of
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 LT. ~- 1 ( 1971). in 'vhich the duty
articulated in Green was applied to the urban school
system of metropolitan Char lotte. X orth Carolina. l 11
describing the residential pattPrll~ ttl Charlotte. thL' Co!lrt
noted the "familiar phetlOlll('I10Jl .. in thl· metropolitan
areas of minority groups lwing ·'concentrated in one part
of the city." 40:L r. :-3 .. at :25. and acknowledged that ;
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated · school system implemented by bus
transportlltion could ' make· adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous schools. congested and colllplrx
traffic patterns. " 402 l ~ ~ .. at l4
Despite this recogmtwn of a fundamentally different
problem from that involved 111 Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and
branch "-which had been formulated for the two schools
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County
In Swann, the Court further noted it "·as concerned only
with Sta.tes having "a long history" of officially imposed
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those
States to implement Brown I. 402 lJ. S .. at 5-6. In so
doing, the Court refrained even from considering whether
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to
Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported
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the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative duty. en
tailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate
segregation in the schools, the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not
result from historic. state-imposed de jure segregation.
Rather, the familiar root ca use of segregated schools in all
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated resid ential and migratory patterns the impact of which on th e racial composition of the schools was often perpet uated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This
is a national , not a so uthem ph enomenon . And it is
largely unrelated to whether a particul ar State had (Jr did
not have segregatory school law8 '•
Whereas Brourn I rightly decreed the elimmation
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations
on southern school distrirts to elum nate conditions which
are not regionally umque but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the n~st of the country . As
6

9
A;,; Dr K a rl T aruber statrs in hi ~ a rticle, Hr~idential SPgrE>gation.
Scientific Amencan , August 1965, a t 14 :

"No elaborate analysis is necessary to conclude from the~e figures
that a high degreE' of rc, Identlal :;egregat ion based on racr IS a un iversal characteristic of Amrncan c iti P~ . Thi,: ~eg regation is found
in the cities of the North and West a" \\'CII a:< of the South; 111 la rge
cities as well as small ; 111 non mdu~trial cit IE'~ as wrll a~ mdu~trial; in
citirs w1th hundreds of thousands of Negro residents as well as those
with only a few thousand ; and 111 cit ies that a re progressive 111 their
employment practice and c1vil nght" policie:< as well a~ tlwse that
are not "
In his book , "\"egroes in Clt iP~ (1965) , Dr Taruber statPd that r e:o:idential srgrrgatw n rxists " regardiPss of thr charactrr of local laws
and policie~ and rega rdl rs~ of ot lwr form~ of di~crimmatwn ." !d.,

at :36.
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the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swarm
points inevitably tovvards a uniform, constitutional ap~
proach to our national problem of school segregation.

TI
The Court's decision today. whrle adhering to the
de jure/de facto distinction, will require the application
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various decisions of the school board. I coneur 111 tlw Court's position that the public school authorities ar<' the responsible
agency of the State. and that if the affirmative duty doC'trine rs sound constitutional la\\' for Charlotte. it is
equally so for Denver. I would not, however, perpetuate
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory Intent." I would
hold, quite simply. that where segregated public schools
exist within a school district to a substantial degree. there
is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public
authorities (I wm usually refer to them collectively as
the "school board") are sufficrently responsible'" to impose upon them a nationally applicable burden to demonA prima facie case of cun;:;tJtut IOnal \'lola1!on PXJ;:;t~ whPn segregatiOn is found to a substantial degrpe 111 thP school~ of a particular district. lt Is rPcognized , of cour~e. that tlu~ term i~ relattve and provide~ no precise standard;:;. But circumstances, demographic and otherwise , vary from d1stnrt to district and hard and
fast rules should not be formulated. The Pxistence of a substantial
pPrcC'ntage of ~choob populated b~· ~tudent~ from onp racP only o~·
predominately so populatrd. shou_ld triggrr the inquir ·,
10
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated school system.
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine,
the distinction no longer can be justified on a principled
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant
to the existence of historic. stat(•-imposed segregation at
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to include compulsory
student transportation went well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school 8egregatiou for which
former state segregation Ia ws were ever responsible.
Moreover, as the Court's opinion today abundantly demonstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de JUre
discrimination present problems of subjective intent
\vhich the courts cannot fairly rPsolve .
At the outset, one must try to 1dent1fy the constitutional right which is being enforceu. This is not easy,
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Brown I , after emphasizing the importance of education,
the Court said that :
"Such an opportumty. where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right \Yhich must be made
available to all on equal terms." 347 "C. S., at 493.
ln Brown I I , the Court identified the "fundamental prmciple" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial discrimination in public education,.,
349 U. S., at 298, and spoke of "the personal interest
Qf the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis.'' 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a minimum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system. 11 In
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right.
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms,
I would now define it as the right. derived from the Equal
Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards
will operate integrated school systems within their respective districts. This means that school authorities,
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and
implement their customary decisions with a view toward
enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of
course. a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized· segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate
faculties and administration ; ( ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, instruction and curricula opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and (iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and
11

See Bickel, supra, n. 7. at 118 :

"It [the problem of ~chool deseg regatiOn I has not been that simple . . . because the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Education was itself not that :;imple. One strain in it became eYident in
subsequent decisions outlawing all form:; of :<tatP-sponsored segregation in ever~·thing from the :spectator :;eetion of a courtroom to golf
courses. The minimal proposition thilt emerged-and about time
it was that it should emergE'--was that the :state ma~· not , by legislation or administratively, cla~>::;ih· the population along racial lines.' '
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-determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to
undertake the transportation of students. this also must
be with integrative opportunities in mind.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of
the contour characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not
mean-and indeed could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly
white or all or predominantly black is not a "segregated "
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one.
Having school boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise. will find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best
able to assure an abseuce of such discrimination while
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate
assurance that minority children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those en trusted with the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti~
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan~
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty
employment and assignments, school construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters.
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause
of segregated school conditions. But if. after such detailed and complete public supervision. substantial school
segregation still persists. the presumption is strong that
the school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so
pervasive and where, after years of such action, segregated schools continue to exist within the district
to a substantial degree. this Court is .i ustified in finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation .
The burden then must fall on the school board to demonstrate it is operating an "integrated school system."
It makes little sense to find prima facie vwlations and
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time
of the Brown decision . The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread 111 our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
recognize.'" As one commentator has noted
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
· ~ Indeed , if one goe~ back far enough, it is probable that all rac:ial
segregation, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the
schools, has at some time been supported or maintainrd by government action . In Becket v. School Board, 308 F . Supp. 1274, 13111315 (ED Va. 1969) , Judgr Waltrr Hoffman compilrd a summary
of pa::;t public segregator~· action which included examples from a
great majority of States. He concluded that "on!~· as to the states
of l\1aine, New Hampshire , Vermont, Wa ~hington , Nevada, and
Hawaii does it appear from this nonexhaustive resea rch that no discriminatory laws appeared on the books at one time or another.:'
/d., at 1315._
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arose in cities-Cincinnati, Gary and Kansas City,
Kansas-where racial segregation in schools was
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966),
cert. denied, 377 U. S. 924 (1964); Downs v. Board
of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CA lO 1964) , cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914, Bell v. School City, 324 F . 2d
209 (CA7 1963) , cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887, Indiana in 1949, and
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated, should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more
than five years before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects." Goodman, De Facto School Segregation : A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297
(1972). 13
Not only does the de jure/ de facto distinction operate
inequitably on communities in different sections of the
3 The author continues :
"True, the earlier the policy of segregation was abandoned the Jess
dangrr there IS that 1! continues to operate covertly, is significantly
responsible for present day patterns of reRidential segregation, or has
contributed material!~· to present communit~· attitudes toward Negro
schools. But there is no reason to suppose that 1954 is a univer:;ally
app ropriate dividing line between de jure segregation that may
safely be assumed to have spent itself and that which may not .
For many remedial purposes, adoption of an arbitrary but easily
administrable cutoff point might not be objectiOnable. But in a
situation such as school desegregation, where both the rights asserted
and the remedial burdens imposed are of such magnitude, and where
the resulting ;;ectional discrimination is passionately resented, it is
surely questionable whether such arbitrariness is either politically
or morally acceptable."
1
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country: more importantly, it disadvantages minority
children as well. As the Fifth Circuit stated:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Boston, New York, or any other area of the
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto
segregation, would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society, while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
in the 17 southern and border states violates the
constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even
their blood brothers. because they were born into
a de jure society. All children everywhere in the
na,tion are protected by the Constitution, and treatment which violates their constitutional rights in
one area, also violates such constitutional rights in
another area. " Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CAS en bane,
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Educ ., 380 F. 2d 385. 397 (CAS en bane)
Gewin. J .. dissenting) ."
The Court today does move for the first time toward
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure
action in what the Denver School Board has done or
failed to do, and even here the Court does not rely upon
the results or effects of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segregatory intent : '"
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor be~< Sre B1ckel, supra, 11. 7, at 119 :
" If a Negro child perceives his srpa ration as discriminatory and
invidious, he is not , in a soc iety a hundred ~·ea rs removed from
slavery, going to make fine dist inctions about the source of a particular separation ."
"Thr Court toda y docs not require , however, a ::;egregatory intent
with respect to the entire school system, and inder<i holds that if such
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tween de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 18)
(italics are the Court's).
The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor"
between .de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia,
407 U. S. 451 (7972). In holding there that "motiva,
tion" is irrelevant, the Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II \Vas to desegregate
schools, a.nd we have said that ' [ t] he measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U. S.
33, 37.
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect--not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.
"Though the purpose of the new school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the
an intent iH found with respect to some schools in a system, the burden-normally on the plaintiffs-shifts to the defendant school authorities to prove a negative : namely, that their purposes were
benign , ante. pp. 17-18
The Court has come a long wa~· since Brown I . Starting from
the unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory constitutional
and statutory provisions of some States, the new formulation-still
professing fidelity to the de jure doctrine-is that desegregation will
be ordered despite the absence of any segregatory laws if: (i) segregated schools in fact exist ; (ii) a court finds that they result from
some action taken with segregatory intent by the school board ,
(iii) such action relates to any "meaningful segment" of the school
system; and (iv) the school board cannot prove that its intentions
with respect to the remainder of the system were nonsegregatory.
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courts' holdings rested not on motivation or pur~
poses but on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
we hold that its approach was proper." 407 U. S.,
at 462.
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in
Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued,
of course, that in Emporia a prior constitutional violation had already been proven and that this justifies the
distinction. The net result of the Court's language, how·ever, is the application of an effect test to the actions of
southern school districts and an mtent test to those in
other sections, at least until an initial de jure finding for
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to
perpetuate any such dual standard, we should hold forthrightly that significant segregated school conditions in
whatever section of the country are a prima facie violation of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted
elsewhere ;
"Circumstances or chance may ,.,·ell dictate that no
persons in a certain class will serve on a particular
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes
our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in
there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The
result bespeaks discrimnation, wlwther or ·n ot it was
a conscious decision on tlw part of any individual jury
commissioner." Henwndez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475,
482 (1954 ) . (Emphasis added.)

B
There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
schoQl desegregation cases, In addition, ther~ ar~ r~a,•.
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sons of policy and prudent judicial administration which
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits in which there can be little hope of uniformity of result.
The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them.
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board 's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. Th e results of litigation- often arri ved
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to
action taken or not taken over many years- will be
fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools,
.despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is, for example, quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
, operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities
and, in effect, to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will,
under the de jure/ de facto distinction, continue to differ,
especially since the Court has never made clear what
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for
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an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were possible to clarify this question , wide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or
"purpose," especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions over many years.
This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation,
or collection of different. motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment," Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S.
214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-,~
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381
(1968) . Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a sin~
gle statute will be compounded in a judicial review of
years of administration of a large and complex school
system. 11' Every act of a school board and school administration, and indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny.
'"'A~ one commentator hao: t•xprr ~~ed it :
"If the courts are indeed prepared to inquire into motive, thorny
questions will arise even if one assume~ that rarwl motivation is
capable of being proven at trial. What of the casf' in which one or
more members of a school board, but less than a majority, are found
to have acted on racial grounds? What if it appea rs that the school
board's action was prompted by a mixture of motives, including constitutionally innocent ones that alone would have prompted the board
to act? What if the members of the school board were not themselves racially inspired but wished to please their constituents, many
of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are classified as unconstitutional de jure segregation, there is little point in preserving
the de jure-de facto distinction at all. And it may well be that the
difference between any of these situations and one in which racial
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant, from the standpoint of both the moral culpability of the state officials and the
impact upon the children involved, to support a difference in con~
stitutional treatment," Goodman, supra, n. 11, {lt 284-285,
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The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated,
remain in that condition, are desegregated, or-for the
long term future-are likely to be one or the other. These
.decisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building construction and location; the timing of
building new schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment, promotion
and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel;
policies with respect to transfers from one school to
another; whether, and to what extent, special schools will
be provided, where they will be !orated, and who will
qualify to attend them; the determination of curriculum,
including whether there will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training, and the rout::
ing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as
to social. recreational and athletic policies.
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 402 U. S., at 5-6. But in a case of
the present type, where no such history exists, a judicial
examination of these factors will be required under today's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and
unpredictable results, to protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the federal courts, and to
serious disruption of individual school systems. In the
absence of national and objective standards, school boards
. and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty
and disarray, speculating as to what is required and when
litigation will strike.
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c
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and contributing to the consequences indicated above, we should acknowledge that
whenever public school segregation exists to a substantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school board. It
is true, of course, that segregated schools-wherever
located-are not solely the product of the action or
inaction of public school authorities. Indeed, as indicated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country, whether in the North ,
West, or South, are the socio-economic influences which
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school boards have
continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school
system within their district and, as Judge John Minor
Wisdom has noted, "where the figures [showing
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a
prima face case of discrimination is establish ed."
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2cl 848,
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in
,Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
which has outlived its time.

III
The preceding section addresses the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the school districts
throul?ihout our COI,lntry to operat~ inter;rated school sys·
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terns. When the schools of a particular district are
found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demonstrate that they have in fact operated an integrated
system as this term is defined above. supra, p. 10. If
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case, the question then becomes what reasonable affirmative desegregative steps district courts may require to
place the school system in compliance with the constitutional standard. In short. what specifically is the
nature and scope of the remedy'?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding~
remand that Denver il"a "dual school system,'' that city
will then be under i:w "affirmative duty" to desegregate
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

A
The controlling case is Swann , supra, and the question
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation decrees " "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
uSee, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of Newport N ews, F . 2d - , - (1972), where the CA4 en bane, upheld a district court
assignment plan where ''traYel time, varymg from a minimum of
forty minutes and a maximum of onP hour, each wa~· . would be required for busing black students out of the old City and white students into the old City in order to achieve a racial balancing of the
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desegregation." 402 U. S .. at 26. In the context of a
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different-and widely
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading
it to date.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound
misg1vmgs. ~othing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such court compelled disruption of public
education. F~rtuna,.te~Swann a]sQ lai r own a roa
rule of reason under which desegregation remedies must
M'-/1 A -~~1 flexib~e and other values and interests be consid'47 .....- ~e-d~ ~he Court recognized that school authorities.
/\
~the federal judiciary. must be charged in the first in~
~~~1ce with the task of desegregating local school systems.
choo boar sin rural areas can a just
402 e. S., at 16.
more readily to this task than those in metropolitan disdistrict. " Thi,; transportation \\'as ch·crrcd for C"hildrrn from the th1rd
grade up , involving children as young as eight ~·cars of age.
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ .. -1-66 F . 2d 890, 895
(1972), tiJP CAfi affirmed a di::;trict court a::;;:;Ignmrnt plan which
daily transportrd 14,000 children with '· the maximum time to be
spent on the buses by any child fbringl 34 minutes. . ," presumably each way. But as .Judge Wrick noted in di~:srnt the CA6
instructed t hr district judgr to implement ~·c t further de:segregation
orders. Plans presently undrr con:sidcration b~· that court call for
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children re:spect i,·ely , for undetermined length;; of timr. !d. , at 895-9R6.
Petitioner::; before this Court in Putts " · Flax. No. 72-288, cert.
(197-), contcndrd that the implementation
denied, U. S. of the CA5'::; directive in Flax \' . Potts , 46-1- F. 2d 865 (1972). would
requirr bu;; ridr:s of up to two hours and 20 minutes rach day and
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition , at 14 Whil r respondents
contend these figure,; reprr:srnt an "a~tounding inflation, " Response,
at 7, tran:sportation of a significant magnitude seems inrvitable.
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tricts "with dense and shifting population , numerous
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at
14. , Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or
..-------di;tance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process." Id ., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as one important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
18
cases.
And the Court further emphasized that equitable
decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other
public and private interests
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right The task is to correct, by a.
balancing of the individual and collPctive interest,
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann,
supra, at 15-16.
Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown II,

349 U. S., at 229:
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts
will be guided by eq uitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
'ls See United States v . Texas Ed'Ucatwn Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 883
(CAS 1972) (Bell, J ., concurrmg in an opinion in which seven other
judges joined) ·

"In our view the remedy which the district court is required to
formulate should be formulated within the entire context of the
opm10n in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. . . . [Emphasis added.] "
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for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs."
Thus in school desegregation cases. as elsewhere, eqmty
counsels reason, flexibility and balance. See. e. g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman, t". S. (1973 ). I am aware, of
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to promote desegregation with other. equally important educational interests which a community may legitimately assert. Neglect
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached.' u Overzealousness in pursuit of any single
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance'' and "flexibility' ' which this Court ha::; alway~
respected .

B
Where school authonties have defaulted in their duty
to operate an integrated school system , district courts
must insure that affirmative clcsegregative steps ensue.
~ of these can be taken effectively without dam.
aging state and parental interests in having children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where desegregative steps are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood education," school
authorities mm;t£ pursue them. For example, bound19

The relevant mqtury Is ··whether the costs of achH'ving de egregation in any given ~it uatwn outweigh the legal, moral and educaIt IS clear . . . that the
tional considerations favonng It.
Constitution ~hould not be held to reqmre an~· transportation plan
that keeps children on a bus for n substantial part of the da~· . consumes ::;ignificant portwns of funds otherwise spendable directly on
educatiOn, or involve~ a genuine rlement of danger to th e sa fety of
the child." School De~egregation After Swann: A Theo r.\· of GoveJ:nment. R esponsibility, 39 lJ Chi , L Rev 421 , 422, 443 (1972),
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn
to integrate, to the extent practicable, the school's student body. Construction of new schools should be of
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integration should be attained throughout the school system,
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). An optional
majority to minority transfer program, with the State
providing free transportation to desiring students . is also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be repeated that alloca~
tion of resources within the school district must be made
with scrupulous faimess among all schools.
The above examples are meant to be Jllust~ x
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all ~tlve,; - impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by
district courts in decidmg whether the duty to desegregate
has been met. For example . "neighborhood school plans
are constitutionally suspect when attendance zones are
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods,
and when school construction preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony of given schools.' ' 2 ° Keyes
v. School District 1\'o. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. 2d - .

United States v Boa.rd of Education of Tulsa County,
429 F. 2d - . 1258-1259. This does not imply that
decisions on faculty assignment, attendance zones. school
constructiOn. closing and consolidation, must be made
to the detriment of all neutral, nonracial considerations.
But these considerations can . with proper school board
initiative, generally be met in a manner that will enhance
the degree of school desegregation .
20
A useful ~tud~· of the l11~tonral u:;es and abuse:; of th<' neighborhood school concept. is M . Weinberg, Race & Place (1967) .
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c
Defaulting school authorities \vould have. at a mini~
mum, the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort
outlined in the abow section . School boards wo uld, of
course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to
promote school desegregation. fn a pluralistic society
such as ours, it is essential that no racial minority feel
.demeaned or discriminated agamst ancl that students of
all races learn to play. work. and cooperate with on
another in their common pursuits and endeavors ~oth
ing in this opinion is meant to discourage sehoul boards
from exceeding minimal constitutional standards ll1 promoting the r~gni~Nl values of in tegraterl school
oonditions
A constitutional requirement of extensive student
transportation solely to achieve integratiou presents a
vastly more complex problem. It pronuses on the one
hand a greater degree of actual desegregatiOn. while It
infringes on what may fa1r ly be regarded as,(important
commumty aspiratiOns and personal nghts. :-iuch a requirement is further likely to ~
sources from the forrmost 1-!:0al of any school system ·
the best quality education fur all pupils. The Equal
Protection Clause does mdeed command that raCial discrimination not be tolerated in the decisions of public
school authonties. But 1t docs not
authorities undertake widespread student transportatiOn
solely for the sakP of maxinm:ing integration "·
21
In fact, du!:' to racwJI~ · ~Pparatf' r!:'~ldrnttal p<lttern~ that rharactenzf' our maJor urban areas 1t 1s qmte unrealistlc to thmk of
arh1eving 111 man~· c1t1e~ ~ub~tantwl mtegratwn throughout the
school di~tnrt \nthout a degr!:'r of ;,;tucirnt tran~portation whiCh
would have tlw gravest eronom1r and educatwnal con~equenr·es
As Proff'R~or Birkel note~

•·In mo~t of the larger urban an·a~. drmograph1c ronditwns arP ;;urh
that no pohrv that a comt can order. ang a school boarq. a dt~· Qf
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportation
has no place in public school systems or is 110t a permissible means 111 the desegregative process. The transporting of school children is as old as public education .
and in rural and some suburban settings It is as indispensable as the provJdiitg of books. It is prPscntly estimated that approximately half of all Amencan childn•Jt
ride buses to school for reasoiJS umelated to integration ."" At the secondary levPI in particular. wherP
the schools are larger and I:'PrvP a wider . nwre dit::persecl constituency than the elem(•ntary :::chool. some
form of pubhc or privately financed transportation IEoften necessary There 1:,; a :::Iglllfil·ant differettce. hO\\
ever. m transportation plans voluntarily IIIItiatetl by loeal
school boards for PdueatJOnal purposes and those un posed by a federal court. ThP former usually represent a
necessary or convenient Illcan of access to the school
nearest home; the latter oftelt rcquirP IPngthy tnps for uu
purpose other than to further integration .!.• Yet the
eve11 a ~tat(· ha~ TIH rapalltl!l ,\ 111 put .nto effe!'t , \\'Ill no fal·t l'l' ~ul!
m rhe fort>~rrablr fnttm• 111 ractnll~ balam·pd public >'C'hool:- Unl~
a rrordrr111g of tlw em·IronmPnr m\·ol\'lnf! t'l·onomic and ,ocwl polle)
on thr hroadr:;t eonrrintbiP front mtght have an apprrciable tmpart '
B1ckel , supra. n ;- , at 1:3:2
22
E~ttmatr~ ,·ary. Su•ann, supra, nt 29, notre! that "rightPrn million of thr ?\Tat10n'~ pnblir ~chool clnldrrn , approximatr!~· 39% , wcrP
t.ran~portrd to thr1r ~rhool~ b~· bus 111 1969-1970 m all part~ of the
ro1mtr~· " Srnator R1b1roff (D.-Conn .) a thouf!htful student of tht~
problPm. ;o;tatf'cl that " ti\'O-thmt~ of all AmPncan rhildr!:'n toda.\· ridE'
hu~!:':< to school for rPa~nn~ llnrPiatl'd to mtrgratJon ·
IH~ Cong Rr!'
8254:3, F!:'b 2-i, 1972
~=• Hi~tonrall~· . cl!~t <lnt tntll>'JlortatJon wa~ 1vrongJ~· 1 1~r<l to rromotr ~rgr<'g<lt 1011 '· \' rgro eh1ldrrn ,,·rrc• grnrrall~· con~IdrrPcl eapablP of trawlling longrr cl!,.;tanrr~ to ~rhool and without thr mel of nny
\'rh1rlr What wa~ too far for a \\'hJte child brrnnw rpa~onably nrar
for a \'pgro chJid .' W(•Jl1l}('rg. 8upra. 11 '20 . a! K7
Th1~ deplorable lnstor)' hn." Ire! somr to argur that intf'gratwr hus
riclr:< arr .iustJfi(•d a~ atonPmE'nt for pa~t ~rgrl'gator~ tnp:,; and that
nr1ghborhood l'durat1on !>' now bn1 a r·odr -1\'ord for racwl ;;;rgrrga-
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Court in u•w1 11 was unquestionably right in descn bing
b us t ransportation as "one tool of school desegregation.''
402 C ::-l .. at 30."' Tlw rrucial1ssue IS when. under what
circumstances. and to what extent such transportation
may appropriately b<· ordered
ThP answer to this
turns-as it does so often 111 the law-upon a sound exercise of discretion under the circumstances.
Swann itself recogmzt:•d lim1ts to desegrega~Ive obligations. It noted that a co nstitutional requirement of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mix1ng
would
be disproved .
." am! sanctiOned district court USl
of mathematiCal ratiOs al' "no more than a startmg point.
in the process of shap1ng a n:·medy ... . · 402 e. S .. at
24. :25. Thus particular ::;clwols t11ay be all white u1
all black and still not mfringc· const1tutwnal nght~;
if the system IS genuinely Integrated and school authori ties are pursuing intcgratiVl' steps short of extensive and
disruptive transportat1o1t. ThP rdusal of till' ( 'ourt 111
Swann to require 1·al'Jal balallf'<" Jil ~eh(Joli" throug;hou1 tiH·
But rm~u~r ol t ran~ponat toll til t IH· pa~t Joe~ not mtpl,\ t1t'tglt
borhood ~rhoolmg; hn~ no Yaltd non~<'IP'Pg;ator~· u~P~ for (]](' pn·~t'lll
:\or would wrongful t ran:; port a non Ill t Itt pa~t .JU~t tf~ elf' I runrnt ;t l
lrn n:;porta t ton for t lw c!uldn•n of toda.\
2
' Some communttte~ had tran~purtatton plan~ 111 ('/tP('t ;It the tlllll
of court de~eg;regntton order~. :See Swann. supra. at 29, n . II ; Davis
v. School Cornm'rs of Mob1/e Cou'n ty, ~02 1'. S. 8:3, :34-:35 (197I)
C'onrt~ han• u~rd tht· pre~en<·<· or ab~t'IH't• of t'Xt,<flng t mn~portat tOil
in a dt~tnct a~ unP factor 111 frammg; and nnplrmr-ntmg; clr~rg-rcgntton
decrt'e,.:. Cmted State~ v. Watson Chapel <\chuol D1:stnct. ~~ti F. :Zd
9.'38, 9:{7 (CAS 1971). Northcroos \" Board uf Educ., 444 F 2d II79,
111\:2-111~:{ ( CA!i 1971), Dat•ts \'. Board of Educ .. :3:21- F. Supp 1197,
1203 (ED Ark. 1971) WhPn· a ~chool board 1~ \· oluntanl~· engaged
in trau~port mg :;tudent::<, a dt,.:t nc·t conrt 1~, of eour:;r, ob!tgntrcl to
insure that ~uch tran~portatton ~~ not undrrtakrn wtth :;egregator~·
effrct. ·wherr, abo, voluntary tran~portatiOn prog;ram:; arP alrcnd~·
Ill progr<'~"• thert' ma.\· be greatn Jtl~ttfiratton for rourt-orclncd tran"portatton of "'tudrnt~ fur a r·omJmrahle tune and rlzstauce to arhtp\T·
grea t{'r \lltt'graqo11,
i ion
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district or the arbitrary elunwation of all ''one-race
schools." 402 U. ~-.at 26. is grounded in a recognition that
the State. parents. and children all have at stake in
school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable
interests.
The personal interest nught lw c·haracterized as the
desire that children attend community schools near
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very eth lll('ally homogeneous.''
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( 1966). the Sixth C'n·cUlt summarized
the advantages of <~uch a ne1p:hhorhood <~ystem ot
schools . !:·
'' Appellants. however. pose th<' questw11 ut whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placernent. fa1rly
administered without racial bias. comports with the
requirements of Pqual opportumty If Jt nevertheless
results in the creation of schools \\·ith predominantly
or even exclusively ~cgro pupils. Tlw neighborhood system JS in wicle use throughout the natiOn
and has been for many years the basis of school
admimstratwn. Tlus IS so because it JS acknowledged to have several valuable aspects which are an
aid to education, such as minimization of safety haz~ " Tlw term ' ' neighborhood ~chou!
~hould not ue ~uppo~rd w
denotr ~olrl~· a walk-111 ,;chou! or onP wh1rh ,;en·r::; rhildren only in
the surroundmg bloch. Tlw Court ha;:; noted , in a different contrxt , that "thr word ' neighborhood ' ~~ qu1tl' a~ su~crptJble of variation n~ th0 won! ·Joraht~·.· Both t0rms nre eln>'tir and, deprndeni
upon rirrum~tanre~. ma.'· be equall .\· ,.:atistiC'd b~· an·no: Inl'rt~ured b_'.
rod,; or by mile~ ." Connally '" General ( 'on ~; t Co .. 2()9 ( T S. 385 ,
395 (192ti) . In the ~ehool colltrxt , " nPighhorhoocl " refrr~ to re!ntJVr
proximity . to a prdPre11cr lor n ,.:r·hool nPare r . rather than mort
distant from home.
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ards to children in reaching school, economy of cost
in reducing transportation needs, ease of pupil
placement and administration through the use of
neutral, easily determined standards. and better
home-school commu11ication
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of
parental and student access and convenience, as well as
greater economy of pub!Jc administration . These are
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy of
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds. 21 '
Neighborhod school systems. Jwutrally admimstered, reflect the deeply felt desire of citizen~ for a sense of community in their pubhr educatiOn . Publ1c schools ha ve
been a traditional source of strength to our ~atiOJl , an d
that strength may derivP 111 part from the identification of
many schools with the personal features of th e surround ing neighborhood. Community support. mterest and
dedication to pubhc schools may well run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern . d1sta11ce may encourage disinterest. Many Citizens sense today a decline l1l
the intimacy of our institutions- home. ch urch , and
school-which has caused a concon11tan t d<'clinP In tht
unity and communal spirit ot our people. { pass 1J1 1
judgment on this viewpoint, but I do believe that this
Court should be wary of compelling in tlw name of constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional, more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely related to the concept of a community and
neighborhood educatiOn, are those rights and duties parents have with respect to the education of their children
H 1 do not Imply that the ne ighborhood rouceJH mu~t be embodied
in every ~c hool ~~·~tem . But wlwrr :1 ~ rhool board ha~ cho~en I1 ,
frc\cral judge~ ~hould accord n respPct !ll frnmmg rcmec!wJ deere<;>~.
2
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The law has long recogmzed the parental duty to nurture,
support. and provide for the welfare of children. including their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510, 534, 535. a unanimous Court held that ·
"Under the doctrine of At eyer v. l\' ebraska, 262
U. S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably intPrferes >vith the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbnnging and
education of children under their control. . . . The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and dirPct h1s dcstmy have the nght.
coupled with the high cl u ty. to recognize and prepare him for additional ohligations "
And Ill Gris'wold v. Connecticut, 381 l ' S. 479. 4~2
( 1965 ). the Court noted that Ill Pierce, "the rtght to educate one's children at> one chooses IS made apphcable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." I do not believe recognitwn of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to seud
a child to public or pnvatP school. Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a pnvate educatiuu for their
children, and the dual obhgatiou of privatP tuitwns and
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons
seek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voicP in the school their
child attends. It would. of course. be Impractical to
allov.: the wishes of particular parpnts to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parentschool and parent-child commumcation allowed by the
neighborhood unit ought not t1> be supprPsserl by force
of law
In the commendablP 11atJOnal eon cern for alleviating
public school segregation . courts may haw overlooked
thP fact that thP rights and in tPrests of children affected
h a desegregation program al$.o are entitlPrl to c.onsi<l-
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eration. Any child, white or black, who is compelled to
leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each
day being transported to a distant school suffers an impairment of his liberty and his privacy. Kot long ago .
James B. Conant wrote that "[a]t the elem entary school
level the issue seems clear To send young children day
after day to distant schools seems out of the question. '' 27
A community may well conclude that the portion of a
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom, playground . or some other extracurricular
school activity. Deciswns such as these. affectmg the
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant
To this pomt r have focused mainly 011 the }Jersollaf
interests of parents a.nd children whiCh a community may
believe to be best protectecl by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader consideratiOns lead me to question just as senously any remedial requirement of exten sive student transportation solely to further mtegration.
Any such requirement is certam to fall disproportionately
on the school distncts of uur country. depending on
their degree of urbanization, financial resources, and their
racial composition. Some districts \\ ith little or no biracial population will experience httle or no educatwnal
disruption, while others, notably in large, biracial metropolitan areas, must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integration frequently bemg ordered by district courts."" At a
time when public education generally is suffering serious
financial malnutritiOn . the economic burdens of such
transportation can be severe, requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
2'

Slum~
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dollars. 2 " And while constitutwnal requirements have
often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children.
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceecls that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by
its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the
Denver Board over the past decades. tlw fundamental
problem of res1clen tial segrega t10n would persist."" It
is indeed a novel application of equJtable power-not to
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrineto require so much greater a degree of forced school integration than would have resulted from purely natural
and neutral nonstate causes.
The compulsory transportation of stude11ts earries a
further infirmity as a ronstitutwnal remedy With mosf
constitutional vwlatwnb, thP ma.Jot hurdt>tt of remetbal
action falls on offending state officials. Public official~'
who act to infringe personal rights of spet>ch, voting. or
" In Memphu;, for example, which ha~ no htstory of bu~ing studentl', the minanum transportation plan ordered by the courts will
require, in the School Board 's estimate, an mitml capital expenditure
of S1 ,664,192 for buses plus an annuar operatmg co~t of S629,192.
The Board· estimates that a more exten~Ive transportatiOn program
to be considered b~· the distnct court will require mitial capital investments of S3,924,000 and annual operatmg co~ts of $1,78:3,490.
The most drast1c transportatiOn plan before the distnct court require:,
estimated annual operatmg co:;ts of from $2,354,220, $2,431,710, or
$3,463,100 depending on the Board 's tran,;portation arrangements.
N orthcross v Board of Eduratwn of ,11 emphzs C'1ty 8ch .. . apm,
n. 17~ at K9K t WC'Ick , .r r!J~~C'ntm~ ) •.
50
S~e n !:J S~tprU!.<
2
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religious exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the
offending act or practice and. where necessary , institute
corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of
remedial action. though other citizens will to varying degrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for
segregation must . at the very minimum . act to 4:le~seg
regatory acts. But when the obligation further extend
to the transportation of student::;, thl' full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is bonw by children and parents who did not participat e III any constitutional
violation .
Finally, courts in requmng so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration,
risk setting In motiOn unpredictable and Uitmanageable
social consequences. ~ o one can estimate th e extent
to which dismantling neighborhood educatiOn will hasten
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school systems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races.
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement giVf-'S
the movement from innercity to suburb . and th e furth er
geographical separation of the race::;. . ot Jo we ktJO \\
to what degree this remedy may cause detenoration of
community and parPntal support of public schools. ordivert attention from the paramount goal uf quality m
education to a perennially devisive debate over who 1s
to be transported where
The problem addressed in this opmion has perplexed
courts. school officials, other public authonties. ant! students of public eclucation for nearly t wo drcacles. Tlw
problem . especially smce 1t has focused on the " busing
issue. " has profoundly riJsquieted the public wherever
Pxtensive transportatiOn has been ordPrecl . l make no
pretense of knowmg the hPst ans\\'ers. Yet. the issue m
this and like cases comes to this ( 'ourt as one of con stitutional law. As to this issue, 1 have no doubt what-.
('y~r , There is nothing 111 the Constitution. its history

71-507-CONCUR & DISSENT
KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLO. 35

or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
of young and teenage children to achieve a smgle interest ,
as important as this interest may be . We have strayed.
quite far as 1 view It, from the rationale of Brown f
and 11, as reiterated
in Swann, that courts in fashioning
"'\
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles'' which
include the "adjusting and reconciling lof] public and
private needs." Rrown II, 349 r. S.. at 229.
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result,
as emphasized above. in no prohibition on court-ordered
student transportation In furtherance of desegregation.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests m neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancmg of interests so appropriate to a fair and JUSt eqmtable rlecree, transportation orders should be appliecl with special cautwn to
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests- ·
and ultimately of education itself-as extensive transportation of elementary age children solely for df'segregatiou
purposes. As a minnnum, th1s Court should not require school boards to f'ngage 111 the unnecessary transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary
agf' children ." ' lt IS at tlnr,; age level that J1e1ghborhood
education performs its most vital educational role. It
is with respf'ct to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog·Thcrr may wrll h<· advantagr~ in <·omtn<'IlCing rlw intrgmtivr
rxperiences at an rarl.\· age, ;t~ ~·otmg rhtldren rna~· be le<'~ ltkel)
than older rluldren and adult~ to den·lop an mhtbitmg ractal con<'ciou~ne:;::< The::<e advantage~ :;hould br con::>tdrrrd a~ ~chool board:,.
makr thr vanou,: drctsJOn~ wtth thr \'IPW to achtrvtng and prr~rrv
ing an mtrgra trd "rhool ~y~t pm Supra. p 10 But in t lw hal ancm)r of all rpJp,·ant mtrrr.,t~. tlw ach·antagr~ of an rarl~· mtrgrativr exprnrncr mtt8t, and 111 all fatrnr::>~ ~hould , br wrighPd agam,;t
other rrlevant aclvantageH and rltHadvantage~ and m light of tht>
demographie charartenstH·~ of thP partJcular rommumtr.
31
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ical health. It is also hPre, at the elementary school,
that the rights of parents and children are most sharply
implicated. ' 2

IV
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on the two issues addressed m this opinion: ( i) whether a constitutional rule of uniform. national application should be adopted with respect to our
national problem of school desegregatiOn and ( ii) if so.
whether the ambiguities of Swann , construed to date
almost uniformly in favor of extensive transportation.
should be redefined to restore a more viable balance
among the various interests wh1ch are involved. W1th
all deference. 1t seems to me that the ( 'ourt today ha~
addressed neither of these i~sut's Ill a way that, will afford
adequate guidance to the courts below Ill this case or lead
to a rational, coherent natwual pohcy .
The Court has chosen. rather, to adhere to the de facto!
,de jure distinction under circumstances, and upon a
rationale, which can only lead to mcreased and lllconclusive litigation. and-espeCially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent J uclicia] pos1t10n on this
subject. There IS, uf course . state actiOn 111 every
school district 111 the land. The pubhc schools always
have been funded and operated by ~tates and their
local subdivisions. It 1s true that segregated schools,
even m the cities of the South, are in large part the
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting
residential patterns. But there is also not a school <.hs""·while greater tran::<portntion of ~l'rondarY ~chool ~tudPnt~ might
be permtttPd, en' n at tin~ levpJ thr dr~II'P of a commumt~· for racwll~·
nPutral nrighborhood ~choob ~ hould command judicial rr~pt>ct. It
would ultimatt>l~· l>P WI~f'Sl, wherr there I:; no ab~PllCP of good faith .
10 permit affected communitiP~ to dPcidP thi~ delicate I~~ue of ~<tudPitt
t rnn~portHtion ou their own .
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trict in the United States. with any significant minority
school population. in which the school authorities-in
one way or the other-have not contributed in some
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails.
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar, multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the
country, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of
the country and on minority children m the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In the
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than
that unposed by distnct courts after Swanu, the
desegregation which \vill now be decreed 111 Denver and
other major cities may \Vell involve even more extensive
transportation than has been \\·itnessed up to this time.
It is well to remember that the course we are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportumty
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and
the incentive to turn their attentwn and energies to thiEgoal of quality education. frpe from protracted and
debilitatmg battles over court-ordered student transportation. The single most disruptive element in education today is the widespread use of compulsory transportation. especially at elementary grade levels. This
has risked distractmg and diverting attention from basic
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities,
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial
friction and misunderstanding. It 1s time to return to
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
of our society in achieving desegregation with other educational and sometal interests a community may legitimately assert. ThiR will help assure that integrated

...
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school systems will be established and maintained by
rational action, will be better understood and supported
by parents and children of both races. and will promote
the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential to its genuine success.
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PowELL concurring in part and dissenting

in part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial
segregation.1 Nor has it been argued that any other
legislative action (such as, for example, zoning and housing laws) contributed to the segregation which is at
issue. 2 The Court has inquired only to what extent the
Denver School Board may have contributed to the segregated schools which are acknowledged to exist in Denver.
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con~titution hm; cxpre~ .-ly prohibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or
color."
"See, e. g., Swann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971):
"We do not reach ... the que~tion whether a showing that ~chool
,;egregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without
any discriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitutional
\·iolation requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree."
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The predominantly minority schools a.re located in two
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court considered that a school
with a concentration of 70 to 75 7o "Negro or Hispano
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F. Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line, it is
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children. The city-wide school mix in Denver is 66 %
Anglo, 141o Negro, a.ncl 20% Hispano. In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides, the
schools are predominantly Anglo , if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in which there
is a substantial minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There
is massive segregation in the schools of these cities fully
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from
the South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footdragging as the process ''"as in most places, substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made
in southern States." No comparable progress has been
made in ma.ny nonsouthern cities with large minority
population s" primarily because of the de facio / de jure
"Arrorcling to the 1971 HEW e~tim:1tc, 4~.9% of .'\egro pupils
attended mn.iority white s chool ~ in the South n~ oppo~ecl to only
27.8% who nttenclecl surh schools in the ~orth and We"t. Fifty~e , ·e n pereent of nil ~Pgro pupils in the i\orth and \Ye~t attend
~chools with oYer 80% minority population as oppo~ed to 32.2%
who do so in the South. 118 Cong. R er. Sl-J.5.
4
The 1971 HEW Enrollment SUI"\"e~· dramatizf'd the ~f'g: rPg:: Jt ed
character of public schools in man~· nonsouthern citie~. The percpntagc of Negro pupil s which attended schools mon· tlmn 80%
black was 91.3 in CJc,·ela nd , Ohio; 97.8 in Compton, C::lli fo rnia;

..
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distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South." But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than logic, we must recognize that the evil of
operating separate schools IS no less in Denver than in
Atlanta.
I
In my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When Brown v. Boar.d of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure
7S.l in Da~·ton, Ohio; 7S.6 in Detroit, Michigan; 95.7 in Gary,
Indiana: 86.4 in Kansas Cit~·, Mi~~ouri: 86.6 in Los Angclr~, California; 78.8 in Milwaukre, Wi~con~in: 91.3 in :'\ewark, ~e\Y .Jer!"r~·;
i'9.S in St. Louis, Mi~souri. The full data from the Enrollment SurYe~· maY be found in ll8 Cong. nee. S1·H-H8, Jan. 20, 1972.
" As Senator Ribiroff (D.-Conn.) recognized:
.. For ~·ear;; \Ye haYe fought the battle of integration primarily in
the South where the problem was sm·err. It was a long, ardnou~
fight that de~ern·d to be fought and nrecled to br won.
"Unfortunate)~·, as the problem of racial isolation has moved north
of the Mason-Dixon line, many northernerR haYe bid an entRiYe
f:trr\Yell to the 100-~·e:1r ~truggle for r:trial equnlit~·. Our motto
~erms to haYe been 'Do to southcrnrrs what ~·ou do not wnnt to do
to your~elf.'
" Good reasons h:n·e al\\'it~·~ been offrred, of eour~e. for not mo\·ing
\ · igorouRl~· ahead in the :\"orth as well as the South.
"Fir;:t , it was that the problem was wor;:e in the ~outh. Then
the factR began to show that tlwt wns no longer true.
""·e then began to hear the de facto-de jure refrain.
"Someho\Y rcsidentinl segregation in the North was arridrntnl or
dr facto and that made it better than the lrgall~· Rupportcd dr jure
~cgrcgation of the South. It was a hard distinction for blnck children
in totnll~· segregated schools in the North to underRt:md, but it
:dlowccl us to aYoid the problem." ll8 Cong. Rec. S2542, Frb. 24,
1972.
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and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the southern
States, was officially imposed racial segregation in the
schools extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 U. S., at 488, 493-495. Although some
of the language was more expansive, the holding in
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States, or their instrumentalities, to force children to attend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in
Brown I was construed-for some years and by many
courts-as requiring state neutrality, allowing "freedom
of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints. 6
But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II,
349 U. S. 294 (1955), did not retain its pristine meaning.
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the
'' Sre, e. g., Bradley "· School Board, 345 F. 2d 310, 316 (CA4
en bane. 1965):

'·It has been held again and again . . . that the Fourlcenth
Amrndment prohibition i:; not against segregat ion as such . . . .
A state or school district offends no constitutional requ irement
when it grant::; to all student::; uniform]~· an unre><trictrd freedom of
choice as to school attended, so that each pupil, in effect , as~ign~ himself to the school he wishes to attend. " (The case wa~ later Yacated
and rrmanded by this Court which expres,;ed no view on the merits
of the desegregation plans submitted.) 382 U. S. 103, 105 (Hl65).
Src also Bell v. School Citu of Gary, Ind., 324 F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963);
Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F. 2d 988 (CA10 1964) ; Deal v.
Board of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966) .
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concept of state neutrality evolved 7 and was expanded to
the present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative
state action to desegregate school systems. The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S.
430, 438 ( 1968), where school boards were declared to·
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." The school system before the Court in Gre.en
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county
where there were no concentrations of white and black
populations, no neighborhood school system (there were
only two schools in the county), and where none of the
problems of an urbanized school district existed. The
Court properly identified the freedom of choice program
there as a subterfuge, and the language in Green imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system
was appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was, however, reason to question to what extent this duty
applied in the vastly different factual setting of a large
city with extensive areas of residential segregation , presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different
from those in the rural setting of New Kent County,
Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept would flower into a new constitutional principle of
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban
school system of metropolitan Charlotte, North Carolina.
In describing the situation as to residential patterns in
Charlotte, the Court noted the "familiar phenomenon"
7

For a conci,;e history and commentary of the evolution, sec generally A. Birkel, The Supreme Court and 1he Idea of Progrc~s , pp ..
126--130 (1970).
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in the metropolitan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in one part of the city," 402 U. S. , a.t 25, a.nd
acknowledged that:
"Rural areas accustomed for half a. century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex
traffic patterns." 402 U. S., at 14.
Despite this recognition of a. fundamentally different
problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was
applicable, and prescribed for a. metropolitan school system \Yith 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and
branch"-which had been formulated for the two schools
a.nd 1,300 pupils of New Kent County.
In Swann, the Court further noted it \va.s dealing only
with States having "a long history" of officially imposed
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those
States to implement Brown I. 402 U. S. , at 5-6. In
so doing. the Court refrained even from noting that the
evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to
Green/ Swann undercut whatever logic once supported
the de facto/.de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts as affirmative duty, including large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate
separate schools, the Court required these districts to
alleviate conditions which in large part did not result
from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation. Rather,
the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the
biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially
the same: one of segregated residential and migratory
patterns the impact of \Yhich on the racial composition
of the schools \Yas perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by
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action of public school authorities. This is a national ,
not a. southern phenomenon. And it is largely unrelated
to ,,·hether a particular State had or did not have segregatory school laws. 8
Whereas Brmvn I rightly addressed the elimination
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country ""·here it did exist, Swann imposed obligations
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As
the remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyond
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawed in Brown, the inevitable rationale
of Swann points towards a uniform, constitutional approach to our national problems of school segregation.
II

The Court's decision today, while adhering to the
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application
of the Green/ Swann doctrine of "affirmative duty" to the
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various de'As Dr. Karl Taeuber states in his article, R<'~idcntial 8<'g:r<'gnt ion ,
Seicntific Amrrican , Augu~t 1965, nt 14:
"'No elaborate anal~·~is is necr~:::ary to conclude from these figures
that a high degree of r<'~idential ~rgrrgation based on race i~ n uni, ·c r~a l charartcri~tic of ~\mcriean eitie~. This scgreg:1tion i ~ found
in the cities of the :\orth and \Ye~t as \H'll n:-: of the South; in lnrgc
cities a:;: well a::: small: in nonindust rial eitir,.: ns m•ll a~ indu:-,trial; in
cities with hundreds of thou,.:ands of Nrgro rr:::idrnt,; :1~ wdl ns those
with on]~· a few thousa nd: and in citi<'s that are progre;:~i, ·e in their
employment practice nnd ci,·il rights policic~ as well ns tho~c that
a rc not."
In hid book, .\'rgroe~ in Citirs, Dr. Taeubcr stated that rc~idcntial
~egregation exi~ts "regardless of the character of local laws and
polieic::: nnd regardlc~s of other forms of discriminntion." !d ., a t - .
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cisions of the school board. I concur in the Court's position that the public school authorities are the responsible
agency of the State, and that the affirmative duty doctrine
is equally applicable in Charlotte and in Denver. I
disagree, however, with any perpetuation of the de j-ure/
de facto distinction and with leaving to petitioners the
initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts"
and deducing "segregatory intent." I would hold, quite
simply, that where segregated public schools exist. there
is a strong prima facie case that the duly constituted
public authorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as the "school board") are sufficiently responsible
to impose upon them a nationally applicable duty to take
appropriate desegregatory measures.
A

The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine,
it no longer can be justified on a principled basis. In
addition, as this case abundantly demonstrates, proof of
the facts deemed necessary to apply the distinction presents problems vvhich the courts cannot fairly resolve.
At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right which is being enforced. This is not easy,
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education,
the Court said that:
"Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 347 U. S., at 493.
In Brown II, the Court identified the "fundamental principle" enunciated in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial discrimination in public education,"
349 U. S., at 298, and spoke of "the personal interest
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of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it meant-as a minimum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system. 9 In
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right.
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms,
I would now define it as the right to expect that the
State-once it assumes responsibility for public education-will provide a reasonable opportunity for education in an integrated school system. The correlative of
this right should be the duty imposed upon the Statenot merely to outlaw dual school systems-but affirmatively to take reasonable action consistent with educational goals to provide integrated school opportunities. 10
9
Sec Bickel, supra, n. 7, at 118:
"It. [the problem of ::;chool desegregation] has not been that simple . . . because the laconic opinion in Brown v. Board of Education was itself not that simple. One st rain in it became eYidcnt in
subsequent decisions outlawing all forms of state-spo n ~o red segregation in everything from the spectator section of a courtroom to golf
courses. The minimal proposition that emerged-and about time
it was that it should emerge-was that the state ma~· not, by legislation or administrative!~·, classify the population along racial lines."
10
The term " integrated school s~·stem" i:; used generally to denote
a system possessing mo::;t, if not all, of the following characteri:stics:
there would be, of course, no law~, regulations or policy supportive
of the t~·pe of "legalized" segregation condemned in Broten (a condition manifest !~· innilid and no longer exi:;ting owrtly an~·wherc).
The school board would have pmsued, within the limits of a rule of
reason consistent with educational goals, the affirmative duty principle enunciated in Green. This dut~· would require that a school
board take sueh appropriate affinnatiYe mensure:; to (i) integrate
fully faculties nnd administration; (ii) scrupulously a~,;urc equality
of farilitie::;, qualit~· of instruction and curricula opportunities
throughout the district ; (iii) utilize its authority to draw attendance
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It is difficult to perceive a basis for vindicating or
denying this right, as the case may be, depending upon
whether or not some court determines that the segregated schools are the product of de facto rather than
de jure action. If, as in Swann, "segregation was the
evil" held to be unconstitutional, 402 U. S., at 15, there
is little reason for perpetuating the evil in some sections of the country on the basis of a formalistic
distinction.
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether
the segregation was state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range planning as well as the daily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty
employment and assignments, school construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters.
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause
of segregated school conditions. But if, after detailed
and complete public supervision, segregated schools still
zones to promote integration ; (iv) locate new ~ehool~, d o~e old ones,
and determine the size and grade categories of ~choob with this
~arne objocti\·e in mind; and (v) rc~o rt to HUch rea~onable transportal ion of pupild, c~pecially at the serundary len'!, n~ i.~ compatible with sound educational gonls. These specification,; arc not
intended to bf' either definiti\·c or indusiw: rather, they are indicatin' of the chnracteri~tic:< of an integmted ~ehool system, in whid1
all eitizens and pupils ma.\· justifiably be confident that im·idions discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated. This docs not men nand indeed could not mean in \·irw of the re~iclcnti:d pattern ~ of
mo~t of our major metropolitan arcHs-that c\·cry school mu~t have
~omr racial mixing. A school whieh happrn.~ to be all white or all
blnck i,; not a "segregated" school in thr legal ~rnsc if tho i')·stcm
itsrlf is a genuinelY intcgrntrd one as de~cribcd herein.
The charaetcri,;:tics and affirmative obligntion~ of nn integrated
::;chool system nrc "Pclled out more fully in §III, infra.
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persist, the presumption is strong that the school board.
by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible.
\Vhat state action and supervision is so pervasive and
where, after years of such action , schools remain thoroughly segregated. this Court is justified in finding a
prima facie case of a constitutional violation. The burden the must fall on the school board to demonstrate it
is operating an "integrated school system" (n. 10, supra).
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and
the consequent affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread in our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
rceognize. As one commeu tat or has noted:
"the three court of appeals decisions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City,
Kansas-\vhere racial segregation in schools was
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v.
Cincimwti Bd. of Educ. , 369 .F. 2d 55 (CA6 1966) ,
cert. denied. 3i7 U. S. 924 ( 1964); Downs\'. Board
of Educ. , 336 F. 2d 988 (CAlO 1964) , cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914, Bell v. School City, 324 F. 2d
209 (CA7 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924.] Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887, Indiana in 1949, and
Kansas City not until the advent of Brown. If
Negro and white parents in Mississippi are required
to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated, should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary, Indiana, where no more
than five years before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects. " Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
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and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297
( 1972). 11
Not only does the de fur elde fa cto distinction operate
inequitably on communities in different sections of the
country: it disadvantages minority children as well. As
the Fifth Circuit stated:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Boston , New York, or any other area of the
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto
segregation, would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society, while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
in the 17 southern and border states violates the
constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even
their blood brothers, because they were born into
a de jure society. All children everywhere in the
nation are protected by the Constitution , and treatment which violates their constitutional rights in
one area, also violates such constitutional rights in
another area." Cisneros v. Corpus Christi IndependThe author continues:
" True, the ea rlier the poli cy of segregation was abandoned the less
danger there is that it cont inues to operate coYertl)·, is signifi ca ntly
responsible for present day patterns of residential segrega tion, or has
contribu ted mat erially to present community attitudes toward :Negro
schools. But t here is no reason t o suppose that 1954 i ~ a uni ve rsally
appropriate dividing line between de jure segrega tion t hat may
safely be assumed to h;w e ~ pe n t itself and that whi ch rna)· not.
For many remedial purposes, adoption of an arbitrar)· but r asily
administra ble cutoff point might not be obj ectionable. But in a
situat ion such as school desegrega tion, where bot h the rights a~~e rted
and the remedial burdens imposed are of such magnitude, and 11·here
t he resulting sectional discrimination is passionately resented, it is
surely questionable whether such arbitrarineos is either politi cally
or morall y accepta ble."
11
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ent School District, 467 F. 2d 142, 148 (CA5 en bane,
1972) quoting United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Bduc., 380 F. 2d 385, 397 (CA5 en bane)
Gewin, J .. dissenting) . ~
1

The Court today does move for the first time to·ward
breaking down past sectional disparities, but it clings
tenuously to its unprincipled distinction. It searches
for de jure action in what the Denver School Board has
done or failed to do, and even here the Court does not
rely upon the results or effects of the Board's conduct
but feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 13
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate." (Court Opinion, p. 17)
(italics are the Court's).
12
Ser Bickel, supra. n. 7, at 119:
"If a Negro child perceives hi~ separation as discriminatory and
invidious, he is not, in a society a hundred years removed from
slavery, going to make fine distinctions about the source of a particular separation."
1
" The Court does not rrquire, however, a segregator:v intent with
respect to the entire school system, and indeed holds that if such an
intent is found with respect to some schools in a sy~tem, the burdennormally on the plaintiffs-shift s to the defendant school authorities
to prove a negative: namely, that their purposes were benign, ante,
pp. 17-18.
The Court has come a long way since Brown I. Starting from
the unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory constitutional
:md statutory provi,.:ions of ~orne States, the new formubtion-still
professing fidelit~· to the de jure doctrine--is that desegregation will
be ordered despite the absrnre of any segregato ry laws if: (i) srgregated "chool ~ in fact exist; (ii) a court finds that they rrsult from
some action taken with segregatory intent b:v the school board;
(iii) such action need not relate to more than a "meaningful segment"
of the school ~~·stem; and (iv) the school board cannot prove that
it s intention" \Yith respect to the remainder of the system were

non~egrrgatory.
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The Court's insistence that the "differentiating factor''
between .de jure and .de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent" is difficult to reconcile in light of the opposite
view explicitly announced as recently as in Wright v.
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972).
In holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court
said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant' motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate
schools, and we have said that '[t]he measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis
v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U. S.

33, 37.
"Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action
in determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.
"Though the purpose of the new school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases, the
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or purposes but on the effect of the atcion upon the dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
was the focus of the District Court in this case, and
''"e hold that its approach was proper." 407 U. S.,
at 462.
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in
Virginia and controlling in Colorado. I have noted above
the pitfalls in distinguishing Emporia because there was
a history of state imposed segregation in Virginia, and
not in Colorado. In fact, it was arguable in Emporia
that the most recent history-the reasons for the incorporation of Emporia into a separate school district-
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" ·ere not segregatory. 14 Rather than attempt to adjudicate the largely subjective issue of intent or motivation,
the Court in Emporia concerned itself with the results
and found that these were likely to be of more rather
than less segregation. The rationale of the Emporia
case is inconsistent with the de jure/ de facto distinction ,
and commends itself in this respect both on grounds of
principle and practicality.
B

There is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases. In addition, there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration which
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today, emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segregatory intent. will invite numerous desegregation suits in which there can be little hope of uniformity of results.
The issue in these cases ''"ill not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them.
The litigation will focus as a consequence of the Court's
decision on whether segregation has resulted in any
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to
action taken or not taken over many years-will be
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious.
11
'

Src Wright v. Council of the City of E111poria. 442 F. 2d 570,
574 (CA4 1971), whrre the Court of Appral~ noted "that was nofinding [by the di~trict court] of discriminatory purpo~e .... "
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The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts below found evidence of de jure violations
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools,
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is. for example, quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities
and , in effect, to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80-83. Yet findings even on such similar acts will,
under the de jure/,de facto distinction, continue to differ,
especially since the Court has never made clear what
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent" for
an initial constitutional violation. Even if it were possible to clarify this question, wide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent" or
"purpose," and especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities under varying conditions over many years.
This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation,
or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment," Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S.
214, 224 (1971); McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-, (1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367. 381
(1968). Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a single statute will be compounded in a. judicial review of
years of administration of a large and complex school
system.'" Every act of a school board and school ad10

As one commentator has exprrs,;ed it:
"If the court;; :ne indeed j)I'Cparcd to inquire into moti1·e, thorny
quc~tion~ will ari~e en'n if one as;;umes that racial moti1·atiun is
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ministration , and indeed every failure to act where affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny.
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools, made almost daily, can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated,
remain in that condition, are desegregated, or-for the
long term future-are likely to be one or the other. These
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building construction and location; the timing of
building new schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of
student attendance zones; the extent to which a neighborhood policy is enforced, especially with respect to elementary schools; the recruitment, promotion and assignment of faculty and supervisory personnel; policies with
respect to transfers from one school to another; whether,
and to what extent, special schools will be provided, where
they will be located, and who will qualify to attend them;
the determination of curriculum, including whether there
will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training, and the routing of students into these
tracks; and even decisions as to social, recreational and
athletic policies.
capable of being proven at trial. What of the case in which one or
more members of a school board, but less than a majority, nrc found
to have ncted on racial grounds? What if it appears that the ~chool
board's action \\·as prompted b~· a mixture of motives, inrluding constitut i onall~· innocent ones that alone would haw 11rompted the boa rd
to art"? What if the members of the school board were not themsci ve::; racia!l~· inc-:pired but wished to please their constituents, many
of whom they knew to be so? If such cases are clas~:;ifird as unconstitutional de jure srgrcgat ion , there is little point in preserving
the de jure-de facto di~tinction at all. And it ma~· \Yell be that the
cliffrrence between any of the::;c situations and one in which racial
motivation is altogether lacking is too insignificant, from the standpoint of both the moral culpability of the :>tate officials and the
impact upon the children involYccl, to support a differrncc in const it ut ional treatment." Goodm:m, supra, n. 11, at 284-285.
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In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each
of these "endless" factors. The basis for its .de jure finding there \Yas rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 402 U. S., at 5-6. But in the
Denver-type case, where no such history exists, a judicial
examination of these factors will be required under today's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and
unpredictable results, protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the federal courts, and to serious
disruption of individual school systems. In the absence
of national and objective standards, school boards and
administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty and
dismay, speculating as to what is required and when
litigation will strike.

c

Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and which will contribute to the
consequences indicated above, we should acknowledge
that whenever significant public school segregation exists
there is strong prima facie evidence of a constitutional
violation. It is true, of course. that segregated schoolswherever located-are not solely the product of state
action or inaction. Indeed, as indicated earlier, there can
be little doubt that a principal cause of the pervasive
school segregation found in the major urban areas of this
country, whether in the North, West. or South, are the
socio-economic influences which have concentrated our
minority citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile
white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also
true that public school authorities have continuing. detailed responsibility for the public school systems 'r. and,
";Indeed, if 011e goe,: back f:tr enough , it i..; prob:1ble th:tt all racial
where,·er ocrurring and whether or not confinf'd to tho
~('hoots , has at some time b0en ~upported or nwintained b~· go,·f'rn~ogregation,
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as one distinguished judge has noted. "where the figures
[showing segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently,
a prima facie case of discrimination is established."
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848,
873 (CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadmYed in
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy '<Yhich must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
,,·hich has outlived its time.

III
The preceding section addresses the constitutional right
of each child to expect that public school authorities take
all reasonable steps in providing him an education in an
integrated school system. Segregated schools, regardless of history or sectional location, stand as prima facie
evidence that this right has been violated. The question
thus becomes what reasonable steps to maximize integrative opportunities must school authorities demonstrate,
either to overcome allegations of constitutional violations
or to remedy those violations which are sho\m to exist.
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of the
remedy?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver is a "dual school system," that city
will soon confront the "affirmative duty" to desegregate
ment aetion. In Becket , .. School Board, 30H F. Supp. 127-1-, 13111:315 (ED \'a. 1969) . .Judge Walter Hoffm:m compiled a ~111nmary
of pa,;t public ~'<egregator~· action whieh included examples from a
gTPat ma.iorit~· of State:;. He concluded that "on!~, ns to the ;-;tates
of :Maine, .:\ew Hamp:shire. Vermont, \Vaohington, Ne1·ada, and
Hawaii does it apJlear from thi:s nonexhansti1·e research that do discriminntory law:; nppcnrcd on the boob at one time or another."
!d., at 1;j15.
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its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.
A

The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial
ratios" and sanctioned extensive transportation of elementary as well as secondary pupils. Perhaps because
of the far-reaching contours of the Charlotte/ Mecklenburg
desegregation decree approved by this Court, lower federal courts have since read Swann as requiring similar
decrees. 17 In the context of a large urban area, with
17
See, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of Ne1cpori News, F. 2d - , (1972), wlwre the CA4 en bane, upheld a dist rict court
a~signment plan where '· travel time, yarying from a minimum of
fort~· minutes and a maximum of one hour, each way, would be required for busing black students out of the old City and white students into the old City in order to achie,·e a racial balancing of the
di~tri c t ." This tran8portation was decreed for children from the third
grade up, involving children as young as eight years of age.
In N orthcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F. 2d 890, 895
(1972), the CA6 affirmed a district court a~signment plnn which
dail~· transported 14,000 children with "the maximum time to be
spent on the buses b~· an~· child [being] 34 minute~ . .. ," presumably each way. But a~ .Judge Weick noted in di~~ent the CA6
in:-<tructed the district judge to implement yet furtlwr d e~rg regation
order~. Plans presently under com:ideration by that court call for
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children res pecti,·el~· , for undetermined lengths of time. /d., at 895-986.
Prtitioners before this Court in Potts '"· Flax, 1\o. 72-2.'-:8. eert.
(197-), contended that the implementation
drnied, U. S. of the CAS's directi,·e in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d 865 (1972), \Yould
rrquire bus rides of up to two hour;; and 20 minutes eac-h clay and
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition , at 1-1. While respondents
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heavy residential concentrations of white and black citizens in different-and widely separated-sections of the
school district. extensive dispersal and transportation of
pupils is inevitable if Swann is read as expansively as
many courts have been reading it to date.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts, I record my profound
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such disruption of public education.
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the
Court recognized that school authorities, not the federal
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S. , at
16. School boards in rural areas might adjust more
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts
"with dense and shifting population , numerous schools,
congested and complex traffic patterns. " !d., at 14.
Transportation orders were suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process." I d., at 31. Finally, the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as on e important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid.
The factor s were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases. 18 And the Court further emphasized that equitable
contend t hese figures represent [1 11 "a8tounding inflation," R esponse,
at 7, t ra nspor tat ion of an irrational magnit ude seems inc,·it able.
I H Sec Unite d Stat es , .. Texas Education Agency, 467 F . 2d 848, 883
(CA5 1972) (Bell, .T., con curring in a n opinion in which eight judges
joined) :
··I n our ,·iew the remedy whi r h the di ~t ri c t court i8 required t o
fo rmulate should be formul ated within t he entire context of t he
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decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other
public and private interests:
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interest,
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann,
supra, at 15-16.
Those words echoed a similar expression in Bro'wn I I,
349 U. S .. at 229:
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs."
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity
counsels reason, flexibility and balance. I am aware, of
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and
subjective concept. But with school desegregation, reasonableness "·ould seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to promote
desegregation with other, equally important interests
which a community may legitimately assert. Neglect of
either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached. 19 Overzealousness in pursuit of any single
opinion

in Swann v.

Charfotte-!l!ecl.-lenburo Board of Educaadc!C'd.j"
'"The relevant inquirY j,; .. ,,·hrthrr thr co~t~ of achiC'1·ing; dc~rgre
gation in any given ~itnation out1reig;h tlw !C'gal, moral and cclucational considerations fa,·oring it. . . . It i~ denr . . . that the

tion. . . .

[Empha~i5
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goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to the "balance'' and "flexibility'' \Yith which this Court has ahYays
regarded it.
B
School boards have at their disposal a variety of means
to implement their duty to promote school desegregation.
Many of these can be employed effecti \'ely without darnaging state and parental interests in having children attend schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where desegregative steps are possible within the framework of a system of "neighborhood education." school
authorities should pursue them. For example, boundaries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn
to integrate, to the extent practicable, the school's student body. Construction of new schools should be of
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the
likelihood of integration, Swann, at 21. Faculty integration should be attained throughout the school system,
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). An optional
majority to minority transfer program. with the State
providing free transportation to desiring students. is also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
Swann, at 26-27. It hardly need be said that allocation
of resources within the school district must be made with
scrupulous fairness among all schools.
The above examples are meant to be illustrative, not
exhaustive. The point is that the over-all integrative
impact of such school board decisions is a crucial factor
Constitution should not bP held to rcquirc an~· transportation plan
that keeps rhildrcn on a bu::; for a substanti:1l part of tllf' da~·. consumes i'ignificant portion~ of funds othcrwi:-e spcndablf' dirPctly on
cducation, or involn's a gPnuine l'lcmcnt of dangcr to the safrt~· of
the child." School Desegregation After Rwann: A Theor~· of Govcmmcnt Bcspon::;ibilit~·, 39 U. Chi. L . Be1'. 421, 422, 443 (1972).
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in assessing their constitutional validity."° For example,
"neighborhood school plans are constitutionally suspect
when attendance zones are superficially imposed upon
racially defined neighborhoods, and when school construction preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony
of given schools." 21 Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver, Colorado,- F. 2d - . United States v. Boatrd
of Education of Tulsa County, 429 F. 2d - , 1258- 1259.
If these decisions are made consistently with such segregatory effect, they violate the right to each child to an
education in an integrated school system.

c
The affirmative duty of school officials is to operate an
integrated school system. This should encompass, at
a minimum, the obligation to take integrative steps of
the sort outlined in the above section. Such steps would
not compromise any significant, countervailing state interest. Extensive transportation of students solely to
maximize integration, however, presents a vastly more
complex problem. It promises on the one hand a greater
degree of actual desegregation, 22 while it infringes what
may fairly be regarded as important personal rights.
20
This should not imply that derisions on fa cult~· as~ignment,
attcnuan ce zones, school construction, closing and consolidation, must
be made to the detriment of all neutral, nonracial ron~idcrations.
But the8c considerations ran, with proper school board ini tiat ive,
general!~· be met in a manner that will enhance integrative
opportunities.
21
A u ~cful study of the historical uses and abuses of thr neighborhood school concept is l\I. Weinberg, R ace & Place (1967).
"" In fact. due to rarially separate residential patterns that rharactrrizc our major urban a re;l,; it i~ quite unrcali ~t i c to think of
achieving in many cities subMantial "racial balance" without a
degree of student trans11ortation which would ha,·e the gmvest
economic and educational consequence~.
A~ Profrs~or Bickrl notr,; :
'· In most of the larger urban :ucn~. demographic conditions arc such
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The transporting of school children is as old as public
education, and in rural and some suburban settings it is
as indispensable as the providing of books. It is presently estimated that approximately half of all American
children ride buses to school for reasons unrelated to
integration. 23 There is a difference, however, in transportation plans voluntarily initiated by local school
boards for educational purposes and those imposed by a
federal court. The former may represent a convenient
means of access to the school nearest home; the latter
often require distant trips for no purpose other than to
further integration."'' Yet the Court in Swann was unquestionably right in describing bus transportation as
that no policy that a court can order, and a school board, a city or
e\·cn a state has the capability to put into effect, will in fact result
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public school~ . Only
a reordering of the em·ironmcnt invoh·ing economic and social policy
on the broad est conceivable front might have an appreciable impact."
Bickel , supra. n. 7, at 132.
2 :. Estimates Yary.
Swann, supra. at 29, noted that '·eighteen million of the Nation',; public school children , approximately 39%, were
transported to their schoob by bus in 1969-1970 in all parts of the
countr)·." Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this
problem, stated that " two-third~ of all American children toda~· ride
buses to school for reasons unrelated to integration." 118 Cong. Rcc.
8254:3 , Feb. 24, 1972.
"·' Historically, distant transportation was wrong!)· used to promote segregation. " Negro children were generally considered capable of travelling longer di~tanccs to school and without the aid of any
Ychicle. What was too far for a white child became reasonably near
for a Kegro child ," Weinberg, supra, n. 21, at 87.
This deplorable history has led some to argue that intcgrati\·c bus
ride,; are justified as atonement for past scgregatory trip::; and that
neighborhood education i:; now but a code-word for racial ~e~~:rega
tion. But mi~use of neighborhood schooling in the pn~t doc,; not.
imply it hns no \·a!id nonsegregatory uses for the present. Nor would
wrongful tran~portation in the pa:;t justify detrimental transportation for the children of today.
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"one tool of school desegregation." 402 U. S., at 30. 25
The crucial issue is when, under what circumstances, and
to what extent such transportation may appropriately
be ordered. The answer to this turns-as it does so often
in the law-upon a sound exercise of discretion under the
circumstances.
Swann itself recognized limits to integrative obligations. It noted that a constitutional requirement of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing ... would
be disproved . . . ," and sanctioned district court use
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting point
in the process of shaping a remedy .... " 402 U. S., at
24, 25. Winston-Salem/ Forsyth Board of Education v.
Scott, 404 U. S. 1221, 1228 (1971) (Chambers opinion of
BuRGER, C. J.). Thus particular schools may be all white
or all black and still not infringe constitutional rights
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authorities are pursuing integrative steps short of extensive and
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to
require racial balance in schools throughout the district
or the automatic elimination of all "one-race schools,"
"·'Some communitirs had tran~port:ttion plnn~ in effect at thP tim!'
of ronrt despg;rrgation order~. Src Su•mm. supra. at 29, n. 11: Da~ •is
v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County. 402 U. S. ~3, 34-~.5 (1971).
Conrts have used the pre,;enre or absenre of exi~ting tran~porta
tion in a di~trirt a;; onr f:trlor in framing and implenwnting desegrrgation decrrP~. Sre. e. (} .. Winston-Sale111 / Forsyth Bd. of Edllc.
, .. Scott. 404 U. S. 1221 , 1225 (1971) (Chamber~ opinion of BuHGER,
C. J.): ['nited States "· TT'atson Chapel School District. 4-W F. 2d
9:~:~. 9~7 (CA8 1971) : N orthcross \'. Board of Educ .. 444 F. 2d 1179,
11R2-11R~ (CA6 1971): Davis \'.Board of Educ. , 328 F. Supp. 1197,
1203 (ED Ark. 1971). \\"herr a S!'hool board is ,·olunt:t ril~· engaged
in t ran~porting studrnt~. a di~t rirt court i", of eour,:r , obli.g atrd to
in,:11re that surh tran~portntion j, not undertaken \\'ith ,:egrcg:~tory
rffect. Where, :1l,:o, Yoluntary trnnRportation progr:1m~ are :~lrracly
in progress, there rna~' be grratcr ju,;tific:~1ion for rourt-ordrrrd 1nmsportation of studrnts for a comparable time and distancp 1o :tehieve
gren ter integration.
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402 U. S .. at 26. is grounded in a recognition that the
State. parents. and children all have at stake in
school desegregation decrees legitimate and recognizable
interests.
The personal interest might be characterized as the
desire that children attend community schools nearest
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55, 60 (1966). the Sixth Circuit summarized
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of
schools: 2 r.
"Appellants. ho\\'evcr, pose the question of whether
the neighborhood system of pupil placement, fairly
administered without racial bias. comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
results in the creation of schools \\'ith predominantly
or even exclusively Kegro pupils. The neighborhood system is in \\'ide use throughout the nation
and has been for many years the basis of school
administration. This is so because it is acknmdedgecl to have several valuable aspects \Yhich are an
aiel to education, such as minimization of safety hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost
m reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil
"" ThC' tC'rm " neighborhood ~rhool" ~hould not bC' ~ uppo~cd to
denote ~olC'l~· a walk-in school or one whir·h :<C'I'\·c~ children on]~· in
the surrounding block,.:. Thr Court ha;; notPd. in a different contpxt, that '·the word ·neighborhood ' i~ quite a,.: :::u:;crptibiP of ,·ariation a:< the word 'locality.' Both terms arC' Plastic and, ckpPndrnt
upon circum~ tnncel'. ma~· be Pqnall~· ;;ati.-<fied b~· arras mea~mPd by
rods or b~· mile"." Connally , .. General Canst. Co., 2fi9 U. S. :385,
:195 (1926). In the school context, "neighborhood" refer,.: to relative
proximit~' , to a prefercnre for a school nearer, rather than more
di:;tant from home.
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placement and administration through the use of
neutral. easily determined standards. and better
home-school communication."
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of
parental and student access and convenience, as \VCll as
greater economy of public administration. These arc
obvious and distinct advantages, but the legitimacy of
the neighborhood concept rests on more basic grounds. ~'
Keighborhood schools. neutrally administered . reflect
the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community
in their public education. Public schools have been a
traditional source of strength to our 1\ation, and that
strength may derive in part from the identification of
many schools with the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood. Community support, interest and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
the intimacy of our institutions-home, church. and
school-"·hich has caused a concomitant decline in the
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no
judgment on this viewpoint, but I do believe that this
Court should be -vmry of compelling in the name of constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional, more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely related to the concept of a community and
neighborhood education , are those rights and duties parents have with respect to the education of their children.
The la'" has long recognized the parental duty to nurture,
support, and provide for the welfare of children , includ"'I do not imply that the 1~c ig;hborhood concept offer~ th e only,
or rvcn the mo~t preferabl e way to organize a school s~·~ tem. I do
cont r nd that, where n school board ha~ chosen it . federal juclg:cs
~hou lcl acconl it rc~p ect in framing remed ial decrees.
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510. 534. 535, a unanimous Court held that:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390, 've think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. . . . The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482
( 1965), the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." I do not believe recognition of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send
a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a private education for their
children , and the dual obligation of private tuitions and
public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons,
seek public education for their children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice in the school their
child attends. It would, of course, be impractical to
allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parentschool and parent-child communication allowed by the
neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force
of law.
In the understandable national concern for alleviating
public school segregation, courts may have overlooked
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected
by a desegregation program also are entitled to consideration. Any child, white or black, who is compelled to
leave his neighborhood and spend significant time each
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an impairment of his liberty and his privacy. Not long ago,
James B. Conant, wrote that "[a]t the elementary school
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day
after day to distant schools seems out of the question." 28
A community may well conclude that the portion of a
child 's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom , playground , or some other extracurricular
school activity. Decisions such as these, affecting the
quality of a child's daily life, should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mainly on th e personal
interests of parents and children which a community may
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to question just as seriously any remedial requirement of extensive student transportation solely to further integration.
Any such requirement is obliged to fall disproportionately
on different school districts of our country, depending on
their degree of urbanization, financial resources, and their
racial complexion. Some districts \vith little or no biracial population will experience little or no educational
disruption, while others. notably in large, biracial metropolitan areas, must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integration frequently being ordered by district courts." 9 At a
time when public education generally is suffering serious
financial malnutrition. the economic burdens of such
transportation can be severe, requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
dollars. 30 And while constitutional requirements have
8

Slums and Submb,:, 29 ( 1961).
See n. 22, supm.
'"'In Memphi~ . for PX;ttnplc, which h:ts no hi,:tor~· of bu,: ing studcnts, the minimum transportation pl:tn ordNcd b~· t hP rourt ~ will
"

"

0
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often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children.
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as an example. The Denver School Board, by
its action and nonaction, may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the
DenYer Board over the past decades. a fundamental
problem of residential segregation would persist."' It
would indeed be a novel application of equitable powernot to mention a dubious extension of constitutional
doctrine-to apply some retributive theory which would
require a greater degree of forced school integration than
would have resulted from purely natural and neutral nonstate causes.
The transportation of students carries a further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. With most constitutional violations. the major burden of remedial action
falls on offending state officials. Public officials \Yho act
to infringe personal rights of speech, voting. or religious
exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the offending
act or practice and, 'vhere necessary, institute corrective
rrquirr, in thr School Board '~ r:<tim:1tr , an initial capit:tl rxprnditurc
of S1.66.f,192 for bu~r~ plu~ an annual opPrating co~t of S629,192.
The Board r~timatr" that a morr rxtrn:<i,·c tran,portation program
to br con~idered bY the di~trirt court will require initi:d capital inw~tmrnts of S3 ,92-t,OOO and annual oprrating ro~t,; of S1,7S:3 ,490 ..
The most dr:1:0tic tran,port:llion pl:m bcforr the cJi,trict eourt rrquircs
r:<tirmtrd :lllnttal operating cost~ of from 82.:354.220, 82 ,4:31.710, or
s:~,46:1,100 drpending on the Board's tmn~port:1tion :1rrangrments.
N orthcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Sch .. supra, at
S!)S (\Veick, .T. cli,.;,cnting).
:n Sec n. 8, supra.
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measures. It is they who bear the brunt of remedial
action. though other citizens \Yill to varying degrees feel
its effects. School authorities responsible for segregation must, at the very minimum, act to cease segregatory
acts. But when the obligation further extends to the
transportation of students, the full burden of the affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who
are quite innocent of any constitutional violation.
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration,
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable
social consequences. No one can estimate the extent
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exodus to private schools, leaving public school systems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races.
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
the movement from innercity to suburb, and the further
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
community and parental support of public schools, or
divert discussion from the paramount goal of quality in
education to a perennially hassling debate over who is
transported where. We do not even know to what extent
forced racial balancing in public schools will be necessary
or effective in reducing racial inequality. 32 I can make
As columnist William Raspberry has noted, it may be offen::<i,·e 1o many black citizens to imp!:: that their children cannot be
JHOpE'rl~· educat0d unless thry are busE'd long di~tances to assure
schooling \Yith white childrm:
'·It has long sE'emed in~anr to mr for black people to pur~ue ,,·bites
from this neighborhood to that and clear on out of the country
becausr of some unspoken belirf that black children could not get a
proprr education in the absence of white children." Ibid.
Such statement~ do not diminish the desirability and constitutional
necessity of maintaining an integrated school system. But if the
S!!Stem i" genuinely desegregated, racial balance in the srnse of
i'llb~tantial mixing of races in all of a district's schools is not mnnclatrd by anything in the Constitution.
32
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no steadfast predications. Yet in pursuit of maximum
integration through extensive student transportation,
courts have ventured onto unchartered terrain in a manner which in the end may prove self-defeating to the
desired objectives.
I would impose no flat prohibition on student transportation to further desegregation. But a neighborhood
system of schools ought, to a much greater extent than
heretofore, be one legitimate community interest considered by district courts in framing equitable relief.
Transportation orders should be applied with a special
caution to any proposal as disruptive of family life
and interests--and ultimately of education itself-as extensive intra-city transportation of elementary age children solely for desegregation purposes. At a minimum,
this Court should not require school boards to engage in
the unnecessary transporting of children in the elementary
grades. It is at this age level that neighborhood education performs its most vital educational role. It is with
respect to children of tender years that the greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological health.
It is also here, at the elementary school, that the rights
and duties of parents are most sharply implicated.
While greater transportation of secondary school students might be permitted, even at this level the desire of
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools
should command judicial respect. It would be wisest,
where there is no absence of good faith , to permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue of student
transportation on their own. Legitimate. nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school concept are
entitled to judicial respect.

IV
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on two issues, namely: (i) \\·hether and
to what extent a uniform judicial approach will be taken
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to our national problems of school desegregation and
(ii) if so. whether the ambiguities of Swann, construed
to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive transportation , will be redefined to restore a more viable balance bet\Yeen the various interests which are involved.
With all deference, it seems to me that the Court today
has addressed neither of these issues in a way that will
lead to a rational, coherent national policy vvith respect
to integration in the schools.
The Court has adhered to the de facto/ de jure distinction under circumstances, and upon a rationale, \Yhich can
only lead to increased and inconclusive litigation, andespecially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this critical subject. There
is, of course, state action in every school district in the
land. The public schools have always been funded and
operated by States and their local subdivisions. It is true
that segregated schools, even in the cities of the South,
are in large part the product of social and economic
factors-and the resulting residential patterns. But
there is also not a school district in the United States,
\Yith any significant minority school population , in \Yhich
the school authorities-in one way or the other-have
not contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation \rhich still prevails. Instead of recognizing the
reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school
districts throughout the country. the Court persists in a
distinction whose duality operates unfairly on local communities in one section of the country and on minority
children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial do"·ngrading of legitimate community
interests in framing equitable decrees. In the absence
of a more flexible and reasonable standard than that imposed by district courts, purporting to follow Swann, the
desegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and
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other major cities may well involve even more extensive
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time.
It is \Yell to remember that the course we are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity
for all children. Communities deserve the opportunity
to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality
education, free from protracted and debilitating battles
over extensive student transportation. The single most
disruptive element in education today is the widespread
use of compulsory transportation , especially at elementary grade levels. This has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic educational ends, dividing
and embittering communities, and exacerbating rather
than ameliorating inter-racial friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to a more balanced evalua.tion of the interest of our society in achieving desegregation with those legitimate interests a community may
assert in nonracial neighborhood and community education. This will help assure that desegregation is accomplished by rational action , better understood and supported by parents and children of both races. For the
long term, this will promote an enduring quality of integration so essential to its genuine success.
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MR. JuSTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court. but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver. Colorado. a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions ·which mandated or permitted racial
segregation .1 Nor has it been argued that any other
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws)
contributed to the segregation which is at issue." The
Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Con;;titution has cxpresRl~· prohibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or
color ."
"Sec, e. g .. Su·ann Y . Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ..
-!02 U. S 1, :23 (1971) :
" \Yr do not reach . . . the qur~twn whether a showing that ;;choof
~egregation i;; a con~equrner of other t~· pe~ of o;tate action, without
an~· di;;criminator~· action b~· ;;chool authoritie;;, 1~ a con::;titutionai
violation requiring remedial action b~- a ;;chool de~egregation drcrrr .'"
Thr trrm "~taw action.'' a~ u~rd lwrrin . thu~ rrfer~ to action~ of tlw
appropriatr publle ~chool n11thoritiP~ .
1

.:

.,.
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Court has inquired only to what extent the Denver
public school authorities may have contributed to the
school segregation which is ackno>Yledged to exist in
Denver.
The predominantly minority schools are located in two
areas of the city referred to as Park Hill and the core
city area. The District Court considered that a school
with a concentration of 70 to 75o/r "Negro or Hispano
students" was identifiable as a segregated school. 313
F . Supp., at 77. Wherever one may draw this line. it is
undisputed that most of the schools in these two areas
are in fact heavily segregated in the sense that their student bodies are overwhelmingly composed of non-Anglo
children. The city-\vide school mix in Denver is 66%
Anglo. 14% Negro. and 20% Hispano. In areas of the
city where the Anglo population largely resides. the
schools are predominantly Anglo. if not entirely so.
The situation in Denver is generally comparable to
that in other large cities across the country in which there
is a substantial minority population and where desegregation has not been ordered by the federal courts. There
is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully
as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus
of the school desegregation problem has now shifted from
tlw South to the country as a whole. Unwilling and
footdragging as the process was in most places. substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made
m southern States." Xo comparable progress has been
made in many nonsouthern cities \\·ith large minority
-, Ac·eording to thr 1971 HEW r~tunatr , 43.9 % of :\Tf'gro puptl:;
attc·11drd majonty \Yhitr school~ in thf' South a:; oppo~ed to only
:!7 .8% who attE-nded ~urh ~rhoob in the North and Weo:t. Fifty,;evcn percent of all Nep;ro pupil,; m thf' North and We:;t attf'nd
~C'hool~ with over ~0% mi11ority population a~ opposE-d to .'32.2%
who do ~o in the South . 111' C'ong. Rrr . Sl.J-5.
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, populations ' primarily because of the de facto / de jure
. distinction nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices "':hich denounced
the evils of segregated schools in the South. '· But if our
national concern is for those who attend such schools.
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality, we must recognize that the
evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver
than in Atlanta.
'The 1971 HEW Enrollmrnt Surn'y dramatized the ;.;egre.~ated
eharnrtPr of public ~rhool ~~Aem~ in man~· non::;outhern riti~ . ThP
perrpntagr of ;'\egro pupils which attrnded ::;rhoob morr than 80%
black WH~ 91.1 in Clewland. Ohio; 9i.8 in Compton , California:
78.1 in Da~·ton, Ohio; 7fUl m Drtroit, ).[irhigan; 95.7 in Gar~· .
Indiana; 86.-+ in Kan,;a~ Cit~· , ).Ii~::;ouri: SfUl in Lo~ Angelrs, California ; 78.8 in ~[ihYaukrr, Wiscon~in; 91.:3 in :\ewark, New .Jrr~ey :
,1\9.8 in St. Lolli::;. :\[i::;,;ouri. Thr full dnta from the Enrollment Sur,·p~ · rna~· br found in 118 Cong. Ree. Sl-++-1-+8 , .Tan. 20, 197:2.
''A~ Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) rrrognizPd :
"For ~·ear~ wr have fou~ht thr hattlr of mtrgration primaril~- Ill
thr South wherr thr problrm wa~ ::;evrrr. It was a long, arduou~
fi~ht that de~en·ecl to b(' fought and nreded to br won .
"l nfort-unatcl~- . a~ the problrm of racml t~olatwn ha" movl'd north
of the :\Ia::;on-Dixon linr. man~· northrrnrr,- ha\'P bid an ent::;ivr
farr\\·dl to the 100-~·rar ~truggl(' for mcial rquality. Our motto
~rrm::; to havr brrn 'Do to :<outlwrn('r:< what ~-ou do not W<lnt to do
1 o ~·om:<rlf .'
'·Good rpa"on" havr alwa~- ,_ b(•Pn off('red , of cour::;e , for not movmg
, - igorou"J~- ahrad in t !JP ?\' ort h n" wrll a~ t hr South.
"Fir"t. it wa" that thr problrm wa:< wor"r m thr South . Then
thP fart:< lw~an to "how that that wn" no longer true.
•·wp thrn brgan to !war tlw dP facto-dP jure rrfram .
··Somrhow rr~idrntial "<'grrgation in tlw '\orth wa~ accidrntal or
dr f;trto and that madr it brttrr than thr lrga]J~- ~upportrd dr jure
~rgrrp:ation of the South . It \\'a" a hard di~tinrtion for black childrrn
m totallY ~egrrgntrd "choob in tlH' :\orth to under"tand. but it
allowed u:< to avoid thr prohlrm •· I JS Cong Rrr S:25-+2 . ~~rb . 2-+ ,
1972.
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In my view we should abandon a distinction which long
since has outlived its time, and formulate constitutional
principles of national rather than merely regional application. When Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 ( 1954), was decided, the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation was consistent with the limited
constitutional rationale of that case. The situation confronting the Court, largely confined to the southern
States. was officially imposed racial segregation in the
schools extending back for many years and usually embodied in constitutional and statutory provisions.
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in
unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state-compelled or authorized segregation of public schools. 347 U. S., at 488. 493-495. Although some
of the language ''vas more expansive. the holding in
Brown I was essentially negative: It was impermissible
under the Constitution for the States, or their instrumentalities. to force children to attend segregated schools.
The forbidden action was de jure, and the opinion in
Brown l was construed:....._for some years and by many
courts-as requiring only state neutrality, allowing "freedom of choice" as to schools to be attended so long as the
State itself assured that the choice was genuinely free of
official restraints."
"Sec·, e. g .. Bradley v. School Board. :~45 F. 2d :310, 316 (CA4

en bauc. 1965) :
" It ha:< been lwld again and agam . . . rhar rhe Fourteenth
Amendmcnt prohibition i" not again::;t ~eg regation a~ .-<uch .
A ~tnte or ~rhool di~trict offend" no con~titutwnal requirement
when it grant~ to all "tudent~ uniform]~· an unre:<tncted freedom of
choice a" to ~chool attended, ~o that each pupil , m effect, a~~w;n~ him"elf to the ~chool he wi~h<'" to attmd." (The ca~e wa~ later vacntecl
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But the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II,
349 F. S. 294 ( 1955). did not retain its original meaning.
In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the
concept of state neutrality was transformed into the
present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative
state action to desegregate school systems.' The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S.
430. 438 ( 1968), >vhere school boards were declared to
have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination \\"ould be eliminated root and
branch." The school system before the Court in Green
was operating in a rural and sparsely settled county
where there were no concentrations of white and black
populations. no neighborhood school system (there were
only two schools in the county). and none of the
problems of an urbanized school district.' The Court
properly identified the freedom of choice program
there as a subterfuge. and the language in Green imposing an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system
\Vas appropriate on the facts before the Court. There
was. however. reason to question to what extent this duty
would apply in the vastly different factual setti11g of a
and rl'manded b~· thi~ Court, which expre~,.;ed no \'irw on the mNit~
of thr dr,.;e~~:rpgation plan~ ~ubmittrd.) :382 U. S. lo:3, 105 (1D55).
8er abo Bell v. School City of Gary. Ind .. :32-t F. 2d 209 (CA7 1963) ;
Downs v. Board of Educ., :3:35 F. 2d 98~ (CAIO 191l.f): Deal v.
Board of Educ., 359 F. 2d 55 (CAll 196())
' For a concisr histor~· and commrntar~· on tlw evolution, ,.;rr ~~:rn
nal!~- :\. Biehl, Thr Suprrmr Court and thr Idea of Progrr~;; , pp
12()-1:30 ( 1970) .
'Srr al~o thr compamon ea~c·:; 111 Rauey \'. Board of Rducatwu.
:ml LT. 8 . .t.t:3 ( 196~), and .u Oil roe \', Board of rom m'n;. :{91 l '. S.
-+50 ( l9fil'). llE'itlwr of which uwolnd largr urban or mrtropolitan
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large city with extensive areas of residential segregation.
presenting problems and calling for solutions quite different from those in the rural setting of ~ew Kent
County. Virginia.
But the doubt as to whether the affirmative duty concept would flower into a new constitutional principle of
general application was laid to rest by Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971), in which the affirmative duty articulated in Green was applied to the urban
school system of metropolitan Charlotte. ~orth Carolina.
In describing the residential patterns in Charlotte, thP
Court noted the "familiar phenomenon" in the metroj)Olitan areas of minority groups being "concentrated in
one part of the city, ' ' 402 U. S .. at 25. and acknowledged
that :
"Rural areas accustomed for half a century to the
consolidated school system implemented by bus
transportation could make adjustments more readily
than metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous ~hools, congested and complex
traffic patterns.'' 402 U. S. , at 14.
Despite this recognition of a fundamentally different
problem from that involved in Green, the Court nevertheless held that the affirmative duty rule of Green was
applicable, and prescribed for a metropolitan school system with 107 schools and some 84,000 pupils essentially
the same remedy-elimination of segregation "root and
branch "-v,:hich had been formulated for the two schools
and 1,300 pupils of New Kent County.
In Swann, the Court further noted it was dealing only
with States having "a long history " of officially imposed
segregation and the duty of school authorities in those
States to implement Brown I. 402 L. S .. at 5- 6. In so
doing, the Court refrained even from considering whether
the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Brown I to
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Green / Swann undercut whatever logic once supported
the de facto/ de jure distinction. In imposing on metropolitan southeru school districts an affirmative duty, entailing large-scale transportation of pupils. to eliminate
segregation in the schools. the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not
result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation.
Rather, the familiar root cause of segregated schools in all
the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely
ameliorated by action of public school authorities. Thi
1s a national, not a southern phenomenon. And it is
largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did
not have segregatory school laws."
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination
of state-imposed segregation in that particular section of
the country where it did exist. Swann imposed obligations
on southern school districts to eliminate conditions which
are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin
and effect to conditions in the rest of the country. As
''A:; Dr. Karl Taeuber ~tate~ in hi~ article, Re,;Identwl Segregation.
Scientific American, Augu~t 19fj5, at 14:
" No elaborate analysis is neces:;ary to conclude from thr~e figures
that a high degree of re:;idential segregation based on rare 1~ a univNsaJ characteristic of American cities. Thi~ ::;egrega1ion 1~ found
in the cities of the North and Wrst as well a:; of the South: in large
cltie;,; a;; well as small ; in nonindustrial citie:- a~ well a" indu:'trial; 111
citie~ with hundreds of thousands of ~egro resident::: as well as tho:;e
with on!~· a few thousand; and 111 citie" that are progres~i,·e in the1r
emplo~·ment practice and Civil rights polirie" a:; well a" tho:;e that
:tre not "
Tn Ius book. Xegroe,; in Citir,; (1965), Dr. Taeubrr "tatrd that rr~i
dentwl ::;egregation PXIsts "regardless of thr character of lora! Jaws
and poliriP" and regardiPss of othrr forms of disrnminatiOII ." !d. ,
at

:~G .

1l--=so7-co);CtJii
$

&

mssm,h'

KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DEXYER. COLO.

th r remedial obligations of Swann extend far beyoiid
the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-imposed
segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swann
points inevitably tov.:ards a uniform. constitutional approach to our national problem of school segregation ,

TI
The Court's decision today, >vhile adhering to the
de jure/ de facto distinction, will require the application
of th e Gree n/ Swanu doctrin e of "affirmative duty '' to th e
Denver School Board despite the absence of any history
of state-mandated school segregation. The only evidence
of a constitutional violation was found in various d e ~
risions of the school board. I concur in the Court 's posit ion that the public school authorities are the responsible
agency of the State, and that if the affirmative duty doctrine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte. it IS
equally so for Denver. 1 would not. however . perpetuate
the de jure/ de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of identifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregatory intent. " I 11·ould
hold . quite simply, that where segregated public schools
r xist with in a school district to a substantial degree. th ere
is a prima facie case that th e duly constituted public
a uthorities (I will usually refer to them collectively as
the "school board " ) are sufficiently responsible '" to impose upon th em a nationally applicable burden to demon"' A prima far 1r ca~r of l'On~ titlll ional \·iolatwn rx 1;o;t ~ \\'h r n ~rgrl'
ga ti Otl 1~ found to a ~ u b~ t a ntial drgrrr in tlw ~ rh oob of a parti cul a r cl1~ t n c r. It 1 ~ rProg ni zt•cl , of ro m~r, that thi~ t prm i ~ rr lat in · :llld pro \· idP~ no prrr i~r ~ tandarcl~ . But rirr um~ t a n rP~ , clr m ogra phi r and o th P n\·i~P. \'ill'~- from di~ trirt to di~tri f't a nd ha rd a nd
fa~ t rul E'~ ~ hould n ot bE' fo rmulat r d_ Th E' rxi~ t P n rr of a ~ uh,.; tanti a l
{lE' rerntagr of ~f' hoob popul a t r d b~- " tudr nt ~ from onr ra r r onl \' or
p n •dominatrh- ~o populat r d . ,.; honld triggrr t hr wquiry ,
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strate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated school system.

A
The principal reason for abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction is that. in view of the evolution of
the holding in Brown I into the affirmative duty doctrine.
the distinction no longer can be justified ou a principled
basis. In decreeing remedial requirements for the
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg school district. Swann dealt
with a metropolitan. urbanized area in which the basic
causes of segregation were generally similar to those in
all sections of the country. and also largely irrelevant
to the existence of historic. state-imposed segregation at
the time of the Brown decision. Further. the extension
of the affirmative duty concept to require compulsory
student transportation went well beyond the mere remedying of that portion of school segregation for which
former state segregation laws were ever responsible.
Moreover. as the Court's opinion today abundantly demonstrates. the facts deemed necessary to establish de juTe
discrimination present problems of subjective intent
,,·hich the courts cannot fairly resolve.
At the outset. one must try to identify the constitu·
tiona] right which is being enforced. This is not easy.
as the precedents have been far from explicit. In
Brown I, after emphasizing the importance of education.
the C'ourt said that :
"Such an opportunity. where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 347 C. S .. at 493.

In BTow·n ll, the Court ide11tified the "funclamental principle" enunciated in BTOwn I as being the unconstitutionality of "racial discrimination in public education.''
349 r. S .. at 298. and spoke of "the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. " 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a minimum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system. 11 In
the evolutionary process since 1954. decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right,
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms.
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause. to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education. local school boards
will operate integrated school systems \\'ithin their respective districts. This means that school authorities.
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and
implement their customary decisions with a view toward
enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system'' presupposes. of
course, a total absence of any laws. regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to ( i) integrate
faculties and administration; ( ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, quality of instruction and curricula
opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their
authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones. and
SN· Birkel, supra. n. 7. at 118 :
''I t rthe problem of ~chool dr~egregation I has not bf:'f:'n that ~ im
plr
. becau~e thf:' laconic opinion in Brown v . Board of Educatwu wa ~ it~elf not that ~implr. Onr stram in 1t became evidrnt 111
~ ub~eq uent decisions outlawing all forms of state-~pon~orrd segregation 111 e \·er~·t hing from tlw spectator section of a courtroom to golf
tour~e8. The rnmimal propo~ition that emer~~:ed-and about time
tt wn~ that 1t should e mergr-wa~ that the state ma~· not, b~· legislation or admini~ trativel~·. da ~sify the population along rarial Jines .. ,
11
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determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind . Where school authorities decide to
undertake the transportation of students. this also must
be with integrative opportuuities in mind.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either
definitive or all-inclusive. but rather an indication of
the con tour characteristics of an integrated school syg·
tem in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not
mean-and indeed could not meai1 ih view of the resi:.
dential patterns of most of our ma.]or metropolitan
areas-that every school must in fac~ be an . integrated
unit. A school which happens to be all or predominantly
white or all or iJreciominantly black is not a "segregated"
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one.
Having school boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination . subtle or
othenYise. will find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best
able to assure an absence of such discrimination vvhile
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate
assurance that minority children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted ".,. ith the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State. and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to consti,
tutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan=
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ning as well as the daily operations of the public school
system. It sets policies on attendance zones, faculty
employment and assignments. school construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other matters.
School board decisions obviously are not the sole cause
of segregated school conditions. But if. after detailed
and complete public supervision, substantial school segregation still persists. the presumption is strong that the
school board, by its acts or omissions. is in some part
responsible. Where state action and supervision are so
pervasive and where. after years of such action. segregated schools continue to exist within the district
to a substantial degree. this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a constitutional violation.
The burden then must fall on the school board to demonstrate it is operating an "integrated school system. ' '
It makes little sense to find prima facie violations and
the consequent. affirmative duty to desegregate solely in
those States with state-imposed segregation at the time
of the Brown decision. The history of state-imposed
segregation is more widespread in our country than the
de jure/ de facto distinction has traditionally cared to
rceognize. As one comnwntator has noted:
" the three court of appeals decisions denying a constitutional duty to abolish de facto segregation all
arose in cities-Cincinnati. Gary and Kansas City,
Kansas- where racial segregation m schools was
formerly mandated by state or local law. [Deal v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F. 2d 55 ( CA6 1966),
cert. denied. 377 C S. 924 (1964); Downs Y. Board
of Educ., 336 F. 2cl 988 ( CAlO 1964). cert. denied. 380 C. S. 914. Bell , .. School City, 324 F. 2d
209 (C'A7 1963). cert. denied. 377 1:. S. 924.J Ohio
discarded its statute in 1887. Indiana in 1949. and
Kansas City not until the advent of Bro·wn. If
Segro and >vhite parents in Mississippi are required
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to bus their children to distant schools on the theory
that the consequences of past de jure segregation
cannot otherwise be dissipated. should not the same
reasoning apply in Gary. Indiana, where no more
than five years before Brown the same practice
existed with presumably the same effects." Goodman. De Facto School Segregation~ A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis. 60 Cal. L. Rev. 275, 297
(1972). 1 "

Kot only does the de jure/ de
inequitably on communities in
country~ more importantly. it
children as well. As the Fifth

facto distinction operate
different sections of the
disadvantages minority
Circuit stated:

"The ::\"" egro children in Cleveland. Chicago. Los
Angeles. Boston. Xew York, or any other area of the
nation which the opinion classifies under de facto
segregation. would receive little comfort from the
assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate their constitutional rights be~
cause they were born into a de facto society, while
the exact same racial make-up of the school system
m the 17 southern and border states violates the
" Thr author rontmur~:
·'Trur. the earlier the polic.\· of srgregation was abandoned the lrss
dangrr thPrr i~ that it continur~ to oprratr covrrtl~-. i:< ,;ignificantly
rl'spon:;ibiC' for prP:;ent cia~· pattrrn:; of re~idPntial ~rgrPgation, or has
eontributrd matPriall~· to prr~ent communit~· attitude~ toward Negro
:;chool ,.:. Hut therr ~~no rra:;on to .~ uppo:;e that 1954 i:; a uniYer,.:ally
appropriate diYiding linr brtwren dr jurr ,;rgregation that may
~afrl~- hr a,.:~unwd to ha\'(' ><]Wilt it:;e]f and thnt which mn~· not.
For man~· rPmedtal ]Htrpo><r,;. adoption of an arbitrar~· but ra,;i]~
admini,.:t rablr <·utoff point might not br objectionable. But in a
:;ttuatton ,.:uch a" :;chool d~rgrrgation. wht're both tht' nght:; a,;:;rrted
and tlw rrmrdial burdrn" impo,;pc] nrP of :;uch magnitudr. and where
t hr rr,;u]ting "rctwnal di"crimmat ion j,.: pa:;::<ionate]~- re,;rntPcl. it t"
.~un·]~, qur:;tionahle whPthrr >'ItCh arbitrarinr~~ i~ rither politically
or morally aeerptnble ."
1
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constitutional rights of their counterparts, or even
their blood brothers, bec1;1Us~ they were born into
a de jure society. AU children everywhere in the
nation are protected by the Constitution. and treatment which violates their constitutional rights i1i
one area. also violates such constitutional rights in
another area.'' Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indepe ndent School District, 467 F. 2cl 142. 148 ( CA5 en bane,
1972) quoting United States v. J_efferson County
Board of 8duc., 380 F. 2cl 385. 397 IC'Ai'i en bane)
Gewin. J .. dissenting) . 1"
The Court today does move for the first time toward
breaking clown past sectional disparities. but it clings
tenuously to its distinction. It searches for de jure
action in what the Denver School Board has do11e or
failed to do, and even here the Court does not rely upon
the resu lts or effects of the Board 's conduct hut feels compelled to find segregatory intent: 11
"We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
11
'

Sf'<' Birkrl , supra. n . 7, ar 119 :
'·If a Negro rhild peref'lVE'~ hi~ srparation

a~ di~crmunator~· and

invidiou~. hr i::-: not, in a o;ocirt~· a hundrrd

,·l'ar~ rrmon•d

from

~lavrr~ · . gomg to makP finr distinrtion~ about tiH· ,;om<·<• of ;t par-

ticular ::;rparation ..
11
Thr Court toda~· doe~ not rrquire, howl'vl'r. a ,;pgrPgator~ · llltl'llt
with rr~prct to thr entirE' ~chool "~·~trm, ami indPl'd hold~ th>~t if ~uclt
an mtrnt 1,; found w1th rr,;pect to :somE' ,;cltool~ 111 a ,;~·,;trm. tlw blll'den-normall\' on the plamtiff:,;-l:'hifts to the d1•fpndant ,;('!tool authoritJf',; to pron' a negativr: n;tmel~ · . that riH•Jr purpo,;(',; \H'n·
h<•mgn , ante. pp 17- 18.
Thr Court hal:' comf' a long wa~· ~Jilt'<' 8roll'll !. F;tartJng; from
thr una,;,;ailablr de JUre ground of thr di,;cnmJnalor~ · eon,;tit JJtl onal
and ~tatutor~· provision~ of ~omc• Stat<•,; , tlw liP\\' formulation-,;tilt
profe~::;mg fidelitY to thr de jure doctrinr-i,; that dr~rg;n•g;ation ll'ill
br ordPrrd c!Pspttr the ab~rJlCr of an~· ,;pgn·gaton· Ia\\'~ if: (i) ~l'grr
!);atcd ~chao]~ in fact rxi::'t : ( ii) a COIJ.l't find~ that tlH•y rr·,;u[t from
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segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or i11tent to segregate." (Court Opinion. p. 18)
(italics are the Court's).
The ( 'ourt's insistence that the "differentiating factor ''
bet\\·een de jure and de facto segregation be "purpose
or intent" is difficult to reconcile with the language in so
recent a case as Wright v. Council of the City of E-mporia,
407 LT. S. 451 ( 7972). In holding there that "motivation" is irrelevant, the Court said:
"In addition, an inquiry into the 'dominant· motivation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate
schools. and we have said that ' [ t lhe measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.' Davis
v. School Commissioners of .Mobile County, 402 U.S.
33. 37.
"Thus. we have focused upon the effect-not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action
i11 determining whether it is a permissible method
of dismantling a dual system.
•'Though the purpose of the Jlev\· school district was
found to be discriminatory in many of these cases. the
courts' holdings rested not on motivation or purposes but on the effect of the action upon the dismantling of the dual school system involved. That
,,·as the focus of the District Court in this case. and
we hold that its approach ,,·as proper.
407 F . S ..
a.t 462.

T can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that
the motivation of school board action is irrelevant in
~omr

:let loll takrn 1\'Ith ~c>p;regator~· mtrnt h~· thr ~rhool hoard :
(Iii) ~llf'h H('!JOil rrlatP~ to an~· "mraningful scgmrnt" of tlw ~chool
~.~ · ~t<·m : anfl (i\') til(' .-whuol hoard c·annot JHon• that It~ intrntion~
,,·it h n·~pc·r t to the !'Pilla inder of t lw ~ys t<·m wPn· nonsrgrpga tor~ · .
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Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be argued.
of course. that in Emporia a prior CO IIstitutional violation hac! already been proven and that this justifies the
distinction. The net result of the Court's language. ho,,·_
ever. is the application of an effect test to the actions of
southem school districts and an intent test to those in
other sections. at least unti l an initial de jure finding for
those districts can be made. Rather than straining to
peqX'tuate any such dual standard. we should hold forthrightly that significant segregated school conditions in
whatever section of the country are a prima facie violation of constitutional rights. As the Court has noted
else\Yhere:
"Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no
persons in a certain class will serve Oil a particular
jury or during some particular period. But it taxes
our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in
there being no members of this class among the over
six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The
result bespeaks discrimnation, whether or not it was
a. conscious decision on the part of any individual JUry
r·ommissio-n er." Hernandez v. Te:ms, 347 l T. ~- 475.
482 ( 1954). (Emphasis added .)

B
There is thus 110 reason as a matter of constitutwnal
principle to adhere to the de jure/ de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases. In addition. there are reasons of policy and prudent judicial administration which
point strongly toward the adoption of a uniform national
rule. The litigation heretofore centered in the South
already is surfacing in other regions. The decision of
the Court today. emphasizing as it does the elusive
element of segrega.tory intent, will invite numerous desegregation suits in whicb there can be little hope of uni-·
fQrmit,v of re~ult ..
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The issue in these cases will not be whether segregated
education exists. This will be conceded in most of them.
Tht> litigation '"ill focus as a consequence of the Court 's
decision on vvhetlwr segregation has resulted in any
"meaningful or significant" portion of a school system
from a school board's "segregatory intent." The intractable problems involved in litigating this issue are obvious
to any lawyer. The results of litigation-often arrived
at subjectively by a court endeavoring to ascertain the
subjective intent of school authorities with respect to
action taken or not taken over many years-will b('
fortuitous. unpredictable and even capricious.
The Denver situation is illustrative of the problem.
The courts belov.- found evidence of de JUre violations
with respect to the Park Hill schools and an absence of
such violations with respect to the core city schools.
despite the fact that actions taken by the school board
with regard to those two sections were not dissimilar.
It is. for example. quite possible to contend that both
the construction of Manual High School in the core city
area and Barrett Elementary School in the Park Hill area
operated to serve their surrounding Negro communities
and. in effect. to merge school attendance zones with
segregated residential patterns. See Petitioner's Brief,
pp. 80- 83. Yet findings even ou such similar acts will,
under the de jure/ de facto distinction. continue to differ.
especially since the Court has never made clear what
suffices to establish the requisite "segregatory intent " for
an initial constitutional violation . Even if 1t \\'ere possible to clarify this question. '"ide and unpredictable
differences of opinion among judges would be inevitable
when dealing with an issue as slippery as "intent' ' or
" purpose." especially when related to hundreds of
decisions made by school authorities unc!Pr varying eoneli tions over many years.
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This Court has recognized repeatedly that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation ,
or collection of different motivations. tha.t lie behind a
legislative enactment." Pal111er v. Thompson , 403 C. S.
214, 224 ( 1971); NfcGi11nis v. Royster, r . S. - . (1973); United States V. O'Brien, 391 r. R. 367. 381
(1968). Whatever difficulties exist with regard to a single statute will be compouilcied in a judicial review of
years of administration of a large and complex school
system.'' Every act of a school board and school administration. and indeed every failure to act v.·here affirmative action is indicated, must now be subject to scrutiny.
The most routine decisions with respect to the operation
of schools, made almost daily. can affect in varying degrees the extent to which schools are initially segregated.
remain in that condition. are desegregated. or-for the
long term future- arc likely to be one or the other. These
decisions include action or nonaction with respect to
school building coustruction and location; the timing of
building ne>Y schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of schools; th e drawing or gerrymanderi11g of
eommC'ntato r h;~~ C'x prl'~~('(l it :
are md rrd prC'pnn·d to inqum• uno motll"<', thorn~ ·
qurstion~ will a ri~e e\"C'n tf onC' a~~umC'~ that ra cial motll"atiOll i~
ca pablr of brmg prown at trial. What of th r cas<' m ll"hi('h one or
morr membf'r~ of a ~rhool board. but lr~~ than a majorit~ ·. arr found
to haYC' nctrd on ractal ground::;'' ~1 h11t if it apprars 1h:1t tllC' ::;rhool
board'~ :1ct10n \\"a::; promptC'd bY a mixtnn• of motiYC'~. lll cl nding con~ titntionall~· innocrnt one~ that alone would han promptPd thC' board
to :let'? What tf the mrmbe r;;: of thr ::;c hool board \\"C'f<' not them~C' h·e::; rnciall~· m~pire d but " ·i::;hrd to pl ra~P their eon,.;titurnt::;, mnny
of \\"hom thC'~· knP\Y to br "o·? If ,;ur h ca,.;e~ are rla::;"ifird a::; uneon,.;tituttonal de Jlll'C' ,;egrPgatton. thNe i~ little pomt m prr~Nving
thC' de jmC'-dC' facto di~tinctJOn at all. And tt ma~ · \H'll bC' that the
differencC' brtll"rcn an~· of tllC',.;c ,.;i tuation" and one in ll"htrh ra rm l
motiYatJOn ts altogC'thrr la cki ng '" too m,;ignifirant. from thP ,;tandpomt of both thC' moral rulpabtlit~· of thr "tatr official,; and thr·
tmpart upon thP children inYOI\'NI. to ,;upport a diffprrnce in rons1ttutional trPatmrnt ," C:ooqma11. sup m. n 11. at 1i<4-2S.'i_
·,c,

A~ Oil<'
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student attendance zones; the extent to \\·hich a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitmeiit. promotion
and assignment of faculty ami supervisory personnel:
policies \Yith respect to transfers from 011e school to
another; whether. and to what extent. special schools ·will
be provided. where they \YiJI be located. and who \\"ill
qualify to attend them; the determination of curricululiL
including whether there \\·ill be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or to vocational training. and tlw rout"'
ing of students into these tracks; and even decisions as
to social. recreational and athletic policies.
In Swann the Court did not have to probe into segregatory intent and proximate cause with respect to each
of these "endless'' factors . The basis for its de jure finding there was rooted primarily in the prior history of the
desegregation suit. 402 l r. ~-. at ;)- 6. But in a case of
the present type. where no such history exists. a judicial
examination of these factors will be required under toclay's decision. This will lead inevitably to uneven and
unpredictable results. to protracted and inconclusive li tigation . to added burdens on the federal courts. and to
serious disruption of individual school systems. ln the
absence of IIational and objective standards. school boards
and administrators will remain in a state of uncertainty
and disarray. speculating as to \Vhat if' required and vdwn
litigation wiJI strike.

c
Rather than contmue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle. and contributing to the consequences indicated above. we should ackno\Yledge that
whenever public school segregation exists to a sub~tantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school board . lt
i~ true. of course. that segregated schools- wherever
located- are not solely thr product of the action or
i naction of public ~ch oo l a uthoriti es. In<kf'd. as indi-
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catecl earlier. there can be little doubt that principal
causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country. whether in the Xorth,
\Vest. or South. are the socio-economic influences \\·hich
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school boards have
continuittg. detailed responsibility for the public school
system vYithin their district"' and. as Judge John Minor
vVisdom has noted. "where the figures lshowing
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently. a
prima face case of discrimination is established."
U11ited States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 84 .
873 ( CA5 en bane 1972). Moreover. as foreshadowed itl
Swann and as implicitly held today. school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
\Yhich has outlived its time.

nr
The preceding section addresses the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the school districts
throughout our country to operate integrated school systems. When the schools of a particular district are
'" IndPPd, if onP g;oP,.; back far Pnoug;h, it i" probabiP that :til ractal
"Pg;regnt ton, whprever occurnng; and II'IJPther or not confined to thr
:<chools. ha,.; at somp ttmP bt>Pn ~upportPd or maintained bv g;o\·rrnmPnt aetion. In Becket \· . School Board. :~0~ F. Supp. 1:27-t, 1:311]:{15 (ED \'a. 1969), .Tudg;r WaltN Hoffman compi!Pd a :<ummary
of Jl:l"t public segregator~· action \\'hich lllcluded Pxample" from :1
g;n•at majorit~· of Statr". He contluded that "on!~· a~ to the .-<tntes
of :\lamP, \"P\\' Hamp~hire. Vermont. V\1 ashington, :\t>vada. and
H:twaii clop,.; it appPar from thi,.; nonPxhau,.;ti\'P rp,.;parch that no cli~
criminator~· law~ appearrd on thr hooks at one tim<' or anorlwr_"'

lcl,.,

at 1:315,
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found to be substau tially segregated. there is a prima
facie casr that this obligation has not been met. The
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demonstrate that they have i ii fact operated an integrated
system as this term is defined above, supra, p. - . If
therr is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case. the question then becomes what reasonable affirma=
tive steps district courts may require to place the school
system in compliaiJCe 1vith the constitutional standard.
In short. what specifically is the nature and scope of thl:!
remedy'?
As the Court's opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver is a "d ual school system,'' that city
will then be under an "affirniative duty" to desegregatf'
its entire system "root and branch.'' Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S .. at 438. Again, the critical question is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

A
The controlling case is Swan'll, supra, and the question
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require .
Swann purported to e iJun ciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and If and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily oi1 "racial
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as
\Yell as seco ndary pupils. Lo\Yer federal courts have often
read 81l'ann as requiri11g far-reaching transportation decrees " "to achieve tlw greatest possible degree of actual
"SPe. e. g .. Thompson 1' . School Board of Xell'port New&. F . 2d - , - (1972) , whPre thr CA.J. en bauc. upheld a distnct court
a~~igmnPnt plan wherr ·'travrl timr, varying from a mmimum of
fort~· minutP~ and a maxnnum of one hour, rach wa~· . would br rrqtmPd for bu~mg black ~tudrnt~ out of thr old Cit~· and white stu~!Pnt~ int o til<' old Cit,1· 111 order to a ch1rve a rarwl balnncmg of th o
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desegregation." 402 L". S., at 26. In the context of a
large urban area. with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different-and widely
Eeparated-Eections of the school district, extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading
it to date.
To. the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts. I record my profound
misgiVmgs. Xothing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such disruption of public education.
Fortunately, Swann also laid down a broad rule of reason
under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible
and other values and interests be considered. Thus the
Court recognized that school authorities. not the federal
judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the
task of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. 8., at
16. School boards in rural areas might adjuEt more
readily to this task than those in metropolitan districts
district." This transportation wa:; dPcreed for children from the thtrd
grad<> up, im·olving childrPn a,; young a:; eight year,; of agr.
In Northcross v . .l1emphis Bd. of Educ .. 466 F. :2d 890, 895
(1972), the CA(i affirmed n di:strict court a,;:signment plan which
daily transported 14,000 childrrn with "the maxtmum timr to hP·
,.;prnt on thr buses b~· an~· child rbeing 1 :34 minute~ . . . . " prP,.,umabl~· rnch wa~·.
But ;t::< .Judgr Weick notre! in dt~:o:E'nt thr CA6
tn;trurtPd thr di~trict judgr to implrment ~·pt furthrr dr,.;pgrrgation
orcl<'r~.
Plan,; prPsentl~· undrr <·on,.;idPration b~· that court rail for
the busing of :39 ,0~5 and 61 ,5:30 childrPn rr:sprctiYrl~·. for unc!Ptrrnunrd length:; of timP. !d .. :tt 895-981i.
PPtitionrr:< hdorP this Court in Pott:s ,._ Flax , Xo 72- 2RS , CPrt .
r. S. - ( 197-), contendrd that t hr implrmPntallon
rlPnied , of tlw CA5'~ dirPctiYP in Plax \',Putts. 464 F. 2d 865 (197:2), would
rpquirP bu" ridP" of up to two hours and 20 minutP~ rach c!n~· and
a round trip of up to 70 milP" . Prtition , at 14. Whilr rr"ponc!Pnts
contPnd thP::;P figure:; rP]H<•,.;pnt an "a::<tounding inflation ." Hrspon,.;p ,
<If ( , t rnn,.;portnti.on of a ,.;ignificant magnitud<• "'<'<'Ill~ iuPvitn bll' ,
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"with dense and shifting population. numerous schools,
congested and complex traffic patterns." !d. , at 14.
Transportation orders are suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the education
process.
ld., at 31. Finally. the age of the pupils to
be transported was recognized by the Court in Swann
as one important limitation on the time of student
travel. Ibid.
These factors were supposed to help guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases.'" And the Court further emphasized that equitable
decrees are inherently sensitive. not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved. but to a variety of other
public and private interests :
. . . a school desegregation case does not difl'er
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct. by a.
balancing of the individual and collective interest.
the condition that ofl'ends the Constitution . Swann.
supra, at 15-16.
Those '"·ords echoed a similar expression in Bro11•n II ,
349 U. S., at 229:

" rn fashionillg and efl'ecting the decrees . the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has beell characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
"Sr<• L'nited States"·

Te.ta ~;

Education Agency. -W7 F . :.!d S-1-8. ,.;;s:{

(CA5 197:2) (Brll . .J. , concmring
Jttd~~:r~ jo inrd) :

111

an opinion in \Yiuch ~r\· rn othl'r

.. In on r \·ipw the renwdy which t hr district comt is n•quirrd i o
formnlatr ~houlcl b(' formulated within thr entire coute:rt of thr
opmwn in Swawt \·. Charlotte-Mer-klenbvrg Board of Educa-

tion. . . .

[Empha~i::;

:LdciC'd.j"
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for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs ..,
Thus in school desegregation cases, as elsewhere, equity
counsels reason. flexibility attd balance. See. e. g. , Lemon
v. Kurtzman, F. S. ( 1973). I am aware. of
course, that reasonableness in any area is a relative and
subjective concept. But vvith school desegregation. reasonableness would seem to embody a balanced evaluation
of the obligation of public school boards to promote dPse~
regation ,,·ith other, equally important educational interf•sts which a community may legitimately assert. Xeglect
of either the obligation or the interests destroys the evenhanded spirit with which equitable remedies must be
approached."' Overzealousness in pursuit of any singlf>
goal is untrue to the tradition of equity and to thf' "balance" and "flexibility" with which this Court has always
rf'garded it.

B
Where school authorities have defaulted in their duty
to operate an integrated school systf'm. district courts
must insure that affirmative desegregative steps ensuf' .
;\/[any of thesf' can be taken effectively ,,·ithout damaging state and parental interests in having children at tf'ncl schools within a reasonable vicinity of home.
Where desegregative steps are possible within th e frame\York of a system of "neighborhood education ." school
authorities must pursue tlwm. .For exampl e. hound"' The• rPl(•yant inquiry i~ ""whrt hrr thP ('O~t~ of arhiPnng dr~('gn•
gation in an~· gi\·pn ~ituation otllwrigh thr lrgal. moral a nd e•durnth:tt th r
tional eon~idrration~ fit\·oring 11. • • . [t i~ clPar .
Con:<titution ,;hould not br hrld to rrquirP am· tran:<portation plan
t hnt krrp~ childrrn on a bu,; for a ~ub:<tantial part of thr da~·. ('On~lllllP~ :<ignifi('ant portion" of fund~ othrrwi~P ,;ppndahlr din• ctl~· on
Pducation. or inYoh·r,; a genuine· C'!rmrnt of dangrr to thr ~aft• t\· of
the ('hild ." ~chool ])p,;rgrrgntion After Swann: :\ Th eor~· of (;0\·C'flllllrnt Hr·~pon:<ibil ity. :39 l". Chi . L. Hr\·. -t21. -l:2:2 , -l-l:l ( 197:!).
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aries of neighborhood attendance zones should be drawn
to integrate. to the extent practicable. the school's student body. Construction of ne,,· schools should be of
such a size and at such a location as to encourage the
likelihood of integration. Swann, at 21. Faculty integration should be attained throughout the school system.
Swann, at 19; United States v. Montgomery County
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 ( 1969). An optional
majority to minority transfer program, \\"ith the StatE'
providing free transportation to desiring students. 1s also
a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.
Swann, at 26- 27. It hardly need be repeated that allocation of resources within the school district must be made
\vith scrupulous fairness among all schools .
.The above examples are meant to be illustrativ0. ttot
exhaustive. Th0 point is that the over-all intt>grative
impact of such school board decisions must be assessed by
district courts in deciding whether the duty to desegregate
has been met. For example. "neighborhood school plans
are constitutionally suspect \\"hen attendance zones arr
superficially imposed upon racially defined neighborhoods.
and whe11 school construction preserves rather than eliminates the racial hegemony of given schools ... "" Keyes
v. School District .Yo. 1, Denver Colorado,- F. :2d - ,
l ' wiled States v. Board of Education of Tulsa County,
429 F. :2d - . 1258- 1259. This does not imply that
decisions on faculty assignment. attendance zones. school
construction. closing and consolidation. must be made
to the detriment of all neutral. nonracial considerations.
But these considerations can. \\"ith proper school board
initiative. generally be met in a manner that "·ill enha11re
the degree of school clPsegregation .
"" A II~dul ~1ucl~· of tlw lu~torieal II~<·~ and ahll~<'~ of 1lw n<·Ighhol··
hood ~chool concept 1~ ::\1 WPmlwrg, Ha<·<· ,\: Pia<"<' 119(-\7).
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c
Drfaulting school authontics ,,·oulcl have. at a mini·
mum. the obligation to take affirmative steps of the sort
outlined in the above section. :-lchool boards would. of
course. be free to develop and initiate further plans to
promote school desegregation. Ln a pluralistic society
such as ours. it is Pssentwl that 110 racial minority feel
demeaned or discriminate><! against and that students of
all races learn to play. work. am! cooperate \\'ith Oil('
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. X othjng in this opinion is nwant to discourage school boards
from exceeding minimal consti tu tiona! standards in promoting the recognized values of integrated school
eonditions.
A co11stitutional requirement of extensive student
transportatio11 solely to achieve integration, hovvever.
presents a vastly more eomplex problem. It promises
011 the one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation.
,,·hile it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as
important community aspirations and personal nghts.
The Equal Protection Clause does lllcleecl require that
racial discrimination not be tolerated in the deciswn
of public school authorities. It does not command that
school authorities unclertakr widespread student transportation solely for the sake of maximizing integration ."'
"' In fact , dur to racial!~· .-<rparat<· n·~J(i<·ntiai p:tttrrn~ that clwrart<:"rlz<· om major urban <H<'a~ lt 1~ quitP unrrali~t1c to thmk of
a ('h1r1·ing in man _,. rit1r~ ~~~h~tantial 1ntrgration throughout tlw
~chool di~tnrt 11·ithom a drgn·<· of ~tudPnt tran~portation IYhich
1\'0llld hal'<' tilf' gran'~t eronumic and c•du<'ational <'Oil~<'CJll<'ll<'<'~ .
.-\ s l'rofr~ ~or Hirkd not<· ... .
· In mo~t of the largPr urban nn·a~. drmograplnr ronditwn~ nrr ~nell
that no policY that a court r·;1n ordPr. and a ~rhool board. a cJt~· or
r1·rn a ~tat<' lw~ th<· rnpabiht~· to put into <'ffrct . II'II! m fart rr~ult
in tbr for!'~PPablr futnr<' m ra<·J;dl~· babJJH'Pd puhll<' ~<'hoob. On!~·
i1 rrordrring of thr ('tll'irnnnwnt llll·oii'Jilg <'!·onomJc <tllcl :-;oculi pol1ry
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportatwn
has no place in public school systems or as a permissible
desegregative tool. The transporting of school children
is as old as public education. and in rural and some
suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing
of hooks. It is presently estimated that approximately
half of all American chilclrpn ride buses to school for
reasons unrelated to integration."" At the secondary
level in particular. where the schools are larger and servP
a wider. more dispersed constituency than the elementary
school. some form of public or privately financed trans~
portatioi1 is often necessary. 'rhere is a difference. ho,,·_
Pver. in transportation pla11S voluntarily initiated by local
school boards for educational purposes and thosP imposed by a federal court. The former usually represent a
11ecessary or convenient means of access to the school
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for no
purpose other tha11 to further rntegratiolL"" Yet thr
on thr broadr~t ronrrn·:tblr front might have an apprrciahl<' impact .''
Bl('krl, supra. n. 7, at 1:3:2
"" E~tlm:Hr:; var~· . SU'ann. su pra, at :29. notrd that "rightl'Pil million of thr X anon·~ public "rhool clnldrrn, approx1matrl~· :m%, wrn·
tran.-po;-trd to thr1r ~rhoob b~· bu~ in l9fi9-l970 Ill all part~ of thr
conntn·.' ' Srnator Rib1cotf (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful "tndrnt of thi~
prohlrm. ~tatl'd that ··two-third,- of all Amrncan rhildrrn toda~· ndr
bn~r" to "chou! for rra~on" unrrlatrd to Intrgration." ]]g Cong. RPr·
82.5-t::l. FPb. :24, 197:2.
"" Hi"torirall~ ·. ch,tant tran,porta1ion wm. IITong;l~· tN•d io promotr ,-pgrt>ga t ion . .. :\ rgro child rrn ll'!' r<' grnrrall~· ron"Idrrrcl rap:l hlr of 1r:11·rllmg longrr di,tanrr" to ,.:chool and without thr aid of an~
YPhirlr. What ll'a~ too far for :1 whitr child brramr rra:::onahl~· nrar
Jor 11 :\q?;ro child." WPinlwrg, su pra. 11. :20. at S/
Tin~ drplorablc• hi~<tor~· ha~ lrd ,;onH· to argur that mtrgrativr bu~
nd!'~ arr .iu~<tifiPd "" atonrmrnt for pa~t "rgrrgator~· tnp~ Hnd thai
IWighborhood PdurHtlOII ~~ 110\\' hut a eodr-11·orrl for racwl "rgrrgatiOll . Hut mi"ii~<P of tran,;por1HtiOII Ill tlw pa,;t dor~< not imp[~· nrighhorhoud ~choolmg ha~ 110 1·;tlid noll,;<'grrg;lton· u,-p~ for tlw JlfC'~<<'nt
X or would IITongful 1ra n,;port a 1Ion 111 t he• JIH"t Jll~t II\· drtnmrn t a[
t r;l n><por t<l 1ion for r he· c-lnld rPII of 1orl:1 1 ,
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Go1:1rt in Swann \\"aS UllQUcstionaoly right in describing
bus transportation as "one tool of school desegregation.··
402 C S .. at 30."' The crucial issue is "·hen. under \Yhat
circumsta11Ces. ami to what extent such transportation
may appropriately be ordcrNI. Tlw answer to this
turns-as it does so often in the law- upon a sound exer•
eise of discretion under the circumstances.
Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative obligations. It noted that a constitutional requir<>ment of "any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing . .. ,.,·ould
lw disproved . . .'' and sanctioned district court usP
of mathematical ratios as "no more than a startmg point
in the process of shaping a remedy .. . ·· 402 'G. S .. at
24. 25. Thus particular schools n1ay be all \\·lute or·
all black and still not infringe constitutional nghts
if the system is genuinely integrated and school authorities are pursuing integratiVl' steps short of extensive and
disruptive transportation. The refusal of the Court to
require racial balance in schools throughout the district
vr the automatic elimination of all "one-race schools. "
402 l. S .. at 26. IS grounded in a recognition that the
State. parents. and children all have at stake in
2
' Some• eommunittr~ had tran~purtation plan~ in rff<•rt at tht• timr
o court dr~t·grrgatiOII ordrr~. 8rr ::)u·awt. oU]Jra, at :29, n. 11 : Dav1s
,.. School Comm'rs of Mobile Count!/. -1-0:2 lT. S. :3:3, 34-:35 (1971) .
( 'on rt~ IHt \'(' ll~f'd t hl' prl'~l'ncr or a b~<·ner of PXI~tmg t nut~porta t ton
in a di~tnet a~ OIH' fartor in framing and implenwnting df'~<'grrgation
derrf'r~. ['niter! State:;\'. ll'atso11 Chap!:'! School Di:;tnct. -1--1-ti F . :Zd
9:n. 9:37 (CA.!' 1971): i\'orthr-ross Y. Board of Edur .. -1--1--l F 2d 1179,
111':2-llx:l (C'A.ti 1971): Dal'ts ,._Board of 8duc .. :3:21' F . Supp. 1197 ,
120;3 (ED A.rk. 1\-l/1 ). \Yhpn· a ~ehool board 1~ ,· oluntaril~ · f'ngagrcl
Ill tran~porting :'tttdPtlt:'. a di,tnrt court i~ . of eour:'f', obl!!!:ated to
m~urr th<lt ~ueh t rrm~portat ion 1 ~ not llltdPrtakPn \\'ith ::<Pgrpgator~
Pff<'ct. "'hrn·. al~o. Yo!umar~· tran~port<ltion progrnm~ arr nlrf'ad~
111 prol-(n'~" . t hPn• nl:l~· br gr<'a t <·r .i u~t lfieallon for court -ordNf'd tra n~ 
portntion of ~tudt•ttt~ fo r a tomparahle time awl distaw ·e to nchlP\'t'
1\l't·at (' r lllt<·g:rat tOll.
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school clesegregatwn decrees legitimate and recoglllzable
interests.
The personal Interest might be characterized as the
desire that children attend community schools ncar
home. Dr. James Coleman testified for petitioners at
trial that "most school systems organize their schools in
relation to the residents by having fixed school districts
and some of these are very ethnically homogeneous."
App. 1549a. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
396 F. 2d 55. 60 ( H)66). the Sixth Circuit summarized
the advantages of such a neighborhood system of
1<chools: ",-.
"Appellants. however. pose the question of whether
tlw neighborhood system of pupil placement. fairly
administered without racial bias. comports with the
requirements of equal opportunity if it nevertheless
l'esults in the creation of schools with predominantly
or eve11 exclusively :\egro pupils. The neighborhood system 1s 111 wide use throughout the nation
and has been for many years the basis of school
administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have several valuable aspects \Yhich are an
aid to education. such as minimization of safety hazards to children in reaching school. economy of cost
in reducing transportation needs. ease of pupil
placement and administration through the use of
"' TIH' trrm ·' nPighhorhood ~rhool' ' ~hould not bP ~uppo~Pcl to
dPnotP ~o}ph- a IYalk-tn :school or onr 1\'lnc-h srrYP~ c·hildren on}~- Jll
tlw ~mroundmg blork.-<_ Thr Comt ha" notPd. m a dtffnrnt contrxt. that "thr 1\'ord ·nptghborhoocl' t~ quite' a,: ~ll::'rrpttbiP of l'a nation a" thl· 1\'orcl ·Joraltt~· · Both tPrm:-< arP ela~tH' and. drpendrnt
upon C'Jf(•um~tanrP;-<, ma~ · be· Pquall~· ~nt it<fiPd b~- arpa,.: mpn~urPd b.1
rod:-; or b~- nulr,.:" Connally 1· nenl!l'al Con~;l. Co .. :2()9 ( 1. S. :31-:5.
895 ( l 9:2())
In t IH' ,.:rhool rontPxt, .. ll<'ighborhood '' rdrr,.: to rl' la tn·p
proxtmlt~ ·. to a prc•fPrPnrr for a ~<'hool tJC•an·r. ratlwr thaJJ more
dJ,.:tant from hom1 •.
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neutral, easily determined standards, and bette!'
home-school comm u nica tiou "
The neighborhood school does provide greater ease of'
parental and student access and convenience, as well as
greater economy of public administration. These are
obvious and distinct advantages. but the legitimacy oi
the neighborhood concPpt rests on more basic grounds."';
:\eighborhod school syst<"ms. neutrally administered. re~
fleet the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public education. Public schools have
been a traditional source of strength to our :\'ation. and
that strength may derive in part from the identification of
many schools with the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood. Community support. interest and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a
nPighborhood attendance' pattern: distance may encoura~e disintf'rest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
tlw intimacy of our institutions-home. church. and
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in the
unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no
judgment on this viewpoint. but I do believe that this
Court should he wary of compelling in the name of constitutional law >vhat may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional. more personal fabric of their public
schools.
Closely related to tlw concept of a community and
neighborhood education. are those rights and duties parents have v.:ith respect to the education of their children.
The law has long recognized the parental duty to nurture.
support. and providf' for the welfarf' of children. includ"'' 1 do uot 1mpl.1· that thr 1wip;hhorhood conrrpt rnu~t hr rrnbodird
m rvrr.1· ~chool ".1·:-;tem . Hut wlwrr a "ehool board ha~ c ho~rn it.
f<'d<'ral .iuclg<'" ~ hould arrord 1t n'"JlPl't 111 frmning rrnwrlial deere·<·~ .
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ing their education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
C S. 510. 534. 535. a unanimous Court held that:
"Under the doctrine of Af eyer v. K ebraska, 262
S. 390. we think it entirely plain that the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their controL . . . The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty. to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

r.

And in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482
(1965). the Court noted that in Pierce, "the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to
the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." r do not believe recognition of this
right can be confined solely to a parent's choice to send
a child to public or private schooL Most parents cannot afford the luxury of a private education for their
children. and the dual obligation of private tuitions and
public taxes. Those \Yho may for numerous reasons
seek public education for tlwir children should not be
forced to forfeit all interest or voice iu the school their
child attends. lt would. of course. be impractical to
allow thf' v,:ishes of particular parf'nts to be controlling.
Yet the interest of the parent in the enhanced parentschool and parent-child communication allowed by the
nf'ighborhood unit ought not to lw suppressed by force
of Ia"·
In the understandable natwnal concern for alleviating
public school segregation . courts may have overlooked
the fact that the rights and interests of children affected
hy a desegregation program also arf' entitled to consideration. Any child, whit<' or black. who is compelled tQ
IPav(' his 1wighborhood and spend sig11ificant timf' each
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day being transported to a distant school suffers an im·
pairment of his liberty and his privacy. X ot long ago,
James B. Conant wrote that "la]t the elementary school
level the issue seems clear. To send young children day
after clay to distant schools seems out of the question.""'
A community may well conclude that the portion of a
child's day spent on a bus might be used more creatively
in a classroom. playground. or some other extracurricular
school activity. Decisions such as these. affecting the
quality of a child's daily life. should not lightly be held
constitutionally errant.
To this point I have focused mainly on the personal
interests of parents and children which a community may
believe to be best protected by a neighborhood system
of schools. But broader considerations lead me to question just as seriously any remedial requirement of extensive student transportation solely to further integration.
AIIY such requirement is certain to fall disproportionately
on the school districts of our country. depending 011
their degree of urbanization. financial resources. and their
racial composition. ~ome districts vvith little or no bJracial population \Vill experience little or no educational
disruption. while others. notably in large. biracial metropolitan areas. must at considerable expense undertake
extensive transportation to achieve the type of integratioii frequcntly being ordered by district eourts."" At a
time \Yhen public education generally is suffering seriom<
financial malnutrition. the economic burdens of such
transportation can be severe. requiring both initial capital
outlays and annual operating costs in the millions of
dollars."" And v.:hile constitutional requirements have.
"' ::-;Jum~ and Submb~. 29 ( 19H1)
.,, S<·r n. :21. sup1·a.
"" In :\f r mphi~ , for c•x;unplr, whic·h ha~ no hi,rorY of hu~mg ~ru
<trnt". tlw mmimum trnn~portation plan ordrrrd h~· tlw romt~ wil)_
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often occasioned uneven burdens, never have they touched
so sensitive a matter as wide differences in the compulsory
transportation requirements for literally hundreds of
thousands of school children.
The argument for student transportation also overlooks
the fact that the remedy exceeds that which may be
necessary to redress the constitutional evil. Let us use
Denver as an exa.mpk. The Denver School Board. by
its action and nonaction. may be legally responsible for
some of the segregation that exists. But if one assumes
a. maximum discharge of constitutional duty by the
DC'n ver Board over the past decades. the fu nclamen tal
problem of residential segregation would persist."" It
is indeed a novel application of equitable power- not to
mention a dubious extension of constitutional doctrineto requirc so much greater a degree of forced school in~
tcgration than would ha.vc resulted from purely natural
and neutral nonsta.te causcs.
The compulsory transportation of students carries a
further infirmity as a constitutional remedy. With most
constitutional violations. the major burden of remedial
action falls on oft'ending state officials. Public officials
\\'ho act to infringe personal rights of speech. voting. or
religious exercise. for example. are obliged to cease the
(Jffemling act or practice and. where necessary. institute
eorrective measures. lt is they who hear the brunt of
n•qmrr . Ill the Sehool Board·~ l':;timatr , an IllltJal capital exprnditun·
of Sl ,Ho-+ ,192 for bu~e~ plu~ an annual operating ro~t of $()29.192
Tlw Board r,;timate~ that a morr extrno:ivP tran::'portntion program
to he ron::'tclrred b~· thr di~trict court \\·ill require mitial capital m\·e:;tm<'nt,; of S:3 .92-+,000 and annual opC'rating co:;t,; of $1 ,78:3,.!90
Thr mo~t clra:;t ir tran~portatton plan before' the di::'trirt eourt r<'quirr"
p:;ttmatrd annual operating ro:;t:; of from $2 ,:35-!,220. 82,.!:31,710. or
$:3,4():3 ,100 depending on thr Board',; tran:;portntion arrangrmC'Ilt:; .
.\'orthc1·o~~ \'. Bua.rrl of Erlucatio11 of .l!emphi~ ('ity Sch .. supra .
II . 17 . at X9X (V\'ri<·k . .f .. dt~~(·nttng) .
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remedial action. though oth0r citizens will to varying degrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for
segregation must. at tht' very minimum, act to cease segregatory acts. But when the obligation further extends
to the transportation of students. the full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who did not participate in any constitutional
violation.
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration ..
risk setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable
sociaJ consequences. Xo one can estimate the extent
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exodus to private schools. leaving public school systems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races.
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
the movement from innercity to suburb, and the further
geographical separation of the races. ~or do we know
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
community and parental support of public schools. or
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in
education to a perennially devisive debate over \~·ho is
to be transported where.
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed
courts, school officials, other public authorities. and students of public education for nearly two decades. Thr
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing
issue." has profoundly disquieted the public wherever
rxtensi ve transportation has been ordered . 1 make no
pretense of knowing the best anS\\·ers. Yet. the issue in
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of constitutionalla\\·. As to this issue. I have no doubt whatever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history
or-until recently- in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
Qf young and tPenage children to achieve a single interest,
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as important as this interest may be. We have strayPtl.
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown l
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which
include the "adjusting and reconciling [ ofl public and
private needs." Brown ll, 349 U. S .. at 229.
T urge a return to this rationale. This would result,
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable decree. transportation orders should be applied \Yith special caution to
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interestsand ultimately of education itself-as extensivP transportation of elementary age children solely for desegregation
purposes. As a minimum. this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary t.ransportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary
age children. It is at this age level that neighborhood
education performs its most vital educational role . lt
is with respect to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school.
that the rights of parents and ehildren are most sharpl.v
implicatPcl."'
"ThrrP mn ~· well bP advantage:; in rommrncing thr intrgr<ltin•
at an rarly age , a::; young children ma.1· bP le~~ likel y
I han oldrr clulclren and adult · to develop an mhibiting rar1:1l con~riou~nr~~- The~r advantage~:; ::;hould be con:>Iderrd a~ ~chool board~
make til(' V<Hiou~ deci::;ion~:; With the new to nchieving and prr~rn·
Jilg an mtrgratecl school ::;y~:; tem . Supra, p. - . But i11 thr balancing of all rrlr1·ant mterc::;t::;, the advantagl'~ of an Pari~· mtegrat ivr (•xprnrnce must , and in all fairne,;,; ~hould, br wei~dwd agam~t
otlwr rrlr1·nnt advantage:,; and cli~aclvantagPs and in light of tlH'
rlrmographir rharnrtenstic~ of thr particular f'Oll1Il11111Jtl·,
('Xprnencr~
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vVhile greater transportation of secondary school students might be permitted. even at this level the desire of
a community for racially neutral neighborhood schools
should command judicial respect. It would ultimately
lw wisest. where there is no absence of good faith. to
permit affected communities to decide this delicate issue
of student transportation on their own. Legitimate.
nonracial aspirations embodied in a neighborhood school
eoncept are entitled to judicial respect.

IV
The existing state of law has failed to shed light and
provide guidance on two issues. addressed in this opinion. namely: ( i) whether and to what extent a uniform
judicial approach should be taken to our national problems of school desegregation and ( ii) if so. whether the
ambiguities of Swann, construed to date almost uniformly in favor of extensive transportation. should be
redefined to restore a more viable balance among the
various interests \Yhich are involved. With all deference.
it seems to me that the Court today has addressed neither
of these issues in a way that will afford adequate guidance to the courts below in this case or lead to a rationaL
coherent national policy with respect to integration in
the schools.
The Court has chosen. rather. to adhere to the de facto/
de jure distinction under circumstances. and upon a
rationale. \vhich can only lead to increased and inconclusive litigation. and-especially regrettable-to deferment of a nationally consistent judicial position on this
critical subject. There is. of course. state action in every
school district in the land. The public schools have
always been funded and operated by States and their
local subdivisions. It is true that segregated schools.
Pve 11 in the cities of the South . are in large part the
product of social and economic factors-and the resulting
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residential patterns. But there is also not a school district in the United States. with any significant minority
school population. in 'vhich the school authorities-ill
olle way or the other-have not contributed in some
measure to the degree of segregation which still prevails.
Instead of recognizing the reality of similar. multiple
segregatory causes in school districts throughout the
country. the Court persists in a distinction \vhose duality
operates unfairly on local communities in one section of
the country and on minority children in the others.
The second issue relates to the ambiguities of Swann
and the judicial disregard of legitimate community and
individual interests in framing equitable decrees. In the
absence of a more flexible and reasonable standard than
that imposed by district courts after Swann, tlw
clesegregation which will now be decreed in Denver and
other major cities may v.·ell involve even more extensive
transportation than has been witnessed up to this time.
It is well to remember that the course we are running
is a long one and the goal sought in the end-so often
overlooked-is the best possible educational opportunity
for all children. Communities deserve the freedom and
the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this
goal of quality education. free from protracted and
debilitating battles over court-ordered student transpor~
tation. The single most disruptive element in educa~
tion today is the widespread use of compulsory trans~
portation. especially at elementary grade levels. This
has risked distracting and diverting attention from basic
educational ends. dividing and embittering communities.
and exacerbating rather than ameliorating inter-racial
friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to
a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests
uf our society in achieving desegregation with other educational and societal interests a community may legitimately assert. This will help assure that integrated
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school ~ystems will lw Pstabli~:dwd UJJd mai11tained by
rational action. \Yill he better understood and i"Upport('d
by parc11ts and childrcll of both race:,;. all(! "·ill proinote
the enduring qualities of an i11tegratcd society so es~NJ
tial to its genui11l' success.
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No. 71-507
Wilfred Keyes et al.,
Petitioners,

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States
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Court of Appeals for
School District No. 1, Denver,
the Tenth Circuit.
Colorado, et al.
[June 21, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I concur in the remand of this case for further proceedings in the District Court, but on grounds that differ
from those relied upon by the Court.
This is the first school desegregation case to reach this
Court which involves a major city outside the South. It
comes from Denver, Colorado, a city and a State which
have not operated public schools under constitutional or
statutory provisions which mandated or permitted racial
segregation. 1 Nor has it been argued that any other
legislative actions (such as zoning and housing laws)
contributed to the segregation which is at issue. 2 The
1 Article IX, § 8, of the Colorado Constitution has expressly prohibited "any classification of pupils . . . on account of race or
color."
2 See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U. S. 1, 23 (1971):
" We do not reach ... the question whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without
any discriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitutional
violation requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree."
The term "state action," as used herein, thus refers to actions of the
appropriate public school authorities.
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as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis." 349 U. S.,
at 300. Although this and similar language is ambiguous
as to the specific constitutional right, it means-as a minimum-that one has the right not to be compelled by
state action to attend a segregated school system. In
the evolutionary process since 1954, decisions of this
Court have added a significant gloss to this original right.
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms,
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards
will operate integrated school systems within their respective districts." This mean s that school authorities,
consistent with the generally accepted educational goal of
attaining quality education for all pupils, must make and
implement their customary decisions with a view toward
enhancing integrated school opportunities.
The term "integrated school system" presupposes, of
course, a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies
supportive of the type of "legalized" segregation condemned in Brown. A system would be integrated in
accord with constitutional standards if the responsible
authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate
faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, instruction and curricula opportunities throughout the district; (iii ) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and ( iv) locate new schools, close old ones, and
11
Sec di~rut:si on in Par t III , in fra, of the rem edia l act ion whi ch
is app ropriat e to arro m p l i~ h desegregation "·here a rom t fi nds t hat
a srhoo l bon rd h a~ fa il ed to opr ratc nn integrated school system
within its di ~ tri ct. Plain t iffs mu ~t, howenr , C::'tnb li ~ h t he fa ilure
of a Rr hool b oa rei to operat e an in tegrat ed school ~~·stem before a
court m a~· ord er clc-<rgrcgat iYc ,- t cp~ b,· '"a~· of r c m cd~·. Th ese arc
t \\'0 dist inct steps wh ich recogn ize the n cce~" i t~· of p roYing t he constit ut ional ,·iolat ion before de,-rg rcga t i,·e rem edi al action can be
ordered.
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determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to
undertake the transportation of students, this also must
be with integrative opportunities in mind.
The foregoing prescription is not intended to be either
definitive or all-inclusive, but rather an indication of
the contour characteristics of an integrated school system in which all citizens and pupils may justifiably be
confident that racial discrimination is neither practiced
nor tolerated. An integrated school system does not
mean-and indeed could not mean in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan
areas-that every school must in fact be an integrated
unit. ~ A school which' happens to be all or predominantly
white. or all·or predominantly black is not a "segregated"
school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is
a genuinely integrated one.
Having school boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise, will find no place in the decisions of public
school officials. Courts judging past school board actions
with a view to their general integrative effect will be best
able to assure an absence of such discrimination while
avoiding the murky, subjective judgments inherent in
the Court's search for "segregatory intent." Any test
resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregatory "intent" provides inadequate
assurance that minority children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted with the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools.
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether
the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle. The school board exercises pervasive
and continuing responsibility over the long range plan-
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c
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer
grounded in principle, and contributing to the consequences indicated above, we should acknowledge that
whenever public school segregation exists to a substantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school b0ard. It
is true, of course, that segregated schools-wherever
located-are not solely the product of the action or
inaction of public school authorities. Indeed, as indi.c ated earlier, there can be little doubt that principal
,causes of the pervasive school segregation found in the
major urban areas of this country, whether in the North,
West, or South, are the socio-economic influences which
have concentrated our minority citizens in the inner cities
while the more mobile white majority disperse to the suburbs. But it is also true that public school boards have
continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school
system within their district and, as Judge John Minor
Wisdom has noted, "where the figures [showing
segregation in the schools] speak so eloquently, a
prima face case of discrimination is established."
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848,
873 (CAS en bane 1972). Moreover, as foreshadowed in
Swann and as implicitly held today, school boards have a
duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is
this policy which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard to a doctrinal distinction
which has outlived its time.

III
The preceding section addresses the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the school districts
throughout our country to operate integrated school sys-
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tems. When the schools of a particular district are
found to be substantially segregated, there is a prima
facie case that this obligation has not been met. The
burden then shifts to the school authorities to demonstrate that they have in fact operated an integrated
system as this term is defined above, supm, p. 10. If
there is a failure successfully to rebut the prima facie
case, the question then becomes what reasonable affirmative desegregative steps district courts may require to
place the school system in compliance with the consti:·tutional standard. In short, what specifically is the
nature and scope of the remedy?
As the Court's,opinion virtually compels the finding on
remand that Denver has a "dual school system," that city
will then be · under an "affirmative duty" to desegregate
its entire system "root and branch." Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. Again, the critical ques·tion is what ought this constitutional duty to entail.

A
The controlling case is Swann, supra, and the question
which will confront and confound the District Court and
Denver School Board is what indeed does Swann require.
Swann purported to enunciate no new principles, relying
heavily on Brown I and II and on Green. Yet it affirmed
a district court order which had relied heavily on "racial
ratios" and sanctioned transportation of elementary as
well as secondary pupils. Lower federal courts have often
read Swann as requiring far-reaching transportation de17
crees "to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
17

See, e. g., Thompson v. School Board of N ewport N ews, F. 2d - , ( 1972), where the CA4 en bane, upheld a district court
assignment plan where "travel time, varying from a minimum of
forty minutes and a maximum of one hour, each wa y, would be required for busing black students out of the old City and white students into the old City in order to achieve a racial balancing of the
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desegregation." 402 U. S., at 26. In the context of a
large urban area, with heavy residential concentrations
of white and black citizens in different-and widely
separated-sections of the school district, extensive dispersal and transportation of pupils is inevitable if Swann
is read as expansively as many courts have been reading
it to date.
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require
large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in
our metropolitan school districts, I record my profound
misg1vmgs. Nothing in our Constitution commands or
encourages any such court compelled disruption of public
education. It may be more accurate to view Swann as
having laid dom1 a broad rule of reason under d1ich
desegregation remedies must remain flexible and other
values and interests be considered. Thus the Court
recognized that school authorities, not the federal judiciary, must be charged in the first instance with the task
of desegregating local school systems. 402 U. S., at 16.
It noted that school boards in rural areas can adjust
more readily to this task than those in metropolitan dis~
district." This transportation was decreed for children from the third
grade up, involving children as young as eight years of age.
In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 466 F. 2d 890, 895
(1972), the CA6 affirmed a district court assignment plan which
daily transported 14,000 children with "the maximum time to be
spent on the buses by any child [being] 34 minutes. . . ," presumably each way. But as Judge Weick noted in dissent the CA6
instructed the district judge to implement yet further desegregation
orders. Plans presently under consideration by that court call for
the busing of 39,085 and 61,530 children respectively, for undetermined lengths of time. /d., at 895-986.
Petitioners before this Court in Potts v. Flax, No. 72-288, cert.
denied, U. S. (197-), contended that the implementation
of the CA5's directive in Flax v. Potts, 464 F. 2d 865 (1972), would
require bus rides of up to two hours and 20 minutes each day and
a round trip of up to 70 miles. Petition, at 14. While respondents
contend these figures represent an "astounding inflation," Response,
at 7, transportation of a significant magnitude seems inevitable.
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tricts "with dense and shifting population, numerous
schools, congested and complex traffic patterns." !d., at
14. Although the usc of pupil transportation was approved as a remedial device. transportation orders are
suspect '\yhen the time or distance of travel is so great
as to either risk the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the education process." !d. , at 31. Finally,
the age of the pupils to be transported \Yas recognized'
by the Court in Swann as one important limitation on
the time of student travel. Ibid.
These factors were supposed to he'lp guide district courts
in framing equitable remedies in school desegregation
cases. 18 And the Court further emphasized that equitable·
decrees are inherently sensitive, not solely to the degree
of desegregation to be achieved, but to a variety of other
public and private interests:
. . . a school desegregation case does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a
constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interest,
the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann,
supra, at 15-16.
. Those words echoed a similar expression in Brown 11,
349 U. S., at 229:
"In fashioning and effecting the decrees, the courts

will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
18
See United States v. T exas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 883
(CA5 1972) (Bell, J., concurring in an opinion in which seven other
judges joined):
"In our view the remedy which the district court is required to
formulate should be formulated within the entire context of the
opmwn in Swann v. Charlott e-Mecklenburg Board of Education. . . . [Emphasis added.]"
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This obviously does not mean that bus transportation
has no place in public school systems or is not a permissible means in the desegregative process. The transporting of school children is as old as public education,
and in rural and some suburban settings it is as indispensable as the providing of books. It is presently esti~
mated that approximately half of all American children
.ride buses to. school for reasons unrelated to integration.2" At the secondary level in particular, whe~
the schools are larger and serve a wider, more dispersed constituency than the elementary school, some
form of puqlic o.r privately financed transportation is
often necessary. There is a significant difference, however, in transportation plans volu,ntarily initiated by local
school boards for educational purposes and those imposed by a federal court. The former usually represent a
necessary or convenient means of access to the school
nearest home; the latter often require lengthy trips for n9
purpose other than to further integration. 23 Yet the
even a state has the capability to put into effect, will in fact result
in the foreseeable future in racially balanced public schools. Only
~ reordering of the environment involving economic and social policy
on the broadest conceivable front might have an appreciable impact."
Bickel, supra, n. 7, at 132.
22
Estimates vary. Swann, supra; at 29, noted that "eighteen million of the Nation's public school children, approximately 39%, were
transported to their schools by bus in 1969-1970 in all parts of the
country." Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) a thoughtful student of this
problem, stated that "two-thirds of all American children today ride
buses to school for reasons unrelated to integration." 118 Cong. Rec.
82543, Feb. 24, 1972.
23
Historically, distant transportation was wrongly used to promote segregation. "Negro children were generally considered capable of travelling longer distances to school and without the aid of any
vehicle. What was too far for a white child became reasonably near
for a Negro child," Weinberg, supra, n. 20, at 87.
This deplorable history has led some to argue that integrative bus
rides are justified as atonement for past segregatory trips and that
neighborhood education is now but a code-word for racial segrega-
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religious exercise, for example, are obliged to cease the
offending act or practice and , where necessary, institute
corrective measures. It is they who bear the brunt of
remedial action, though other citizens will to varying degrees feel its effects. School authorities responsible for
segregation must, at the very minimum, discontinue segregatory acts. But when the obligation further extends
to the transportation of students, the full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who did not participate in any constitutional
vi.olation.
Finally, courts in requiring so far-reaching a remedy
as student transportation solely to maximize integration,
risk setting in motion unpredictable a.nd unmanageable
social consequences. No one can estimate the extent
to which dismantling neighborhood education will hasten
an exodus to private schools, leaving public school systems the preserve of the disadvantaged of both races.
Or guess how much impetus such dismantlement gives
the movement from innercity to suburb, a.nd the further
geographical separation of the races. Nor do we know
to what degree this remedy may cause deterioration of
community and parental support of public schools, or
divert attention from the paramount goal of quality in
education to a perenni-ally devisive debate over who is
to be transported where.
The problem addressed in this opinion has perplexed
courts, school officials, other public authorities, and students of public education for nearly two decades. The
problem, especially since it has focused on the "busing
issue," has profoundly disquieted the public wherever
extensive transportation has been ordered. I make no
pretense of knowing the best answers. Yet, the issue in
this and like cases comes to this Court as one of constitutional law. As to this issue, I have no doubt whatever. There is nothing in the Constitution, its history
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or-until recently-in the jurisprudence of this Court
that mandates the employment of forced transportation
of young and teenage children to achieve a single interest,
as important as this interest may be. We have strayed,
quite far as I view it, from the rationale of Brown I
and I I, as reiterated in Swann, that courts in fashioning
remedies must be "guided by equitable principles" which
include the "adjusting and reconciling [of] public and
private needs," Brown II, 349 U. S., at 229.
I urge a return to this rationale. This would result,
as emphasized above, in no prohibition on court-ordered
student transportation in furtherance of desegregation.
But it would also require that the legitimate community
interests in neighborhood school systems be accorded far
greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair a.nd just equitablt;:! decree, transportation orders should be applied with special caution to
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interestsand ultimately of education itself-as extensive transportation of elementary age children solely for desegregation
purposes. As a minimum, this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary transportation away ~rom their neighborhoods of elementary
age children. 31 It is at this age level that neighborhood
education performs its most vital educational role. It .
is with respect to children of tender years that the
greatest concern exists for their physical and psycholog31
There may well be advantages in commencing the integrative
experiences at an early age, as young children may be less likely
than older children and adults to develop an inhibiting racial consciousness. These advantages should be considered as school boards
make the various decisions with the view to achieving and preserving an integrated school system . Supra, p. 10. But in the balancing of all relevant interests, the advantages of an early integrative experience must, and in all fairness should, be weighed against
other relevant advantages and disadvantages and in light of the
demographic characteristics of the particular community.

